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ABSTRACT 
The years after 1763 were vital to the special 
position of the West Indian islands within the British 
Empire. Yet no integrated study has been made of the 
economic and political issues raised in the West Indies 
during the period of the confrontation between the 
American colonies and Britain. This thesis is intended 
to fill this gap. 
The first chapter, which outlines West Indian 
commercial connections from 1770 to 1775, shows that 
during these years the production of West Indian staples 
was increasing in most islands, especially in Jamaica 
and the ceded islands where new plantations were being 
developed. The War of American Independence therefore 
raised the question of the future of the islands as 
profitable commodity producing areas, given their 
dependence on the American colonies for lumber and 
provisions, as well as a market for their excess 
products. Chapters II to V look at the War's effect 
on the islands' economy, and examine the various 
measures adopted by Parliament and the local legislatures 
to avert any lasting recession. 
The other aspect of the Revolution was the political 
impact on the Caribbean colonists. In the islands, as in 
America, many constitutional questions were raised. The 
idea, held by the Americans, that Parliament was not 
ii 
sovereign, and could not legislate for the colonies 
in internal affairs, or when British interests 
conflicted with theirs, was also widely discussed. 
Chapters VI to VII assess politics in the colonies, 
showing that there was widespread opposition to 
individual governors in most of the islands, and an 
erosion of much of the executive power. 
iii 
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CHAPTER I 
YEARS OF PROSPERITY: 
WEST INDIAN COMMERCE 1770-1775 
The economic development of the British West 
Indies during most of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries was dependent on their unrestricted relations 
with Britain and the American mainland colonies. Before 
1775 the sugar colonies, as they were commonly called, 
and the American colonies maintained close economic ties 
which were allowed to develop under the protection of 
British mercantilism. Thus, the West Indian planters 
were able to sell their staples at guaranteed markets, 
while receiving cheap and reliable supplies of 
provisions, lumber, slaves and all varieties of 
manufactured goods. Furthermore, the commerce between 
Britain and her colonies operated within a closed 
system of shipping, financing and marketing which 
functioned to the benefit of the sugar producers until 
the outbreak of the War of American Independence in 1776. 
But the system was not without certain drawbacks 
for the colonists. Mercantilism, as a commercial 
doctrine, was rigidly imposed to encourage and protect 
British shipbuilding and shipping, to develop her 
fisheries, to promote agriculture in the colonies and to 
foster manufacturing at home; but even more important, 
2 
to help Britain maintain a favourable balance of trade. 
The British government adopted several measures to 
achieve this: high duties on foreign imports for 
domestic consumption, bounties on the export of home and 
colonial products, steps to encourage the importation of 
specie, and to prohibit its exportation, and finally the 
strict regulation of colonial trade. ' By adhering to 
the principles of mercantilism, the British government 
created a self-sufficient commercial empire comprised of 
mutually complementary parts which sustained the West 
Indian economy until 1775. 
It is the aim of this chapter to examine the role 
of the West Indies in the British commercial system, 
bearing in mind that they could not have contributed to 
it without the American colonies. This role can be best 
understood by examining the islands' trade relations 
from 1770 to 1775 - the years immediately preceding the 
restriction on American-West Indian commerce by the 
Prohibitory Act of December 1775. To support some of 
the conclusions on the trends of West Indian trade during 
the period, it is necessary to use the relevant 
statistical data, but before doing so I should like to 
comment on the criticisms raised by some historians about 
the use of eighteenth century statistics. 2 These, like 
'Lowell Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter Class in the Caribbean 
1763-1833 (New York, 1928), Chapter III, pp. 81-107; see Douglas Hall, 
'Incalculability as a Feature of Sugar Production in the Eighteenth 
Century', Social and Economic Studies, X, No. 3 (1961), p. 347. 
2See Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole, PPitish Economic Growth 1688-1959 
(Cambridge, 1962), pp. 41-42; Richard Sheridan, 'The Wealth of 
Jamaica in the Eighteenth Century', T720 Economic Hi8tory Review, 2nd 
Series, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (August, 1965), pp. 292-304 (hereafter 
cited as Ec. 11. R. )- 
3 
other statistical material, need careful use, and should 
be supported by other evidence where possible. However, 
to refrain from using such valuable historical evidence 
would be as much a mistake as to use them carelessly. 
The statistics on British overseas trade were 
prepared by the office of the Inspector-General. The 
ledgers give details of British commerce with foreign 
countries, as well as the colonies, specifying the 
places from which goods were imported into Britain, and 
those to which British goods went. The statistics are 
usually given in values for foreign trade, while those 
for the colonies are given in quantities and, or, values. 
The recorded values of British exports represent the 
cost of the articles when landed at foreign ports, and 
include such charges as the costs of insurance, and 
freight. On the other hand, the figures for imports give 
only the value of the goods at their country of origin, 
and seldom include the above charges. Consequently, the 
statistics, if used to determine British balance of trade 
cannot be taken at their face value. Any assessment of 
her balance of trade would have to take into account, 
for example, the "invisible" earnings of British 
fishermen selling their catch directly to foreign 
countries, the incomes of British underwriters, the 
earnings from British ships trading between foreign ports, 
interests on loans, or commissions paid to British agents 
3 
working for foreign companies . 
3 See T. S. Ashton, An Foonomic Hiotol'? J of Ený71and: The Z8th 
Century (1, ondon, 1955), pp. 150-151. 
4 
But they are more accurate when used as records 
of the quantity of goods listed by weight or measure. 
Smuggled goods by their very nature are not included in 
the listed quantity and therefore pose one major problem 
for the researcher. Nevertheless, the quantity of West 
Indian products smuggled into Britain could not be large 
enough to make any change to the trend of the trade. 
Smuggling was more important in West Indian-American 
trade connections than in commerce between Britain and 
the West Indies. 
Another criticism is that the statistics may 
contain incorrect entries, but Sir George Clark, who 
made a detailed study of their value to historians, 
argues that after 1759 they are virtually free of errors 
caused by double entries, or incorrect transcription. 
Moreover, before 1785 they were subjected to very little 
interference from political parties or any other interest 
groups. 4 Thus, if used carefully, this material is of 
significant value as historical evidence. Professor 
Ashton points out that although the criticisms of the 
statistics should be considered when using them, the 
Inspector-General's figures are not useless. 
Far from it. Between one year and another 
close in time it may be assumed, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, that 
any change in the constituents of trade 
was small. The statistics may thus be 
used as supplementary evidence of booms 
and slumps in overseas commerce. Moreover, 
4 Sir Georqe Clark, Guide to Aglish Comercial Statistics 
1696-1783 (London, 1938), pp. 33-35. 
5 
they offer a mass of information 
as to the commodities dealt in and 
the rise 
5 
and decline of particular 
markets. 
Although British-West Indian trade was rigidly 
regulated, and British policy was formulated to make the 
colonies mainly commodity producing communities, the 
majority of West Indian sugar planters were satisfied 
with the functioning of the commercial system. The 
British merchants furnished the planters with slaves, 
equipment and machinery for their plantations, clothing 
and foodstuffs for the white population, building 
materials and furnishings for their homes, expensive 
linens and many items of luxury. In addition, cheap 
clothing and other articles for the Negro population, 
and some manufactured goods for trade with the foreign 
islands were also taken from Britain, in exchange for 
West Indian staples-6 
The value of the slave trade in West Indian 
commerce was directly linked to the production of 
tropical staples which were always in demand in 
British, European and American markets. Consequently, 
as a result of the economic prosperity of the sugar 
5 Ashton, Economic History of England, p. 153. 
6 Ragatz, The Manter Class, p. 92: Edward Long, 'History of 
Jamaica' Vol 1 (1774). Add. Mss. 12,404, fos. 378-378d; 'Queries 
with Answers', 1774. C. O. 137/70, fo. 89; 'Queries and Answers 
relating to His Majesty's Leeward Caribbee Islands', 26 June 1774. 
c. o. 152/54, fo. 63d (hereafter cited as 'Queries and Answers'); 
'Barbados: the Governor's Answers to Queries', August 1774. 
C. O. 28/55, fo. 80 (cited as 'Barbados: Answers to Queries'); 
'The State, Condition, Trade and Cultivation of... Dominica', 
24 December 1773. C. O. 71/4, fo. 73d (hereafter cited as 'The 
Trade of Dominica'). 
6 
colonies during the eighteenth century, until 1776, 
there was always a demand for now slaves, and the trade 
developed into one of the main branches of British 
commerce. Most slaves were carried to the West Indies by 
British merchants, but after the middle of the eighteenth 
century the Americans participated in the trade. Slave- 
ships would leave Bristol, London or Liverpool in 
England, New York or a New England port with rum and an 
assorted cargo of manufactured goods, utensils and 
textiles which were carried to Africa and there ex- 
changed for Negroes, ivory, dye-woods or gold. 7 
Newly imported slaves were subjected to high 
mortality rates, and consequently the demand for new 
imports remained constant after 1763, peaking in 1770's. ' 
For example, 'in the five years 1760-1764,100 ships 
brought 40,634 Africans to Jamaica, of which 27,974 
were retained: between 1770 and 1774, no less than 
44,409 arrived in 172 bottoms and of these only 5,741 
were exported to other islands'. 3 The annual average 
number of slaves brought to the West Indies between 1756 
and 1770 was approximately 25,000.10 The number of 
Africans imported into Jamaica reached its peak in 
1774-1776, before the trade was all but destroyed by the 
7 Ragatz, The Planter Class, pp. 81-82,84; F. R. Augier et al., 
The Making of the West Indies (London, 1961), pp. 64-65,73. 
8 Philip D. Curtin, The AtZantic Slave Trade: A Census (London, 
1969), P. 19. 
9 Ragatz, The Planter Class, p. 87. 
10 Curtin, Atlantic Slave Ti, adc, p. 134. His figures are based 
on imports for 1771 which was not one of the best years for the 
trade. 
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American War. 11 Likev7ise, the number of Negroes imported 
into Dominica under the Free Port Act of 1766 shows a 
12 similar upward trend over the same period . 
Though there were large annual importations of 
African-born and a slight natural increase of the native- 
born slaves, because of the high mortality rate among 
the former, the black population of the islands increased 
only slightly after 1756.13 That of Barbados actually 
14 declined between 1768 and 1774 . In Jamaica and the 
ceded islands - Dominica, Grenada, St. Vincent and 
Tobago - the black population grew steadily between 
1770 and 1778. That of Jamaica rose by almost 25,000 
in the five years from 1773 to 1778. But part of this 
increase was due to the American loyalists who went to 
the island with their slaves. 15 One significant feature 
of the slave trade was the ability of the British 
merchants to supply the colonies 'in relation to' their 
demand. 16 Therefore, with the opening of lands in 
Jamaica and the ceded islands and the increased 
importation of new slaves, the production of most West 
11 See Appendix A, Table 1. 
12 Ibid., Table 2. 
13 Ibid., Table 3, 
14 Richard Sheridan, 'The Development of the Plantations to 
17501. Douglas Hall, Elsa Goveia and F. R. Augier, eds., Chapters 
in Caribbean History (Barbados, 1970), pp. 28-29; see Ragatz, 
The Planter CZars, p. 30; also see Curtin, Atlantic SZaVe Trade, 
pp. 57-59. 
15 See Appendix A, Tables 4,5, and 6. 
Is Richard Sheridan, 'An Era of West Indian prosperity 1750- 
1775'. Douglas Hall, Goveia and Auqier, eds., Chapters in 
Caribbean Hit-tory, p. 81. 
8 
Indian staples increased after 1763,17 and continued to 
do so until the prohibition of American commerce. 
For example, during the first five years immedi- 
ately following their cession to Britain, the average 
annual exportation of cocoa from Grenada and St. Vincent 
to England was 287,240 pounds. That for the period 1774 
to 1778 rose by 31 per cent to approximately 378,700 
pounds. 18 If we look at the islands individually, cocoa 
exports from Grenada to England made only slender gains 
after 1769. These increased from approximately 2,340 cwts 
in 1769 to 2,660 cwts in 1775. Coffee exports, on the 
other hand rose significantly by an uneven rate during 
the same period, almost doubling in six years - from 
12,400 cwts in 1769 to 24,000 cwts in 1775. Similarly, 
Grenada became the chief exporter of cotton to England, 
and except in 1775 and 1776, this trade was not seriously 
affected. The average annual quantity of Grenada sugar 
sent to England also showed an uneven upward trend 
between 1770 and 1775, but declined after that year. Rum 
exports, on the other hand, declined by almost fifty per 
cent between 1771 and 1774. Like the other British 
islands, Grenada exported only a very small portion of 
its rum to England. Most of it was bartered with the 
Americans for provisions and lumber. 19 
St. Vincent also produced large quantities of 
cocoa, coffee, sugar and rum. For example, the annual 
17 Augier et al., The West Indies, p. 119. 
is Ragatz, The Nantor Class, p. 40, 
19 See Appendix Al Table 7. 
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production of coffee from St. Vincent and Grenada 
totalled approximately 1,605,000 pounds in the first 
five years after cession to Britain. Between 1774 and 
1778, this increased by roughly 76 per cent to 2,826,560 
poun s. 20 Though the last figures seem high, the 
islands might have done even better in the second period 
if there had been no war between Britain and the American 
colonies, but more will be said of the economic effect 
of this conflict in later chapters. The St. Vincent 
statistics for the period 1769 to 1779 also show an 
increased exportation of all commodities, especially 
sugar, rum and cotton before 1776, after which the 
decline in all exports, except rum, is sizeable and 
continuous until 1779 when the colony was captured by 
the French. 21 Before 1766 no sugar was exported from 
St. Vincent, and its production therefore began with 
the colony's development by the British. 
Dominica and Tobago experienced similar economic 
growth. When Tobago was acquired, it was uncultivated. 
The island was therefore planted in sugar cane, and as 
a result it experienced a prodigious development before 
it was captured by the French during the American War. 
In 1771 there were 22 sugar works; in 1773 these had 
risen to 50 with 103 settled or nearly settled estates, 
and in 1775 there were 84 sugar works - 23 windmills, 
water and 52 cattle MillS. 
22 Most of the animals used 
20 Ragatz, The Nanter Claso, p. 40. 
21 See Appendix A, Table B. 
22 Noel Deerr, Ae HIMOrY Of Sugar (London, 1949b Vol. 1, p. 178. 
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to operate the mills came from America. The increase 
in sugar production, from 1,660 cwts in 1770 to over 
50,000 cwts in 1775, was the most phenomenal part of the 
island's economic devolopmont. 23 Cotton cultivation had 
also increased significantly between 1770 and 1775, but 
did not reach its peak until during the American War. 
Such a dramatic growth rate, however, was not achieved 
without a great deal of sacrifice by the planters, as 
well as the black population. one contemporary 
merchant summed it up this way: 'to be a planter is 
to be little better than a slave, the best part of 
one's life ..... 
24 
The economic development of Dominica, though 
parallelting that of the other ceded islands, was 
restricted by the passage of the Free Port Act of 1766 
by which Roseau and Prince Rupert Bay, as free ports, 
were allowed to import sugar, coffee, rum, pimento, 
25 
ginger and tobacco . All imports into Britain from 
Dominica, except sugar and rum when certified to be 
local products, were charged the same duties as foreign 
products brought in for domestic consumption. 26 Yet, 
exports of British grown coffee increased quite markedly, 
23 See Appendix A, Table 9. 
24 Thomas Ruddach to Charles Steuart, late Surveyor-General of 
Customs in North America, 6 April, 1774. Charles Steuart Papers. 
National Library of Scotland MSS. 5,028, fo. 181d (hereafter cited 
as N. L. S. MSS. ). 
25 Frances Armytage, The Yroe Port Systam in the Britiý3h Wast 
Indios: A Study in Coarnci, cial Polloy, 1766-18,9P (London, 1953), 
p. 4 2. 
26 Ragatz, Vic Plaýjtcp p. 41. 
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though unevenly, between 1770 and 1776. Sugar production 
on the other hand, advanced by thirty-five times between 
1769 and 1774.27 In 1773 there were 41 sugar works, and 
84 in 1775. As in Tobago, most of these were drawn by 
cattle, horses and oxen imported from North America. 28 
In the older islands - namely Barbados, Jamaica, 
and the Leeward Islands (Antigua, Nevis, Montserrat and 
St. Ki ttS29) - sugar production varied yearly, and 
depended on several factors such as weather conditions, 
labour and food supplies, as well as the fertility of 
the soil. The increased consumption of coffee and tea 
in Britain and Europe acted as a catalyst in motivating 
the planters to produce more sugar to meet the growing 
demands. Production in those islands, with the 
exception of Jamaica, thus increased under a system of 
monoculture, 30 and provided the colonies with a staple 
product during the seventeenth and most of the 
eighteenth centuries. 31 
But Barbados, one of the chief sugar producing 
islands during this period, had begun to decline by the 
beginning of the seventeen-seventies, mainly as a 
result of unfavourable weather conditions for many 
27 See Appendix A, Table 10. 
28 Deerr, History of Sugar, Vol. 1, p. 177. 
29 This island is also known as St. Christopher, but St. Kitts 
will be used in this text. 
30 Richard Sheridan, 'The Rise of a Colonial Gentry: A Case 
Study of Antigua 1730-1775'. Ec. II. R., 2nd series, Vol. XIII, 
No. 3 (1961), p. 343. 
31 D. A. Farnie, 'The Commercial Empire of the Atlantic, 1617-1783'. 
Ibid., 2nd series, Vol. XV, No. 2 (1962), p. 209. 
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years . Because of the need for 
increased exports, 
more and more slaves, cattle, horses and other plantation 
necessaries had been purchased to maintain the produc- 
tiveness of the estates. Consequently, very little land 
was allocated to the growth of provisions, and the 
planters became increasingly dependent on the mainland 
colonies. Yet, it does not seem from an examination of 
the statistics that the planters had achieved their 
objectives although sugar production was still the most 
important business. The downward trend of the island's 
33 
trade worsened markedly during the American War . Rum 
exports to England followed the same pattern as in the 
other islands. 
Though the Barbados economy was on the decline 
in the 1770's because of the falling production of 
sugar, cotton exports rose moderately but steadily 
during the period. The cotton industry was becoming 
such an important feature of the island's economy 
that in 1779 Ro, -)ert Hind's private bill 'to encourage 
Pearce Archer in his new projection of a Wind Mill 
for Ginning and Cleaning the seeds out of cotton' was 
unanimously passed by the Assembly after a thorough 
34 
investigation of the new invention . This predated the 
32 Edward Hay to the Earl of Dartmouth, 31 August 1774. C. O. 28/55, 
fo. 76. 
33 See Appendix A, Table 11. The downward trend of the island's 
economy as demonstrated by the figures will be discussed more 
fully in Chapters II and IV. 
34 Journal of the Assembly of Barbados, 16 March 1779. C. O. 31/39 
(hereafter cited as J. A. B. ). 
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cotton-gin which was developed in America over a decade 
later, and which led to the extensive cultivation of 
cotton in the southern states. It is not quite clear 
how far the Barbados invention succeeded, but it 
indicates that the planters were aware of the urgent 
need to mechanise the cotton industry to reduce cost 
and boost production. 
The decline of sugar production in Barbados was 
more marked than in any of the Leeward Islands. In 
Antigua, for example, after the increase of sugar exports 
from approximately 4,900 tons annually between 1711 and 
1720, to over 9,000 tons annually between 1761 and 
1770,35 there was no significant increase in production 
36 between 1770 and 1773 . After that year, however, in 
Antigua sugar production recovered from the slump, and 
in 1774 and 1775 over 230,000 cwts of sugar were sent to 
37 England . The annual production of sugar in Montserrat 
and Nevis, on the other hand, changed very little, 
averaging about 4,000 hogsheads annually from 1770 
38 
to 1775 . 
St. Kitts, called 'the garden of the West 
Indies' 39 because of the fertility of its volcanic soil, 
35 Sheridan, 'The Rise of a Colonial Gentry'. Ec. H. R., Vol. xIII 
(1961), p. 343. 
36, Queries and Answers', 26 June 1774. C. O. 152/54, fo. 64. 
37 See Appendix A, Table 12. 
38, Queries and Answers, 26 June 1774. C. O. 152/54, fo. 66d. 
39 Sheridan, 'An Era of West Indian Prosperity'. Hall, Goveia 
and Auqier, ed. , Chaptom,,, in Caiýibbcan 111-toyýjj, p. 84. 
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increased its production of sugar annually until 1783, 
exporting an average of 13,000 hogsheads of sugar 
yearly ;40 but as in the case of the other islands, its 
rum was bartered with the Americans for provisions and 
lumber. On the whole, the average annual sugar exports 
from the Leeward Islands to England rose during the five 
41 years preceding the outbreak of the American War . 
For example, the crops they had made in 1774 had 
'surpassed the expectations of the Planters', w-rote the 
42 Governor, Sir Ralph Payne . 
It is somewhat surprising that the West Indian 
planters maintained so high a level of sugar production 
in an age when very little reclaiming of agricultural 
land was done, when no adequate fertilising methods 
were known, when few managers knew how to prepare 
adequate compost for their estates, and when the normal 
tendency in America, probably not so prevalent in the 
West Indies, was to work an area of land to the bone, 
and then move to new land. In the older islands, every 
effort was made to manure the land, thus remeaying the 
effects of over-planting. Cattle and other animals were 
kept on many estates as a means of supplying manure. 
The efforts and achievements of the Barbados planters 
40, Minutes of the Society of West India Merchants and Planters' 
First series, vol. 1 (1769-1779), fos. 9,18,28,47,61,76,85, 
115,147,174; second series, Vol. 11 (1779-1783), fos. 30,58d, 
92d, 112d (hereafter cited as Minutes of the West India Merchants); 
see Appendix A, Table 13. 
41 Sir Ralph Payne to the Earl of Dartmouth, 17 December 1773. C. O. 
152/54, fo. 14. 
42 Payne to Dartmouth, 15 October 1774. Ibid., fos. 103d-104. 
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in manuring the land, thus keeping it fertile enough to 
make sugar production a profitable business for over a 
century, were praised by Edward Long, planter, historian 
43 
and judge of the Vice-Admiralty Court of Jamaica . 
In contrast to the general rule of monoculture in 
the older colonies, the economy of Jamaica was more 
diversified, though there was a tendency after 1763 to 
make sugar the single staple providing the largest part 
44 of the island's wealth . But minor staples such as 
cocoa, coffee, indigo, pimento, cotton and ginger were 
also grown, while large tracts of land in the interior 
were cleared and opened for pasturage and provisions. 
Cattle pens were established as parts of some sugar 
45 
estates, or by estate managers, as a side business . 
In most cases, the pens were very profitable, and most 
owners made sizeable returns, as there were little 
overhead costs. For exa=le, William Smalling, manager 
of Sir Joseph Foster Barham's Jamaica estate made over 
j2,400 profit in nine months, while increasing his herd 
of cattle. Small sugar estates with pens were paying 
46 
for themselves in 'five years' . In 1773 there were 
47 500 pens occupying approximately 100 acres each . 
43 Long, 'History of Jamaica', Vol. I. Add. MSS. 12,404, fo. 348. 
44 Ragatz, The PZanter CZass, p. 38. 
45 Sheridan, 'The Wealth of Jamaica in the Eighteenth Century'. 
Ec. H. R., Vol. xviii (1965), p. 303; Sir Archibald Campbell, 
'Memoir of Jamaica' (1782). King's MSS. 214, fos. 6-6d. 
46 William Smalling to Sir Joseph Foster Barham, 14 November 1775. 
Barham Papers: Bodl. MSS. Clarendon Dep. C. 357, Bund. 1. 
47 Long, 'History of Jamaica', Vol. I. Add. MSS. 12,404, fos. 379- 
379d. 
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Between 1776 and 1782 the cattle industry had made 
significant gains, and the number was estimated at over 
224,000 in 1782.48 
Similarly, Jamaica coffee production, although 
restricted by the excessive duty charged on its importa- 
tion into Britain, 49 increased between 1769 and 1775. 
one of the main factors responsible for this increase 
was the encouragement given to the planters by the 
Jamaica Assembly which aided them in improving the 
quality of their beans - equal to that of Mocha coffee. 
Beginning in 1773, the Assembly gave cash awards to 
planters who produced a high grade of beans. These were 
increased in the following year, from Z100 to 1150 for 
the best sample, from E50 to E100 for the second, and a 
third prize of E50 was added. Each planter submitting 
samples was required to give detailed accounts of the 
type of soil in which the trees were grown, the time at 
which the ripened beans were picked, and the method used 
in curing them. This information was published in the 
local newspapers, and the best samples were sent to 
England for further evaluation. 50 
The House agreed in 1775 to extend the awards to 
find a new method of curing the beans. A bounty of E20 
48 Campbell, 'Memoir of Jamaica'. King's MSS. 214, fos. 6-6d. 
49Ragatz, The Planter Class, p. 42. 
"Journal 
of the Assembly of Jamaica, 21 December 1774. C. O. 
140/46, p. 563 (hereafter cited as J, A. J. ): J. A. J., I November 1775. 
Ibid. p. 575; 'Proceediriqs of the House of Assembly of Jamaica in 
the Sugar and Slave Trade', 8 November 1792. Add. MSS. 12,432, 
fo. 13. 
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was therefore allocated for anyone who made a special 
mat which allowed the air to circulate freely through 
the beans, thereby causing the total evaporation of all 
moisture while enabling them to retain their flavour. 51 
A record twenty-five samples were submitted in 1776, 
but the bounty system was not wholly successful. The 
planters were unable to capture the British market, 
although they doubled coffee exports between 1770 and 
1775. 
Though the production of minor staples contri- 
buted to the wealth of Jamaica, the years after 1763 
witnessed a considerable expansion of Jamaica's sugar 
production which accounted for 76 per cent, and rum 13 
per cent of the colony's total exports to England in 
1770.52 Among the indicators of a healthy sugar economy, 
as illustrated by Richard Sheridan, were the increased 
importation of slaves, the rise in commodity exports, 
the growth in the number of patented and cultivated 
areas, and the steady increase in property values. The 
number of sugar estates increased from 440 in 1741 to 
745 in 1775, and to 1,061 in 1782, meanwhile the value 
of the average plantation rose from Z7,956 to Z19,502.53 
Moreover, because of Jamaica's healthy economy, in the 
51J. A. J., 21 December 1775. C. O. 140/46, pp. 625-626. 
52 Sheridan, 'Development of the Plantations to 1750. ' Hall, 
Goveia and Augier, eds. , Clyzpters 
in Caribbean Ili-t-, tory, p. 47. 
53 For the increased importation of slaves, see footnote 9. 
Sheridan, 'The Wealth of Jamaica in the Eighteenth Century' 
Ec. II. R., Vol. XVIII (1965), p. 302; see Campbell, 'Memoir of 
Jamaica', 1782. King's MSS. 214, fos. 6-6d. 
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'seventies the island was producinq more and more of its 
own provision needs in response to increased cane 
cultivation, as well as a larger black population to 
feed. It is estimated that there were about 6,000 
provision gardens throughout the island in 1774.5' 
Only a part of West Indian products were ever 
sent to Britain during any given year. Some of the 
minor staples, and most of the rum were exported to the 
American colonies. In the case of the year's crop of 
sugar, the best quality was sent to London; another 
portion was sold to the Americans, and a third part, 
the worst sugar, was refined and sold in the islands to 
help pay the estates' contingent expenses. 55 Some 
managers even sold the greater part of their crops 
56 
locally when prices were better than in England . In 
1775 the firm of Thomas Hubbert and Nephews which 
managed the Spring Plantation estate in Jamaica, 
belonging to Sir John Smyth of Bristol, sold locally 
over two-thirds of the crop of approximately 60 hogs- 
heads of sugar at Z18 sterling each. The price on the 
London market was only ý12 sterling each. 57 There were 
many advantages accruing to the estates from selling 
54 See Long, 'History of Jamaica', Vol. I. Add MSS. 12,404, fos. 
379-379d; also see Appendix A, Table 14. 
55 John Van Keelen to John Foster Barham, 4 June 1781. Barham 
Papers: Bodl. MSS. Clarendon Dep. C. 357, Bund. 1. 
56 Thomas Hubbort to Sir John Hugh Smyth, I September 1774. 
Woolnough Papers: Ashton Court Collection, AC/WO 16 (27), 89-101. 
57 Hubbert & Nephews to Smyth, 16 May 1775. Ibid. 
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sugar locally. Savings were made on freight, insurance, 
port charges, agents' commissions, and duties in 
Britain .58 This practice became even more prevalent 
during the American War when the high costs of all 
charges to Britain greatly reduced the planters' 
59 
profits . Consequently, the islands' total production 
of each commodity i%, ould be greater than the statistics 
showing exports to Britain would indicate. 
Therefore, in spite of 'sixteen years of warfare, 
a great storm in 1744 and a slave rebellion of some 
magnitude in Jamaica in 1760, the thirty-fi-;. 7e years 
from 1741 to 1775 witnessed' 60 a significar. 'ý., although 
uneven expansion of the West Tndian sugar economy. 
There has been much debate 
61 and con-fusion in determining 
the balance of trade between Britain and the West Indian 
colonies. Some of the reasons for this difficulty have 
been discussed; but another problem, however, stemmed 
from the practice of valuing the imports and exports in 
the custom-house ledgers in official rather than market 
values. 
62 
58 Dalhousie and Stephens to John Hugh Sm. vth, 30 April 1777. Ibid. 
59 Dalhousie and Stephens to Smyth, 24 July 1779. Ibid. 
"Sheridan, 'The Wealth of Jamaica in the Eiahteenth Century', 
Ec. H. R., Vol. XVITI (1965), p. 296. 
"See Sheridan, 'The Wealth of Jamaica in the Eighteenth Century', 
EC. H. R., Vol. XVIII (1965), pp. 292-303; Sheridan, 'The Wealth 
of Jamaica in the Eighteenth Century: A Rejoinder', Zý , Vol. 
XXI (1968), pp. 46-61; Robert Paul Thomas, 'The Sugar Colonies 
of the Old Empire. Profit or Loss for Great Britain'. 
Vol. XXI (1968), pp. 30-35. 
62Sheridan, The Wealth of Jamaica in the Eighteenth Century', 
Ec. H. R., Vol. XVILII (1965), p. 303. 
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The available statistics giving the values of 
exports from, and imports into,, Britain from the colonies 
would seem to indicate that the balance of trade was in 
favour of the commodity producing areas. For example, 
for the seven years from 1769 to 1775, the total value 
of imports from Britain into the sugar colonies was 
approximately Z9,768,300 with an annual average of 
il, 395,470. on the other hand, the exports from the 
West Indies to Britain totalled over 921,006,290 or an 
annual average of more than Z3,000,000.63 Though, on 
paper, the balance was in the islands' favour, they 
received no cash payments from the British merchants, 
but often had to send specie to make up their annual 
payments. To assess the balance of trade on the official 
figures only would be to exclude port and freight charges, 
as well as the invisible earnings of the British 
merchants and underwriters, which included such expenses 
as interests on loans, insurance on goods shipped to 
London, and properties in the West Indies, commission to 
factors, and allowances for the planters' children 
educated in Britain. 
Consequently, many of the planters were perennially 
indebted to the British merchants. Their accounts were 
constantly overdrawn, and the exports in one year went 
to pay the previous year's debts. 64 The result of the 
working of this system was a loss of specie from the 
63 See Appendix A, Table 15. 
64 Long, 'History of Jamaica', Vol. 1. Add. MSS. 12,404, fo. 433. 
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colonies, and the show of wealth among many planters was 
deceptive. Consequently, although comprising only a 
small part of the British Empire, the West Indian islands 
attracted large capital investments before the American 
65 
War . In the new colonies, such as Grenada, many 
planters used their loans to purchase the estates of the 
departing French proprietors, on condition that all their 
produce would be sent directly to their creditors. The 
planters were thus forced by the conditions of their 
mortgages to depend entirely on their London creditors, 
and as they were 'tied' to one merchant, they lost both 
the choice of their agents, and the market: 'Thus tho' 
the Island was rich, the individual was poor', wrote 
Lord Macartney, Governor of Grenada. 66 
At the beginning of the 'seventies, the planters 
also had to contend with other problems which resulted 
from the closed system of financing the development of 
the islands. Of immense significance to the British 
West Indies was the failure of the banks in 1772, which 
began in London spreading to Scotland and Europe. 67 
The ensuing panic greatly distressed the TATest Indian 
planters, and land speculators, especially in Jamaica 
and the ceded islands. The London merchants called in 
65 Richard Sheridan, 'The British Credit Crisis of 1772 and the 
American Colonies'. Jouvnal of Economic lliý3tory, Vol. No. 2 
(June, 1960), p. 165 (hereafter cited as J. E. H. ). 
66 Lord Macartney to Lord Germain, 30 June 1776. C. O. 101/20, fo. 29d. 
67 Sheridan, 'The British Credit Crisis', J. F. H., Vol. XV (1960), 
p. 162. 
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all outstanding debts, causing distrust and loss of 
confidence throughout the islands. 
68 The coffee 
producers of Dominica suffered severely from the 
crisis, 69 which forced the planters to rely even more 
70 on the British merchants . To relieve the sugar 
colonies Parliament passed an Act in 1773 permitting 
foreigners, chiefly the Dutch, to lend the colonists 
money on the security of their estates. 
71 T-his was 
only the second time that the British government had 
allowed outsiders to participate in the commerce or 
development of her colonies. 
The first was the creation of free ports in 
Jamaica and Dominica in 1766, for trade with the neigh- 
bouring foreign colonies. The two ports in Dominica 
were permitted to export British manufactures, Irish 
and North American provisions and slaves to Martinique 
and Guadeloupe in single-decked French vessels, in ex- 
change for all kinds of foreign tropical products and 
bullion. The four ports in Jamaica - Kingston, Savannah 
La Mar, Montego Bay and Santa Lucea - were prevented 
from receiving any tropical product from the foreign 
colonies. Instead, they were allowed to trade Negroes 
68 A. Henderson, Collector of Customs at Roseau, to Governor 
Leyborne, 27 November 1773. C. O. 71/4, fo. 96. 
69 Address of the Assembly of Grenada to the King, 2 November 1773 
C. O. 71/6, fos. 52d-53. 
70 Governor Thomas Shirley to the Earl of Dartmouth, 3 March 1775. 
C. O. 71/5, fos. 20d-21. 
71 Sheridan, 'The British Credit Crisis'. Vol. XV (1960), 
pp. 172-173. 
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and British manufactures for cattle, horses and bullion. 
All six ports were prohibited from importing any foreign 
72 
manufactures . 
Although foreign ships were allowed to enter the 
free ports, this was not a significant departure from 
the principles of British mercantilism. The articles 
that were allowed into the islands did not compete with 
British goods, and exports were restricted to British 
73 manufactures and slaves . To meet the cost of operating 
the ports, dutie S74 were placed on all imports into 
Dominica, and when these goods were carried into Britain 
for domestic consumption, extra charges were placed on 
them. An impost of Z1.10s was also charged on slaves 
imported into Dominica, and those exported from Jamaica 
in foreign ships. 75 To evade the tax, however, new 
slaves were seldom landed in Dominica, but were trans- 
ferred to foreign ships at sea; while in Jamaica, Negroes 
were clandestinely exported in foreign ships. 76 
Although the establishment of free ports in 
72 Armytage, The Free Port System, p. 42; 'Queries with Answer, 
1774. C. O. 137/70, fos. 87-87d; 'The State of Dominica', 24 December 
1773. C. O. 71/4, fo. 73d. 
73 Armytage, The Free Port System, pp. 1-2. 
74 The charges were 6d. sterling per barrel of beef, and pork, a 
firkin of butter, and per cwt of sugar and coffee; 2 s. sterling 
per cwt of cocoa. 
75 6 Geo. III C. 49. 
76 Thomas Irving, 'To His Riqht Honourable the Lords of the Committee 
of His Majesty's Privy Council for Considerinq of Matters of Trade 
and Plantations', 1784. Add. MSS. 38,345, fo. 209d (hereafter cited 
as Irving's Report to the Privy Council for Trade). 
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Dominica brought some benefit to the island, there were 
77 
also many complaints against several of the regulations 
In 1773 the legislature sent a petition to London 
stressing the benefit to the colony if the Act were 
amended to prevent a clash of interests between the 
planters and merchants over the duties on slaves, beef, 
pork and butter, the costs of which were borne by the 
planters and not the foreign traders on which they were 
expected to fall. Furthermore, the planters bringing in 
slaves from the neighbouring British islands to work in 
Dominica were incensed with paying the same duty as on 
new Negroes. Likewise, they opposed paying the same 
taxes on coffee and cocoa grown in Dominica, as those 
charged on foreign products when imported into Britain 
78 for domestic consumption. 
Jamaica was strategically placed for trade with 
the Spanish colonies. Before 1766 the lucrative illegal 
trade was chiefly carried on by smugglers in contra- 
vention of Spanish, and even British, commercial laws! 9 
It has been estimated that the Jamaican merchants 
received over E150,000 currency annually for selling 
British manufactures and slaves to the Spanish colonists. 
Except for a small quantity of rum sent to the Spanish 
mainland in exchange for mules, no Jamaica produce was 
77 Armytage, The Free Port System, pp. 43-44. 
7 BIA Memorial of the Commandor in Chief, Council and Assembly of 
Dominica' to Lords North and Dartmouth, 6 March 1773. C. O. 71/4, 
fos. 2-5. 
79 Armytage, The Fi, ce Port Sip; tem, p. 13. 
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used in the trade. However, after the passage of the 
Free Port Act, the foreign commerce declined despite 
large sums of money sent periodically to Jamaica by the 
Royal Asionto Company of Havana to purchase slaves. 80 
Because of the loss of the trade, Lieutenant- 
Governor John Dalling undertook an investigation to 
determine 'the true causes of the declension in an inter- 
course, which had been so beneficial to the island, and 
to discover the most effectual means of restoring it'. 
Dalling was surprised by his findings which differed 
markedly from those he had envisaged at first. Though 
the creation of the free ports had angered the Spanish 
authorities in Madrid who now appointed new guardas 
costas at Porto Rico and Cuba to replace the old ones 
corrupted by the illegal traders, Dalling found that it 
was 'the perversion of the original institution' which 
had obstructed the effective working of the ports. " 
To prevent Spanish vessels from entering the ports, the 
authorities furnished them with registers which could 
only be opened by the designated authorities at the 
vessels' ports of destination. Yet, in spite of this, 
the profitability of the trade was worth the risk, 82 and 
brought a partial revival of the lucrative commerce. 
But the main obstacle to its complete restoration 
80 Edward Long, 'Notes for the History of Jamaica (no date). Add. 
MSS. 12,411, fos. 25-25d, 43d. 
8''Tract 
on the Spanish Trade' in John Dalling to the Earl of 
Dartmouth, 11 April 1773. C. O. 137/68, fos. 63-64. 
82 Armytaqe, Tho Free Mrt Kyatom, p. 13. 
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was an order sent by the Commissioners of the Customs 
to the collectors at the free ports in Jamaica to keep 
regular and detailed accounts of the entry of all 
foreign vessels and the amount of money they had 
brought. The Spanish captains who complied with the 
regulations were nevertheless afraid that their names 
would be obtained from the customhouse in London, 
subjecting them to severe punishment for importing 
bullion into Jamaica. 83 Dalling's report was sent to 
London with a strong recommendation for the abolition of 
the instruction, and to allow Spanish traders to go 
without hindrance to the free ports . 
84 In April 1774 
the Earl of Dartmouth, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, directed the new Governor Sir Basil Keith to 
instruct the naval officer at Kingston not to include 
Spanish ships on his books. 85 
Nevertheless, the planned renewal of the Free Port 
Act in 1773 met with mixed reaction in the British West 
Indies. Many of the small sugar producers and coffee 
planters, who opposed their creation from the very 
beginning, were now up in arms about the Act's renewal. 
They petitioned Lord Dartmouth for the closure of the 
ports which had become the centres for smuggling French 
products into Jamaica. 86 Meanwhile, in England the 
"Aid. 
, M. 48-49. 
84, Tract on the Spanish Trade', 1773. C. O. 137/68, fos. 67-67d. 
85 The Earl of Dartmouth to Sir Basil Keith, 6 April 1774. c. o. 
137/69, fos. 114-114d. 
86 Address of the Coffee Planters of Jamaica to the Earl of 
Dartmouth (1773). C. O. 137/68, fo. 83. 
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London Society of West Indian Merchants appointed a 
sub-committee to lobby Members of Parliament in support 
of the renewal of the Free Port Act. The merchants and 
planters of Dominica also favoured the measure, but with 
changes. 87 By the Free Port Act of 1773, the ports in 
Dominica were to be continued until November 1780, 
while those in Jamaica were to operate for one year. 88 
In February of the following year, however, a committee 
of the House of Commons recommended the extension of the 
free ports in Jamaica. 8 9 By the provisions of the Act 
of 1773, Dominican sugar, coffee and cocoa were permitted 
to enter Britain on certification that they were British 
plantation grown. The duty on slaves imported into 
Dominica, or exported from Jamaica, was reduced to 
2s. 6d. each. 9 0 
The decline of the Spanish trade also meant the 
loss of specie in circulation in Jamaica. of the money 
carried there, the largest portion was sent to England 
to make up the island's trade deficit. Part of the 
remainder was put into circulation, while yet another 
part was advanced to the planters by the Kingston 
merchants on the credit of their crops. This portion 
was used to purchase mules and cattle, to pay legal 
fees, to buy groceries for their own use, to settle small 
87 Armytaqe, Tho Fwo Port Syý3tom, p. 45; Irvinq' s Report to the 
Privy Council for Trade. Add. MSS. 38,345, fo. 209d. 
88 13 Geo. III C. 73 
89 Armytaqe, Vic Fror, Port Sqrýtcm, p. 50. 
90 23 Geo. III C. 73. 
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debts and quarterly taxes, and to purchase bills of 
exchange which were either given to the Americans, or 
sent to England to pay for the manufactures used in the 
Spanish trade. 91 On the whole, the free port trade 
fitted neatly into British mercantilist policy - no 
inroads affecting the consumption of British manufactures 
were made by either the French or Spaniards. The volume 
of British shipping was not reduced and thus Britain's 
commerce with her colonies was not adversely affected. 
The trade between Britain and the West Indian 
colonies was carried on mainly in ships owned, and manned 
by British seamen. The number of ships employed annually, 
increased or decreased in proportion to the size of the 
92 
islands' crops . The principal London West Indian mer- 
chants engaged in commerce with the colonies were also 
shipowners, and often sent out their own ships freighted 
with British manufactures to the islands for sugar and 
rum during the eighteenth century. 93 These double-decked 
ships averaging from 200 to 250 tons were commonly called 
gstationed ships', because they were assigned to the 
sugar trade only and very seldom went out of their course. 
Also employed in British-West Indian commerce were single- 
decked ships ranging from 80 to 100 tons burden, and 
91 Loong, 'Notes for the History of Jamaica'. Add. MSS. 12,411, 
fos. 43d-45. 
92, Queries with Answers', 1774. C. O. 137/70, fos. 89d-90; 
'Answers to Queries', 26 June 1.774. C. O. 152/54, fo. 64. 
93 Ralph Davis, Tho of tho Di, g Indus t. in the gllo, h Slilppiytý( rlj 
Sevontoorith and . jhtrwnth 
Conturica (London, 1962), pp. 272-273. 
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known as 'seekers' or 'transient vessels' which were not 
committed to any single pattern of trade. Their 
movements were flexible, and they were free to ply 
between the islands, as well as between the West Indies 
and the American colonies. Some left England in ballast 
for the Caribbean on the chance of procuring freight. 
Others were slavers which sold their cargoes in the West 
Indies, after which they sought a freight of sugar for 
Britain; but in most cases they were unsuccessful, 
because the planters were already committed. 
94 
In a few instances, however, the 'seekers' were 
involved in the intercolonial trade. On some occasions, 
those which were promised freight were loaded with 
sufficient sugar and rum to pay for a cargo of lumber 
and provisions in North America. These vessels would 
leave their supercargoes on the islands and then return: 
the others found freight in America for Britain; but 
only a few 'seekers' were involved in this trade and 
these went chiefly to Georgia and the Carolinas. A few 
wealthy absentee planters also occasionally sent their 
ships directly from England to America for lumber and 
provisions, and then to the West Indies where they were 
freighted with sugar and rum. These annual vessels were 
unprofitable, and were an unreliable source of supplies 
for the plantations. 
" The only ships which were likely 
94 
Minutes of the Committee of Privy Council, appointed for all 
Matter relating to Trade and Foreign Plantations', 11 March 1784. 
B. T. 5/1, fo. 20 (hereafter cited as Minutes of the Privy Council 
for Trade). 
95 Ibid. , fos. 33-33d , 56. 
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to profit from the circuitous trade were the 'seekers', 
but their unreliability, as well as the difficulty of 
insuring goods in them discouraged their use. By the 
end of the eighteenth century, as Professor Ralph Davis 
writes, the structure of transport between Britain and 
the West Indies became more inflexible, even though the 
'seekers' continued to go out to the islands with no 
96 
commitments for freight . 
It was possible for the owners to do this, as the 
West Indian trade required a large quantity of shipping, 
and of course there was the inter-island business. More 
than four hundred ships with a registered burden of over 
75,000 tons were employed in the British-West Indian 
97 
trade in 1771 . Forty vessels went from Britain and 
Ireland to Dominica alone in 1773.98 The number employed 
in the Jamaican trade with Britain in 1774 was estimated 
to be 233 with a total burden of 47,000 tons, and 
navigated by 3,700 men. 
99 About 3 per cent of the ships 
used in British-West Indian trade belonged to Americans, 100 
but these were used mainly when there were shortages. 
The American ships seen in large numbers in the islands 
were engaged in traffic with their own colonies. 
101 
96 Davis, The Rise of EoZich Shipping, p. 273. 
97 See Table 15 in Appendix A. 
90, The State of Dominica', 24 December 1773. C. O. 71/4, fo. 73d. 
99, Queries with Answers', 1774. C. O. 137/70, fo. 90. 
100 Edward Payne, Chairman of the Committee of Merchants tradinq to 
America, to William Fawkener, 14 November 1707. B. T. 6/20, fo. 272. 
IOIDavis, 71o Rise of Aglish Shipping, p. 281. 
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Because of the very nature of the West Indian 
economy, and by reason of the requirements of both areas, 
a large and profitable trade was bound to develop over 
the years before the American War. The factors which led 
to the rapid growth of commerce between Britain and the 
West Indies were similar to those contributing to the 
development of trade with the mainland colonies. The 
West Indian planters therefore found themselves uniquely 
placed between two markets which took their products to 
such an extent that at times the demand exceeded supply. 
Yet, it was not as a market for West Indian 
products, except rum and other minor staples, that the 
American colonies were of inestimable value to the sugar 
islands. As the Caribbean colonies were dependent on an 
external market for provisions and lumber which were 
seldom brought from Britain and Ireland, the American- 
West Indian trade occupied a pivotal position in the 
economy of the British West Indies, and by the close of 
the American colonial period, its importance was 
immeasurable. This inter-colonial commerce offered such 
unlimited attractions to traders in America that even a 
series of great wars between the European colonial 
powers, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
had made no significant impact on it, and therefore the 
weaknesses inherent in the West Indian monocultural slave 
economy never became apparent until the years of the 
American War. 
The relationship which developed between the 
colonies was a symbiotic one. The farmers of the middle 
32 
colonies, the fishermen, the ship-owners of the Now 
England colonies and the merchants of Boston, Philadelphia 
and New York depended on the West Indian trade which was 
instrumental in keeping the wheels of American commerce 
in constant motion. 102 Exports from the mainland 
colonies to the West Indies came from a variety of ports 
along the eastern continental seaboard - from Canada and 
Newfoundland in the north to Georgia in the south. The 
most important industry of the northern colonies in the 
eighteenth century was fishing. Massachusetts alone had 
eight to nine hundred vessels of all descriptions 
employed in the cod, whale and mackerel fisheries. The 
best quality fish was exported directly to Europe. Some 
were carried to the West Indies for the planters. But 
the success of the American fishing industry depended 
upon the export of a large quantity of low grade pickled 
fish which was first taken to the British islands, and 
after the planters had taken their pick, the remainder 
was carried to the French colonies. 
To carry on their trade, a large quantity of 
molasses, estimated at over 22,000 hogsheads, was dis- 
tilled annually by about sixty-four companies. Some of 
the rum was consumed in Massachusetts, and the remainder 
was shipped to Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Canada for 
their fisheries, to the southern colonies to purchase 
provisions, and to the African coast for slaves. Rhode 
102 Richard Pares, Way, and Tmido in Ov? Wcot lndl(ý-N IZ39-176)z 
(London, 1963), p. 158; see Great Britain, Parliament. Tho If!., ', toPj1 
of Ow an(l ATal. c. t, of thi, flouew of Common. -ý (London, 
1775), 1). 329. 
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Island also manufactured a considerable quantity of rum 
most of which was exported to Africa for slaves. Its 
domestic trade was mainly with the southern colonies to 
which molasses and rum were sent in exchange for bread, 
flour, corn, beef and pork for the West Indies. Nearly 
all the 12,000 hogsheads of molasses taken by Connecticut 
were consumed in that state, though a small portion was 
distilled into rum and shipped to Africa, Newfoundland 
and Nova Scotia in exchange for articles for its West 
Indian trade. That colony exported horses, cattle, 
sheep, beef, pork, Indian corn, bread, flour and lumber 
(mainly boards, masts and hoopS). 103 
New Hampshire which produced little of its own 
rum, imported a substantial quantity from the West Indies. 
New York, on the other hand, distilled about two-thirds 
of its importation of approximately 14,000 hogsheads of 
molasses; but as even this was insufficient for its 
domestic consumption, as well as for its export trade to 
Africa, Newfoundland and the southern colonies, it 
imported another quantity from the coastal trade. 
New York exported bread, flour, beef, pork, hams, and a 
small quantity of lumber (mainly boards, staves, and 
shingles) to the West Indies. Unlike the other colonies, 
New Jersey had very little direct trade of its own, and 
therefore most of its produce went to New York and 
Philadelphia for export, and it received its imports 
103, Remarký; on the Trade of the different Governments on the 
Continent of North America' (no date). Add. MSS. 38,342, fos. 211- 
212d (herafter cited as 'Remarks on the Trade on North America'). 
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through those ports. Philadelphia imported a 
considerable quantity of British rum averaging about 
735,000 gallons annually, as well as a small quantity 
from the coastal trade. In return, it sent bread, flour, 
beef, pork, corn and lumber to the sugar colonies. ' 04 
Rum had thus become one of the chief articles of commerce 
in the inter-colonial trade, 105 and its use in almost 
every barter transaction continued until 1775, thus 
benefitting the sugar colonies where money was scarce 
but rum plentiful. ' 06 
The remaining five southern colonies, Maryland, 
Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia imported 
most of their rum and molasses for domestic consumption 
from the British West Indies. Like Maryland, Virginia 
exported tobacco, corn, pork, beef, flour and lumber 
(mainly boards, shingles and planks). In addition to 
these, North Carolina exported pitch, tar, turpentine, 
peas, and Indian corn. While South Carolina and Georgia 
sent the same products, they also exported beans, rice, 
wax, tallow and leather to the West Indies. 
10 7 
Although each American colony contributed to the 
needs of the West Indian Islands, the size of the 
104 Ibid. ; Richard Pares, Ankees and AeoZes (London, 1956), p. 27. 
105 Charles William Taussig, Rum, Romance and ReboZZion (London, 
1929), p. 69. 
106 Pares, Yanke, e, -- and Crcolpý3, pp. 121p 123. 
107 
'Remarks on tho Trade of North America'(no date). Add. MSS. 
38,342, fos. 213-213d; Herbert Bell, 'The West Tndia Trade before 
the American Revolution', 71o Amorioan Antopical KNOW, Vol. XXII 
(June, 1917), pp. 272-273 (hereafter cited as 
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contribution varied. For example, between 1771 and 1773 
the New England colonies exported an increasing quantity 
of fish, lumber, provisions, cattle, horses and oxen'OR 
which were in great demand in the islands for turning 
the rollers of cane-mills, for hauling sugar-cane from 
the fields, and for transporting sugar and other 
supplies from, and to, the wharves. The West Indian 
demand gave a new impetus to horse rearing in New 
England, 109 until the outbreak of the American War. 110 
A general examination of the statistics of imports from 
the mainland colonies into the British West Indies shows 
that most of the supplies came from New England which 
sent five-eighths of all the fish, approximately two- 
thirds of the lumber, half of the shingles, one-third of 
the staves, and nearly all the hoops. Then came 
Virginia, New York and Maryland. "' 
The annual value in America of the goods sent to 
the West Indies for the years 1771 to 1773, was 
approximately E500,000 sterling. When the cost of 
freight estimated at E250,000 is added, the value of the 
108, An Account of the Total Quantities of Imports from North 
America to the British West India Islands, for three years past 
(1771-1773) distinguishing each year and from what Province' (no 
date). Add. MSS. 12,431, fo. 170 (hereafter cited as 'Account of 
Imports from North America); see Appendix A, Table 16. 
109 Dean Phillips, 'Iforse Raising in Colonial New England', Cornp. Zl, 
Vniv(--? iý.,, ity AgpioultzLral Axpoilimont Station Ah'111oir; No. 54 (May, 
1922), p. 88 9. 
'''Ibid., p. 915; see Appendix A, Table 16 for figures. 
""Account 
of Imports from North America' (no date). Add. MSS. 
12,431, fo. 170. 
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goods in West Indian ports was about ýC750,000! 12 The 
West Indian planters paid for American provisions and 
lumber mainly with their rum, sometimcs with cash, or 
bills of exchange - but rum was the chief medium of 
exchange in the colonies. Lowell Ragatz claims that 
'the sale, rather than barter, of 'American produce 
eventually drained the Caribbean colonies of specie'. 113 
This is not the case before 1775, though his conclusion 
seems applicable to the period after 1783.1 14 
Rum exports to the continent increased annually 
between 1768 and 1774, except in 1771 and 1773; but the 
decline is small, and resulted from a loss of production. 
A similar trend was evident in exports from the 
Caribbean islands to Britain for the same years. This 
115 decline was also noticeable in sugar exports to America, 
and was probably caused by a reduction in production 
because of severe dry weather in the Caribbean area from 
1769 to 1772, rather than a reluctance of the Americans 
to purchase from the British planters. After all, the 
colonists were very much aware that their economic 
destiny was inexorably linked. 
Included in the commerce between the West Indies 
and the mainland colonies was the trade between Nova 
Scotia, Newfoundland and Canada, and the sugar colonies. 
1 12 Bell, 'The West India Trade before the Revolution', A. H. R., 
Vol. XXII, p. 273. 
113 Ragatz, Th(, Planter p. 89 
114 Pares, Yankcocý and Cm-oZca, pp. 40-41,53. 
115 See Appendi x A, Table 17. 
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The pre-revolutionary trade which developed between these 
areas was small in relation to the planters' needs. Por 
instance, the total quantity of lumber exported from 
Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Canada was approximately 
one-three hundredth part of that from the thirteen 
colonies. The quantity of fish was slightly more; but 
even so, the loss of this trade would not have had any 
adverse effect on the planters, as happened when the 
commerce of the American colonies was prohibited at the 
beginning of 1776.116 
The reasons for the failure of these new colonies 
to compete with their southern neighbours are quite 
clear. Canada, acquired by the British by the Treaty of 
Paris in 1763, was mainly a fur trading society. The 
white population, chiefly French speaking, was small and 
the new British subjects had very little economic or 
social ties with the British West Indian planters. Most 
of the agriculture carried on in Canada was done at 
subsistence level. In short, the economy of these 
colonies was not geared to compete with, or to replace 
that of the thirteen colonies. Even the Newfoundland 
and Nova Scotia fisheries wore controlled, and supplied 
with provisions by the New England merchants. Commenting 
on this trade, Bryan Edwards, Jamaican planter and 
historian, wrote that 
... of the 1203 cargoes of lumber and 
provisions imported from North America into 
the British sugar colonies in 1772, only 
116 See Appendix A, Table 16. 
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seven were from Canada and Nova Scotia; 
and that 701 top sail vessels, and 1681 
sloops which were cleared outwards from 
North America to the British and foreiqn 
West Tridies, only two of the top sail 
vessels and eleven of the sloops were from 
those provinces. 117 
Imports of sugar and rum into Canada, Newfoundland 
and Nova Scotia were also inconsiderablo-118 By 1763 the 
New England merchants had monopolised the coasting 
traffic, and as the American carrying trade was con- 
trolled chiefly by the New Englanders, it was probably 
more profitable for the Canadian merchants to sell their 
produce to the New England traders rather than compete 
with them in markets in which they had virtually no 
experience. 
During the period before the War of Independence, 
the Bermudians were the only colonists, other than the 
Americans, who were involved in the inter-colonial 
carrying trade. Because of the unproductiveness of 
that island, many Bermudians soon became expert ship- 
builders, taking full advantage of the cedar. Others 
erected salt works in the Bahamas, while some emigrated 
to the Turks Islands where they raked salt used by 
the Americans in making butter, and pickling fish, beef 
and pork. From Bermuda, the traders would go to one 
of the southern colonies or Virginia for corn; to 
Philadelphia or New York to sell salt for money with 
117 Bryan Edwards, Thr Civil and Cormn"',! (, al 'f tho Ry-i, t' -,, h 
(London, 1784), Vol. II, p. 409; seC, 
Ragatz., Planf, )I, 1). 88. 
116 See Appondix A, Table 18. 
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which they purchased flour, salted beef and pork, peas, 
candles and lumber. From America some returned home, 
while others went to the West Indies where they sold 
their cargoes for cash. Part of the money was used to 
purchase bills of exchange, and the remainder to buy 
West Indian products for the American market. The 
Bermudians also carried their excess poultry, cabbaqes 
and onions, as well as limestone which was in great 
demand as building material, to the sugar colonies, 
which they exchanged for tropical products. This trade 
which grý, w quite significantly after 1763 became an 
important branch of the illegal trade between the 
British West Indians and the rebels during the War. 119 
Two other groups of merchants - those resident 
in Britain, and British merchants resident in America - 
were also engaged in American colonial trade, but of 
these two groups, only the latter had any share in the 
carrying trade between the continent and the West 
Indies. The vessels used in this commerce were of 
varying sizes and types with brigs forming a majority, 
but schooners and snows were also employed in large 
120 numbers . The size of the sloops ranged from 30 to 
90 tons, while schooners averaged 50 tons. 121 The 
119 Wilfrid Kerr, Bernuda and the American i? ovoZzution: 1760-1783 
(Princeton, 1936), pp. 3-5; see Chapter III for a discussion on 
illegal trade during the American War. 
120 Bell, 'The West India Trade before the American Revolution', 
A. H. R., vol. XXII, p. 278. 
1 21 
Minutes of the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade, 
20 March 1784. B. T. 5/1, fo. 27d. 
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majority of vessels contained only single decks 
suitable for carrying lumber and bulky commodities. 122 
The sizes of the vessels were of advantage to eighteenth 
century American traders who sailed from port to port 
along the entire eastern coast of America 'over Shallows 
and Bars which no vessels of large burthen could pass', 
bartering goods for the West Indian market 223 
As the outward-bound cargoes from the thirteen 
colonies were bulky, they employed a large amount of 
shipping. In his evidence before the Committee of the 
Privy Council for Trade in April 1784, Thomas Irving, 
former Inspector-General of Customs in America, 
estimated that about 533 vessels consisting of approx- 
imately 38,000 tons, and navigated by 3,339 men, were 
used in American-West Indian pre-revolutionary commerce, 
making on the average three round trips annually. It 
was on this computation that Irving argued vehemently 
against the use of United States ships in the West 
Indian trade after 1784. Other American vessels 
totalling about 266 with a burden of slightly under 
20,000 tons transported mules from the foreign islands, 
slaves from the coast of Africa, logwood and other dye- 
woods from Honduras, as well as in the inter-island 
1 24 trade among the British and foreign islands . 
122 Edwards, 11i.,, toy, y of the Wost I70ics; Vol. 11, p. 399. 
123 Long, 'History of Jamaica', Vol. 1. Add. MSS. 12,404, fo. 
402d. 
12 41 Minutes of the Privy Council for Trade' , 16 April 1784. 
B. T. 5/1, fo. 82. 
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Of the total number of vessels engaged in the 
inter-colonial commerce, the American merchants owncd 
about five-eighths, while the remainder belonged to 
British merchants resident in America. 125 Not only did 
the merchants living in Britain disappear from the trade, 
but the West Indians had virtually no share of it. 126 
This monopoly of the carrying business had worried many 
Englishmen. Josiah Tucker expressed the fears of many 
when he wrote that if the American War had not occurred, 
the colonists would have engrossed not only the inter- 
colonial trade, but also that between Britain and the 
127 West Indies . This was unlikely, 
but his fears were 
probably based on the large numbers of plantation- 
built vessels used in British shipping. 
In the domestic commerce of North America, 
tropical products were used as payment between one 
colony and the other. Since the West Indian trade formed 
the nucleus of the coasting traffic, of the New England 
and Newfoundland fisheries, as well as American commerce 
with Britain, it provided for trade among the colonies. 
Merchants from Portsmouth and New Hampshire who needed 
any money would often send their vessels loaded with 
rum and molasses to Philadelphia, enabling them to 
125 Payne to Fawkener, 14 November 1789. B. T. 6/20, fo. 272d. 
126 Pares, Yankooo and CrooZer, P. 8. 
127 Josiah Tucker, 'The State of the Nations in 1777, compared 
with the State of the Nation in, the famous Year of Conquest and 
Glory of 1759', 1777. Bristol Public Library: Jefferies 
Collections of MSS.: Vol. VIII, fo. 87. 
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purchase flour and bread. 128 Vessels employed in the 
New England fisheries during the summer months were 
freighted with cargoes of dried fish, rum, molasses and 
household furniture, and sent to the Carolinas and 
Georgia where they exchanged their cargoes for corn, 
rice, lumber and other southern products. Some of these 
merchantmen then sailed directly to the sugar colonies: 
others returned to the northern colonies where the owners 
assembled assorted cargoes for the West Indies. 129 In 
some cases, the captains of vessels travelling from the 
Caribbean colonies might exchange some of their cargoes 
in the southern and middle colonies for lumber and 
provisions, then proceed to the northern colonies with 
molasses to be distilled into rum for the Newfoundland 
fisheries, or return to the middle and southern 
colonies to purchase more local products for the 
West Indies. 130 
Consequently, the monopoly of the West Indian 
trade stimulated the American shipping industry, centred 
in New England where about 301 sloops and schooners 
measuring approximately 13,160 tons were constructed 
annually, and employed in the several branches of the 
colonial trade. Another 137 square-rigged vessels, 
mainly ships, scows and brigs containing about 18,000 
tons were also built on account of some British merchants, 
128 Pares, Yank, w,,, and Cpcolco, P. 148. 
129, Minutes of the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade' 
16 Api-i 1 1784. B. T. 5/1, fos. 52-52d. 
130 Pares, wi(l pp. 40-47. 
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or to be remitted to others for debt. 131 These last 
vessels were freighted with American produce for the 
Caribbean islands where they discharged their cargoes, 
and received sugar and rum for Britain. This was a 
profitable branch of commerce, and was an important link 
between America, the West Indies, and Britain. 132 
The purpose of this chapter has been to clarify 
certain issues and to outline the basic trade links 
which were needed to keep the West Indian economy afloat. 
By 1775 the American trade was fully interwoven with 
that of the sugar colonies, and together they formed 
part of a commercial system encompassing the new North 
American colonies, and the British and foreign West 
Indies. By supplying the sugar colonies with provisions 
and lumber, and taking off their excess products in 
return, the American colonists had contributed in 
maintaining a healthy sugar economy. Even if they 
received bills of exchange and cash as payment from the 
planters, these were not retained in America for any 
length of time, but were sent to Britain to pay debts, 
as the balance of trade between the northern colonies 
and Britain always favoured the latter. 
Before 1776, very few middlemen were involved in 
West Indian-American commerce, and commodities could 
either be sold cheaply or bartered. Furthermore, because 
cheap and plentiful supplies of food and lumber were 
131 Payne to Fawkener, 14 November 1789 B. T. 6/20, fo. 270. 
132 
Ibid., fo. 273. 
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sent to the West Indies, the planters were able to adopt 
a system of agriculture best suited to the profitable 
production of sugar. Land which would have been 
allocated to the growth of provisions could now be used 
for sugar-cane cultivation. Though the increase in 
sugar production had not been as encouraging in the 
older islands as in Jamaica and the ceded islands, there 
is very little evidence to indicate that West Indian 
economy, as a whole, was in any serious state of decline, 
if any at all, before 1776. In 1775 the islands had 
exported well over 100,000 hogsheads of sugar to Britain 
alone, and in the following year the value of West 
Indian exports was estimated at approximately four and 
a quarter million pounds. 
The dispute between Britain and America after 
1763 had very little effect on supplies reaching the 
sugar colonies, and they continued to receive the 
fundamental necessities of a plantation economy - 
labourers, cheap and plentiful supplies of food and 
building material - so much so that Long wrote: 
The years 1774,1775 & 1776 were remarkable 
for the greatest Importation that had ever 
come from our Islands, and at that period 
which ended at the commencement of the 
American war they may with truth be said to 
have obtained the highest point of Culture 
& Improvement, not that they were capable 
133 of, but that they had ever arrived at . 
Any interference with the American trade was fraught 
with disastrous implications for the British West 
133 Long, 'Collections for the History of Jamaica'. Add. MSS. 
12,413, fo. 66. 
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Indies, because of the very nature of their economy and 
their dependence on external markets and suppliers. 
CHAPTER II 
BRITISH-WEST INDIAN TRADE 
DURING THE AMERICAN WAR 
In the colonial era of the United States of 
America, the thirteen colonies and the West Indies 
developed a mutual trade and intercourse. Their 
reliance on each others' products was not only important 
to the economic development and prosperity of the 
colonies, but also enabled Britain to wage successful 
wars against France and Spain in the Caribbean and 
North America. During wartime, trade between Britain 
and the West Indies was never seriously affected, 
because of the strength of the British navy, and its 
ability to protect the trade. Some branches of 
British-West Indian commerce 'even prospered more than 
in peace'. 1 Similarly, previous wars in the Caribbean 
did not have any significant effect on American supplies 
carried to the sugar colonies, in small vessels which, 
by sailing close to the coast, were able to evade the 
warships of the enemy. During the American War, however, 
supplies reaching the islands were greatly reduced, 
mainly because it was an internal conflict between 
Britain and a group of her colonies, and because both 
1 Pares, War and Tra(le, p. 471; see also R. P. Crowhurst, 'British 
Oceanic Convoys in the Seven Years War, 1756-1763'. Unpublished 
Ph. D. Thesis (London, 1970), p. 70. 
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Britain and the rebellious colonies resorted to economic 
warfare to achieve their goals. 
As the Caribbean colonies were partly dependent 
on America, any cessation of American-West Indian 
commerce meant severe hardships, and the possible 
destruction of the sugar economy. Apart from Jamaica 
and the newly acquired colonies, the islands were fully 
cultivated, had large slave populations and provided 
very little of their own food. Aware of this feature 
of the West Indian economy, the American colonists 
sought to exploit its weaknesses. Consequently, the 
representatives to the first Continental Congress held 
at Philadelphia in September 1774 placed the emphasis 
for achieving their constitutional goals on economic 
sanctions against Britain. 
After drawing up a declaration of rights embodying 
their grievances, and denying Parliament the right to 
tax the colonies internally, the representatives from 
all the colonies, except Georgia, formed a 'continental 
association' by which they agreed to terminate all 
commercial relations with Britain until Parliament had 
repealed the 'Oppressive Acts'. At the end of September 
1774 Congress unanimously passed a non-importation 
aggreement - no goods, wares or merchandise from Britain 
or Ireland; no molasses, sugar, rum, coffee or pimento 
2 
from anywhere were to be imported into the colonies .A 
few days later, it adopted a non-exportation resolution 
2 Worthinqton Chauncery Ford, ed., JournaZ J the Ontinental 
Marcos (Washinqton, 1904), Vol. I, p. 43. 
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stating that after 10 September 1775, no goods were to 
be exported to Britain, Ireland or the West Indies. 3 
Congress further recommended the non-importation of 
slaves, the abolition of the slave trade, and the 
termination of commercial intercourse with any country 
using slave labour, 4 but these proposals encountered 
opposition from some members, as the interests of the 
colonists differed significantly. Some had a greater 
need for British commerce and slave labour than others, 
and desired to retain their old system. 
The general belief held by many Americans, however, 
was that a total stoppage of all commerce with the 
sugar colonies would severely injure British trade, 
thus forcing the government to accede to their demands. 
But there were those who argued that an embargo on 
West Indian commerce would seriously injure the 
economies of the northern colonies, wiping out the 
revenues from rum production, and annihilating the 
thriving fishing industry, thus causing internal unrest. 
The revolutionary element in Congress, on the 
other hand, favoured a complete break with Britain. The 
question of American-West Indian commerce was hotly 
3 
ibid., pp. 51-52. 
4 
Ibid., p. 77. 
5, 
Notes of Debates in the Continental Congress', 26-27 September 
1774. John Adams, The Ad=s Papers: Diary and Autobiography of John 
Adwns, ed. by L. H. Butterfield (Massachusetts, 1961), Vol. II, 
pp. 138-139. 
6 John Adams, 'Notes on Debates', 6 October 1774. E. C. Burnett, ed., 
Letter.,, of the Mornber-, 'ý- of the Continental Congrosa (Washington, 1921), 
Vol. T, p. 64. 
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debated, judging from John Adams' correspondence. 
Adams, revolutionary leader who was to become the second 
Presidont of the United States, was much concerned with 
the question of West Indian trade. In August 1774 he 
wrote in his diary: 'No one could tell. None could 
pretend to forsee the effect of a total Non-Exportation 
to the West Indies'. 7 In a letter to William Tudor in 
October, Adams supported economic sanctions against 
Britain, opposing any military action. On this 
occasion, he wrote: 
If it is a secret hope of many, as I 
suspect it is, that Congress will advise 
to offensive measures, they will be 
mistaken. I have had opportunities 
enough, both public and private to learn 
with certainty the decisive sentiments of 
the delegates and others upon this point. 
They will not, at this session, vote to 
raise money, or arms or ammunition. Their 
opinions are fixed against hostilities and 
rupture, except they should become absolutely 
necessary; and this necessity they do not 
yet see. 
Yet, in spite of the general mood of Congress, 
before the middle of 1775 the disputes between Britain 
and the thirteen colonies had very little impact on 
supplies reaching the West Indies. At the end of 1774, 
there was a final burst of activity, and food and 
lumber were sent to the islands in large quantities. 
John Pinney, planter, merchant, and Member of the 
Council of Nevis, 9 who returned to that colony in 
7 Adams, The Adams Papers, ed., Butterfied; Vol. IT, p. 101. 
ejohn Adams to William Tudor, 7 October 1774. Burnett, ed., 
Lettera, Vol. I, p. 65. 
SFor a study on the Pinney family see Richard Pares, A Wost 
India Yoptuno (London, 1950). 
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in February 1775, even cancelled his orders for staves 
and provisions left with the London merchant-houso of 
Mills and Swanston. 10 Pinney's optimism was short- 
lived. Reports reaching him from Philadelphia confirmed 
that the Americans would impose their non-exportation 
resolution if their grievances were not redressed, and 
although the islands were still well-furnished with 
supplies, Pinney now predicted a gloomy economic future 
for the planters. " 
The formation of 'associations', and the adoption 
of several resolutions prohibiting American commerce 
with the British West Indies had a mixed reception in 
the Caribbean. Some, mainly the Governors and other 
officials, felt that the hard-line policy adopted by 
Parliament would change the colonists' minds. Others 
viewed British policy with dismay, and as an attack upon 
the rights of the Americans; but both groups agreed that 
'should these Combinations take Place, and their Result 
carried into Execution, the consequence could not but be 
fatal to every' British planter, 'as well as ... all the 
insular colonies whose Welfare, and very Being' were 
ýinseparably connected' with American commerce. ' 2 
In Jamaica, for example, the Assembly led by the 
merchants sent a petition to the King at the end of 1774, 
championing the rights of the American colonists, and 
10 John Pinney to Mills and Swanston, 26 July 1775. Pinney Papers: 
Bristol University Library, Letter Book 4, p. 12. 
11 John Pinney to John flayne, 26 July 1775. Ibid., p. 12. 
12 Sir Ralph Payne to the Earl of Dartmouth, 3 July 1774. C. O. 
152/54, fo. 84. 
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beseeching him to reconcile the differences between his 
'European and American subjects, and to consider the 
latter, however far removed from your royal presence, as 
equally entitled to your protection, and the benefits of 
the English constitution'. 13 The political implications 
of the petition will be discussed in a later chapter ý4 
Other local Assemblies and Councils also voiced their 
fears of the possible ill effects of any further 
deterioration of Anglo-American relations. 's 
But in England, the West Indian interests did 
nothing until the beginning of 1775. Because of the 
increasing pace of events and the growing discontent 
of the North Americans with British rule, the Committee 
of West Indian Merchants held a meeting to consider the 
implications of any 'd, isruption of American-West Indian 
trade. A request from the absentee planters for a 
joint general meeting of 'the whole Body of Planters, 
& West India Merchants, to deliberate on the steps, 
necessary to be taken ... jointly, on the present 
important Crisis' was accepted. The Committee further 
agreed to adopt no resolutions as a separate body, but 
to join in a 'General Meeting of the Whole Body of 
Planters, and West India Merchants', 16 which met at 
the London Tavern, Bishopgate Street, on 18 January, 
13 J. A. J. 'C. O. 140/46, pp. 569-570. 
14 See Chapter VI: Section on Jamaica. 
25 David Makinson, Barbados: A Study of North American West Indian 
Relations 1739-1789 (The 11ague, 1964), pp. 89-90. 
Minutes of the West India Merchants, 3 January 1775. Vol. To 
fos. 69-70. 
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marking the formation of a joint Committee (also called 
the Society of Merchants and Planters) which has remained 
one group ever since. The unity of the West India 
Committee, writes Professor Douglas Hall, 'resulted from 
a close succession of crises which endangered the 
interests of both planters and merchants', 17 and which 
began with the American War of Independence. 
A petition presented to the House of Commons by 
Richard Oliver, alderman of Billingsgate ward 1770-1778, 
Member of the House of Commons for the city of London 
1770-1780, and an active supporter of John Wilkes, 
estimated that British property and stock held in the 
West Indies amounted to over X30,000,000 sterling. In 
addition, several more millions created by the islands' 
commerce were invested in trade with Africa, the East 
Indies and Europe. Since the islands were supplied by 
the American colonies, the merchants and planters 
requested Parliamentary assurance that if the inter- 
colonial trade were restricted, measures would be 
adopted to alleviate any setback to the islands' sugar 
economy, or 'the great national stock thus vested and 
employed must become unprofitable and precarious'. 18 
The petition was referred to a committee of the House 
of Commons appointed to consider American affairs, 
where it met the same fate of its predecessors from the 
London merchants, and Bristol. 
17 Douglas Hall, A Brief History of the West India Comittee 
(Barbados, 1971), p. 4. 
is Minutes of the West India Merchants, 7 February 1775. Vol. 1, 
fos. 71-71A; Makinson, Barbados, pp. ag-go. 
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The Society also prepared a pamphlet in which it 
argued that any interference with the established 
system of West Indian commerce would not only retard 
the development of the islands, but would ultimately 
lessen the revenue of the British government, that the 
shortage of provisions and lumber and their high prices 
in Britain and Europe would make it virtually impossible 
for adequate supplies to be sent out to the West Indies. 
The West India Committee further appealed to Parliament 
to surrender its constitutional claims over the 
colonies, and return to 'that great political system' 
which had existed within the British Empire. 19 Whether 
or not the Committee meant to side with the Americans 
is doubtful. The evidence points to the contrary and 
shows that its members were genuinely worried about the 
future of the West Indian sugar economy, and thus their 
investments. But no concessions were made to the 
West Indian interests, and Anglo-American relations 
slipped along the collision path. 
Having rejected the pleas of various interests in 
Britain for conciliation, Parliament retaliated to the 
planned closure of American ports to British and West 
Indian merchants by passing in March 1775 the first of 
two Restraining Acts. The Act restricted the commerce 
of the mainland colonies with Britain, Ireland and the 
British West Indies, and prohibited the New England 
191bid., fo. 71A. 
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colonies from participating in the Newfoundland 
fisheries. 20 But before these restfictions could be 
imposed, another Act was passed in April extending them 
to the southern colonies, except North Carolina and 
Georgia. All enumerated articles produced in the 
American colonies were excluded from Imperial markets, 
and all other products could be exported to British and 
Irish ports only. 21 
To evade the Acts, the Americans legally cleared 
out their goods for the British West Indies, but went 
instead to the foreign islands. When the Americans 
went to the former, they sold their cargoes for cash 
rather than exchange them for rum as was done previously. 
Since the islands' economy functioned on strong 
bilateral connections with the Americans, the planters 
could not procure building material, plantation supplies 
and food if their rum was not taken in exchange. In 
retaliation to the Acts, however, in May Congress 
forbade all American merchants from supplying the 
Newfoundland fisheries, and prohibited the exportation 
of American products to those colonies retaining their 
allegiance to the British government. 22 This was a 
severe psychological blow to the West Indian planters 
who realised that if enforced it signalled the 
destruction of their sugar production and commerce. 
20 15 Geo. III C. 10. 
21 15 Geo. III C. 18. 
22 Ford, ed. t Journals of Congress, Vol. II, p. 54. 
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After the clash between British troops and 
Americans at Lexington, in April 1775 Congress 
abandoned its economic policy as the general mood among 
a majority of the representativ6s moved towards 
independence from Britain. The non-exportation 
agreement was scrapped, and merchants importing 
munitions of war were allowed to export provisions to 
23 any place, except British ports. The Bermudians who 
had openly supported the Americans were thus exempted 
from all restrictions on their trade. Supplies of 
corn, bread, flour, beef, pork, peas or beans, and rice 
were to be sent to Bermuda from Carolina, Virginia, 
Maryland, Pennsylvania and New York, in exchange for 
salt. Lumber, soap and candles were to be added to the 
list, when the island's needs were ascertained. But in 
the meantime, Edward Stiles, a Bermudian resident in 
Pennsylvania, was authorised to ship a cargo of 
provisions to Bermuda in the brig Sea Nymph, Sam Stobel 
master. In addition, the colonists were eligible to 
receive further supplies of food and lumber in exchange 
for arms, saltpetre, and sulphur. 24 These Congressional 
measures were vital factors in making British economic 
war policy unworkable. 
The enforcement of the Restraining Acts also 
posed a major problem for the British naval commanders 
in the West Indies, because of the general unwillingness 
23 Ibid., pp. 184-185; John Adams to James Warren, 4 November 1775. 
Burnett, ed., Letters, vol. ii, p. 248. 
24 Kerr, Bermuda, pp. 53-541 Ford, ed., Journals of Congress, Vol. 
II, p. 54. 
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of the colonists to refrain from selling gunpowder and 
small arms to the Americans .25 Furthermore, some law 
officers questioned the legality of the Acts, as well as 
the orders to enforce them from the Secretary of the 
Admiralty, Philip Stephens, to the Commanders-in-Chiefs. 
Early in September 1775 the Lords of the 
Admiralty directed Rear-Admiral Clark Gayton, Commander- 
in-Chief of the Jamaica squadron, and his counterpart 
James Young on the Leeward Islands station to seize all 
American vessels trading contrary to the Restraining 
Acts, or carrying arms and gunpowder without a certificate. 
Consequently, Gayton sent Captain Stair Douglas in the 
Squirrel to cruise off Mole St. Nicholas, in Saint 
Dominque, and Captain Gardner in the Maidstone to cruise 
off Inagua, one of the Bahama Islands, with orders to 
seize all American vessels trading illegally . 
26 Vice- 
Admiral Young gave similar orders to his captains 
27 
operating in the waters around the Leeward Islands . 
The captures made because of these instructions reveal 
the beginnings of a trade in arms and ammunitions between 
the rebellious colonies and the foreign West Indies. 
Nine vessels captured off Saint Dominque and sent 
25 James Young to Philip Stephens, 30 August 1775. Adm. 1/309, fo. 
240; James Young to Craister Greatheed, 22 August 1775. Ibid., fos. 
242-243d; Lord Germain to Sir Basil Keith, 23 December 1775. C. O. 
137/70, fos. 167-167d. 
26 Orders to Captain Stair Douglas by Rear-Admiral Clark Gayton, 
29 November 1775. Adm. 1/240, fos. 130-131d; Orders to Captains 
Douglas and Gardner, 29 November 1775. Ibid., fo. 131. 
27 Vice-Admiral James Young to the Captains of His Majesty's Ships, 
21 December 1775. Adm. 1/309, fos. 319-392. 
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to Jamaica had been properly cleared out by the Customs 
officers in America for a British West Indian port; but 
once they had cleared the American coast, their captains 
headed to the foreign islands where they exchanged their 
cargoes for tropical products and gunpowder. For example, 
the sloop Dove, Nicholas Bull master, had sailed from 
Rhode Island for Jamaica, but went instead to Saint 
Dominque where he sold his cargo, and received sugar and 
molasses., Three other vessels captured enroute to 
America after trading at Saint Dominque had cleared out 
from North Carolina in order to take advantage of that 
colony. 's exemption from the Restraining Acts. Of the 
remaining vessels, the schooner Thames, alias SaZZy, 
alias Supreme, presents further interesting insights into 
the nature of the new trade, and the new method of 
registering American vessels, which became an effective 
and common practice during the American War, enabling 
the rebels to trade freely with the West Indies. 
When the Thames was cleared out from Philadelphia 
for Jamaica, the American mate was registered as master. 
After leaving the continent the captain sailed directly 
to St. Nicholas where the ship's cargo was sold. Then 
Fairbault, a Frenchman, who now acted as captain sailed 
to Leogane, in Saint Dominque, where the ship was 
freighted with sugar and molasses. He then sailed to 
Petit Goave where he received a set of French papers. 
As the occasion required, either of the ship's papers 
was to be shown to English or French warships to protect 
it from capture. The Thames then sailed for New England, 
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but was captured enroute by Captain Douglas in the 
20 Squirrel In some cases, the captains of American 
vessels sailed, in accordance with their clearances, to 
one of the British islands, and after selling their 
cargoes for cash, they cancelled their bonds and 
sureties. They then received letters 'as safe conduct' 
from the British West Indian governors, and with these 
they cleared out for an American colony; but enroute 
they went to the French islands to buy supplies. 29 
In compliance with their instructions, Douglas 
and Gardner sent the nine vessels into Port Royal to be 
condemned in the Vice-Admiralty Court there, but by the 
time they returned to Jamaica the Prohibitory Act had 
already come into force. This Act prohibited all 
trade between the British West Indies and the rebellious 
colonies. All ships belonging to, or found trading with, 
those colonies were to be seized, and libelled in any 
court in the British Empire. However, it contained 
provisos which exempted certain American vessels from 
capture, and these provided the West Indian colonial law 
officers with loopholes for giving opinion against 
condemning American vessels captured by reason of the 
Acts. 
The Prohibitory Act, for example, did not apply 
to American ships or goods sent to pay debts in Britain, 
Ireland or the British West Indies, on or before 
28 'A Case' (January 1776). Adm. 1/240, fos. 187-188. 
2 9Ibid., fo. ised. 
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1 January 1776, nor to those continental vessels which 
arrived in the West Indies on or before the same date, 
and after discharging their cargoes were loaded with 
West Indian products for Britain or Ireland, befqre 
1 August. American vessels which sailed for the 
United Kingdom with their products on or before 1 March 
were also exempted from seizure. The captains of 
vessels wishing to take advantage of these exemptions 
were required to carry certificates valid for six months 
only which had to be surrendered to the collectors of 
the Customs on the ships' arrival in the United 
30 Kingdom. 
When Captains Gardner and Douglas returned to 
Port Royal, they received a copy of the Prohibitory 
Act, and it was probably their interpretation of its 
proviso clauses which made them question the legality 
of their captures. Consequently, they again seized 
the vessels while they lay at anchor in the harbour. 
Yet, the legality of their actions remained doubtful, 
and they sought'the opinion of two eminent law officers 
in Jamaica, the Attorney and Advocate-General Thomas 
Harrison, Member of the Assembly, and Chief Justice 
Richard Welch. But these ruled that the seizures were 
illegal because they were made on orders from the Lords 
of the-Admiralty, and 'State Policy and State Orders' 
could not be upheld in the courts, unless they were 
warranted by law, that as no Act of Parliament authorising 
3016 Geo. III C. 5. 
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such captures existed before the Restraining and 
Prohibitory Acts, the vessels had to be released to 
allow the owners to take advantage of the provisos in 
the latter. 31 It is difficult to'understand their 
reasoning which implied that Parliament could not 
prohibit American trade, as long as the colonies 
retained their allegiance to the Crown. 
With regard to the condemnation of the vessels 
under the Prohibitory Act, Harrison and Welch ruled that 
under its provisions none of them could be condemned 
'without giving the Act a retrospection beyond the 
express Term of its commencement'. As the new Act had 
superseded the Restraining Acts, the jurisdiction which 
they had created was repealed, and since the former did 
not retain the conditions for seizure contained in the 
latter Acts, the Prohibitory Act could not apply to 
captures made under them. Furthermore, it was 'a penal 
Act', and they were therefore 
restrained by every rule of construction 
from raising provisions out of intents 
unaccompanied with enacting Clauses, to give 
such intents Effects; Nay, the Clause which 
enables vessels belonging to Inhabitants 
of the Prohibited Colonies to sail from this 
Island before March contradicts such supposed 
interests. As little is to be inferred from 
the Indemnity Clause, which makes the Acts of 
the captors legal. Instead of giving them or 
rather confirming a right of seizure previous 
to the lst January 1776, it only indemnifies 
for having possibly seized without such right. 
What they have done is to make legal as to 
themselves but not legal as to captures; 
31 'A Case' (January 1776). Adm. 1/240, fo. 189. 
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which are thereby liable to confiscation. 32 
This law officers' opinion was at variance with 
the intentions of Parliament. Likewise, they surely 
had departed from the customary practice whereby 
colonial law officers and judges were guided in their 
opinions and decisions by Parliamentary statutes in 
accordance, with the punishment prescribed for non- 
compliance with those regulations. After giving their 
opinion, Harrison and Welch recommended the release of 
the vessels to allow their captains to take full 
advantage of the provisos in the Prohibitory Act, since 
the detention of the ships and crews, in case sentences 
of condemnation were not obtained, would subject the 
naval officers to legal suits. 33 
Another lawyer in Jamaica, J. P. Baker, took the 
opposite and orthodox view, and wrote as his opinion 
that the captured American vessels were prima facie 
property of the captors. Applying a broader and rather 
loose interpretation to the Prohibitory Act, Baker 
contended that though Parliament had never stated that 
the American colonies were independent, the preamble to 
the Act which declared that the colonists had usurped 
the powers of Parliament had in fact amounted to a 
declaration that the colonies had relinquished that 
allegiance; thereby placing them on the same footing as 
foreign nations which were unable to sue in British 
courts. Baker also contended that the Prohibitory Act 
32 Ibid., fo. 189d. 
33 Ibid. 
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had assumed the authority of the Restraining Acts, thus 
making the vessels condemnable under its provisions, 
'unless the Law of Nations is to give way to Common Law 
Rules in our Courts of Admiralty: and Rebellion is to be 
assisted by favourable Construction of Acts of Parliament, 
of which no one would doubt the meaning I. 34 
None of the vessels sent into Port Royal was 
condemned, and the Restraining Acts which were expected 
to crush the rebellion in America failed because the 
American traders with help from the West Indian colonists 
wer e able to evade their penal clauses. Welch's and 
Harrison's opinion was a contributory factor, and led 
Gayton to complain that there were 'too many friends to 
America in Jamaica' .35 The ease with which the American 
traders cleared out for British West Indian ports and 
then sailed to the foreign islands assured them of large 
quantities of tropical products, as well as arms and 
gunpowder. The sufferers were the British sugar planters 
who were caught in the midst of an economic war over 
which they had no power, either to change its course or 
to determine its outcome. The years 1774 and 1775 had 
also witnessed the creation of a new British policy towards 
the Americans - one which continued after the thirteen 
colonies gained their independence in 1782. Similarly, 
these years saw the development of a new American policy 
restricting trade with the sugar colonies and the rest of 
34 QJ. P. Baker's opinion' (no date). Adm. 1/240, fos. 200-200d. 
35 Clark Gayton to Philip Stephens, 28 March 1776. Adm. 1/240p 
fos. 180d-181. 
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the British Empire -a policy which was rightly expected 
to affect the islands' commerce and their economic 
development. 
By the beginning of 1776, trade between the 
rebellious colonies and the British Caribbean islands 
was placed under severe restrictions by both Parliament 
and Congress. The former did so by the Prohibitory 
Act, while on 6 April the latter opened American ports 
to all foreign countries to the exclusion of Britain 
and her colonies. The resolution adopted by Congress 
authorised the export of all goods, except staves and 
empty casks, 'from the thirteen United Colonies by 
the inhabitants thereof, and by the people of all such 
countries as are not subject to the King of Great 
Britain, to any parts of the World, which are not under 
the dominion of the said King It also permitted 
the importation of merchandise, except East India tea, 
slaves and manufactures from Britain and Ireland, 'from 
any other parts of the world to the colonies, by the 
inhabitants thereof, and by the people of all such 
countries as' were not the subjects of the British King. 
Congress and the states further reserved the right to 
regulate their commerce when, and if, necessary. All 
goods illegally imported from any part of the British 
Empire, except Bermuda, were to be confiscated. 36 
For the West Indian planters, the closure of the 
36Ford, 
ed., JournaZs of Congress, Vol. II, pp. 257-259; Vernon 
Setser, The Commercial Reciprocity Policy of the United States: 
1?? 5-1829 (Philadelphia, 1937), p. 11. 
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continental ports was serious; but some relief was to 
be found in the loopholes in the measures. Both 
Parliament and Congress made exemptions to their 
restrictions. For instance, the case of Bermuda has 
already been discussed. In the case of Britain, the 
Prohibitory Act did not end all trade with America, but 
only forbade that with the rebellious colonies. By its 
first proviso, licences were to be granted to all 
British subjects wishing to trade with those areas under 
British control, or to those colonies acknowledging the 
37 sovereighty of the Crown. In the West Indies, the 
response to this proviso varied. Some Governors granted 
licences, upon request, to merchants going to the 
continent .38 After the capture of New York 
in 1776, for 
example, Lord Macartney gave permits to a group of 
prominent Grenada merchants to send rum, molasses and 
other products for the troops there. He even applied to 
Vice-Admiral Young for a warship to convoy the vessels 
39 to America. 
Young turned down the request because he could 
not spare a warship to go to America, 40 and as he had not 
been officially informed that New York had surrendered to 
the British troops. It is more likely, however, that he 
feared that his permits would have been used to cover an 
37 16 Geo. III C. S. 
3e Merchants of Grenada to Lod Macartney, 3 June 1777. Adm. 1/310, 
fo. 123. 
39 Lord Macartney to James Young, 3 June 1777. Ibid., fo. 124. 
4 OYoung to Stephens# 12 June 1777. Ibid., fos. 114-114d. 
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illegal trade between the West Indies and the rebels, 
for he told Lord Macartney: 
I cannot think myself at liberty to grant 
convoy to ships bound to ... America on 
private Trade; and was it-all necessary 
that such large supplies should be sent 
-from these islands, for use of the King's 
Army and Navy I should certainly have 
received directions from home concerning 
it, and a suitable provision of ships for 
that purpose: or at least Lord Howe and 
the General would have given notice 
thereof.... 41 
Gayton also rejected a similar request from Governor 
John Dalling, on behalf of the Assembly of Jamaica, 
on the grounds that he had no orders from the 
Admiralty to send convoys anywhere, except to England 
with the homeward trade. 42 
But despite their refusals, most Governors 
continued to give licences to vessels wishing to go to 
America. Some gave to only those merchants who were 
considered loyal. But those who were refused licences 
in one government either went without any, or received 
them from another island. 43 In some instances, the 
merchants were able to get the Proper clearances from 
the officers of the Customs even without any licences. 
For example, the schooner Race Horse, Harry Tottle 
captain, owned by Roach and Eccles of Barbados, and 
41James Young to Lord Macartney, 8 June 1777. 
42 Clark Gayton to John Dalling, in J. A. J., 31 October 1777. 
C. O. 140/59, p. 8. 
43 Lord Macartney to Sir William Howe, 16 November 1778. C. O. 
101/21, fo. 198; William Mathew Burt to Lord Germain, 16 April 
1778. C. P. 152/57, fo. 183d; 'Vessels with Letters of Marque 
granted by his Honor John Dalling', 6,15,17 October 1777. 
C. O. 137/73, fo. 64. 
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freighted with over sixty puncheons of rum consigned to 
America, was legally cleared out at the custom-house in 
St. Vincent. There were several merchantmen loaded with 
rum for the continent lying at anchor in Kingston 
harbour, awaiting their clearances. 44 To what extent the 
Governor's licences aided smuggling between the rebels 
and the West Indians is not quite clear, but without them 
the merchants would have still traded illegally. 
Nothing, in fact, could have prevented the West 
Indians from carrying on a part of their traditional 
trade, however small, with the American colonists. Their 
success could be judged by the complaints from Lord Howe 
and Sir William Howe. Because of the large number of 
British West Indian vessels seen trading with the 
enemy, both British officers sent circular letters in 
1777 to the West Indian Governors, as well as to Lieu- 
tenant-Governor Mariot Arbuthnot of Nova Scotia, requesting 
them not to grant licences to vessels wanting to go to any 
port, whatever in America, except to those under the total 
control of British forces .45 This information was 
transmitted to Lord Germain, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 46 who in turn sent out a circular letter to the 
Governors instructing them to grant no more permits to 
44 Valentine Morris to Lord Germain, 16 April 1778. C. 0-260/5, fo. 
187; see Chapter III for a discussion on smuggling. 
45, Circular Letter to the West Indian Governors from Lord Viscount 
Howe and Sir William Howe, 20 April 1777. C. O. 5/94, fo. 249; See 
Lord Howe and Sir William Howe to Lieutenant-Governor Mariot 
Arbuthnot, 10 April 1777. Ibid., fo. 247. 
46 Sir William Howe to Lord Germain, 8 June 1777. C. O. 5/94, fo. 245. 
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vessels to carry rum, molasses, or any other products 
'for the use of the Army and the Navy', except to the 
contractors for supplying the troops in America . 
47 
The new restrictions met with staunch opposition. 
In the West Indies, Lord Macartney was the most outspoken 
critic of the new policy. While agreeing with the aims 
of the Howes, he felt that the contractors, by being 
given a virtual monopoly df victualling the British 
forces, would give preferential treatment to some islands, 
while others would not 'have an equaZ right to the Chance 
of the Market, where the law permitted it to be open'. 
Macartney was particularly upset over the loss of rum 
sales in Grenada, and he proposed that all the British 
islands should be given the same opportunities of 
41 
supplying the forces when the mainland ports became open. 
In England, the West India Committee strongly 
opposed Lord Germain's attempt to suspend the proviso of 
the Prohibitory Act. At a meeting in March 1778, the 
merchants resolved that many West Indian Governors had 
considered Germain's instruction 'a general Prohibition' 
against issuing licences to vessels to America, and that 
his action had defeated the intentions of Parliament in 
giving relief to the, loyal colonists in America and the 
West Indies. 49 The Committee therefore applied to - 
Germain for new instructions ordering the Governors 'to 
47 Minutes of the West India Merchants, 8 March 1778, Vol. I, fo. 
140. 
48 Lord Macartney to Lord Howe, and Sir William Howe, 5 December 
1777. C. O. 101/21, fos. 198-200d. 
49 Minutes of the West India Merchants, 3 March 1778, Vol. I, fo. 141. 
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grant licences, for clearing out Rum and molasses, for 
the Supply of the Inhabitants, of Such Places as are 
possessed by the King's'Troops, in any of the Colonies, 
not at the King's Peace, to all the King's Loyal 
Subjects that shall apply to you for the same'. ' 
0 The 
West India Committee, having received a valuable 
concession, was satisfied with the new arrangement. 51 
In the West Indies, Germain's decision was favourably 
received by everyone concerned. Some planters were 
optimistic that the renewal of the Governors' authority 
to grant licences to merchants wishing to go to America 
would increase the demand for rum 'which otherways must 
have either Remained in our Stores of have been Reduced 
so low as not to pay one fourth Part of the Expence in 
Producing it', wrote Governor William Mathew Burt of the 
Leeward Islands. 52 
But though the Prohibitory Act had given slight 
relief to the sugar planters to send their rum to the 
continent, the termination of unrestricted commerce 
between the mainland colonies and the British Caribbean 
islands was expected to cause severe economic disaster. 
The planters had tried to prevent this by importing 
larger quantities of foodstuffs in 1774 and 1775, but 
these could not have been stored in the sub-tropical 
50 Copy of Lord Germain's Circular Letter to the West Indies 
Governors, in Minutes of the West India Merchants, 9 March 1778i 
Vol. 1, fo. 144. 
51 See Minutes of the West India Merchants, 9 March 1778, Vol. I, 
fo. 145. 
52 Burt to Germain, 9 June 1778. C. O. 152/58, fo. 114d. 
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climate of the islands. Furthermore, the very nature of 
the West Indian slave society made it inevitable that if 
the islands were to be saved from economic disaster 
alternative sources of supply had to be found, and it was 
hoped that one such source would be Scotland. 53 
Since 1730, the Scottish merchants had revived 
their business interests in the West Indian trade, 
carrying it on through agents in many of the colonies. 
Before 1765 the volume of trade was small and was 
included in that of England. After that year, however, 
Scottish 'business seems to have been gaining ... until 
the American Revolution', writes Professor Pares. 54 The 
letter books of Alexander Houston and Company, one of 
the principal Glasgow merchants trading to the West 
Indies, provide valuable material from which one can 
gauge the volume of trade between Scotland and the 
British West Indies, the prices of West Indian products, 
as well as the economic impact of the American War on 
the sugar colonies. 
it was inevitable that the cessation of American 
commerce with the British islands would lead to a growing 
demand in them for Scottish dry goods, oats, beans, flour, 
biscuit, Negro clothing, staves and herring. John Pinney, 
53 M. L. Robertson, 'Scottish Commerce and the American War of 
Independence', Ec. H. R., 2nd 
pp. 123-128. 
54 Richard Pares, 'Merch& 
Supplement No. 4 (1960), p. 
and Company of Glasgow were 
and Paul of St. Vincent and 
the Assembly of St. Kitts. 
series, Vol. IX, No. 1 (August 1956), 
nts and Planters', Ed. H. R., 2nd series, 
33. Some of the factors of Houston 
Houston and Paterson of Grenada, Turner 
Tobago, and Robert Houston, a Member of 
70 
for instance, placed substantial orders of herring with 
Houston and Company, " but unlike the American method of 
supplying the West India markets -a system under which 
hundreds of vessels left the continent annually, with few 
pre-arranged plans, to go to the West Indies where they 
sailed from port to port, the captains or factors 
bartering, selling, purchasing or simply delivering 
freight - the planters had now to order their supplies 
of herring almost a year in advance, even before the 
season's catch was made, so that all the goods could be 
sent out in one ship. 56 
This system had many disadvantages. If a planter's 
orders were lost because of natural disasters to the 
ship, or captures at sea, or if they arrived late, or if 
the supplies were carried to a different island, as was 
the case on numerous occasions during the American War, 
he was unable to receive some classes of food for a whole 
year. In some instances, the planters' orders were 
substantially reduced because demand exceeded supply, and 
even when supplies were available there were several 
complaints of herrings being spoilt before reaching the 
West Indies. 5 7 In addition, unlike the American merchants 
who carried their supplies to the British islands first 
55 John Pinney to Alexander Houston and Company, 3 June 1776. 
Pinney Papers: L. B. 4, p. 46. 
56 Houston & Co. to John Richardson Herbert, 19 June 1776. Houston 
Papers: National Library of Scotland MSS. 8,793, p. 40 (hereafter 
cited as Houston Papers: N. L. S. MSS. ). 
57 Houston & Co. to James Smith, I October 1776, Ibid., p. s5; 
Houston & Co. to John Constable, 7 February 1777. Ibid., p. 170. 
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during the colonial period, Scottish supplies depended 
on several factors, namely: the success of the fishing 
season, the domestic as well as the foreign demand, and 
the price and availability of staves for making barrels 
to transport the fish. These factors also determined 
the price of herring which was much higher than that 
previously imported from America. 58 
Similarly, after the outbreak of the American War, 
there was great demand in Scotland for West Indian 
products. The prospects of increased business led 
Houston and Company to hope that the boom would continue 
for the rest of the War. Of course, the Glasgow sugar 
importers were doing well. At the beginning of 1776 the 
price of sugar rose by 4s. to 5s. per cwt., while that 
of rum increasedby 9d. to ls. per gallon; but cotton 
prices did not increase, remaining at pre-war levels of 
59 19d. to 22d. per lb. The general prosperous outlook 
for improved trade led Houston and Company to write to 
its agents in St. Vincent: 'Sugar and Rum are still. 
rather advancing and we begin to be of opinion that 
prices will be maintained throughout the year'. 60 
58 Houston 9, Co. to Lewis Chavel & Co., 13 October 1777. Houston 
Papers: N. L. S. MSS. 8,795, p. 39. 
59 Houston & Co. to Josias Jackson, 4 March 1776. Houston Papers: 
N. L. S. MSS. 8,793, p. 2; Houston & Co. to James Akers, 4 March 1776. 
Ibid., p. 3; Houston & Co. to Patrick Maxwell, 4 March 1776. Ibid., 
p. 5; Houston & Co. to Duncan Campbell, 4 March 1776. Ibid. 
60 Houston & Co. to Turner & Paul, 4 March 1776. Ibid., p. 12. A 
similar letter sent to Houston & Paterson of Grenada. Prices quoted 
by the Company: Sugar - 30s. to 42s. per cwt., Rum - 2s. 2d. to 3s. 3d. 
per gal., Cotton - 19d. to 22d. per lb.; Robertson, 'Scottish 
Commerce and the American War', Ec. 11. R., Vol. IX, No. 1 (August 
1956), p. 125. 
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But this early optimism was premature. No sooner 
had the Company forecast the continuation of high prices 
and increased business, than the Scottish market for 
West Indian products began to decline, with prices falling 
as low as those of 1775. Over-importation of West Indian 
sugar, rum and cotton, and the destruction of the 
Scottish tobacco trade by the War had stagnated the 
market. 61 That of London was also glutted with West 
Indian rum, and the price fell to around 2s. per gallon 
in June 1776,62 with no likelihood of rising again for 
the rest of that year. In contrast to their earlier 
letter, Houston and Company now wrote: 'the Want of an 
exportation of ref'd goods to America makes the market 
very heavy'. 6' 
The recession caused by the decline in British 
exports to America began in the latter part of 1776, 
and was accompanied by an 'uncommon scarcity of money' 64 
which forced Houston and Company to restrict its 
commercial dealings in the West Indies. No estates were 
to be taken as collateral in any business transactions, 
and the Company refused to accept any new*customers. 65 
"Ibid., p. 126; Houston & Co. to David McFarlane, 19 April 1776. 
Houston Papers: N. L. S. MSS. 8,793, p. 31; Houston & Co. to Turner 
and Paul, 19 April 1776. Ibid., p. 29; Houston & Co. to Duncan 
Campbell, 31 May 1776. Ibid., p. 38. 
62 Houston & Co. to Houston & Paterson, 19 June 1776. Ibid.. p. 45. 
63 Houston & Co. to Turner & Paul, 1 October 1776. Ibid., p. 79. 
64 Houston & Co. to Turner & Paul, 25 June 1778. Houston Papers: 
N. L. S. MSS. 8,794, p. 30; Robertson, 'Scottish Commerce and the 
American War', Ec. H. R., Vol. IX, No. 1 (August 1956), pp. 127-128. 
65 Houston & Co. to John Cockurn, 1 October 1776. Houston Papers: 
N. L. S. MSS. 8,793, p. 83. 
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When the threat of a French war became more serious at 
the end of 1777, a time also of numerous losses caused 
by American privateers, * the Company wrote to its Agents, 
Turner and Paul, in Tobago: 
The public affairs of this nation seems to 
be arrived at a very alarming Crisis, for, 
besides the American War, which bears a 
most gloomy aspect, it seems highly probable 
that we shall soon be engaged in another with 
France, the consequences of which may prove 
fatal to the Commerce of Britain, in this 
situation we beg leave to mention to you that 
we have resolved to restrict our trade to 
the West Indies. 66 
As the American War continued into 1778, and 
British trade with Europe slackened, West Indian goods 
'for which there was no demand and no outlet', accumu- 
lated in the storehouses. 6 7 For example, in Scotland 
there was no demand for rum or cotton 'at any Price'. 68 
Therefore, Houston and Company'was once more writing 
to its Agents in Grenada, Houston and Patterson, 
beseeching them not to mortgage any estates for debts, 
as 'the uncertainty of a French War, the low price & 
no demand for cotton -& above all the very great want 
of money all Combine to hinder us from engaging in Such 
169 a business.... In spite of large sums of money sent 
to Scotland from the West Indies in 1778, the Company 
continued to call in its debts, and to advocate a 
66 Houston & Co. to Turner & Paul, 30 December 1777. Ibid., p. 325. 
67 Robertson, 'Scottish Commerce and the American War', Ec. H. R., 
vol. IX, No. 1 (August 1956), pp. 126-127. 
68 Houston & Co. to Turner & Paul, 27 May 1778. Houston Papers: 
N. L. S. MSS. 8,794, p. 2. 
69 Houston & CO. to Houston & Patterson, 20 July 1778. Ibid., p. 43. 
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reduction of its Caribbean business. Even prospects of 
profits from high freight rates and food prices in the 
islands could not entice it 'to go deeper into the West 
Indian trade'. 70 
The planters who depended on the Scottish trade 
received a severe blow when in 1780 Houston and Company 
refused to ship any goods to the islands . 71 In the 
following year, there was yet another recession in the 
Scottish trade, 72 and the Company was not able to fill 
its West Indian orders. Yet, despite the failure of 
Houston and Company to supply the colonies adequately, 
it had continued -Co trade with them during the entire 
War, and had suffered heavy losses from the failure of 
the West Indian trade, and its debtors. 73 But even though 
the Scottish trade fell short of the sugar colonies' 
requirements, it went a long way in relieving the islands, 74 
and supplemented other supplies from England and Ireland. 
To further lessen the expected distress in the 
colonies, the British government adopted legislative 
measures to permit the exportation of wheat and other 
70 Houston & Co. to Samuel Cary, 9 April 1778. Houston Papers: 
N. L. S. MSS. 8,793, p. 428. 
71 Houston & Co. to Robert Houston, 17 January 1780. Houston 
Papers: N. L. S. MSS. 8,794, p. 294. 
72 Robertson, 'Scottish Commerce and the American War', Ec. H. R., 
Vol. IX, No. 1 (August 1956), p. 127. 
73 Houston & Co. to William McTair, 17 January 1780. Houston 
Papers: N. L. S. MSS. 8,794, p. 285. McTair (Mactier) was trading 
with Samuel Curson and Isaac Governeur of St. Eustatius; see 
Chapter III. 
7 It Piers Mackesy, The WaY) fOT, America 1775-1783 (London, 1904), p. 
228. 
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articles of food to the West Indies. 75 In 1778 
Parliament also passed an Act lifting some of the 
restrictions on Irish trade with the colonies. But 
because of intense opposition from the West India 
76 
S77 Committeer as well as some merchant sugar could 
not be imported directly into Ireland. Instead, that 
country was allowed to export all her products, British 
goods, except woollen manufactures and glass, and all 
foreign goods legally imported, to the British colonies? ' 
But these concessions were not enough, and in 
1779 new demands for direct trade between Ireland and 
the British West Indies were made. Consequently, in the 
1779-1780 session of Parliament, all restrictions on 
Irish trade were abolished .79 Nevertheless, commerce 
between Ireland and the West Indies made only slight 
gains between 1780 and 1784. Larger quantities of 
herring, beef and pork were exported to the islands, but 
it is doubtful whether these were equal to the planters' 
demands. '30 Yet, as in the case of the Scottish trade, 
beef, pork and herring exports from Ireland were vital to 
the survival of the colonies. 8 1 
7516 Geo. III C. 37; Ragatz, The Planter Class, p. 147. - 
76Minutes of the West India Merchants, 9 March 1778; Vol. 1, f o. 149. 
77 Houston & Co. to Richard Neave, 18 March 1778. Houston Papers: 
N. L. S. MSS. 8.795, pp. 302-321. 
78 18 Geo. III C. 55; Ragatz, The Planter Class, p. 149. 
7920 Geo. III C. 10; Ragatz, The Planter Class, p. 149. 
so Donald Macpherson, Annals of Commerce (London, 1805), Vol. IV, 
pp. 59-60. 
81 Mackesy, The War. for America, p. 228. 
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In previous wars, the ships which went from 
England to the West Indies 'carried no lumber but hoops, 
no provisions but some-beans and oats, they had little to 
do with the plenty or scarcity of plantation necessaries 
in the islands'. 82 During the America War, however, 
England became the chief supplier of provisions to the 
colonies, and the arrival or loss of the merchantmen 
determined the levels of supplies in the British West 
Indies. Of course, illegal trade with the Americans 
(which is discussed in the following chapter) did 
contribute to the quantities of provisions and lumber, 
but this source was unreliable. Once the Prohibitory 
Act went into force at the beginning of 1776, many 
planters immediately ordered provisions from their 
83 
correspondents in England. 
Consequently, between 1775 and 1782 there was a 
significant increase in all classes of foodstuffs 
exported to the West Indies. 84 Beef and pork exports 
rose from approximately 2,300 barrels in 1775 to over 
38,000 barrels in 1782. The quantity of'wheat and flour 
also increased substantially during the same period, 
while bread exports from England to the West Indies 
climbed from 431 cwts. in 1774 to 43,795 cwts. in 1782. 
Peas and f ish exports were also greater than at any 
other time before. But, on the whole, the enlarged 
82 Pares, War and Trade, pp. 474-475. 
83 John Pinney to William Manning, 10 February 1776. Pinney Papers: 
L. B. 4, p. 26. 
84 
See AppendiX B, Table 1. 
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quantities of foodstuffs from England, Ireland and 
Scotland in no way compensated for the loss of the 
American trade. as one problem of interpreting the 
statistics is that there is no record to show whether 
the provisions were for the planters or for the King's 
forces stationed in the West Indies. It is more likely, 
however, that the presence of a large number of troops in 
the colonies during certain periods of the American War 
doubled the consumption of the finer foods, as had been 
the case in previous wars. 86 
The statistics showing the value of British 
exports to, and imports from, the West Indies 1770 to 
1783 help determine with some accuracy, the state of the 
trade between Britain and the sugar colonies. 87 For 
the six years from 1770 to 1775, the average total 
annual value of exports from Britain to the West Indies 
amounted to approximately 91,403,675. From 1776 to 1782, 
the average annual value of British exports to the 
colonies was roughly E1,346,491 -a drop of approximately 
9100,000. Although this is a moderate figure, the decline 
is still significant. In the wars of 1744-1748 and 1756- 
1763, the volume of British exports did not decrease, and 
both wars 'appear to have stimulated exports to the West 
Indies'. Pares cites as a possible reason for this 
increase the improved prices of West Indian produce, 
"Ragatz, The Planter Class, pp. 149-150. 
86 Pares, War and Trade, pp. 491-493. 
1 87 See figures in Appendix A, Table 15. 
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which enabled the planters to purchase more British 
goods. 88 But the total annual value of West Indian 
goods exported to Britain also decreased during the 
American War. For instance, the average annual value of 
exports from the sugar colonies to Britain amounted to 
approximately E3,000,601 for the six years ending in 
1775. From 1776 to 1782, this did not exceed E2,647,000! 9 
The sharp decline in the total annual value of 
West Indian products, in spite of the high prices for 
sugar in London, was a result of the decrease in the 
quantity West Indian staples exported to Britain during 
the period. 90 Previous wars did not affect the 
production of the sugar colonies, and imports of West 
Indian staples into Britain increased after the Peace 
of Aix-la-Chapelle, and 'continued throughout the Seven 
Years War and-the years which followed it'. 91 The 
American War reversed this, and not only in sugar; for 
there was little demand for minor staples and rum. 9 2 
Yet, despite the drop in West Indian trade, the 
islands still needed a large number of ships to take off 
their produce. During the American War, however, less 
Be Pares, War and Trade, pp. 474-475. 
89 See Appendix A, Table 15. 
so See Appendix B, Table 2. 
91 Pares, War and Trade, pp. 473-373. 
92 Houston & Co. to Charles Irvine, 28 August 1777. Houston Papers: 
N. L. S. MSS. 8,793, p. 259; Houston & Co. to Turner & Paul, 1 
October 1778. N. L. S. MSS. 8,794, p. 53; Houston & Co. to Mathew 
Munro, 9 February 1780. Ibid., p. 327; Rawlinson, Chorley & 
Grierson to William Eccles, 12 March 1782. In J. A. J. 12 February 
1783. C. O. 140/159, p. 546. 
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shipping reached Caribbean ports than during any 
previous war, for three main reaýons: the numerous 
captures of British shipping by American privateers, 
the large number of ships recruited for government 
service, and the prohibition of American-West Indian 
commerce which removed the American branch of shipping. 
Most of the British merchantmen captured during the War 
were not replaced because of the high cost of labour, 
as well as the shortages and exorbitant prices of 
material. 93 As the situation worsened after 1778, many 
planters could not secure freight to Britain. One 
planter in the Leeward Islands wrote that it was 'not 
the largeness of our crop that makes it difficult to 
get freight, but the want of vessels'. 94 Letters from 
Jamaica to Edward Long conveyed the same tale - 'the 
stores crammed with Irum] & sugar, & no ships to carry 
them off'. 95 The situation was equally serious in 
Grenada and the other islands. " 
The removal of a large number of 'stationed ships' 
from the West Indian trade made it difficult for some 
planters who, in spite of the scarcity, were reluctant 
93 William Chrichton, 'A True State of the Explanation ... of the 
Causes of the Rise of the Price of Sugar', 6 July 1778. Add. MSS. 
12,404, fo. 445 (hereafter cited as 'The Causes of the Rise of the 
Price of Sugar). 
94 John Pinney to Mills & Swanston, fMay 1778. Pinney Papers: 
L. B. 4, p. 191; Pinney to Mills & Swanston, 10 September 1778. 
Ibid., p. 262. 
95 'Jamaican Advices', 23 July 1778. Add. MSS. 12,412, fo. 6.; 
'Jamaican Ad 
, 
vices', 26 July 1778. Ibid., fo. 6d.; 'Jamaican Advices' 
23 September 1778. Ibid. 
96 Macartney to Germain, 23 May 1779. C. O. 101/23, fos. 159-159d. 
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to take freight in 'seekers'. In one specific case, 
when the Fortitude, Captain Johnstone, belonging to 
Glasgow, arrived at Black River, in Jamaica, John 
Van Keleen, the new manager of Sir Joseph Barham's 
Jamaica estate, refused to ship his sugar aboard the 
vessel, because very few planters knew either the ship 
or its captain. He preferred to wait for a 'stationed 
ship', although he had no idea when one would arrive. 97 
The lack of ships also created ill-feelings between the 
planters and captains, who would select which cargoes 
they were prepared to take-98 'The Scarcity of Ships', 
wrote one manager, 'has raised the insolence of their 
commanders in such manner as is hardly to be borne with, 
for they will take just as much and as little as they 
choose from each shipper.... 199 
Because of the reduced shipping, supplies for one 
island were sometimes delivered at another. 100 Planters 
also had to send their products to any British port to 
which they could procure freight, contrary to their own 
commitments and interests. 101 But, if the planters were 
distressed, the British merchants suffered equally from 
the American War. Shipping in wartime was considered a 
97 Van Keleen to Barham, 19 March 1782. Barham Papers: Bodl. MSS. 
Clarendon; Dep. C. 357 Bund. 1. 
so Pinney to Manning, 17 June 1780. Pinney Papers: L. B. 5, p. 78. 
99 Van Keleen to Barham, 10 May 1782. Barham Papers: Bodl. MSS. 
Clarendon; Dep. C. 357 Bund. 1. 
100 Houston & Co. to Nesbitt & Co., 27 January 1777. Houston 
Papers: N. L. S. MSS. 8,793, p. 148. 
101 Pinney to Manning, 17 June 1780. Pinney Papers: L. B. 5, p. 78. 
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profitable though risky business. In the wars of 1739- 
1748 and 1756-1763, some merchants made substantial 
profits. 102 But in the American War, it is doubtful 
whether many merchants made any significant profits from 
their ships engaged in the West Indian trade, though 
freight rates were substantially higherP1 
on application from the merchants, the West India 
Committee agreed in September 1776 to increase the out- 
ward freight rates from England to the West Indies by 
thirty-five per cent, and in the following year the new 
rates were doubled. ý 04 They were further increased in 
1781 by fifty per cent on all goods shipped to the 
Leeward Islands! " But these higher rates did not 
offset the increased costs of seamen wages, repairs, 
insurance, and the expense of arming the vessels. 106 The 
uncertainty created by the War, and the heavy losses 
suffered by some shipowners, led many of them to turn to 
the more lucrative transport service. 107 Consequently, 
102 Pares, War and Trade, p. 502. 
103 Houston & Co. to Turner & Paul, 11 March 1777. Houston Papers: 
N. L. S. MSS. 8,793, p. 169; Houston & Co. to James Smith, 5 December 
1777. Ibid., p. 297. 
204 Ragatz, The Planter Class, pp. 145-146. In 1777, the rates were: 
boards 4.10s. per 1060 feet; Loops, 4.4s per thousand feet; staves, 
ES per thousand; puncheon packs, 5s. each; and white oak staves and 
headings 5.10s per thousand. 
1051bid', 
p. 146; Minutes of the West Indies Merchants, 30 October 
1781, Vol. II, fos. 72d-73. 
106 Houston & Co. to Turner & Paul, 20 February 1781. Houston Papers: 
N. L. S. MSS. 8,793, p. 401. 
107 Chrichton, 'The Causes of the Rise of the Price of Sugar', 6 July 
1778. Add. MSS. 12,404, fo. 445. 
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in 1782 'the Society of West India Merchants was obliged 
to resort to law to force ship masters to accept freight 
at even those high figures'. 108 
The homeward freight rates'were also advanced 
significantly. The usual charges from Jamaica to London 
during peace was 3s. 9d. per cwt for sugar, and 6d. per 
gallon for rum. These rose in 1777 by ls. 3d. on sugar, 
and 2d. on rum. Those from the remaining islands were 
increased to 5s. per cwt for sugar, and 7d. per gallon 
for rum, except from Barbados where it was only 6d. 109 
When shipping became scarce in early 1778 the rates on 
sugar went up to 8s. per cwt. 110 Later that year it was 
advanced by a further ls. Charges on rum rose by 2d. to 
3d. per gallon. "' There were further increases in 1779 
and 1780, reaching 10s. 6d. per cwt for sugar and 10d. to 
lld. for rum. 112 The costs of freight from the smaller 
islands, intermingled as they were between the French 
and Dutch colonies frequented by American privateers, 
were as high as those quoted for Jamaica. 
The onset of previous wars in the West Indies also 
usually increased the business prospects of the insurance 
brokers and underwriters in London and the 
Ice Ragatz, The Planter Class, p. 146. 
109'Rates of FrRqht Homewards for 1777', in Supplement to the 
CornwalZ Chronicle and Jcffnaica General Advertiser, 29 March 1777. 
Vol. 1, No. 200: 3. 
"ODalhouse, Stephens & Co. to Smyth, 23 April 1778. Woolnough 
Papers: Ashton Court Collection, AC/WO 16 (27), pp. 89-101. 
"'Houston & Co. to David Graham, 7 December 1778. Houston Papers: 
N. L. S. MSS. 8,794, p. 117. 
112Houston & Co. to Turner and Paul, 14 May 1779. Ibid., p. 193: 
Houston & Co. to Captain David Scott, 11 February 1780. Ibid., 
p. 337. 
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colonies. 113 But during the American War, however, only 
the very wealthy underwriters, backed by large sums of 
money, were able to make substantial profits; for 
although their losses were heavy at times, the premiums 
were high throughout the War. 114 In the Seven Years War 
the cost of insurance for the homeward voyage reached as 
much as 30 guineas per cent in 1757; but this was 
exceptional. The normal rates for vessels without 
convoy was 15 to 20 guineas per cent. Those with convoy 
paid premiums of 7,10, and even 15 guineas lowerP' 
One of the first factors to affect the cost of 
insurance was the onslaught on British shipping by 
American privateers which swa=ed along the trade routes 
to Britain, as well as the seas around the Caribbean 
islands. From about the middle of 1776, these privateers 
captured large numbers of British merchantmen, thus 
bringing heavy reverses to the underwriters who in 
order to recover part of their losses pushed up their 
premiums. For example, after the loss of one of 
Houston's ships, the CaZedonia, his insurance premium 
skyrocketed by 55 per cent, although this seems to be an 
exceptional case. 116 
As the activities of the privateers increased in 
113 R. P. Crowhurst, 'British Oceanic Convoys', p. 90; see his 
Chapter II for a discussion of Marine Insurance. 
114 Charles Wright and Charles Ernest Fayle, A History of Lloyds 
(London, 1928), p. 158. 
1.15 Pares, War and Trade, pp. 495-496. 
116 Houston & Co. to Aretas Akers, 1 October 1776. Houston Papers: 
N. L. S. MSS. 8,793, p. 71. 
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the following year, insurance rates became 'higher than 
in' the last war. 117 Insurance for the homeward voyage 
rose to 25 guineas per cent in February 1777,118 but 
appears to have declined a few months later to around 
15 guineas per cent, to return 5 per cent if the 
merchantmen arrived safely under convoy. 119 which was 
included as a condition in the policies to deter 
captains from leaving the convoy or from placing their 
vessels in the path of the privateers. The threat of a 
French war in 1778 immediately pushed the cost of 
insurance to 20 and 25 guineas per cent, to return 98 
per cent for the former and Z10 per cent for the latterj20 
The actual outbreak of war with France sent the rates 
skyrocketing to around 30 guineas per cent, and they 
remained at this level for the rest of the war. 
Premiums to Ireland in 1781 were E25 per cent to return 
X8 if with convoy. 121 But, although insurance premiums 
were high, shipowners in the West Indian trade were 
required to get the 'character of the ships ... ascertained, 
approved' and certified that they were going to sail with 
convoy before most underwriters would even consider 
117 Houston & Co. to Alexander Houston Jr., 26 May 1777. Ibid. , P. 243. 
ile Houston & Co. to Captain David Graham, 17 February 1777. Ibid., 
P. 185. 
119 Houston & Co. to Alexander Hamilton, 4 June 1777.1-bid., p. 249. 
120 Harry Clarke to Rcbert Dunmore & Co., 14 April 1778. Cuningham of 
Lainshaw MSS.: N. R. A. (Scotland): GD 247, Box 59, Bund. Q. 
121'Rate of Insurance on the West Jamaica Fleetlp 1 November 1781, 
in the CornwaZZ Chronical and Jwnaica GeneraZ Advertiser, Vol. 1, 
No. 439; 3-4. 
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insuring them. -222 
The outward insurance rates were always less than 
those for the homeward-voyage, in previous wars. 123 The 
same conclusions are true for the American War, but the 
premiums were much higher than usual during wartime. In 
June 1777 the cost of insurance was from 8 to 10 guineas 
to return 4 guineas per cent for convoy and safe arrival 
of the ships. ' 24 The rates increased in the following 
year, but by placing a ceiling on the premiums they were 
prepared to pay, some merchants through their brokers 
were able to get the rates they wanted, but such cases 
were rare. For example, when Harry Clarke, a broker, 
had secured 91,500 insurance on the Janet Lawrie and her 
cargo at the lower premium for Robert Dunmore and Company 
of Glasgow, he wrote: 
It was with much difficulty, I affected this 
assurance at your limits of 8 gns per cent as 
our underwriters are very shy of West India 
risques unless really intended to go with 
convoy, or of considerable force, & good pms. 
Considerable number of men is also as material 
as the Guns. 125 
Contributions towards these policies were 
usually spread among the businessmen who normally took 
an equal share in the enterprise. For example, Robert 
122 Clarke to Dunmore & Co. 14 September 1778. Cuningham of 
Lainshaw MSS.: N. R. A. (Scotland): GD 247: Box 59, Bund. 
. 223 Pares, War and Trade, pp. 495-496. 
124 Houston & Co. to Houston & Patterson, 5 June 1777. Houston 
Papers; N. L. S. MSS. 8,793, p. 251. 
225 Clarke to Dunmore, 17 February 1778. Cuningham of Lainshaw 
MSS.: N. R. A. (Scotland): GD. 247: Box 59, Bund. Q. 
86 
Dunmore and Company insured the Jamaica PoZZock and its 
cargo for E1,400 - E1,000 on the ship valued at t2,400 
and E400 on the goods. Seven merchants contributed E200 
each towards the policy which Clarke procured at 10 
guineas per cent, 126 about 5 guineas less than the cost 
of insurance by the more established groups. 127 
Insurance premiums remained at about 15 guineas for the 
remainder of the War, 128 until 1782 when it fell to 
12 guineas per cent withouto convoy. 12 9 
During the American War, the underwriters 
inserted several conditions into their policies. Ships 
on the outward voyage were allowed to go to Cork and 
from there to sail with convoy to the West Indies, but 
within a specified time. The homeward merchantmen 
were insured to depart from the West Indies on a stated 
date only, and under convoy. 130 Prize vessels were 
considered poor risks and many refused to insure them . 
131 
Insurance on sugar was fixed at E24 or E25 per hogshead, 
and therefore the market prices had nothing to do with 
the rate of insurance. But, in spite of these safe- 
guards the underwriters suffered heavy losses. A total 
126 Clarke to Dunmore, 19 March 1778. Ibid. 
127 William Cuninghame to Robert Dunmore & Co., 3 August 1778. lbid. 
128 Houston & Co. to Turner & Paul, 26 April 1779. Houston Papers: 
N. L. S. MSS. 8,794, p. 188. 
129 Wright and Fayle, Lloyds, p. 158. 
. 130 Clarke to Dunmore (no date) Cuningham of Lainshaw MSS.: N. R. A. 
(Scotland); GD. 247; Box 59. 
"'Clarke to Dunmore, 7 March 1778. Ibid. 
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of 3p386 British ships involved in all areas of trade 
were captured, of which 495 were retaken, and 527 
ransomed. 132 
Survival of British-West Indian commerce'during 
wartime depended on the ability of the navy to provide 
adequate protection. This was especially so during the 
Seven Years War, and its effectiveness is well- 
. 133 documented. In contrast, during the American War the 
convoy system had virtually collapsed giving little 
protection to the trade routes, the coasts and approaches 
to Britain and the islands. Convoys for the West Indian 
trade were organized through the West India Committee. 234 
At the beginning of 1776, however, it did not request 
outward convoys, but asked instead for reinforcements 
to strengthen the squadrons stationed in the West Indies, 
and for convoys for the homeward trade. 135 
The arrangements for the homeward convoy differed 
from those of the Seven Years War. Rather than allow 
the admirals stationed in the West Indies to arrange 
convoysp 136 the West India Committee established a 
definite programme of regular sailings from Jamaica and 
132 Wright and Fayle, Lloyds, pp. 155-158. 
. 133 Crowhurst, 'British oceanic Convoys', Chapters IV and V for a 
discussion of the convoy system and the West Indian trade during 
the Seven Years War; Also see Mackesy, The War for America, 
p. 228; Pares, War and Trade, p. 472; Davis, The Rise of English 
Shipping, p. 327. 
134 Crowhurst, 'British Oceanic Convoys'r p. 68. 
135 Minutes of the West Indian Merchants, 2 January 1776, Vol. II, 
fo. 87. 
136 Crowhurst, 'British Oceanic Convoys', p. 146. 
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St. Kitts. Those from Jamaica were to sail at the end 
of April, May, June, July, September and December. The 
first three convoys from St. Kitts were to depart around 
the same time, but the fourth was to sail at the 
beginning of August and the last at the end of October 
after the hurricane season. ' 37 This schedule was never 
kept, and there were several alterations and cancellations 
of convoys. 
Because of the activities of American privateers, 
around the middle of 1776 the West India Committee now 
applied to the Admiralty for a number of outward convoys 
which were scheduled to sail between October and April 
of the following year. This was a departure from the 
system established in the Seven Years War when they 
sailed from Cork to the West Indies regularly between 
December and February. 138 Similarly, not all convoys 
to the West Indies went from Cork during the American 
War; the majority sailed from Portsmouth, with the last 
one in April of each year being allowed to call at 
Madeira. 139 Once France joined the War, the Admiralty 
would usually order the convoys from Cork and Portsmouth 
to unite, and proceed to the West Indies in-strength; 
but whenever this was contemplated, the West India 
Committee was assured that the outward-bound merchantmen 
237Minutes of the West India Merchants, 16 February 1776, Vol. 1. 
230Crowhurstp 'British Oceanic Convoys', pp. 81-82. 
139Minutes of the West India Merchants, 2 September 1777; Vol. I, 
fo. 126: Minutes of the West India Merchants, 24 August 1779, 
Vol. II, fo. 12. 
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would not be delayed off Cork. 
But delays were inevitable, because of the 
weakness of the British navy. The demands of the West 
Indian trade had placed a strain on the depleted 
squadrons in Jamaica and the Leeward Islands. In April 
1776, for example, there were only four ships on the 
Leeward Islands station, 140 and Young warned that unless 
the squadron was reinforced he could not send any 
convoy with the homeward merchant fleet, without 
endangering the safety of the islands. 141 'The Squadron 
Employed here', he wrote, 'is very weak and Insufficient 
for the Various Services wanted, in the present very 
precarious Situation and Uncertainty, who are our 
Friends or Foes'. 142 
This situation became worse after France entered 
the war, and in November 1778, Rear-Admiral Barrington, 
who replaced Young as Commander-in-Chief, also warned 
that if the Leeward Islands squadron were not reinforced, 
he could not 'spare a ship even to convoy the homeward- 
bound trade'. 143 As the fighting moved to the 
Caribbean waters, convoys were further weakened and 
delayed for long periods. The one appointed to sail for 
England in April 1779, for example, did not leave 
140 Young to Stephens, 7 April 1776. Adm. 1/309, fo. 456. 
141 Young to Stephens, 30 September 1776. Ibid., fo. 567. 
142 Young to Stephens, 13 March 1778. Adm. 1/310, fo. 229d. 
143 Rear-Admiral Barrington to Philip Stephens, 19 November 1778. 
Ibid., fo. 352d. 
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St. Kitts until several months later. 144 Its value was 
put at over r2,000,000,145 and to protect it from 
capture by a French squadron under Monsieur de la Motte 
Piquet, which had left Brest for Martinique, Vice- 
Admiral Byron who had superseded Barrington as 
Commander-in-Chief decided to use his entire squadron 
to accompany the convoy out of danger of the French 
islands. 14 6 He saved the trade, but lost Grenada and 
St. Vincent. 147 
The delays in sailing of both the outward and 
homeward-bound convoys resulted in losses to the West 
Indian planters, as well as the British merchants, who 
depended on a steady movement of goods to and from the 
West Indies. Delays of the outward merchantment added 
to the shortages of provisions and ships in the islands. 
There were reports of goods rotting while the ships lay 
at anchor at Portsmouth awaiting convoys. "' The post- 
ponement of homeward-bound vessels for as long as eight 
months 149 led to a deterioration in the cargoes and 
consequent depreciation in the value on their arrival 
in Britain. Vessels lying unprotected off St. Kitts 
144 Vice-Admiral Byron to Phil Stephens, 4 April 1779. Adm. 1/312, 
fos. 56-56d. 
14S Macartney to Germain, 6 June 1777. C. O. 101/23, fo. 181. 
146 Byron to Stephens, 15 June 1779. Adm. 1/312, fo. 84. 
147 Captain Thomas Southey, The ChronologicaZ History of the West 
Indies Uondon, 1827), Vol. II, p. 441. 
148 Minutes of the West India Merchants, 17 February 1778, Vol. I, 
fo. 126. 
149 Minutes of the West India Merchants, 1 June 1779, Vol. II, 
fos. ld-2. 
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were also easy prey for the privateers. The convoy 
system thus failed to meet the high standard 
established during the Seven Years War, and this 
failure led to protests from the local planters, and 
the islands' agents in London. One West Indian planter 
in calling for public support for the Americans pointed 
to Britain's inability to protect the colonies and their 
commerce. 150 In England, Stephen Fuller, the Agent for 
Jamaica, used the capture of a number of merchantment 
under convoy to show the failure of the system. 151 
Lloyd's insurance group, as an example, suffered severe 
losses in 1780 when a Spanish fleet under Cordora, with 
a French reinforcement, captured fifty-five of sixty- 
three ships in a combined East and West India convoy. 
Ths loss estimated at over Z1,500,000 resulted in the 
failure of many underwriters. 152 
Another branch of British-West Indian commerce 
affected by the American War was the slave trade. 
During wartime when no contestant had any clear control 
of the sea routes, the trade declined. 153 However, in 
the wars of 1739-174ý and 1756-1763, when British naval 
power was superior to that of her enemies, even though 
British shipping to Africa decreased, slave imports into 
150'The West India Planter to the West India Planters and 
Merchants;, in the Antigua Gazette, 16 September 1779. C. O. 101/22, 
fo. 128. 
15 'Memorial of Stephen Fuller to Lord Germain, 8 December 1779. 
C. O. 137/75, fo. 211d. 
152 Wright and Fayle, LZoyds, pp. 42,155. 
153 Curtin, Atlantic Slave Trade, p. 154. 
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the West Indies increased because the ships carried more 
'slaves to the ton'. Consequently, the number of Negroes 
retained in the colonies was not seriously reduced, if 
at all. 15" In contrast, the number of slaves retained 
in the'sugar colonies during the American War declined 
quite markedly. 155 
Many of the ships engaged in the African trade 
were captured within sight of the British colonies by 
American privateers. ' 56 For example, a sloop belonging 
to the firm of Ashburner and Hinds of Grenada, on a 
voyage from Sierra Leone to Grenada with 90 slaves, 
four tons of ivory, and six tons of camwood was captured 
at the end of February 1777 by an American privateer 
within a few leagues of St. Vincent, and carried into 
St. Lucia. 157 The snow ApoZZo Carrying about 290 
slaves, 158 and the brig St. George, Robert Stein master, 
with approximately 199 slaves were also captured off 
Barbados in the following month. 159 
The American War of Independence did not ruin, 
but it seriously affected British-West Indian commerce 
in a way that no earlier war had done. British shipping 
154 Pares, War and Trade, pp. 472-473. 
15sSee Appendix B, Table 3. 
156 Long, 'History of Jamaica', Add. MSS. 12,404, fo. 446d; Hay 
to Germain (marked secret), 12 July 1777. C. O. 28/56, fo. 127. 
157 Macartney to Germain, 6 March 1777. C. O. 101/20, fo. 128d. 
Ise Deposition of Richard Webb, 25 April 1777. Ibid., fos. 186- 
186d. 
159 Deposition of Robert Tait, 21 April 1777. Ibid., fo. 184. 
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was greatly reduced, as was the production of sugar and 
rum on which the economy of the islands was based. 
Although larger quantities of provisions were carried to 
the islands from Britain and Ireland, most of these 
probably went to feed the larger white population 
swollen by an influx of loyalists in some islands and 
by the presence of the troops. Some lumber also 
reached the colonies from Britain, but demand greatly 
exceeded supply. The decline of the slave trade also 
meant the loss of yet another element which was needed 
to maintain a buoyant sugar economy. 
Apart from reducing the production of staples, 
the American War had dampened the spirit of the planterst 
and they appeared to have lost part of the driving 
force so characteristic of the West Indian planter who 
produced tropical staples amidst all the hardships and 
dangers to himself and his family. But nevertheless, 
in spite of the many setbacks, British West Indian 
trade survived although greatly weakened, as was the 
imperial tie which fostered it. An extract from a letter 
written by a resident of Bristol best sums up the 
effect of the American War on British-West Indian trade. 
He wrote: 
**9 Commerce hath suffered an unspeakable injury. some branches of it have been 
almost, if not quite annihilated; and others 
are so miserably incumbered with heavy 
Expenses; that they are attended with little 
or no Profit. But the Calamities of the 
Nation, are too painfully felt, to need 
being mentioned, as they are likewise too 
numerous, to be particularly recounted. 
Their existence however is not more certain 
than the Cause of them is manifest. They 
94 
have aZZ originated in the War with 
America. And they can never end, while 
that continues. They have increased every 
Year, since it began, and will increase 
still faster, the longer it is carried on. 160 
The loss of the American trade had therefore forced the 
West Indian merchants and planters to rely on the foreign 
islands for that part of their supplies which could 
have been received only from the continent, thus creating 
an extensive illegal trade with the Americans in the 
foreign ports. 
160 Fellow Citizen to the Citizens of Bristol, 22 January 1782. 
Bristol Public Library: Jefferies Collections of MSS., Vol. viii, 
p. 94. 
CHAPTER III 
BRITISH WEST INDIAN MERCHANTS AND ILLEGAL TRADE 
In the development of trade between the West 
Indies and the American colonies before 1776, smuggling 
formed an important and profitable business. The 
percentage of imports smuggled into the mainland 
colonies, and thus the extent of the illegal trade are 
not exactly known. During the American War, contraband 
trade was, apart from privateering, the chief means by 
which the British West Indies received most of the 
products which could not be obtained from Britain or 
Ireland, 1 and by which the rebellious colonies, on the 
other hand, procured supplies of British manufactures, 
tropical products and war materials. The illegal 
commerce depended, of course, on the cooperation of the 
rebels and the British colonists whose social and family 
ties enabled both parties to trade with little risk. 
Although the smugglers aided the American rebellion, they 
also helped the planters to survive the War. Not all the 
illegal trading was done directly -a large part was 
carried through intermediaries in the foreign islands 
where commercial agents for the United States were 
stationed to handle American trade, in addition to a 
"State 
of Trade with-America from 1773 to 1782' (no date). C. O. 
325/6, fo. 4 (hereafter cited as 'State of Trade'). 
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variety of other related matters (more fully discussed 
in Chapter IV). 
The restrictions imposed on American-West Indian 
commerce by the Prohibitory Act and the need for supplies 
formerly received from the thirteen colonies were 
incentives to the British West Indian smugglers. 
Similarly, the enforcement of the Act caused severe 
shortages in the mainland colonies of woollen and Negro 
clothing, rum, molasses and salt which were sold at 
vastly increased prices. Likewise, the prohibition of 
the exportation of gunpowder, arms and ammunition from 
any part of the British Empire to the rebellious colonies 
forced the Americans to find alternative channels through 
which these articles were clandestinely shipped to the 
continent. Congress therefore resolved in July 1775 that 
American merchants importing war materials, within nine 
months of that date, would be exempted from the non- 
exportation resolution, and would be allowed to export 
American products to the value of their imports. A copy 
of this resolution was sent to all provincial committees 
of safety, and the Pennsylvania delegates were'requested 
2 
to forward copies in hand-bills to the West Indies . 
In the pre-Revolutionary and Revolutionary periods, 
the American colonies depended almost entirely on the 
British West Indies for salt, which was essential in 
making butter, and preserving meat and fish for domestic 
use, as well as for exportation. Over half of the 
2 Ford, ed., JournaZs of Congress, vol. ix, pp. 184-185. 
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million and a half bushels imported annually came from 
the West Indies, a quarter from southern Europe and the 
3 
rest from Britain The prohibition of American commerce 
with the remainder of the British Empire had thus cut off 
the chief suppliers of salt to the mainland colonies, and 
therefore the permission given to the Bermudians to trade 
freely with the rebels was a strategic move by Congress 
because any interruption of salt supplies threatened not 
only the commerce of the colonies, but their ability to 
wage a successful war. 
The scarcity of salt at the beginning of the 
American War caused severe hardships among the rebellious 
colonists, and exorbitant prices were charged for the 
limited quantities available. For instance, the price 
increased from 6s. per bushel in 1776 4 to almost 30s. in 
the middle of 1777.5 Because of the high price of salt 
in America, many British West Indian merchants risked 
exporting it to the continent either directlyp or through 
St. Eustatius and Bermuda. For example, the Young Shark, 
commanded by Ezra Field, belonging to St. Eustatius was 
captured on a voyage from Anguilla, one of the British 
Leeward Islands, to the Dutch colony with a cargo of salt 
3 Asa E. Martin, 'American Privateers and the West India Trade, 1776- 
1777', A. H. R. (1934-1945), Vol. XXXIX, pp. 704-705; Lord Sheffield, 
Observation on the Commerce of the American States, p. 117. 
William Spear to John Spear, 6 January 1776. Adm. 1/309, fo. 450d. 
5 Issac Smith, Sr. to John Adams, 13 August 1777, Adams, The Adams 
Papers, ed., Butterfield; Vol. II, pp. 310-311. 
98 
for America. 
The opportunities created by the American War for 
contraband trade were fully exploited by the Bermudians 
who retained a special relation with the rebellious 
colonies, but as 'loyal' British subjects were free to 
trade with the British West Indies, and Turks Islands 
from which they obtained most of their salt. In addition, 
they controlled a sizeable share of the lucrative trade 
with St. Eustatius. Of the Bermudian merchants engaged 
in contraband trade with the rebels, members of the 
Tucker family were the most important, and owned many of 
7 
the ships used in the illegal commerce . For example, 
the schooner RacheZZ belonging to John Tucker, merchant 
of St. George, captain Purcell Johnson, was loaded with 
850 bushels of salt, some loaves of sugar, and a quantity 
of other goods, consigned to John Wright Stanley and 
Company of Edenton, in North Carolina; 8 but was captured 
enroute to America. Fortunately for Tucker, he had 
remained home to procure another vessel of salt for 
Stanley and Company. 9 
In order to smuggle successfully, the Bermudian 
r"'An account of Ships and vessels taken as Prize of War by his 
Majesty's ships under Vice-Admiral Young at Barbados and the Leeward 
Islands, and in the seas adjacent', December 1776. Adm. 1/309, 
fo. 593. 
7 Kerr, Bermuda, pp. 55-58; P. Barrow Searcher of Customs at 
Bermuda, to Peter Franchlyn, Collector at Jamaica, (no date). 
Add. MSS. 38,376, fo. 93. 
8 Henry Tucker to John Wright Stanley & Co., 6 March 1778. H. C. A. 
32/436/4, fo. 8. 
9 John Tucker to Stanley & Co., 6 March 1778. Ibid., fo. 9. 
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merchants who controlled the Assembly would apply to the 
Governor for licences to go to America for provisions, 
on the pretext that the island was in imminent danger of 
famine. In some instances, the Assembly's fears were 
real,, 10 but on numerous occasions, the threat of famine 
was exaggerated. For example, on an appeal from the 
Assembly at the end of 1777 that there would be famine 
if provisions were not brought to the island immediately, 
Governor George James Bruere granted a licence to Ephraim 
Paynter, 
-master 
of the sloop Recovery,. to go to 
St. Eustatius in ballast for foodstuffs. 11 Instead 
Paynter went directly to North Carolina where he was 
captured by the Phoenix warship, -Commander Hyde Parker 
Jr. 12 Bruere also issued permits to vessels wishing to 
go to the rebellious colonies contrary to the stipula- 
tions of the Prohibitory Act. As an example, the LittZe 
Betsy, master Josiah Tatem, was given a licence to go to 
Georgia or North Carolina for provisions, to be sold 
under the supervision of Henry Tucker. 13 
It is difficult to understand what motivated 
Governor Bruere to issue permits to vessels going to the 
10 St. George Tucker to John Page, A Member of the Council of 
Safety for the colony of Virginia, 31 March 1776. William Bell 
Clark, ed., Naval Documents of the American Revolution (Washington, 
1969), Vol. IV, pp. 604-605. 
"'Geor'ge James Bruere to All Whom these Presents Shall Come,, 26 
November 1777. H. C. A. 32/437/13, fo. 7. The Recovery was originally 
owned in Virginia, but the previous register was cancelled and a 
new one taken out in Bermuda. Ibid., fo. 6. 
12 Deposition of Thomas Roston, 19 January 1778. Ibid., fos. 2-2d. 
13 Bruere to All Flag Officers, Captains, Commanders etc. (no date). 
H. C. A. 32/390/10, fo. 9. 
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rebellious colonies, and why the provisions were to be 
sold under the supervision of a member of the Tucker 
family. of course, the applications received the support 
of the House; but there is little doubt that Bruere was 
being fooled on some occasions by the Assembly. For 
instance, a claim was made to him in January 1778 that 
Bermuda was experiencing a severe scarcity of provisions, 
and that famine was imminent unless supplies were carried 
to the island immediately. Bruere therefore gave a 
licence to the owners of the sloop Ranger, master John 
Ingam, to go to Virginia for provisions which were to be 
sold under the supervision of John Tucker. But from 
Bermuda, the vessel went in ballast to the Turks Islands 
for a cargo of salt. It then sailed from there, by 
authority of another licence from Bruere, for Virginia; 
but was captured enroute by the British privateer 
St. Andrew, commander Simon Donnell. 24 If the inhabi- 
tants of Bermuda were really faced with famine as the 
Assembly had claimed, then the vessel should have gone 
directly to America. It can therefore be assumed that 
the Tuckers had an undue influence over the Governor, 
and famine was used as a ploy to get his cooperation. 
To cover their illegal trade and to delude the 
captains of British warships, the Bermudians procured 
Dutch registers from St. Eustatius, and clearances for 
14 'Claim of Anthony Van Dam of ... New York Merchant for and in 
behalf of Haratio Wood, John Easton, John Masters, Benjamin Morris 
and William Morris Merchants of Bermuda, ' 7 April 1779. H. C. A. 
32/436/21, fos. 2-3. 
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their vessels from the St. Kitts merchants. 15 Before 
the American Revolutionr the Bermudians shared in the 
West Indian carrying trade, and with the loss of American 
shipping, their vessels were even more widely used in 
West Indian commerce. The captains of Bermudian vessels 
would go to the Turks Islands, or Anguilla for salt. 
With the assistance of the officers of the Customs, these 
would be legally cleared out for New York or Nova Scotia 
for lumber. In some instances, however, they went 
instead to one of the rebellious colonies where, after 
discharging their cargoes, they loaded tobacco which was 
carried to a sugar colony. Here, the vessels were then 
freighted with sugar and rum which were carried to one 
of the rebellious colonies, usually North Carolina. 
Sometimes the captains would go in ballast to one of the 
middle colonies for lumber and flour. On other occasions, 
they went to a southern colony for rice and indigo which 
were then carried either to Bermuda or another British 
island. on one such voyage, the Superb owned by Thomas 
Forbes and John Tucker, was captured by the CamMa war- 
ship, commanded by John Collins. " 
Because of the success of the Bermudiansp so much 
salt was received in America that in March 1778 the 
merchant William Newton reported that it had become a 
drug in Baltimore. 17 Attempts by British officials to 
IsKerr, Bermuda, pp. 55-58. 
16 Deposition of Richard Hinson, 9 April 1779. II. C. A. 32/457/1, 
fos. 3d-4. 
17 William Newton to Issac Gouverneur, 14 March 1778. H. C. A. 
32/419/14, fo. 13. 
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restrict the trade in salt failed. For example, when 
Captain Charles Everitt of the armed brigantine Badger 
went to the Turks Islands in 1777, because of the large 
number of American and Bermudian vessels loading salt 
there, ýe imposed an embargo on its exportation to 
Bermuda and New York, 18 but to no avail. Vessels with 
false certificates 'surreptitiously procured from New 
York', as well as some of the British islands, succeeded 
in evading the restrictions. " 
Although most of the war supplies exported to the 
rebels reached them from the French and Dutch West 
Indies, 20 when small arms and gunpowder could not be 
bought at the foreign islands they were procured from 
the neighbouring British islands .21 Attempts by Vice- 
Admiral Young to restrict the sale of gunpowder to the 
Americans failed. 22 Intelligence reaching England from 
South Carolina also informed Lord Germain that the rebels 
were furnished with significant supplies of gunpowder 
is Gayton to Stephens, 14 April 1777. Adm. 1/240, fo. 363d. 
"Thomas Shirley to Lord Germain, 30 August 1781. C. O. 151/61# 
fo. 127. 
20 Young to Stephens, 7 April 1776. Adm. 1/309, fo. 408. 
21 Martin, 'The West India Trade, 1776-17771. A. H. R., Vol. xxxix, 
P. 704; Young to Stephens, 30 August 1775. Adm. 1/309, fo. 340. 
22 Young to Craister Greatheed, 22 August 1775. Ibid., fos. 342- 
342d, 343. Similar letters were also sent to Governor Thomas 
Shirley of Dominica, Governor Edward Ilay of Barbados and 
Lieutenant-Governor William Young of Grenada; also see James 
Young to the President, and Members of the Council of Antigua, 
11 August 1775. Ibid., fo. 346. 
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from Jamaica. 23 
But most West Indian Governors were unaware of 
this trade. Some even denied that the merchants in their 
colonies were exporting gunpowdef to the rebellious 
colonie6,24 but the available evidence points to the 
contrary .25 For instance, the Bermudians who traded 
with the other British West Indian islands and the rebels 
supplied the latter with salt and gunpowder. 26 Likewise, 
though Sir Basil Keith had prohibited the exportation of 
gunpowder from Jamaica, the merchants there supplied the 
Americans with sizeable quantities of that article. 
'Under the colour of fallacious and fraudulent clear- 
ances', wrote Governor Archibald Campbell, the Jamaicans 
exported canvas and other stores to the enemy, via the 
Spanish merchants at Havana. 27 Furthermore, they had 
collaborated with the Americans, and supplied them with 
naval stores and ammunition throughout the War. 2i 
Although the evidence for illegal trade between 
Jamaica and the rebels is less voluminous than that for 
23 Lord Germain to Sir Basil Keith, 23 December 1775. c. O. 137/70, 
fos. 167-167d. 
24 Edward Hay to Lord Germain, 13 February 1776. C. O. 28/56, 
fos. 26d-27; Sir Basil Keith to Lord Germain, 2 March 1776. C. O. 
137/71, fos. 81-82d. 
25 See Martin, 'The West India Trade, 1776-1777', A. H. R., Vol. 
XXXIX, p. 704. 
26 Barrow to Franchlyn (no date). Add. MSS. 38,376, fo. 93. 
27l In Privy Council', 9 July 1782. C. O. 137/82, fos. 283-283d. 
2 eArchibald Campbell to the Earl of Shelburne, 11 July 1782. 
Ibid., fos. 279-279d; Campbell to Shelburne, 30 September 1782. 
Ibid., fo. 292. 
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the Leeward Islandsl it could be assumed that any conclu- 
sions drawn from an examination of the evidence for the 
latter ar& also applicable to Jamaica. Helen M. Allen, 
in her work 'British Commercial Policy in the West Indies 
1783-17931 maintained that 
Considerable quantities of provisions must 
have entered the Islands through illicit 
channels, largely under cloak of trade with 
the neutral islands, though other means were 
also found. Thus, for example in Jamaica, 
it was well known that many of the merchants 
there had ventures in privateers, American 
as well as British. 29 
Despite attempts to curb the illicit commerce 
between the West Indians and the rebels, ways were 
devised to continue it. In March 1776, for example, 
Captain Taylor of the ship Industry, belonging to North 
Carolina, was ordered to sail from there to Jamaica, in 
spite of the restrictions imposed by the Prohibitory Actr 
with a valuable cargo of provisions which he was to sell, 
30 and the proceeds to be used to purchase sugar and rum. 
As incentives for undertaking the voyage, if Taylor were 
detained or captured by British ships, his wages were to 
be continued until he returned to America. He was also 
given a commission of 5 per cent on the outward goods, 
and 2ý per cent on the return cargo .31 The Industry was 
captured enroute to Jamaica for trading contrary to the 
29 Helen M. Allen, 'British Commercial Policy in the West Indies 
1783-1793'. Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis (London, 1928), P. 34. 
3 ORichard Quince & J. Foster to Captain Taylor, 29 March 1776. 
H. C. A. 32/360/15, fo. 9. 
"Foster to Taylore 5 April 1776. Ibid., fo. ld. 
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Prohibitory Act* 32 
But the Act itself was an important factor in 
fostering the illicit trade. By allowing West Indian 
merchants to trade freely with those areas in America. -ý 
which came under British control, it aided illegal 
commerce with the rebellious colonies. 33 In some 
instances, American ships carrying false registers 
obtained in New York were taken to Jamaica where they 
were sold for cash, to be used in the contraband trade. 
Some traders even left money with their Jamaican 
merchant friends to be sent to their wives in America 24 
Other merchants in order to maintai:, z their trade 
links with the continent would send money to Saint 
Domingue to purchase tropical products for their friends 
and correspondents2s Joseph and Eliphalet Fitch, 
Jamaican merchants, were guilty of this practice. On 
one occasion, they gave William Cockram, master of the 
I 
ship Argo, E21018 sterling to purchase molasses in the 
French colony for the Boston merchant Thomas Boylston. 
36 
A bill of exchange for over Z491 sterling payable to 
32 George III vs. The Industry, 28 January 1779. Ibid., fo. 1d. 
33 Sir Peter Parker to Philip Stephens, 19 April 1778. Adm. 
1/241, fo. lld. 
34 David Gregory to Polly Gregory, 19 May 1777. C. O. 101/21, fo. 45. 
35Clark Gayton to Governor Dalling, 8 January 1778. C. O. 137/73, 
fo. 76; Gayton to Philip Stephens, 14 January 1778. Adm. 1/240, fos. 
494-494d; Affidavit of William Cockram, 9 January 1778. C. O. 137/73, 
fo. 90. 
36 Cayton to Stephens, 8 January 1778. C. O. 137/73, fo. 76d. 
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Boylston and drawn on the Nantucket merchant William 
Rotch was also found in a prize captured by Captain 
Everitt. 37 Five or six other vessels belonging to 
Rotch were already seized for trading illegally with 
Jamaica. 38 
Any punitive action against the Fitches, was ruled 
out by Thomas Harrison's opinion. The Attorney-General 
had prepared an earlier report in 1777 advising the then 
Governor Sir Basil Keith against prosecuting Jamaican 
merchants found trading or corresponding with the American 
rebels. 39 He now ruled that the Fitches could not also 
be considered rebels because they corresponded or traded 
with the Americans, nor was this sufficient evidence to 
indict them on any treasonable offence. They were 
guilty only of trading contrary to the Prohibitory Act; 
for which the penalty was the seizure and probable 
condemnation of their vessels. Harrison further con- 
tended that the West Indian merchants were free to trade 
with the American loyalists, many of whom were Quakers, 
and therefore not involved in any military action against 
the King. As he had done, in the case of the nine 
American vessels captured under the provisions of the 
Restraining Acts, Harrison based his opinion on c7t strict 
interpretation of the Prohibitory Act, rather than on the 
intention of Parliament to curb the illegal commerce 
37 Affidavit of William Cockram, 9 January 1778. Ibid., fo. go. 
38 Gayton to Dalling, 8 January 1778. Ibid., fo. 76. 
39 Thomas Harrison to Sir Basil Keith, 1777. Ibid., fos. 84-87. 
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between the rebellious colonies and the West Indies. 
'The very Preamble of the Prohibitory Act expressly 
mentions', he wrote: 
that many only are in Rebellion; it 
supposes then that there are many who are 
not. Are those who are not in Rebellion 
to be involved with those who are? or is 
each individual to stand or fall by his 
own actual innocence or Guilt? The 
Government have not accepted Simon's 
Maxim "Cumine ab uno disces omnes", nor, 
if they had, would the Laws support them 
in it, or, for the Conduct of the many, 
try and convict aZZ. 40 
Surely, Harrison did not expect. the British govern- 
ment to frame an Act which would single out every 
individual colonist in America. The provisions of the 
Prohibitory Act were broad enough to allow the loyalists 
to take advantage of its provisos. Four months later, 
41 the Attorney-General refused to alter his opinion . 
The reason for his position seems unclear, but it is 
quite possible that he was sympathetic to the American 
cause. The Fitches were certainly involved in numerous 
business transactions in America and the Dutch colony of 
Surinam, and traded freely with the rebels. The corres- 
. 
pondence of other West Indian merchants bears testimony 
to this. For example, Messieurs Bourn and Lue,, Grenada 
merchants, wrote to Thomas Day of Surinam: 'my friend 
Mr. Fitch is in expectation of dispatching a vessel soon. 
He has given me the generous offer of shipping my goods 
40 'Harrison's Opinion', 1777. nid., fos. 94-94d; see discussion 
of Harrison's opinion in Chapter III. 
41 Thomas Harrison to John Dalling, a January 1778. Ibid., fo. 94. 
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on any vessel of his free of Freight as they are not 
Bulky'. 42 When Eliphalet Fitch was appointed Receiver- 
General in 1784, Governor Campbell objected because he 
had supported the Americans during the War. Campbell 
could not have legally deprived Fitch of his office and 
therefore he acquiesced. 
43 
In addition to trading illegally, Joseph Fitch, 
and other Jamaican merchants filed writs of habeas corpus 
with the new Chief Justice Edward Webley for the release 
of American sailors captured in vessels trading contrary 
to the Prohibitory Act. For example, on receilvIng 
information that Robert Sands, former commander of the 
sloop CorneZia, and Nathan Bull, -former master of the 
Dove, were detained on board the AnteZope, Captain Judd, 
Fitch applied to Webley for a writ of habeas corpus for 
the release of the men, 44 which was granted. Gayton's 
compliance with several more court orders for the 
release of American traders stemmed from his assessment 
of the political climate of Jamaica - he feared, and 
rightly so, 4S that his refusal would have sparked off 
1 46 great Disturbances' among the white people . Apart 
42 M. H. Lue and Metatiah Bourn to Thomas Day, 10 April 1777. 
C. O. 101/20, fo. 50d. 
43Archibald Campbell to Lord North, 22 January 1784. C. O. 137/84, 
fos. 96d-97. 
44Affidavit of Joseph Fitch, 16 January 1776. Adm. 1/240, fos. 
145-145d. 
45 Thomas Harrison to Clark Gayton, 17 January 1776. Ibid., fo. 142. 
46 Gayton to Stephens, 5 February 1776. Ibid., fo. 158; see Gayton 
to Stephens, 2 January 1776. Ibid., fos. 139d-140. 
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from maintaining peace in the colony, Gayton's cooper- 
ation had subjugated the military to the civil authority, 
and some welcomed his readiness 'not to affect their 
liberties & properties... beyond... the necessity' of 
his du ty . 
47 
The response of the Governors in the remaining 
colonies was similar to Keith' S. 48 They published 
proclamations in 1775 banning the exportation of gun- 
Powder, although in the Leeward Islands, especially 
St. Kitts, where there was greater overt support for the 
American rebellion (discussed more fully in Chapter VIII), 
the absence of the Governor who had returned to England 
on leave made it more difficult for cooperation between 
the civilian and military authorities. At its meeting 
to discuss Young's request, the Council of Antigua agreed 
that while it could adopt measur es to discourage the 
illegal exportation of gunpowder and arms to the rebels, 
it had 'no authority to prevent the buying and selling 
of Merchandize which hath been fairly imported .49 The 
Council therefore refused to empower its President 
Thomas Jarvis to issue any proclamation, as some Antigua 
merchants, on the pretext that they did not know the 
Americans were in rebellion, openly opposed any restric- 
47 Harrison to Gayton, 17 January 1776. Ibid., fo. 142d. 
48 Thomas Shirley to James Young, 25 September 1775. Adm. 1/309, 
fo. 360d; Edward Hay to James Young, 25 September 1775. Ibid., 
fo. 361; William Young to James Young, 17 August 1775. Ibid., 
fo. 361d. 
49 Thomas Jarvis to James Young, 17 August 1775. Ibid., fo. 246d. 
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50 
tions on their commerce. 
Of course, this type of reasoning was used as a 
cloak to trade with the Americans. Some West Indian 
merchants took full advantage of the resolution of 
Congress allowing them to send powder to the rebellious 
colonies in exchange for provisions and lumber. Young's 
charge that the Antiguans were exporting powder to the 
rebels was substantiated in the correspondence of William 
Spear of Baltimore with his son John, merchant of Antigua, 
whom he told: 'Your powder will entitle me to load the 
sloop out but [I] would not advise you to be large in 
that article as large quantities are expected in daily'. 51 
The merchants of St. Kitts adopted a parallel 
attitude to that of the Antiguans. Craister Greatheed, 
President of the Council, and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Leeward Islands, refused to issue a proclamation banning 
the exportation of gunpowder without taking the advice 
of the Council, which could not meet as some members 
were ill. His own inquiry, however, had led him to 
believe that there was very little powder on the island 
which could have been sold to the Americans. S2 When the 
Council met in the middle of September, it unanimously 
opposed the publication of a proclamation. ' 3 Greatheed's 
so Young to Stephens, 30 August 1775. Ibid., fo. 340d. 
"William Spear to John Spear, 6 January 1776. Adm. 1/309, 
fo-451d. 
52 Craister Greatheed to James Young, 30 August 1775. Ibid., 
fo. 340. 
53 Extract of Minutes of the Council of St. Kitts, 13 September 
1775. C. O. 152/55, fos. 70-70d. 
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refusal to use his initiative and prohibit the export of 
powder angered Lord Germain who warned him that his 
attitude marked 'a want of zeal for the King's service 
that cannot but bedispleasing to his Majesty.... 15, 
Germain's reprimand had the necessary effect. Greatheed 
immediately summoned the Council, and with its advice 
issued a proclamation on 22 February banning the exporta- 
tion of war materials from the Leeward Islands. SS 
These restrictions met with little success. The 
geographical placing of the British Leewards among the 
French and Dutch islands made it relatively easy for the 
British merchants to trade with the Americans in the 
foreign ports, especially St. Eustatius which remained 
as a free port during the War. Furthermore, in order to 
continue trading with the West Indies, the Americans 
developed a new method of carrying on their commerce. 
Their vessels loaded with contraband goods at the French 
ports employed nominal French captains who, if stopped 
by British warships, produced fictitious bills of sale 
for the vessels. 56 
Complaints about such illegal practices were 
constantly sent to the French West Indian authorities, 
but to no avail. The ship Betsy, for example, sailed 
from America with the mate as captain. After loading 
54 Lord Germain to Craister Greathbed, 23 December 1775. Ibid., 
fos. 30-30d. 
55Greatheed to Germain, 2 March 1776. Ibid., fo. 63; see A 
Proclamation, in Extract of the St. Christopher Gazette, March 
1776. Ibid., fo. 72d. 
"Young to Stephens, 30 August 1775. Adm. 1/309, fo. 347d; 
'A Case', 1776. Adm. 1/240, fo. 188. 
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military and naval supplies at St. Pierre, in Martinique, 
a French master was appointed to take the ship to America. 
An appeal from Captain Francis Gordon of the warship Argo 
to the Governor Count De Nosier for the seizure of the 
Betsy was turned down. At the same time, De Nosier 
promised to 'sell the Americans Powder, Arms, or anything 
else they wanted, under the nose of any English Man of 
Warl. '57 Thus the'policy of the foreign governments, in 
addition to the lack of support for the naval Commanders 
from some Assemblies and Councils in the British West 
Indies, restricted the British officials from taking any 
effective action to stop the illegal trade. 
After the Prohibitory Act-went into effect at the 
beginning of 1776, and because of the resolution of the 
Continental Congress allowing merchants to export 
American products to the value of their imports of gun- 
powder, numerous arrangements were concocted between 
relatives and business associates in America and the 
British West Indies for a continuation of their former 
commercial relations. In the trade which emerged 
cargoes of American products were consigned to agents 
in the foreign islands for re-export to the British 
colonies. These agents were mainly concerned with public 
matters but transacted business for private individuals. 
-The case of William Spear illustrates this point. 
At the beginning of 1776, he decided to use his son, 
57 Intelligence to James Young from Francis Grant Gordon, 
7 October 1775. Adm. 1.309, fos. 364-364d. 
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John, in the lucrative illicit commerce. Consequently, 
he consigned cargoes of lumber and provisions to Abraham 
van Bibber, the Maryland commercial agent at St. 
Eustatius, who agreed to accept no commission from John, 
in return for his assistance, which was never spelt out 
but might have involved procuring badly-needed British 
manufactures, gunpowder and arms, as well as securing 
registers for American vessels. The Spears agreed to 
the arrangement. 58 John was involved in other business 
transactions for American companies. He purchased bills 
of exchange for Usher Roe & Company of Baltimore - one 
was for X1,000 sterling at 160 per cent exchange, or 
E500 at any rate of exchange. These were then remitted 
to London to buy manufactures. In addition, Spear also 
settled small debts in Antigua for the Company. 
59 
But the main centre of the illegal trade from 
1775 to 1780 was St. Eustatius. This small and unpro- 
ductive Dutch island was described by Lieutenant-Governor 
Valentine Morris in 1774 as a 'barren rock' which was 
'one of the most populous richest spots for its size on 
60 the globe', St Eustatius which became, during the 
American War, the headquarters of merchants trading 
illicitly to America, was ideally situated for trade with 
the British and French colonies: 
SeSpear to Spear, 6 January 1776. Adm. 1/309, fos. 450-451d. 
59 Usher Roe & Co. to John Spear, 15 November 1775. Ibid., 
fo. 448. 
60 Valentine Morris to the Earl of Dartmouth, 25 December 1774. 
C. O. 101/18, Part 1, fo. 16. 
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St. Christopher lay but some eight miles 
to the Southeast. Northward, a few miles 
farther away, lay th 'e 
French Island of 
St. Bartholomew.. St. Croix, a Danish 
Island to the Windward, was but little 
more remote; and beyond, at no great 
distance, lay St. Thomas and the Spanish 
colony of Porto Rico, while beyond St. 
Christopher, to the southeastward, lay 
intermingled the rich islands belonging to 
England and to France - Antigua, Guadeloupe, 
Dominica, Martinique, Barbados, St. Lucia, 
St. Vincent, Grenada and Tobago. 61 
Many British and West Indian merchants, recog- 
nizing the economic potentialities of St. Eustatius, 
emigrated to that island and became Dutch burghers, and 
in conjunction with the merchants from the neighbouring 
British colonies, they formed the main commercial link 
between Britain, the West Indies, and the rebellious 
colonies. 'Here the English bought the products of 
America, and the Americans the manufactures of England: 
here, after France had joined the war, the British 
merchants met the planters from the French West Indian 
islands; and here, finally was the chief market where 
the Americans obtained their military stores'. 62 By 
sending contraband goods to St. Eustatius, the Dutch 
merchants were able to evade the regulations of the 
States General who had forbidden the export of war 
supplies to the rebel colonies. 
on some occasions, articles destined for America 
61J. Franklin Jameson, 'St. Eustatius in the American Revolution' I 
A. H. R. (July, 1903), Vol. VIII, p. 683. 
62 Friedrick Edler, The Dutch RepubZic and the American RevoZution 
(Baltimore, 1911), pp. 42-43. 
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were exchanged in mid-ocean. 63 An example is the Dutch 
ship De Hoop declared to be enroute to Flushing when she 
was captured by the Seaford at the end of May 1777. on 
board was a cargo of 1750 barrels of gunpowder and three 
very large casks of flints which the captain claimed were 
being returned to Europe, as he was unable to sell them 
at St. Eustatius. He had already sold 3,000 pounds of 
powder, and 750 stands of arms complete with bayonets 
and cartridge boxes. But in spite of these claims, the 
vessel was suspected of transferring its cargo at sea 
64 
and was therefore seized . It does not seem, however, 
that many such transfers took place. On the other hand, 
most contraband goods were first landed in St. Eustatius. 
But, if that island became the rendezvous for the 
Americans it also served as a useful depot for the British 
West Indian merchants, especially after France entered the 
War in 1778 .6s This was not the only, or most important, 
reason which made St. Eustatius so valuable to the British 
colonists. It was as the centre for illegal trade that 
it served the islands well; for under the guise of 
trading with St. 'Kitts, the merchants from Antigua, Nevis, 
Grenada, Barbados', and the remaining British colonies 
traded with the Americans. It was also mandatory for the 
American merchants, wishing to trade with the foreign 
63 Ibid., p. 37. 
64 Young to Stephens, 12 June 1777. Adm. 1/310, fos. 137d-138. 
65 Jameson, 'St. Eustatius in the American Revolution', A. H. R. 
Vol. VIII, p. 685; Ragatz, The Planter Class, pp. 159-160; Edler, 
The Dutch Republic and the American Revolution, p. 43. 
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West Indies, to secure the assistance of their British 
counterparts as a guarantee. for the success of their 
business plans. An American vessel carrying British 
papers would escape seizure by British warships, and as 
they almost always carried Dutch and French papersp their 
chances of being taken in West Indian waters were greatly 
reduced. 
The Edenton merchant William Savage, for example, 
made plans with John Crohon and Company of St. Eustatius, 
for salt which he agreed to purchase with American 
products; but he advised Crohon that if their scheme 
were to work successfully, his company had to enlist the 
support of the British West Indians, by allowing them to 
share in the business. Savage, who had previous 
commercial relations with the British merchants, was 
confident that they would assist Crohon and Company 'to 
take out English Clearances, with English Bottoms for 
Halifax, or St. Augustine', 66 in accordance with the 
proviso of the Pr'ohibitory Act. As his vessels also 
carried foreign clearances and registers, they were 
protected from rebel privateers when they arrived on the 
coast of America. 67 
Around the same time, Carter Braxton, a Member of 
the Continental Congress in 1776, appointed Isaac 
Gouverneur his agent in a trade deal between Braxton, 
Willing and Morris, Philadelphia merchants, and P. Merckle 
66 William Savage to John Crohon & Co., 13 September 1776. Adm. 
1/309, fo. 577. 
67 ibid., fos. 577-577d. 
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of Amsterdam. 68 The secret contract with Merckle was 
valued at E10,000 sterling in. goods, consisting mainly 
of manufactures, powder and small arms. Of this amount 
X6,000 worth of goods were to be sent directly to America 
on Merckle's own account. The remainder was to be sent 
to Gouverneur. To pay for the latter, the company 
agreed to consign 300,000, lbs of tobacco at 30s. per 
hundred pounds to Gouverneur who was to retain the 
proceeds from the sale of the tobacco for Merckle's use, 
but no money was to be sent to him until Gouverneur had 
received the goods. A further quantity of tobacco was 
also sent to the agent to be sold on account of the 
American company, and with the proceeds from its sale, 
Gouverneur was to send salt, cotton and woollen cards, 
linen, brown and refined sugar, rum and molasses to 
America. As in the previous example, the vessels 
employed in this trade were provided with British and 
Dutch registers, but were manned by Dutch saflors. 69 
- Apart from being of significant commercial benefit 
to the British West Indian merchants, when the Leeward 
Islands were threatened by famine between 1778 and 1781 
supplies were brought from St. Eustatius. Many planters 
were known to have shipped their year's produce to that 
islandIto purchase provisions and plantation stores 
to prevent their slaves from starving to death 10 70 
68 Carter Braxton to Isaac Gouverneur, 28 September 1776. Adm. 
1/309, fo. 571. A Copy of this agreement is in C. O. 152/56, fos. 
18-19. 
"Ibid., fos. 57ld-572. 
7DAnonymous, Speech which was spoken in the Bouse of Assembly of 
St. Christoplzers... (London, 1782), p. 28. 
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Thus, although objecting to Lewis Count do Bylandt, 
Commander of the Dutch squadron in the West Indies and 
Governor of St. Eustatius, about the support given to 
re. bel privateers, Governor Burt was quick to acknowledge 
the economic importance of that island to his government. 
'Au Nom De Dieu, he wrote. Carry on & enjoy as large a 
Trade as you can; we in these islands sometimes reap bene- 
fits from it: the Risque Run of being taken & Condemned 
is an object of the Merchants own Consideration. '71 
The success of the merchants at St. Eustatius 
attracted the attention of other British West Indian 
officials. Brigadier-General Robert Prescott described 
it as 'a magazine for the French and Rebels and greatly 
supplied by Ourselves'. 72 Admiral Sir Brydges Rodney, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Leeward Islands squadron, 
blamed the successes of the Americans on the. extensive 
trade with the Dutch colony, as well as the other 
Caribbean islands. He once wrote: 'Commerce, Commerce, 
alone, has supported them, in their Rebellion; cut off 
that Resource, and it will soon subside .... An end to 
Commerce, is an end to Rebellion. t73 
However, all attempts to prohibit the trade fa3-led. 
For example, in November 1776 Greatheed issued a proclama- 
71 Mathew Burt to Lewis Count de Bylandt, 22 October 1778. C. O. 
152/59, fo. 24d. 
72 Robert Prescott to Lord Germain, 30 November 1779. C. O. 318/7, 
fo. 64d. 
73 Admiral Sir Brydges Rodney to Philip Stephens, 29 June 1781. 
Adm. 1/314, fos. 214d-215. 
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tion prohibiting the export of Negro clothing and all 
woollen goods, which were usually cleared out by the 
officers of the Customs for a British colony, but 
carried instead to St. Eustatius. President Greatheed 
found that the illegal commerce carried on between 
St. Eustatius and St. Kitts had made the latter 'an 
infamous Channel of conveying Comfort and Assistance 
1 74 to His Majesty's Enemies .... Governor Burt also found 
that there was nothing he could do to stop the trade. 
His efforts only brought him into conflict with the 
merchants. 'I have already become', he wrote, 'obnoxious 
to the Gallo-Americaris of the Island & deemed too rigid: 
My King's Displeasure & My Country's Service of Con- 
sequence; their Resentment or Opposition insignificant. ' 75 
This tendency to underestimate the opposition was a 
major failure of the West Indian Governors. 
The correspondence between the merchants of St. 
Kitts and Isaac Gouverneur and his partner Samuel Curson 
of St. Eustatius, who had trade connections with many 
British West Indian merchants, gives us an idea of the 
nature of the illegal trade :6 At the beginning of the 
War, large supplies of provisions and lumber were getting 
through the British blockade to St. Eustatius from 
74 Greatheed to Germain, 27 November 1776. C. O. 152/56, fo. 28; 
'A Proclamation', 26 November 1776. Ibid., fo. 30. 
75 Burt to Germain, 1778. C. O. 152/59, fo. 9; Vice-Admiral Byron 
to Philip Stephens, 13 May 1779. Adm. 1/312, fo. 61. 
76 Wardenborough and Wright to Isaac Gouverneur and Samuel Curson, 
(Curzon), 13 September 1777. C. O. 239/1, fo. 158; Wardenborough and 
Wright to Gouverneur & Curson, Ibid., fo. 203; Curson is the correct 
spelling used. 
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America, 77 and from there to St. Kitts, where they were 
sold to the planters at enhanced prices. 78 But after 
1779, tobacco was the principal article of commerce; 
though small quantities of provisions were still 
reaching the British colonies. 79 orders for tobacco 
were made several times per week. 80 On some occasions 
the merchants would go down to St. Eustatius to collect 
their orders of tobacco; 8 I but in most instances, the 
tobacco was sent to the islands in quantities of 10 to 
25 hogsheads in each vessel to lessen losses in the 
event of captures. 82 The tobacco was paid for with cash 
or bills of exchange drawn on merchants in St. Eustatius, 
and part of the money might have helped to finance the 
American War. 83 
Gouverneur also acted as agent for Mactier in 
negotiating bills of exchange drawn on merchants in 
Amsterdam. one bill for the St. Kitts merchant William 
Mactier for E400 sterling payable in London and credited 
to Aull and Mactier was drawn on Py, Rick and Wilkinson 
77joseph Donaldson to William Sitgreaves of Philadelphia, 11 April 
1776. H. C. A. 32/436/20, fo. 9; Donaldson to Mr. Donaldson, 11 April 
1776. Ibid., fo. 10d. 
78 Joseph Donaldson to Joseph Curson (Samuel), 11 April 1776. 
Ibid., fo. 11. 
79 William Mactier (McTair) to Isaac Gouverneur, 6 February 1780. 
C. O. 239/1, fo. 168; see Chapter I footnote 74 and Chapter V. 
so Mactier to Gouverneur, 1 February 1780. Ibid., fo. 164. 
B'Mactier to Gouverneur, 11 January 1780. Ibid., fo. 160. 
82 Mactier to Gouverneur, 28 January 1780. Ibid., fo. 163 
83 Mactier to Gouverneur, 2 February 1780. Ibid., fo. 166. 
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at sixty days notice. 84 Another bill for t125 sterling 
was drawn by James Cross# a friend of Mactier, on Patrick 
Colquhoun of Glasgow and payable in London within 60 
days notice at 65 per cent exchange. 85 Even though the 
illegal commerce was against the military interests of 
Britain, the greater part of the proceeds from it was 
sent to London and benefitted the British merchants. As 
in the case of tobacco imports, the bills were sent to 
St. Eustatius by different vessels so as 'to divide the 
risque I* 86 
The Dutch merchants also acted as the commercial 
intermediaries between Britain and the rebellious 
colonies, but to this violation of the Prohibitory Act, 
87 the British authorities in London closed their eyes . 
After 1778, it was also through St. Eustatius that most 
of the supplies from Britain and Ireland were sent to the 
British colonies captured by the French. For instance, 
Houston and Company continued trading with Grenada via Messrs 
Crawford of Rotterdam and Hope and Company of Amsterdam. 
The company's agent Fergus Paterson, formerly of Grenada, 
went to live in St Eustatius 'for the purpose of 
supplying' its customers in Grenada. The supplies 
reaching them via the Dutch companies were invaluable to 
84 Mactier to Gouverneur, 11 February 1780. Ibid., fo. 173. 
85 Mactier to Gouverneur, 19 February 1780. Ibid., fo. 175d; see 
Mactier to Gouverneur, 21 February 1780. Ibid., fo. 177. 
86 
Ibid., fo. 175. 
87 
Edler, The Dutch RepubZic and the American RevoZution, p. 38. 
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their survival. 30 Similarly, the captured islands' 
products were imported into Britain through the Dutch 
colony. 
The attitude of the local revenue officers in the 
British colonies conflicted with the policy of the 
Governors, thus causing problems for the latter. The 
Inspector-General George Felton, a close friend of 
Aretas Akers, and John Tyson, who was a friend of Isaac 
Gouverneur, 89 two of Burt's enemies in the Assembly of 
St. Kitts informed them that they were legally entitled 
to import American products from any place in British 
vessels, as 'what was not Prohibited by Act of Parliament 
might be done'. 90 In conformity-with his own policy of 
allowing British vessels to import provisions from the 
neutral islands, Burt agreed to permit the merchants to 
import food and lumber, but refused to allow the importa- 
tion of tobacco from anywhere in any ships. The merchants 
accordingly petitioned him stating that they were'alarmed' 
by his objections to the importation of tobacco 'in any 
Bottom whatsoever'when this was acceptable to the officers 
of the Customs, and they requested his 'reasons for such 
opposition and refusal'. Burt therefore acquiesced, and 
allowed the merchants to import tobacco in British 
vessels, on the condition that it was not the property 
88 Houston & Co. to Fergus Paterson of St. Estatius C/o Aretas 
Akers of St. Kitts, 3 January 1780. Houston Papers: N. L. S.: IISS. 
8794, p. 256. 
89 Wilkes to Curson and Gouverneur, 23 January 1781. C. O. 239/1, 
fo. 211. 
9OBurt to Germain, 30 April 1778. C. O. 152/58, fo. 66d. 
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of the American rebels and the tobacco would be exported 
to Britain. 91 
By Act of Parliament in 1778, tobacco grown in 
Dominica was allowed into Britain'on the same terms as 
North Am . erican tobacco, 92 and in 1780 Parliament legalised 
the circuitous tobacco trade. 
Navigation laws were relaxed. 
By the latter Act, the 
Tobacco could be imported 
into Britain from any place other than that of its growth, 
on the payment of an additional duty of approximately 
ld. per lb. Before 1 January 1780, all tobacco grown in 
America could be imported into Britain from the Caribbean 
colonies, if first landed at a neutral port, without 
incurring any penalties. After that day, however, 
American tobacco when carried to a neutral port could 
only be imported into Britain from a colony if a 
certificate showing the place from which it was brought 
was attached. The Act also legalised the importation of 
tobacco from the neutral islands into the British 
colonies in British vessels" - the policy was first 
adopted by Governor Burt after his dispute with the St. 
Kitts merchants on this question. 
These Acts helped the British West Indian 
merchants to establish a lucrative illegal trade in 
tobacco for the remainder of the War. 94 In the first 
"Ibid. 
, fos. 66-67. 
92 18 Geo. III C. 24. 
93 20 Geo. III C. 39. 
94 Lord Sheffield, Observations on the Commerce of the American 
States, pp. 219-220; see Appendix A, Table 16. 
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year of the new Act, over ten million pounds of tobacco 
were imported into Britain from the sugar colonies. 95 
In that year, 
the tobacco imported into Great Britain, 
through St. Eustatius sold at the British 
markets for 1,600,000/. - Of this sum, one 
part was applied to the payment of duties; 
a second part, the profit of the merchants 
in Great Britain, -a third part, the 
profit of the purchaser at St. Eustatius, 
and such purchaser was generally a merchant 
of some neighbouring British Islands; - the 
remaining, fourth part, the returns to 
America, not exceeding 280,000/. and two- 
thirds of these returns were in British 
manufactures. " 
In addition to the loopholes in the Parliamentaxy 
Acts, the inefficiencies of the Customs officers helped 
the smugglers. For example, many vessels loaded at 
Guadeloupe for America were fraudulently cleared out 
from Prince Rupert Bay, in Dominica, to protect them 
from capture. 97 William Watkins, the former surveyor 
of that port, was intimidated by some people for dis- 
closing these practices, and was therefore forced to 
leave the island. 98 An investigation carried out by 
George Felton, and William Senhouse, the Surveyor- 
General of the West Indies, established that certain 
officers of the Customs in Dominica had granted certifi- 
cates of clearances to American vessels, which were 
9SSee Appendix C, Table 1. 
"Anonymous, Speech, p. 21 (note). 
"Watkin's Case (no date). T. 1/551v fa. 191. 
"Petition of William Watkins to Sir Grey Cooper (no date). Ibid. 
fo. -190; Petition of Watkins to the Commissioners of the Treasury 
(no date). Ibid., fo. 194. 
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loaded at Guadeloupe, showing that the inward cargoes 
were discharged at Dominica and others taken on board. 99 
The Commissioners of the Customs therefore dismissed the 
comptroller Henry Constable, waiters James Brett and 
James Hall, and the collector William Izod Mosley for 
negligence. 100 
At Sandy Point, in St. Kitts, the custom-house 
officers permitted the merchants to export beef to St. 
Eustatius. 101 Those at Antigua also collaborated with 
the merchants there. For example, the AZexander bound 
for Bristol, under convoy of the warship CameZ, Captain 
William Finch, was cleared out from Antigua as containing 
20 tons and carrying a cargo of 40 hogsheads tobacco, 
165 tierces rice and 2,000 staves, which were legally 
condemned as prize goods. in fact, when the AZexander, 
sailed from Antigua, the vessel had only 5 hogsheads 
i tpbacco, 20 tierces rice and approximately 2,000 staves, 
as well as a quantity of beef and pork not mentioned 
in the AZexander's bill of lading. After leaving 
Antigua, the vessel broke convoy and went to St. 
Eustatius where the captain delivered the beef and pork, 
and took on board the remainder of the cargo which now 
consisted of 40 hogsheads tobacco, 110 whole and 10 half 
"Report of the Commissioners of the Customs to the Lords of the 
Treasury, a July 1779. Ibid., fo. 196. 
looIbid., fos. 196d-197. 
101 Governor Burt in Council to the Assembly of St. Kitts, 13 April 
1779. C. O. 241/11. 
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tierces of rice, 11 bags of cotton, and 5,200 staves. 102 
Nevertheless, the AZexander was not condemned in 
the Court of Admiralty in England, because the Customs 
officers in Antigua certified that the vessel's entire 
cargo was put on board in that island, and that the 
tobacco was the remainder of a cargo legally condemned 
in the Vice-Admiralty Court there. Yet, the AZexanderls 
manifest and other papers showed that not all the goods 
were loaded in Antigua. Finch was commended by the 
Customs Board for detecting the false certificates 
issued by the revenue officers in Antigua to cover up 
the illegal trade which if allowed to continue, they 
wrote, would 'materially injure the trade of the British 
West Indian Islands, and afford the Strongest Encourage- 
ment, to the disturbances in America'. 103 
The revenue officers in Jamaica were also involved 
in numerous fraudulent deals which were disclosed by 
James Elford, clerk to Thomas Davison, collector at 
Kingston. Some of the officers accepted bribes from 
merchants to turn a blind eye to their illicit dealings. 
For example, Robert Byrne, a waiter and searcher, took 
E15 from Alexander Allardyce to release a sloop laden 
with contraband goods. On two other occasions, Byrne 
accepted sums of money for allowing prohibited goods to 
102 Memorial of the Honourable William Clement Finch to the Lords 
of the Treasury, 24 December 1777. T. 1/542, fos. 67-67d. 
103 Report of the Commissioners of the Customs to the Lords of 
the Treasury, 8 January 1778. Ibid., fos. 70-71. 
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be exported. ' 04 Another waiter and searcher, John 
Pidsley, received money from an officer of the Duke of 
Cumbertand packet boat for loading contraband goods. 105 
Likewise, William Hill, clerk of the Customs, received 
money for clearing out a quantity of tobacco as prize 
goods legally taken and condemned in Jamaica, but which 
was really smuggled into Kingston in Flags of Truce from 
Saint Dominque. 106 The Flags of Truce trade does not 
appear to have been as widespread during the American 
War as in previous ones. 107 Elford's disclosure of these 
practices made him unpopular, and he was criticised by 
his colleagues-'as 
So annoying to the British authorities was the 
assistance given to the Americans by the residents of 
St. Eustatius, and the British West Indian merchants who 
traded there, that when Britain declared war against the 
Dutch in 1780, Admiral Rodney and General Sir John 
Vaughan, Commander-in-Chief of the Leeward island forces, 
were ordered to attack the Dutch colony, which they 
accomplished on 3 February 1781, without any resistance 
104 Affidavit of James Elford, 15 November 1779. T. 1/549, fos. 
36-36d. 
1051bid., fo. 38. 
1061bid. 
, fo. 40. 
107 See Pares, War and Trade, pp. 446-455, for a discussion of the 
Flag of Truce trade during the years 1739-1763. 
10BElford to the Lords of the Treasury, 21 November 1779. - 
fo. 32. 
128 
from the Dutch residents. 109 It was the St. Kitts 
merchants who attempted to lure Rodney away from pursuing 
his successful attack of St. Eustatius by their repeated 
reports that the British islands were in imminent danger 
of capture by a French squadron which had arrived at 
Martinique, . 110 hoping to regain their provisions and 
naval supplies stored in the warehouses there. "' 
The value of the goods found on the island was 
immense. Over 150 vessels of all descriptions were 
captured in the road. The water front consisted of one 
continuous line of storehouses rented by French, Spanish, 
Americans and British merchants at over one million 
pounds annually. ' 12 The naval stores, sugar, rum and 
tobacco in the storehouses were valued at in excess of 
three million pounds. 'Included in the goods seized were 
consignments from British and West Indian merchants which 
had been entered under free port regulations in the 
expectation of immense profits, as well as stocks of 
resident Englishmen. ' 1-13 
109 Admiral Rodney and General Vaughan to Lord Germain 3 July 1781. 
C. O. 318/7, fos. 117-117d; Copy of his Majesty's instructions to Sir 
George Brydges Rodney, in Sir George Brydges Rodney, Letters... to 
His Majesty's Ministers... Relative to the Capture of St. Eustatius... 
(London, 1790), pp. 5-6; Donald MacIntyre, A&niral Rodney (London, 
1962), pp. 161-162; Mackesy, The War for America, pp. 416-417. 
110 Extract of letter from Admiral Rodney to Rear-Admiral Samuel 
Hood, 8 March 1781, in Rodney, Letters, p. 33; Admiral Rodney to 
Philip Stephens, 4 February 1781. Adm. 1/314, fo. 4d. 
Rodney to Stephens, 6 March 1781. Ibid., fo. 47d. 
112 Rodney to Stephens, 4 February 1781. Ibid., fo. 5. 
113 Ibid., fos. 7-9; Ragatz, The Planter Class, p. 160; MacIntyre, 
Rodney, p. 162; Wright and Fayle, Lloyds, p. 157. 
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Rodney and Vaughan, disappointed by the assistance 
given to the Americans by the St. Eustatius merchants, 
showed them no mercy. Their goods were confiscated, and 
all foreign merchants were expelled from the island, 
being allowed to take only their personal belongings and 
household goods. ' 14 Samuel Curson and Isaac Gouverneur 
were sent to England as prisoners of state in the 
Vengeance, commanded by Commodore Hotham, and probably 
selected for its name. ' is They were committed for 
treason, but were later released. In justifying this 
plunder of St. Eustatius and the treatment of the 
merchants, Rodney wrote: 
We thought that this Nest of Smugglers, 
Adventurers, Betrayers of their Country, 
and Rebels to their King, had no right to 
expect a capitulation, or to be treated as 
a respectable People: their atrocious 
Deeds deserved none, and they ought to have 
known the just Vengeance of an, I 
ýnjured 
Empire, though slow, is Sure. 
Rodney and Vaughan remained at St. Eustatius for 
three months hoping to destroy 'the Nest of Viperst which 
preyed upon the Vitals of Great Britain'. 117 This delay 
has raised a measure of controversy among historians. 118 
114 Rodney to Stephens, 6 March 1781. Adm. 1/314, fo. 50; 
Jameson, 'St. Eustatius in the American Revolution', A. H. R., Vol. 
VIII, pp. 703-704. 
115 Rodney to Commodore Hotham, 4 March 1781, in Rodney, Letters, 
pp. 25-26. 
116 Rodney to Stephens, 6 March 1781. Ibid., p. 29. 
117 Extract of Letter from Rodney to James Cuninghame, Governor of 
Barbados, 17 February 1781, in Rodney,. Letters, p. 17. 
lie MacIntyre, Rodney, p. 167; Mackesy, The War for America, p. 417, 
Jameson, 'St. Eustatius in the American Revolution', A. H. R., 
Vol. VIII, pp. 706-707. 
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Captain Donald MacIntyre who is sympathetic to Rodney 
dismisses most of the criticisms levied against him by 
his subordinate officer Sir Samuel Hood. 119 Mackesy and 
Jameson disagree. Mackesy argues that Rodney's delay and 
his partial relinquishment of his command to Hood were 
inexplicable and resulted in his failure to complete his 
plans for the capture of Curacao and Surinam. 120 Because 
of his prolonged stay, the French squadron under Count De 
Grasse slipped away from Hood's surveillance and joined 
the remaining French ships at Martinique, 
121 thereby 
gaining the superiority of the seas, which resulted in 
the loss of Tobago. 122 Jameson is very critical of 
Rodney's actions which he sees as 'serious professional 
errorst. He views the juncture of the French squadrons 
as a turning point in the American War, and concludes 
that 'Yorktown itself might never have happened, if this 
juncture of the French had not been effected, and in all 
probability it would not have been effected if Rodney, 
with his. whole fleet, had been ... to the windward of 
Martinique'. 123 - 
When Rodney's confiscation of all properties in 
St. Eustatius became known in St. Kitts, the merchants 
119Maclntyre, Rodney, p. 165. 
120 Mackesy, The War for America, p. 417. 
121 Jameson, tSt. Eustatius in the American Revolution', Vol. VIII, 
pp. 706-707. 
122 John Pinney to Simon Pretor, 30 June 1781. Pinney Papers: L. B. 
5, p. 126. 
123 Jameson, 'St. Eustatius in the American Revolution', Vol. VIII, 
p. 707. 
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sent a delegation to plead their cause with the Admiral, 
but it returned without an answer. They then appointed 
Mr. Glanville their agent to negotiate for the release 
of the goods. 124 Rodney hastily rejected their 
appeals. 125 The inhabitants were so infuriated that 
they threatened to arrest Rodney and Vaughan if they 
ever went to St. Kitts again. 126 The Assembly of St. 
Kitts took up the issue, and passed a motion calling for 
an address to the King complaining of 'the oppressive 
illegal and unwarrantable proceedings'. of the Commanders 
who had violated 'the laws of nations' by their disregard 
of the rights of the conýuered. 127 
The destruction of the illegal trade to St. 
Eustatius increased the hardships of the British West 
Indian planters since it cut off their supplies of 
provisions, horses, livestock and lumber. 128 Houston 
and Company immediately wrote to its agents inquiring if 
they had lost everything. 129 Merchants from the neigh- 
bouring islands levied charges of misconduct against 
Rodney. Pinney, who was quite disturbed by what he 
called 'the extraordinary conduct of Admiral Rodney and 
124 Anonymous, Speech, p. 19. 
125 MacIntyre, Rodney, p. 164. Ibid. 
126 Extract of a letter from Rodney to Samuel Hood, 28 February 1781, 
in Rodney, Letters, p. 18. 
127 Anonymous, Speech, pp. 1-2,7. 
128 Pinney to Pretor, 26 April 1781. Pinney Papers: L. B. 5, p. 110. 
129 Houston & Co. to Henry Johnston, 17 April 1781. Houston Papers: 
N. L. S. MSS. 8794, p. 523; Houston & Co. to Thomas Haliburton, 17 April 
1781. Aid., p. 524. 
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General Vaughan, 130 expected some form of retaliation 
from the French, and wrote to William Croker: 'Today we 
are in possession of easy fortunes - tomorrow we possibly 
may be reduced to a state of beggary'. 131 Pinney 
remained obsessed with the question for months. His 
letters to England contain blistering attacks on Rodney's 
and Vaughan's conduct. He once claimed that Rodney's 
zeal for his country had 'been damped by the Riches, he 
acquired in plundering, in the most disgraceful & inhuman 
manner, the inhabitants of St. Eustatius'. 13 2' 
With the capture of the Dutch colony, the planters 
were forced to rely even more on supplies from Britain 
and Ireland, which could not meet the demands of the 
islands (see Chapter II). Orders to England were doubled. 
For example, Pinney wrote to William Manning: 
I sent you an invoice for Plantation and 
Family stores, and, as I then thoughtl for 
a sufficient quantity of Provisions, but I 
find by the capture of St. Eustatius, our 
situation, in regard to supplies, is become 
more critical than ever: I must therefore 
earnestly entreat you will send an addition 133 to my invoice by the very first conveyance .... 
The loss of the St. Eustatius trade was also a 
severe psychological blow to the British West Indian 
merchants. There is every likelihood that by trading 
with the Americans in the foreign islands, they were 
maintaining their old commercial connection whi. ch could 
130 Pinney to Pretor, 26 April 1781. Pinney Papers: L. B. 5, p. 110. 
131 Pinney to William Croker, 26 April 1781. Ibid., p. 
132 Pinney to 11. Pouncy, 25 July 1781. Ibid., p. 129. 
133 Pinney to Manning, 3 September 1781. Ibid., p. 143. 
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be fully renewed once the War was over. Now, they had 
lost everything. An extract of a letter from St. Kitts 
in October 1781 tells of the mood and despair of the 
merchant class: 
The times here are extremely dull, and the 
island is in a great measure ruined by the 
capture of St. Eustatius, for no manner of 
trade is carried from here. I hope you 
have better times in Jamaica; the people 
here seem mostly absorbed in a melancholy 
state of despondency. The trade of St. 
Eustatius was of service to indigent 
individuals, but now the small pittance 
they gained from it is lost, and the poor 
creatures reduced to beggary. This is a 
true picture of the island of St. Chris- 
topher's; and I believe I may include all 
the Windward Islands. 134 
While the local inhabitants viewed the capture of 
St.. Eustatius with grave forebodings, some government 
officials welcomed it. Anthony Johnson, Commander-in- 
Chief of the Leeward Islands, claimed that this had 
'destroyed that nest of heterogeneous beings, who have 
been so long a pest to the English nation, and under the 
mask of friendship have been the vultures on our vitals'. 1's 
But if Rodney and Vaughan had successfully destroyed the 
illicit commerce between St. Eustatius and the British 
colonies, they failed to destroy the illegal trade 
between the Caribbean islands and America. A large part 
of the goods confiscated at St. Eustatius, and auctioned 
at public sales, was taken to St. Thomas where they were 
134 Extract of a letter to Gentleman in Kingston, 14 October 1781, 
in Supplement to the Cornwall Chronicle and Jamaica General Advertiser, 
10 November 1781, Vol. Ir No. 359: 1. 
135 Anthony Johnson to Lord Germain, 13 February 1781. C. O. 
152/61, fo. 29. 
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sold to the rebels. 
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That island now replaced St. Eustatius as the 
centre of the illegal trade to America, and the high 
prices of everything in the British colonies assured the 
merchant s participating in it of a profit. Plans between 
the merchants of Antigua and St. Kitts, and their counter- 
parts in Guadeloupe and St. Thomas, were agreed upon for 
making use of the Flagsof Truce trade which until now 
was not prevalent during the America War. Vessels were 
also legally cleared out from St. Kitts and Antigua for 
Montserrat, but instead they went directly to the foreign 
islands. 137 Reciprocal arrangements were made to provide 
the participating merchants with British and Danish papers. 138 
The help of the Bermudians was sought, and they persuaded 
Governor Browne to grant them Flags of Truce to go to the 
British islands, but then went directly to St. Thomas. 139 
Consequently, many Danish vessels carrying British papers 
140 traded with the sugar colonies. Governor Shirley of 
the Leeward Islands attempted to prohibit the trade, 141 
136 Anonymous, Speech, p. 31. 
137 Copy of letter from Rodney to John Laforey, commissioner of his 
Majesty's Yards at Antigua, 23 March 1781, in Rodney, Letters, 
pp. 43-44. 
138Thomas Tipping to Thomas Thompson, 1 March 1781. C. O. 152/611 
fo. 38d. 
139Barrow to Franchlyn (no date). Add. MSS. 38,376, fo. 93. 
140 Governor James Cuninghame to the Earl of Shelburne, 11 May 
1782. C. O. 28/56, fo. 334. 
141 Governor Shirley to Lord Germain, 30 August 1781. C. O. 152/61, 
fo. 127. 
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but for fear of offending the Danish Court, nothing was 
done to stop the illicit commerce, and though commended 
for upholding British commercial laws, Shirley was 
warned not to violate 
ýanish 
neutrality. 142 
During eighteenth-century wars in the Caribbean, 
the British merchants made substantial profits by 
trading with the enemy. 143 Moreover, the special 
relationship which the West Indian colonists had with 
the Americans, before 1776, gave rise to the development 
of smuggling on a large scale during the War. The first 
proviso of the Prohibitory Act was the most significant 
loophole in British economic policy. Likewise, the 
Tobacco Acts of 1778 and 1780 also encouraged the illegal 
trade through St. Eustatius, and in spite of the lack of 
statistics to show the precise volume of the trade, it 
was large enough to worry both British and American 
officials. 
The American War, therefore, did not interfere 
very seriously with the quantity of British manufactures 
reaching the rebellious colonies where many merchants 
refused to outlaw English goods. The Committee of the 
Privy Council for Trade used this fact to oppose 
allowing American vessels to trade with the West Indies 
after the War. 144 Some American officers had also 
realised that the extensive illegal trade had caused 
242 Lord Germain to Governor Shirley, 5 December 1781. Ibid., 
fos. 132-132d. 
143 See Pares, War and Trade, Chapter IX. 
144 Minutes of the Privy Council for Trade, 25 March 1784. B. T. 
5/1, fo. 38d. 
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some rebel merchants to retain some loyalty to the 
British government. In 1781 General John Sullivan 
wrote to George Washington: 'the traffic carried on 
with the enemy is alarming, as it not only serves to 
furnish them with necessaries, but tends to reconcile 
our citizens to the idea of renewing their connection 
with Great Britain, and of course disaffects them to 
our government. ' 145 Similarly, James Madison wrote 
that the illicit trade had drained the states of their 
specie, and had disrupted their finances. But efforts 
by Congress to get the cooperation of the states to 
prohibit this commerce failed. 146 
The clandestine trade with New York had also 
harmed the efforts of Congress to develop trade with 
foreign nations, 147 and at the end of the War, there- 
fore, Britain's position in the economic life of the 
United States had not changed as much as might have 
been expected. Furthermore, the illegal commerce 
between the rebels and the West Indian colonists, 
although not nearly enough to replace pre-war American- 
West Indian trade, had served the interests of both 
groups, and was extremely necessary in helping the 
145 John Sullivan to George Washington, 6 March 1781, in Jared 
Sparks, ed., Correspondence of the American RevoZution (Boston, 
1856), Vol. III, p. 253. 
14 GJames Madison to Edward Randolph, 18 June 1783, in Gallaird 
Hunt, ed., The Writings of James Madison (New York, 1900), Vol. I, 
p. 210; Madison to Randolph, 18 June 1782, in Burnett, ed., Letters, 
Vol. VI, p. 373. 
24 7The 
Virginia Delegates to the Governor of Virginia, 25 June 
1782, in Burnett, Letters, Vol. VI, p. 372. 
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planters to maintain the production of their staples. 
Whatever criticisms might be hurled against the 
British Caribbean merchants for trading with the 
enemy, they had buoyed up the West Indian sugar economy 
by keeping alive the commercial connections between 
Britain and her former colonies. 
CHAPTER IV 
MIERICAN PRIVATEERING IN THE CARIBBEAN 
During wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, privateering by the British colonists in 
America and the West Indies flourished in the North 
Atlantic and Caribbean waters, but in these wars there 
was little interference of the colonial trade. The 
Board of Admiralty had to contend only with French 
privateers, and were therefore 'able to form a fairly 
accurate estimate of the number of privateers which 
each French port was likely to equip.... 11 During 
the American War, however, the overall threat of rebel 
privateers to the West Indian trade could not be 
easily assessed, and privateering became an efficient 
weapon of the Americans, and an important obstacle to 
the continuation of West Indian commercial operation. 2 
Conditions in the West Indies favoured the 
growth of American privateering. when convoys made 
their landfall at Barbados, the merchantmen were 
usually left to make their own way across the C aribbean 
to their designated ports. Since the British islands 
were intermingled with those of the Danes, French and 
I Crowhurst, 'British Oceanic Convoys', p. 61. 
Davis, The Rise of English Shipping, p. 332. 
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Dutch, American privateers, using the foreign ports 
as bases, were able to prey on British shipping. The 
uninhabited coastal areas of the islands abounded with 
secluded bays, creeks, and passages among reefs, which 
were inaccessible to large warships sent to cruise along 
the trade routes when the merchant fleet from England 
was expected to arrive in the West Indies. 3 These 
cruisers did offer some protection to the outward-bound 
merchantmen, but as few of the ships under convoy were 
well-armed and provided with letters of marque, since 
they travelled across the Caribbean with little 
protection, they became easy prey for American privateers 
stationed in the ports of the foreign islands. 
While the capture of the outward-bound merchantmen 
would distress the islands by causing severe shortages, 
the capture of the homeward-bound ships was one of the 
most important elements of American strategy; it aimed 
at forcing the British government to withdraw part of its 
fleet from the American coast to defend its commerce, 
thus enabling the rebels to import arms, and all classes 
of contraband goods. But without naval bases in the 
West Indies, however, this plan was almost impossible 
to operate. It was thus a foregone conclusion that the 
French and Dutch Governors were willing to provide the 
Americans with the necessary refuge and other facilities, 
in exchange for provisions and lumber, when they allowed 
the rebellious colonies to station agents in their 
SCrowhurst, 'British Oceanic Convoys'r PP. 135-136. 
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4 
governments . The most important of these was William 
Bingham, a wealthy man who gained immense influence with 
the French authorities in Martinique and St. Eustatius, 5 
and Richard Harrison in Martinique, Abraham van Bibber, 
and Samuel Curson, partner of Isaac Gouverneur, agent 
for the Continental Congress, at St. Eustatius. 
These agents were responsible for a variety of 
duties: such as procuring and shipping supplies, 
refitting privateers, disposing of prizes, obtaining 
convoys for American merchantmen, and sending intelli- 
gence to Congress concerning British naval operations 
in the West Indies, as well as in Europe and America. 
Some of the information regarding the location and 
movement of British troops and warships was relayed to 
the rebels by the British West Indian colonists, thereby 
enabling American merchantmen and privateers to evade 
British warships and to reach St. Eustatius safely. 
For example, information was sent to the Dutch island 
from Antigua at the beginning of February 1776, to the 
effect that the PortZand, flagship of the Leeward 
Islands squadron, was stationed off its coast; that the 
Hind and Viper, sloops of war, along with an armed snow 
loaded with wine and troops wereexpected to sail from 
Antigua on 6 February for Boston, and that the troops 
4 James Young to Philip Stephens, 3 March 1776. Adm. 1/309, 
fo. 414. 
SLord Macartney to Lord Germain, 22 October 1777. C. O. 101/21, 
fo. 64d; Robert Walter to James Young, 9 March 1776. Adm. 1/309, 
fos. 452-452d; Thomas Whitings to American Agents, 6 February 1777. 
Adm. 1/310, fo. 149; Governor Morris to James Young, 24 February 
177B. Ibid., fos. 234-234d. 
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from St. Vincent were ordered to America. 6 
The inhabitants of St. Kitts who maintained close 
commercial connections with the rebels throughout the 
War also sent them military reports which were published 
in American newspapers. For example, a letter sent from 
Basseterre on 6 July 1776, and carried in the Connecticut 
Courant conveyed this information: 'We hear orders are 
expected or are already arrived from England, giving 
Admiral James Young directions to cut out of every 
foreign port all American vessels that may be found 
there'. 7 In some instances, reports were first sent 
from England to the British West Indies, and then either 
directly to America, or via friends in St. Eustatius. 
"It is by the West Indies that the Rebels receive all 
their information', wrote Lord Dunmore, 'it is first 
sent to the British West India Islands and from thence 
conveyed to St. Eustatia with which Place the rebels 
have a constant intercoursel. 8 
But although the rebels received help and 
information from the British colonies, it was the foreign 
governments on which they relied most for war materials, 
as well as news regarding the movement of the British 
squadrons in the West Indies. The American War, from 
6 Martin, 'The West India Trade, 1776-1777'. A. H. R. , Vol. Xxxix, pp. 
703-704; Charles Oscar Paullin, The Navy of the American Revozution 
(Cleveland, 1906), p. 308. 
7 'News from the British West Indies;, in Connecticut Courant, 
Williams James Morgan, ed., Naval Documents of the American 
Revolution (Washington, 1970), Vol. V, p. 957. 
a Lord Dunmore to Lord Germain, 31 July 1776. Ibid., pp. 1313- 
1314. 
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the onset, had all the appearances of being a long one, 
and of draining Britain of her resources, by distressing 
the Caribbean colonies - one of the fountains of her 
wealth. In 1774 the Comte de Vergennes, Charles 
Gravier, became Foreign Minister of France, and he 
believed that France should grasp the opportunity 
provided by the quarrel between Britain and the American 
colonies to retrieve her losses in the Seven Years War. 
Consequently, he embarked on a policy of pretending to 
observe France's right as a neutral power to allow 
American ships to enter French ports; while, at the same 
time, holding out the olive branch to quell any 
suspicion by the British government that France favoured 
the American cause, and was therefore secretly aiding 
the rebels. In order to effect his double role, 
Vergennes used the services of Pierre Augustin Caron, 
the author of Figaro-, under the pseudonym Beaumarchais. 
When Caron visited London in 1774, he was introduced to 
John Wilkes, Lord Mayor of London and at that time an 
avowed supporter of the Americans. On his return to 
London in 1776, he met Arthur Lee who acted as American 
agent, and together they devised a plan to establish a 
dummy company which was to operate in a private capacity 
to furnish the Americans with war supplies in exchange 
for American products. 
On Caron's return home, he persuaded Vergennes 
911enry Steele Cormnager and Richard Morris, ed. , The Spirit of 'Seventy-Six 
, The Story of the American Revolution as Told by 
Participants (London, 1967), p. 667. 
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to assist in the establishment of Roderigue Hortalez 
and Company to trade with the West Indies, 10 whence 
the Americans would receive, without implicating the 
French Government, military and'naval supplies. The 
government secretly contributed one million livres, and 
promised another million from Spain; while a third was 
contributed by wealthy merchants. The French arsenal 
supplied some arms, rendered obsolete by the army, which 
Caron either paid for in cash, or replaced with modern 
ones. To guard against any untimely recognition of 
the relationship between Hortalez and Company and the 
French Government, all correspondence with Caron was 
written by Vergennes' young son. " 
Although the foreign governments concerned denied 
that they were supporting the Americans in any way and 
had formally declared neutrality at the outbreak of 
hostilities, they did nothing to stop the violation of 
that neutrality by their colonial officials. 12 Elisha 
Hinman, who was sent by Congress on a secret mission to 
France in the middle of 1777, gave the following as his 
private observations on the foreign governments' 
attitude towards the American War: 
The French are really friends at Heart 
10 Ibid., pp. 668-669; Bernard Fay, The RevoZutionary Spirit in 
France and America (London, 1928), pp. 58-59. 
11 See William Stinchcombe, The American RevoZution and the French 
AlZiance (New York, 1969), p. 9. 
12 Clark Gayton to Francis Aimar de Montiel, Commander-in-Chief of 
French squadron at Saint Dominque, 18 September 1777. Adm. 1/240, 
fos. 307-307d. 
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to the Americans in the present Controversy, 
but rather seem to decline a War at present, 
altho' large Armaments are fitting and 
getting in readiness both by Sea and Land. 
They will give America every assistance in 
their Power, but not Publicly, and are 
determined that a final separation of 
America from Great Britain shall take place, 
even at the Expence of a War - Spain may be 
said to be equally disposed as France. 13 
During the American War, therefore, much of the 
military and naval supplies reaching the continent was 
routed through colonial ports of the European countries. 
For example, a common practice was to clear out ship- 
ments of arms from Martinique for the French islands of 
St. Pierre and Miquelon in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, but 
once these vessels reached the coast of America, they 
slipped into one of the many rebel ports, and this proved 
a very effective way of escaping British warships. 14 To 
curb this practice, Vice-Admiral Young ordered his 
captains to stop and search all vessels going to St. 
Pierre, or Miquelon, for contraband goods, without 
violating French neutrality or creating an international 
dispute. 15 Rear-Admiral Gayton also sent Captain Douglas 
in the SquirreZ to cruise along the Windward Passage to 
intercept American privateers and contraband traders, but 
warned him not to violate French or Spanish territorial 
waters. 16 
13 Elishe Hirman to Ellis Gray, 26 October 1777. C. O. 101/21, fo. 
184d. A copy of the letter is in Adm. 1/310, fos. 254d-255. 
14 Walter to Young, 9 March 1776. Adm. 1/309, fos. 452-452d. 
15 James Young to the Captains of the Portland, Experiment, Argo 
Hind, Lynx and Pomona, 31 March 1776. Adm. 1/309, fo. 463. 
16 Rear-Admiral Gayton to Captain Douglas, 25 August 1776. Adm. 
1/240, fo. 317. 
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In consequence of Young's instructions, Sir 
Charles Hammond, captain of the Roebuck, on his way from 
Delaware to Antigua, seized the French ship Le Feticite, 
on a voyage from Guadeloupe to Miquelon, which was 
carried into Antigua, and libelled in the Vice-Admiralty 
Court for trading with the rebels, but the ship was 
released because it was outside British territorial 
waters when taken. 17 However, when Count D'Arbaud, the 
Governor of Guadeloupe complained of the 'unwarrantablel 
and 'illegal' seizure of Le Felicite which was travelling 
from one French port to another, 18 Young retorted that 
the ship's 'Clearance for Miquelon was collusive and 
intended to Cover an Illicit contraband Trade ... openly 
carried on between the French West India Islands and His 
Britannic Majesty's Rebellious Subjects in America ,. 19 
Around the same time, the capture of Le GuiZZaume, 
a French brigantine, on a supposed voyage from St. Pierre 
to Martinique, also brought a complaint from the Governor 
Count D'Argout, 20 a wealthy native of St. Dominique, who, 
through the inarriage of his daughter, had good connections 
in France. Young counter-charged that the Governor was 
protecting American privateers enabling them to attack 
and destroy British shipping and coastal villages. 
17 Young to Stephensp 9 March 1777. Adm. 1/309, fos. 656,656d. 
leCount D'Arbaud to James Young, 14 February 1777. Ibid., fos. 
663-663d. 
"James Young to Count D'Arbaud, 20 February 1777. Ibid., fo. 
665. 
2 OCount D'Argout to James Young, 2 February 1777. Ibid., fos. 
659-659d. 
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Requesting D'Argout to end these practices, Young 
pointed out to him that he and other French Governors 
had violated their government's pledge of neutrality by 
allowing American privateers to'use their ports as 
bases. 21 
Other charges and counter-charges were made by 
British and French colonial authorities over the latter's 
support for the rebels, and the former's violation of 
French neutrality. In 1777 Governor Thomas Shirley of 
Dominica became embroiled in a dispute with D'Argout 
over the seizure of the French ship St. Jacques, 
commanded by Bernard Descaseaux, captured by a British 
warship, and libelled in the Vice-Admiralty Court of 
Dominica. The ship was carrying a cargo of pork, candles, 
other articles purchased from American and even British 
merchants. D'Argout thus maintained that it was not 
illegal to send military stores and provisions from one 
French port to another, and therefore, 'to seize them is 
nothing else than to subvert by unjust force the 
principles of trade established by all civilized Nations, 
to violate openly the Law of Nations'. 22 But when this 
form of commerce was used as a cover to supply the 
Americans, it could not be tolerated by the British 
officers. 
Shirley, on his part, justified the seizure of 
21 James Young to Count D'Argout, 7 February 1777. Ibid., fos. 
662-662d. 
22 Count D'Argout to Thomas Shirley, 14 April 1777. Ibid., fos. 
138-139. 
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the St. Jacques, and objected to the 'severe stricturcs 
and animadversions' used by. D'Argout against the conduct 
of the British captains who were moved to make these 
seizures because of French protection and assistance for 
23 the Americans . Of course, these accusations were 
denied, but Shirley remained adamant that the French 
Governor was guilty 'of a most flagrant breach of the 
Articles of Peace between the two Nations in regards to 
the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon'. 24 
Through his connections in France, and partly 
because of the numerous complaints against him, D'Argout 
was given the command of Saint Dominque in 1777 on the 
25 
death of Count D'Enery . But his support for the 
Americans continued. On one occasion when he complained 
to Governor Dalling about the tender SnaiZ which was 
harassing French merchantmen.. Dalling did not conceal 
his contempt for D'Argout's policy. He wrote: 
The impediment given to your Commerce I 
am afraid, considering the Times, and the 
cloak so kindly lent to that of our Rebels, 
must occasion some little stoppage, now 
and then, to the Fair Traders: but what, 
are your disqui. etudes, and vexations to 
our real captures and plunderings tq. the 
ruin of many a wretched family 
Though the British officers might not have 
adhered very strictly to the law of nations, which was 
23 Shirley to D'Argout, 18 April 1777. ibid., fo. 140. 
'Governor Shirley to Lord Germain, 17 April 1777. Ibid., fo. 128. 
25 Macartney to Germain, 22 October 1777. C. O. 10/21, fos. 63-63d. 
26john Dalling to Count D'Argout, 31 January 1778. C. O. 137/173, 
fo. 114. 
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more a code of behaviour at this time than a law in the 
strict sense of the word, and had violated declared 
French and Dutch neutrality, the foreign governors were 
equally at fault. Despite their'protestations of 
neutraiity, they, nevertheless, provided the Americans 
with much of the same facilities they would have 
received in their home ports. From the outbreak of the 
War, therefore, the rebels considered Martinique their 
'chief magazine and asylum', and D'Argout their best 
ally . 
27 'Whatever Trade the rebels carry on is with 
the French ... whatever captures are made in these seas, 
it is the French who receive the benefits of them', 
wrote Lord Macartney. 28 For instance, when a Guineaman 
was carried into French colonial ports, no legal condem- 
nations of these vessels were ever made, because the 
government, as a neutral power, could not have allowed 
prize cases to be heard in her courts of admiralty; 
and therefore the Americans were forced to make presents 
of several slaves to the local French authorities before 
they were allowed to sell any. 29 
Continental warships, and other privateers also 
visited St. Eustatius occasionally until that island's 
capture in 1781, but this was mainly on commercial 
errands. Cape Francois, in Saint Dominque, and Havana, 
5 
27 Macartney to Germain, 22 October 1777. C. O. 101/21, fo. 63. 
2SMacartney to Germain, 6 March 1777. C. O. 101/20, fos. 128d-129. 
29 Young to Stephens, 24 February 1778. Adm. 1/310, fo. 234; 
Paullin, The Navy, p. 266; Ilay to Germain, 12 July 1777. C. O. 
28/56, fos. 127-127d. 
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in Cuba, were also used as bases later in the War. But 
it was chiefly at Martinique that rebel vessels were 
repaired, refitted and provisioned when cruising in 
Caribbean waters. The RattZe Snake, commanded by David 
McCulloch, for example, was converted into a ship at 
the royal dock yards there, with the help of government 
workers, and allowed to fly the American flag while at 
Martinique. Governor Burt was incensed by the action 
of the French Governor, and told him, in no uncertain 
terms, that the use by the rebels of the facilities of 
a friendly nation for military purposes was 'a... 
flagrant Encouragement to the American rebellion'. 30 
The removal of Count D'Argout from Martinique did 
not improve matters. 31 At first, his successor, the 
Marquis de Bouillie, made attempts to quiet the fears 
of the British officers. He sent representatives to all 
the Commanders-in Chief assuring them that France had no 
intentions of assisting the Americans; that he disap- 
proved of his predecessor's policy, and he promised to 
work to develop, harmonious relations with the British 
islands. 32 Notwithstanding his promises, and in spite 
30 Governor Burt to Marquis de Bouillie, 10 September 1777. C. O. 
152/56, fo. 211; see Deposition of William Leecraw and Jonathan 
Wheeler, 9 September 1777. Ibid., fo. 209; Valentine Morris to 
Lord Germain, 2 April 1777. C. O. 265/4, fos. 120-120d. 
31 Germain to Macartney, 2 July 1777. c. O. 101/20, fos. 128d- 
129; Lord Germain to Thomas Shirley, 2 July 1777. C. O. 71/6, 
fos. 149d-150; Lord Germain to Governor Burt, 30 November 1777. 
C. O. 152/57, fo. 126d. 
. 32 Macartney to Germain, 11 July 1777. C. O. 101/20, fo. 231; 
Macartney to Germain, 22 October 1777. C. O. 101/21, fo. 63d; 
Marquis de Bouillie to James Young, May 1777. Adm. 1/310, fos. 
117-117d; Burt to Germain, 13 June 1777. C. O. 152/56, fo. 112; 
Young to Stephens, 25 May 1777. Adm. 1/310, fo. 114; Hay to 
Germain, 12 July 1777. C. O. 28/56, fo. 127. 
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of the fact that he had issued a proclamation banning 
American privateers from entering the ports in Martinique, 
even seizing a few of them, de Bouillic did not maintain 
his initial policy. The same practice of allowing the 
rebels to carry their prizes into Martinique, and to 
sell them without condemnation continued. 33 Furthermore, 
he justified his conduct on the grounds that Americans 
and West Indians were British subjects who were equally 
entitled 'to the freedom of the ports & commerce, with 
the French, the same as any nation in peace & Friendship 
with that Crown'. 34 This doctrine was particularly 
worrying to the West Indian officials, especially since 
de Bouillie had secretly assured Bingham that he was 
authorised by his home government to give protection and 
assistance to rebel privateers. 35 Under him, St. Pierre 
thus became 'more American than ... French... 
', wrote one 
Governor. 36 
De Bouillie even embarked on a new policy of 
allowing French warships stationed at Martinique to 
convoy American merchantmen going to the continent. On 
such occasions, American vessels flying French colours 
were convoyed northward of Anegada, one of the Virgin 
Islands, whence they sailed along the coast of the 
33 Shirley to Germain, 26 November. 1777. C. O. 71/7, fo. 11; 
Governor Hay to Marquis de Bouillie, 13 August 1777. C. O. 28/57, 
fos. 5-5d. 
34 flay to Germain, 12 July 1777. C. O. 28/56, fo. 127; Macartney 
to Germain, 22 October 1777. C. O. 101/21, fo. 63d. 
35 Morris to Germain, 3 August 1777. C. O. 260/4, fo. 181, p. s. 
Shirley to Germain, 11 June 1777. C. O. 71/6, fos. 153-153d. 
36 Burt to Germain, 29 January 1778. C. O. 152/57, fo. 238. 
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foreign islands to North America. Young was incensed. 
He became convinced that the French should not be 
allowed to flout their pledges of neutrality so openly, 
and he was anxious to do something about it. He wanted 
to test French reaction to his stopping and searching 
American vessels under convoy, but nothing came of his 
threat. 37 
The other European colonial powers adopted 
policies similar to those of the French. At home, they 
passed edicts and proclamations prohibiting the 
exportation of military and naval stores; but in the 
West Indies, their officials and merchants openly 
disobeyed them. For example, the official policy of the 
United Provinces was harmful to the interest of the 
merchants, and the States-Generals closed their eyes to 
the merchants' refusal to obey the restrictions on trade 
with America. Consequently, St. Eustatius was used as 
the chief commerical link between Europe, Býitain and 
the rebellious colonies. The Dutch ports, like those 
of the French, also offered some shelter to American 
privateers, and the colonial authorities there 
repeatedly complained of the infringement of Dutch 
neutrality by British cruisers, and non-commissioned 
privateers. In May 1776, for example, Abraham Heyliger, 
37 Young to Stephens, 13 March 1778. Adm. 1/310, fo. 229; see also 
Burt to Germain, December 1777. C. O. 152/57, fo. 257d; Morris to 
Germain, 15 January, 4 February 1778., C. O. 260/5, fos. 69,134- 
134d. 
38 Young to Stephens, 9 March 1777. Adm. 1/309, fo. 657d. 
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Governor of St. Eustatius, accused Captain John Colpoys 
of seizing an American vessel which was anchored in that 
port. An earlier complaint against Captain William 
Garnier of the Argo went unnoticed. Heyliger's 
objections to the seizure of American vessels stemmed 
partly from his involvement in the American trade, and 
his belief that 'the Political contention between Great 
Britain and her American Colonies neither hath or ever 
can furnish... Britain with any plausible reason for 
offering causeless insults to the flag of any neutral 
power'. 39 
Like the French, the Dutch Governors never 
admitted that their support for the Americans had 
provided the cause for the violation of their neutrality. 
Furthermore, the foreign governors expected the immediate 
redress of their grievances. In spite of the protection 
given to the rebels, however, Young, in accordance with 
British policy of observing French and Dutch neutral 
status, disapproved of Colpoy's action. But at the same 
time, Young could not help pointing out that Heyliger 
had repeatedly disobeyed all the declarations of the 
States-Generals that their colo nial officers were 
40 instructed not to support the Americans . In the 
middle of 1776, Heyliger was replaced by the Secretary 
Johnannes de Graaf, one of the wealthiest merchants in 
39 Abraham Heyliger to James Young, 14 May 1776. Adm. 1/309, 
fo. 486. 
40James Young to Abraham Ileyliger, 20 May 1776. Ibid., fos. 
487-488. 
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St. Eustatius. 
But de Graaf's interest was best served by 
supporting the rebels, and therefore he did no better 
from the British point of view. ' lie immediately opened 
the island's port to American merchantmen and 
privateers, and he became the first foreign Governor 
41 to salute the American flag . Craister Greatheed 
complained bitterly over the recognition given to the 
rebels by the Dutch fort's nine-gun salute of the armed 
brig Andrew Doria, and demanded a formal renunciation 
42 of the fort's action . Denying that any salute was 
given to the Andrew Doria, de Graaf called the reports 
Ivague, general and uncircumstanced', propagated for 
the sole purpose of undermining Anglo-Dutch relations, 
and he therefore refused to restrain the island's 
commerce with America, without the expressed authority 
of the West India Company, or to justify his conduct to 
anyone but his superiors. 43 
The Governor's response was unsatisfactory, and 
Captain Colpoys, on a visit to St. Eustatius, refused 
to salute the Dutch fort, until de Graaf had made a 
44 formal disavowal of the charges . Not losing sight of 
41 Affidavit of James Fraser, 16 December 1776. C. O. 152/56, fos. 
22-22d. 
42 Craister Greatheed to Johannes de Graaf, 17 December 1776. 
Ibid., fo. 8d. 
43 Johannes de Graaf to Craister Greatheed, 23 December 1776. 
Ibid., fos. lo-11. 
44 Captain Colpoys to Governor de Graaf, 16 December 1776. Adm. 
1/309, fo. 600d. 
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the importance of neutrality to the Dutch merchants, in 
general, and to those in St. Eustatius in particular, 
plus his own interest in. the American trade, de Graaf 
denied that to salute the Andrew Doria was to show 
disrespect to the British government. His excuse that 
his government never asked foreign merchantmen entering 
Dutch ports for passports, but returned their salutes, 45 
was an attempt to whitewash the incident. In February 
1777, Sir Joseph Yorke, the British Ambassador to the 
United Provinces, delivered a harshly worded memorandum 
from the British government demanding of the States- 
Generals a formal disavowal of the fort's action, and 
the immediate recall and dismissal of de Graaf .46 But 
before any action was taken, other complaints concerning 
American privateers being allowed to carry prizes to 
St. Eustatius were sent to Lord Germain. For instance, 
two British merchantmen, the Lancashire Hero and the 
Irish GimbZet, were captured, and carried to the Dutch 
colony. In spite of repeated appeals, Governor Burt 
failed to procure their release. 47 Similarly, despite 
several requests, de Graaf refused to release the Laurel 
privateer of Antigua captured by the Rattle Snake. 48 
The numerous comDlaints from the West Indian 
45 De Graaf to ColPoys, 16 December 1776. Ibid., fo. 601. 
46 Southey, History of the West Indies, Vol. II, p. 127; Edler, 
The Dutch RepubZic and the American RevoZution, p. 45. 
47 Burt to Germain, 28 April 1778. C. O. 152/58, fo. 45d. 
4 'Ibid.; Protest of Richard Browning, 9 February 1778. Ibid., 
fos. 52-52d. 
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Governors, transmitted to Sir Joseph Yorke, were causing 
serious cracks in Anglo-Dutch relations. But it was with 
great reluctance, however, that the States-Generals 
disavowed de Graaf's conduct, and instructed him to 
return home to answer the charges against him. Count 
van Bylandt was ordered to replace him, and the States- 
Generals reaffirmed their initial policy of neutrality, 
by ordering its officers in the West Indies to observe 
the ban on war materials to the American colonies. De 
Graaf arrived home in July 1778, and submitted a report 
of his conduct in St. Eustatius, which was supported by 
two directors of the West India Company who recommended 
that he should be found innocent of all charges. 
Pressure from many of the provinces forced the government 
to absolve him of any wrong-doing, and de Graaf was 
49 
ordered to return to St. Eustatius . 
But neither van Bylandt's appointment nor the 
orders prohibiting the sale of military and naval stores 
to the rebels were observed by the local merchants; van 
Bylandt estimated that during the thirteen months he was 
at St. Eustatius over 3,182 vessels sailed from there to 
America. In 1779 alone above 12,000 hogsheads of tobacco 
and 1,500,000 ounces of indigo were received from America 
in exchange for naval and military supplies. so 
Yet, in spite of the foreign governments' 
49 Edier, The Dutch Republic and the American Revolution, pp. 59- 
60. 
501bid., p. 62; Burt to Germain, 28 April 1778. C. O. 152/8, 
fo. 25. 
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repeated violation of their neutrality, British policy 
towards them remained basically non-aggressive. The 
captains of some warships inadvertently searched and 
even captured American vessels within French and Dutch 
territorial waters, and in other cases they also failed 
to observe the very strict regulations given to them by 
their Commanders-in-Chief; but they were never supported 
on occasions when they had blatantly violated French or 
Dutch neutrality. The British government also insisted 
on a strict observance of the declared status of the 
European countries, and its Governors were warned not 
to give 'any real Cause of Complaint to the Court of 
France, or, to any other Power.... in Amity with the 
King..... "' 
The neutral status of the foreign nations posed 
the greatest problems for the security of the British 
West Indies and their trade. Had Britain gone to war 
at the outbreak of the American Revolution, when France 
was still unprepared, the wholesale destruction of West 
Indian commerce by American privateers might not have 
occurred. The British Governors, from the outset of the 
American War, were aware of the immense importance of 
French and Dutch neutrality to the success of the rebels; 
for without access to French ports where they were able 
to refit, to victual, to enlist seamen, and to sell 
their prizes, the privateers would not have been so 
effective in capturing West Indiamen, or in raiding the 
"Germain to Shirley, 7 May 1777. C. O. 71/76, fo. 120. 
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coast of many of the islands. 'For if the pyrates did 
not find shelter within these seas', wrote Governor Hay, 
'they could not molest us as they do'. 52 
In retaliation to the Prohibitory Act of 1775, 
Congress adopted a number of resolutions on 23 March 
1776 empowering the American colonists to fit out armed 
vessels to capture British ships and their cargoes. 53 
On 2 April it adopted a form of commission for 
privateers, 54 and on the following day Congress further 
resolved to send blank commissions to each of the United 
Colonies to be issued to owners of privateers. " These 
resolutions excluded British West Indian ships as 
Congress had confined captures to the 'inhabitants of 
Great Britain'. This loophole had caused discontent 
among many Americans who felt that 'English property' 
was being covered by the West Indians, and argued for 
the seizure of all ships going to Britain. 56 Congress 
therefore closed the loophole on 24 July by resolving 
that all captures should include the vessels '"belonging 
to any subject or subjects of the King of Great Britain, 
except the inhabitants of the Bermuda and New 
Providence or Bahama Islands"'. 57 
52Hay to Germain, 12 July 1777. C. O. 28/56, fos. 127d-128; see 
also Morris to Germain, 18 February 1778. C. O. 260/5, fo. 147. 
53 Ford, ed., JournaZ of Congress, Vol. III, pp. 230-231. 
54 ibid., pp. 247-248. 
"Ibid., pp. 251-252. 
56 James Warren to John Adams, 5 June 1776. Morgan, ed., NavaZ 
Documents, Vol. V, pp. 379-380. 
57 Ibid., p. 350, Note 3. 
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Several types of armed vessels were fitted out 
at the outbreak of the American War - vessels of the 
I 
Continental navy, privateers commissioned by individual 
colonies, and those owned and armed by private persons, 
carrying commissions from Congress or the states 
enabling them to capture British ships for the owners' 
profit. Normally, all captures were to be condemned 
in courts of admiralty in America, but prizes taken to 
the foreign islands were sold without condemnation. In 
the case of captures made by Continental ships, a third 
of the proceeds from the sale of the prizes went to the 
officers and crews, while the owners and crews of 
privateers received the whole of the prizes. S8 
Several schemes were contemplated, and every 
seaport had its quota of privateers. Merchantmen which 
were now excluded from the West Indian trade, vessels 
barred from the Newfoundland fisheries, and those which 
could no longer be profitably employed in the coastal 
trade were hastily converted to privateers and sent to 
cruise in the West Indies. All the states commissioned 
their own small 'navies' of privateers. 59 In the auturqn 
of 1776, for example, the armed ship Defence of the 
Maryland 'navy', Captain Cook, captured five small 
vessels laden with logwood, mahogany, indigo, rum and 
sugar while on a cruise in the West Indies. In the same 
year, the North Carolina Committee of Safety ordered its 
so Paullin, The Navy, p. 127. 
-59 Edgar Stanton Maclay, A History of knerican Privateers (London, 
1924), p. 69. 
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three vessels to the West Indies to cruise for the 
Jamaica merchant fleet, but they achieved very little-60 
Vessels belonging to the Virginia 'navy' also cruised 
in the Caribbean. In the spring bf 1777 Captain Harris 
in the Mosquito of 16 guns and 74 men carried into 
St. Pierre the ship NobZe valued at 75,000 livres. The 
Mosquito was in turn captured by Thomas Pringle of the 
warship Ariadne early in June 1777, and was converted 
into a British sloop of war. 61 
With the exception of Massachusetts, however, 
few colonies sent their armed vessels to cruise in the 
Caribbean regularly. Between 177G and 1777, armed 
vessels of the Massachusetts 'navy' captured about 
thirty-five prizes of which approximately one-half were 
successfully carried into safe ports. 62 Apart from 
these activities, warships of the Continental navy also 
cruised in West Indian waters in search of British 
shipping. For example, the ALfred of 20 guns and 180 
men was sent to the Caribbean after leaving L'Orient, 
in France, at the end of 1777. r'3 While in the West 
Indies, the AZfred had a very successful cruise taking 
about nine merchantmen until it was captured by the 
Ariadne and Ceres around the middle of March 1778. Its 
CoPaullin, The Navy, 
"Young to Stephens, 
Germain, 6 June 1777. 
62 Paullin, The Navy, 
63 Instructions from 
C. O. 101/21, fo. 120. 
pp. 448-449,452-453. 
12 June 1777. Adm. 1/310, fo. 145; Ray to 
C. 0.28/56, fo. 117. 
p. 429. 
Congress to Elisha Hinman, 6 September 1777. 
A copy is in Adm. 1/310, fo. 254. 
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consort the RaZeigh of 32 guns escaped because of its 
superior sailing ability. Captain Thomas Pringle of 
the Ariadne was so chagrined at his failure to capture 
the RaZeigh that he wrote: I ... even a copper bottom 
could not out sail a ship tho' reduced by lightening to 
the quality of a skimming dish . 
64 
Throughout the War, ships of the Continental navy 
made captures of West Indiamen. For example, in 1779 
the warship Generat Gates and the sloop of war Providence 
sent prizes valued at, 2240,000 into Boston. In August 
of the same year, a fleet of several Continental armed 
ships, the Providence of 28 guns, commanded by Commodore 
Abraham Whipple, the Queen of France also of 28 guns, 
Captain John Rothburn, and the Ranger of 32 guns fell in 
with the homeward-bound Jamaicamen, convoyed by a 32-gun 
frigate and three other armed vessels, and captured ten 
large ships loaded with sugar and rum, without any 
significant opposition. Of the ten, seven were carried 
into Boston, and one into Cape Ann; the others 
65 were retaken. In October of the following year, the 
Saratoga of 16 guns, one of the first three vessels 
built by Congress, returned to America after a very 
successful cruise in the Caribbean where she captured 
some Jamaica merchantmen with their cargoes of sugar and 
rum. 6 6 In the aututmi, of 1782, John Barry in the frigate 
64Captain Pringle to James Young, 18 March 1778. Ibid., fos. 
557-557d. 
6SPaullin, The Navy, pp. 171-173. 
66james Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 17 October 1780, in Ifunt, 
ed., Writings of . 1canes Madicon, Vol. I, p. al. 
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AZZiance, after unsuccessfully cruising in the region 
of the Bermudas, sailed eastward where he overtook a 
fleet of West Indian merchantmen capturing four vessels 
freighted with sugar and rum. 67 
But if the ships of the Continental and states 
'navies' operated successfully in the Caribbean and 
North Atlantic waters, individual privateers were even 
more menacing to West Indian shipping. In 1776 several 
private plans for distressing the British were con- 
sidered. Some were 'for, taking the Hull'ships, with 
woollens for Amsterdam - some... for the Tin ships - 
some for the Irish Linen ships - some for the Outward 
Bound and others for the Inward Bound India Men - some 
for the Hudson's Bay ships - and many for the West 
India sugar ships'. 68 This information was very 
disconcerting to the Commanders of the British squadrons 
in the West Indies because the small units under their 
command could not prevent the privateers from inflicting 
immense damage to the islands and their commerce. 
British West Indian military and naval commands 
were divided into two distinct groups separated by over 
one thousand miles of sea - one in Jamaica, and the 
other based at Antigua was known as the Leeward Islands 
station. British acquisition of the ceded islands had 
extended the duties of the Leeward Islands squadron to 
include Dominica, Grenada, St. Vincent, and Tobago which 
67Paullin, The Navy, pp. 236-237. 
"John Adams to Abigail Adams, 12 August 1776, in Adams, T72e 
Adams Papers, ed., Butterfield, Vol. 11, p. 89. 
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lay about 100 miles to the southwest of Barbados. 69 No 
adequate reinforcement was made to the squadron, nor 
were there any significant changes to the defence system 
in the British West Indies. Consequently, the lack of 
an adequate naval force in the Caribbean restricted the 
naval duties of the British Commanders. This was duly 
noted in one of Lord Macartney's despatches to Lord 
Germain: 
Of this indeed we had very sufficient 
Evidence, for even whilst the Admiral 
was lying here [in Georgetown, Grenada] 
and his flag flying on board a 50 gun ship, 
Both Tobago and the Windward parts of this 
Island were hourly insulted by a number 
of small privateers which either took our 
small crafts when they ventured to sea, 
block'd them up in the bays, or cut them 
out as they lay at anchor. 70 
A weak navy therefore meant that the islands. and 
their trade were vulnerable to physical destruction. 
Several factors contributed in reducing the effective- 
ness of the small squadron under Young's command: 
the ships were kept at sea for long periods and were 
thus in need of repairs; the keels of many of the 
ships were virtually eaten away by worm making them 
unseaworthy; unlike previous wars, nava, l stores were 
difficult to procure, and when they were available, 
the merchants charged exorbitant prices. Like the sugar 
planters, the British navy relied on the American 
colonies for some supplies, and a scarcity of these was 
experienced throughout the War. In March 1777 Vice- 
69 Mackesy, The War for America, p. 225. 
70 Macartney to Germain, 11 July 1777. C. O. 101/20, fos. 23ld-232. 
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Admiral Young had to call on the Secretary of the 
Admiralty to order the Commander-in-Chicf in America to 
send out naval supplies. 71 But the condition of the 
squadron remained the same; for in 1779 Vice-Admiral 
John Byron wrote: 'The ships of the Line can scarcely 
be put into a state of action'. Several were crippled 
by damaged masts, hulls needed-repair, others were 'upon 
single Bottoms' only. In addition, many seamen 
deserted to join the privateer s. 72 
Thus, the situation of the islands had changed 
completely. In previous wars, the French colonies had 
faced physical and economic destruction; now it was the 
turn of the British West Indies. For the first time in 
almost one hundred and fifty years, the French and 
Spanish navies were able to establish naval superiority 
for long periods in the Caribbean. The British navy was 
hampered by the factors already mentioned, as well as 
the loss of American bases to which the ships could 
retreat for repairs during the hurricane season, 
returning to the Caribbean for spring and summer offensives. 
The weakness of the British navy greatly favoured 
the American privateers which increased in number from 
year to year: from 136 vessels carrying 1,360 guns in 
1775 and 1776,73 vessels and 730 guns in 1777,115 
vessels with 1,150 guns in 1778,167 vessels with 2,505 
guns in 1779,223 vessels with 3,420 guns in 1780,449 
71 Young to Stephens, 13 March 1777. Adm. 1/310, fos. 239-239d. 
72 Vice-Admiral Byron to Philip Stephens, 13 May 1779. Adm. 1/312, 
fo. 60d. 
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vessels carrying 6,735 guns in 1781, and 323 vessels and 
4,850 guns in 1782. Along with the growth in the number - 
of privateers came the-increase in size and efficiency 
of the vessels thus employed. At the beginning of the 
American War, any vessel was armed; but as it dragged 
on, and some owners amassed wealth from the profits of 
their enterprises, better and much swifter sailing 
privateers were built. 73 
From 1776 to 1782 the privateers performed an 
invaluable service to the American war effort, in so 
much so that attempts by some members in Congress to 
restrict their operation later on in the War was 
74 opposed . In addition to transporting war materials 
and West Indian staples to America, they had severely 
75 damaged the islands' commerce. In May 1776, for 
example, two well armed privateer sloops from 
Pennsylvania, the Congress and Chance, cruising in the 
Windward Passage, and in the waters around Hispaniola, 
seized several Jamaicamen, sailing without convoy, 
including the Lady JuZiana, Captain Stepheson, the 
ReynoZds, Captain Rusden, and the Degune, Captain Marson, 
loaded with sugar, rum and other tropical products, and 
73Maclay, American Privateers, p. 113. 
74 Josiah Bartlett, Chief Justice and Governor of New Hampshire, 
to William Whipple, 20 June 1778, in Burnett, ed., Letters, Vol. 
III, p. 309. 
75 Martin, 'The West India Trade, 1776-1777'. A. H. R., Vol. 
XXXIX, p. 702. 
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carrying a large amount of Spanish dollars .76A few 
weeks later, two more Jamaican ships were taken one 
was carried into Marblehead, and the other about 700 
tons, richly laden with tropical Products, was taken 
into Dartmouth, in Massachusetts. A few days afterwards, 
a privateer owned by Richard Derby of Salem captured 
the brigantine Fanny, on a voyage from Barbados to 
Halifax, with rum for the British troops, 77 and a 
Jamaica ship with 390 hogsheads of sugar, and 143 
puncheons of rum which was sent into Sheepscatt .78 The 
privateers were so successful in the early months of 
the War that Abigail Adams wrote to her husband: 'As 
to news we go on briskly taking prizes. We have a 
plenty of sugars. Within these ten days Sugars have 
fallen from 4 pounds to 3 and 2.8 by the hundred 1.79 
The success of the privateers was in part 
dependent on the inability of British naval officers to 
pursue them in the territorial waters of the foreign 
governments. on his way to Martinique in July 1776, the 
Continental brig ReprisaZ, commanded by Lambert Wickes, 
with William Bingham as a passenger, 80 captured several 
76 Sir Basil Keith to Lord Germain, 29 June 1776. C. O. 137/71, 
fo. 193d; Geronimo Emile Guerci and Manual Phelix Riesch, Agents 
of the Royal Asciento Company of Havana to Messieurs Foord & Delptratt, 
19 May 1776, Ibid., fos. 199-199d. 
77 Cotton Tufts to John Adams, 17 June 1776, in Adams# The Adams 
Papers, ed., Butterfield, Vol. II, p. 17. 
78 Richard Cranch to John Adams, 22 July 1776. Ibid., 
79 Abigail Adams to John Adams, 12 August 1776. Ibid., p. 98. 
80 Committee of Secret Correspondence of the Continental Congress 
to William Bingham, in Morgan, ed., NaVal Docionentsp vol. V, p. 454. 
In the Colonial office papers, the name is spelled Weekes. 
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British ships, of which one was the Friendship, Charles 
Mackay captain, on a voyage from Grenada to London with 
a cargo of West Indian. staples. 81 At the end of the 
month, the RepricaZ was engaged in an action, which 
lasted for about three-quarters of an-hour, with the 
British sloop of war Shark, Captain John Chapman; but 
the American brig escaped with damage to her sails and 
riggings, when two shots from the French battery 
St. Mathe was fired at the Shark. Baron De Courcy, 
Commander at St. Pierre, upheld the action of his officer 
and promised to order further actions if British war- 
ships continued to violate French territorial waters. 82 
Such actions and threats made it almost impossible for 
British ships to deal effectively with the privateers. 
British merchantmen were also captured because 
of information received from American supporters in the 
islands, concerning the time of sailing of the homeward 
fleet, the strength of the convoy, and other related 
matters. In addition, it was impossible to prevent the 
rebel privateersmen from observing the assemblage of 
the merchant fleet at St. Kitts. On receiving infor- 
mation, the Americans quickly seized the opportunity to 
place their vessels in the path of the convoys. To 
8'Macartney to Germain, 3 September 1776. C. O. 101/9, fo. 20d.; 
Captain Lambert Wickes to the Committee of Secret Correspondence 
of the Continental Congress, 11 July 1776, in Morgan, ed., NavaZ 
Documents, vol. V, p. 1030. 
82 Daron do Courcy to Count D'Argout, 29 July 1776, in Morgan, 
ed., NavaZ Docwnents, Vol. V, pp. 1263-1264,1276-1277; John 
Chapman to James Young, July 1776. Adm. 1/309, fos. 526-62Gd; 
Deposition of John Courage, 11 September 1776. C. O. lol/19, fos. 
208-20d. 
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execute such attacks effectively, the privateers usually 
cruised in pairs, and were thus able to pounce on a 
merchant fleet successfully, especially when the 
merchantmen were escorted by only one warship, as was 
often the case during the American War. 83 
Between early August and the middle of December 
1776, over twelve--Jýmaicamen alone were captured in the 
Windward Passage. 84 William Crichton, a member of the 
West India Committee, and a partner of Houston and 
Company, estimated that in 1776 over 25,000 hogsheads 
of sugar were captured by the Americans .85 George 
Johnstone, former Governor of East Florida, who was one 
of the Commissioners sent to America in 1778, and Captain 
Luttrel who participated in the abortive attempt to 
capture Nicaragua, estimated that over E1,069,000 worth 
of West Indiamen and their cargoes were taken in the 
first nine months of American privateering. In addition, 
African ships and slaves valued in excess of E187,000 
were also captured. The total value of all British 
merchantmen captured during this period was estimated at 
approximately Z1,575,000-86 
83 Maclay, American Privateers, pp. 18-19; SuppZement to the 
CornwaZZ Chronicle and Jamaica General Advertiser, 14 December 1776, 
Vol. I, No. 107: 4. 
84 
Ibid. 
es Crichton, 'The ... Causes of the Rise of the Price of Sugar', 6 July 1778. Add. MSS. 12,404, fo. 445. The papers of David 
Crichton, brother of William, are in N. R. A. (Scotland) and deal 
with the period after 1787. 
86 CornwaZZ Chronicle and Jamaica General Advertiser, 19 April 
1777, Vol. I, No. 125: 3. 
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The British merchants had sustained heavy losses 
during the first two years of the War. They estimated 
(computing the value of the outward-bound merchantmen 
at X6,000 - 0,000 and the homevýard-bound at approxi- 
mately 10,000), that the total value of all captures 
made between April 1776 and December 1777 was over 
X1,800,000.87 The losses in the Jamaica trade alone 
exceeded E500,000 during this period. 87 The CornwaZZ 
ChronicZe and Jamaica GeneraZ Advertiser puts the total 
losses of the West Indian, Newfoundland and African 
commerce with Britain at over E1,700,000 at the end of 
the first year of privateering. 88 Because of the heavy 
losses, one West Indian Governor commented: 'Scarce a 
day passing that we don't hear of two or three captures'. 89 
In November 1777 the Assembly of Jamaica appointed 
a committee to enquire into and report to the House on 
the protection given to the island's trade and coastal 
areas, by the Jamaica squadron. Lewis Burwell Martin, 
assistant-judge, who became embroiled in a dispute with 
Governor Dalling in 1780, was appointed Chairman. 
After hearing evidence from several persons, who were 
summoned to appear before it, the committee stated in 
its report that in spite of repeated warnings given to 
Rear-Admiral Gayton by the late Sir Basil Keith and 
87Long, 'History of Jamaica', July 1778. Add. MSS. 12,404, fo. 
446d. 
"Cornwall Chronicle and Jamaica General Advertiser, 12 April 
1777, vol. I, No. 202: 1. 
89Lord Macartney to Vice-Admiral Young, 2 April 1777. C. O. 101/20, 
fo. 146d. 
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Governor Dalling, the island's commerce was exposed to 
continuous attacks because of the shortage of warships 
in the Jamaica squadrori. 90 The report was highly 
critical of the Admiralty's decision to employ so many 
ships to cruise in the Windward Passage to intercept 
Jamaican vessels trading illegally with the rebels. 
The Council and Assembly in a petition to the 
King contended that the coast and trade of Jamaica were 
undefended, were therefore exposed to attacks by enemy 
privateers, and they requested that Gayton should be 
ordered to employ a sufficient number of vessels to 
cruise constantly around the island for its protection. 91 
Although immediate action was taken by the Admiralty to 
reinforce the Jamaica squadron, conditions changed 
very little; 92 for at the end of 1780, the West India 
Committee had to apply to the Admiralty to station 
cruisers on the north coast of the island for its 
133 protection. A little less than a year later, the 
Committee renewed its appeal for cruisers to protect 
Jamaica from enemy privateers. 94 
The southern Caribbean colonies, like Jamaica, 
90J. A. J., 19 November 1777. C. O. 140/59, pp. 15-16; see also 
C. O. 137/73, fos. 4-5d. 
91 
Petition of the Council and Assembly of Jamaica to the King, 
21 November 1777. C. O. 137/73, fo. 29. 
92 
Lord Germain to Governor Dalling, 10 March 1778. Ibid., fos. 
104-104d. 
93 
Minutes of the West India Merchants, 5,8 December 1780, Vol. II. 
fos. 49-50. 
94 
Minutes of the West India Merchants, 30 October 1781, Vol. II, 
fo. 74d. 
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were not exempt from attacks. American privateers 
constantly raided the coastal villages in these islands 
with very little opposition, except in a few areas where 
the inhabitants had erected batteries. For example, in 
May 1777 part of the crew of an American privateer, Oliver 
Cromwell, attempted to make a landing at Sandy Point, in 
the Leeward part of Tobago, but was driven off by the 
battery. 95 However, other attacks were made on the more 
remote parts of the island. After an earlier attempt 
was foiled, 96 at the end of December a party of American 
sailors successfully landed at Bloody Bay, in the north- 
western section of the island, where they spiked the 
cannons, and carried off the gunpowder. 97 
Early in January 1779, about fifty American 
sailors landed at Man of War Bay where they plundered 
the village, burnt some of the houses, and carried off 
three white people as prisoners. Two prominent planters, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart and Captain Lincoln who led 
a small party of the militia in an attempt to drive off 
the invaders, were seriously wounded. 98 Because of these 
attacks and the capture of several droghers, few 
merchant ships could be persuaded to go to the island 
95 Peter Campbell to Lord Macartney, 16 May 1777. C. O. 101/20, 
fo. 211d. 
96'Memorial of the Proprietors and Merchants concerned in Tobago', 
to Lord Germain, 1777. Ibid., fo. 242. 
97 'Memorial of the Merchants and Proprietors of Tobago', 28 May 
1778. C. O. 101/21, fo. 150. 
98 Macartney to Germain, 28 January 1779. C. O. 101/23, fos. 76- 
76d; 'Extract of a letter from Lieutenant Oswald Clark of the 
St. Paul's Company of Militia;, 18 January 1779. Ibid., fos. 78-78d. 
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either to carry supplies or to receive its crops. 99 
Barbados also suffered at the hands of the 
privateers which infested the seas around that island 
destroying not only its trade, but capturing droghers 
within its bays. For example, a privateer which entered 
Speights Bay was fired on by Orange Fort, but escaped 
carrying off a slave who was asleep in a boat. Another 
captured several fishing boats with slaves on board. 
In response to these attacks, the Assembly bypassed the 
Governor, contrary to custom, and applied directly to 
Vice-Admiral Young who sent a frigate to cruise around 
the island. 100 Some relief was immediately received, 
and Captain Pringle of the Ariadne captured the Johnson 
of eight guns, at the end of November 1777. Hay told 
him that he had brought great relief to Barbados. 101 
In the Leeward Islands too the planters were 
fearful of raids during the nights. John Pinney wrote: 
'I cannot help thinking, but our Estates in the Islands 
are held, at present, on a very precarious tenure. 
Enemies all around us: While at breakfast, a few weeks 
ago, I saw a brig taken, bound to St. Christopher, near 
our landing'. To safeguard his estate, Pinney built a 
battery of three guns which he got from Governor Burt, 
and placed a nightly guard on it. 102 At the beginning 
99'Memorial 
of the Merchants and Proprietors of Tobago', 28 May 
1778. C. O. 101/21, fo. 150d. 
looSchomburgk, History of Barbados, pp. 335-336. 
10'Edward Hay to Thomas Pringle, 3 December 1777. C. O. 28/57, fo. 
13; Hay called the vessel the 
102 Pinney to Pretor, 12 June 1777. Pinney Papers: L. B. 4, P. 114. 
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of July 1777, a small American privateer landed a number 
of men at Moyreau, in Grenada, 'stripped quite naked all 
the inhabitants who fell into their hands', burnt and 
destroyed everything which they'could not carry off. 103 
Traveliing between the islands too had become unsafe, 104 
and such was the gravity of the situation in all the 
West Indian islands that in September 1778, a letter 
calling on the inhabitants to declare publicly their 
support for the Americans appeared in several West 
Indian newspapers. The author contended that Britain 
could protect neither the islands nor their trade. 105 
Because of the inability of the British squadrons 
to deal with the privateers, as well as a desire on the 
part of some of the merchants to get rich, many 
inhabitants in Dominica, and the Leeward Islands, fitted 
out non-commissioned privateers, 106 and their prizes 
were condemned in the Vice-Admiralty Courts, as 'Droits 
of the Crown'. But the actions of these vessels were 
looked upon with disfavour by the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Leeward Islands squadron, thus giving rise to a 
heated dispute between Young, Attorney-General Thomas 
Warner and the owners of the non-commissioned vessels. 
103 Macartney to Germain, 23 July 1777. C. O. 101/20, fo. 239d. 
104 Affidavit of John Robb, Sergeant of the 48th Infantry Regiment, 
27 February 1777. Ibid., fos. 156-156d. 
105 The West India Planter to the West India Planters and 
Merchants, 16 September 1778. C. O. 101/22, fo 128. 
106 Petition of the Merchants and other Inhabitants of Dominica to 
Governor Shirley, 8 February 1777. C. O. 71/6, fos. 116-116d; 
Governor Shirley to the Merchants, 8 February 1777. Ibid., fos. 
118-118d; Shirley to Germain, 30 March 1777. Ibid., fo. 122. 
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Petitions were sent to the King concerning the seizure 
of some of the vessels, and several suits were filed in 
the courts of Antigua against Young and Captain 
Dumaresq. 107 Up to 1778 the non-commissioned vessels 
rendered an invaluable service to the islands. Though 
most of them were ill-armed droghers, they captured many 
unarmed American trading vessels untilYoung issued a 
proclamation declaring them illegal and making them 
subject to seizure. Without intending it, Young's 
action greatly relieved the American traders. 108 
The Antigua merchants were so incensed by Young's 
policy and his seizure of their vessels that their 
ac, tions now greatly hindered the operation of the Lee- 
ward Islands squadron. There were open feelings of 
hostility between Young and Dumaresq, and the colonists 
who were already engaged in heated political and 
constitutional disputes with their Governors, which 
lasted until the end of the War. Young was sued for 
E1,200 Antigua currency for seizing the Hammond 
privateer; while Captain Dumaresq was fined 9950 sterling 
for impressing 19 men from the same vessel. As the 
owners of the Hammond had filed writs of execution 
against both men, they were confined to their ship. 
These actions and decisions of the court against the 
naval officers hampered the government's service 
107 Petition of the owners of the ReprisaZ to the King (no date). 
C. O. 152/56, fos. 58-59; Address of the Council and Assembly of 
Antigua to the King (no date). Ibid., fo. 67. 
108 Martin, 'The West India Trade, 1776-1777'. A. H. R., Vol. xxxix, 
pp. 705-706. 
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by forcing them to keep out of the way-109 The affair 
was amicably settled by Lord Germain's intervention, and 
also by Governor Burt's unceasing efforts to keep other 
suits out of court, and to persuade the owners of other 
non-commissioned vessels to contribute a sum of money 
to pay the fines to the owners of the Hammond. 110 
The dispute between Young and some of the 
inhabitants of Antigua, over the legality of non-commis- 
sioned vessels to make seizures under the Prohibitory 
Act, helped to influence Parliament to pass a new Act 
in 1777 empowering British Governors to grant letters of 
marque to private merchantmen, or to ships retained in 
the government's service. The new law amended the 
Prohibitory Act. All vessels trading contrary to its 
provisions were to be seized. The whole of the prizes 
were to be given to the captors, as in the case of 
American privateers, except when such commissioned vessels 
were under convoy. "' It did not prohibit the non- 
commissioned privateers; but in cases where these vessels 
made captures, the prizes were to be condemned as 'Droits 
of the Crown', and the captors were not given an auto- 
matic share of the booty. 122 
In spite of the commissioning of British 
109 
Young to Stephens, 21 July and 24 August 1777. Adm. 1/310, 
fos. 172-172d, fo. 179; Burt to Germain, 17 September 1777. C. O. 
152/56, fos. 191-191d. 
110 
Young to Stephens, 27 October 1777 Adm. 1/310, fo. 181; Burt 
to Germain, 17 September 1777. C. O. 1; 2/56, fos. 192-192d. 
111 17 Geo. III C. 7. 
112 Germain to Burt, 20 June 1777. C. O. 152/56, fo. 81. 
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privateers, there was no significant reduction of the 
losses to British West Indian commerce. The defence of 
the islands had always been left to the British navy in 
previous wars. 113 In the American War, however, the 
navy was far too burdened to cope effectively with 
enemy privateers. Consequently, the planters of the 
British islands, from Jamaica to Tobago, suffered severe 
hardships because they were, on the whole, defenceless 
against attacks. 
After France entered the War, the strategy of the 
American privateers seemed to have changed, although 
they continued to play an important role until the end 
of the War. The West Indies now became the scene of 
some of the fiercest fighting on land and sea, between 
the French and British. The entrance of France into the 
fighting also marked the second phase of the American 
War, and the beginning of the struggle for the Caribbean 
colonies. It was no longer mandatory to the rebels' 
success that their privateers keep up their continuous 
attacks on the British islands and their trade - the 
French navy was well able to do this. 114 
The American rebels had nevertheless succeeded in 
disrupting British-West Indian commerce, with the help 
of the foreign governments. The protection which was 
usually provided to British shipping in previous wars"s 
113 Pares, War and Trade, see Chapter VII; Crowhurst, 'British 
Oceanic Convoys', Chapters IV and V. 
114 See Mackesy, The War for America, pp. 224-234,329-337. 
115 Crowhurst, 'British Oceanic Convoys', Chapters IV and V. 
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was not given during this one, for many reasons: the - 
smallness of the Jamaica and Leeward islands squadrons, 
the unseaworthiness of the warships, loss of American 
trade and American ports on which the navy usually 
depended. The loss of American naval supplies had an 
adverse effect on the efficiency of the British 
squadrons in the Caribbean area. Throughout the War, 
the coasts of the British islands remained unprotected 
and many of them were at the mercy of the smallest 
American privateer. The American strategy of attacking 
the islands and their trade in order to draw off the 
British fleet from the coast of America was generally 
successful, and made it more difficult for the planters 
in their struggle for survival. 
CHAPTER V 
THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL: THE PLANTERS AND THE WAR 
The impact of the American War on sugar production 
in the British West Indies cannot be fully determined by 
an examination of British-T. -, Test Indian trade. Though the 
quantities of products exported will tell us something 
of conditions in the islands, there are other factors 
which must be taken into account in order to determine 
the full effect of the loss of American supplies on the 
daily lives of the sugar producers who were the backbone 
of the West Indian economy. In Chapter I, we have seen 
that the unrestricted commercial relation which had 
developed between the British Caribbean and American 
colonies was of inestimable benefit to the sugar planters 
who were able to develop their estates at low costs. In 
1774 when Congress threatened to take economic sanctions 
against Britain, the Earl of Dartmouth expressed the 
seriousness with which the British viewed the American 
threat in a letter to Sir Ralph Payne, Governor of the 
Leeward Islands. He wrote: 'The State of Affairs in 
North America and particularly in the New England 
Colonies is become very serious, it is to be hoped 
however that nothing will happen to obstruct the commerce 
between the Northern Colonies and the Sugar-Islands. It 
178 
is a Commerce that for the mutual interest of both ought 
to be cherished on both sides. ' I 
The American War was therefore expected to have 
a two-fold effect on the islands. First, it would 
increase the costs of production of sugar; and second, 
it would lessen the demand in Britain for other West 
Indian products. The older islands were in a precarious 
situation once their traditional trade links were damaged. 
In Barbados and most of the Leeward Islands, for example, 
deforestation had long taken place, and most of the 
arable land was under sugar-cane. Thus, these colonies 
were less able to produce their own food than were the 
ceded islands and Jamaica where there were larger areas 
of uncultivated fertile land. Since the importance of 
the British West Indies depended on the profitable pro- 
duction of sugar which, in turn, depended on assured 
markets for their exports at the highest prices and 
guaranteed supplies of food and lumber, the removal of one 
of these factors spelled disaster for the islands, and 
threatened their continued economic development. 
During 1775 the strained relations between Britain 
and America had little effect on the steady flow of pro- 
visions and lumber to the sugar islands. Many Governors 
in their despatches home stated that the disputes had not 
2 affected supplies to their governments . Governor Edward 
I The Earl of Dartmouth to Sir Ralph Payne, 5 October 1774. c. O. 
152/54, fo. 101d. 
2Sir Ralph Payne to the Earl of Dartmouth, 12 January 1775. C. O. 
152/55, fo. 7. 
t 
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Hay of Barbados, for example, reported: 'no bad effects 
have been felt in this Island hitherto from the disturb- 
ances in the Northern Colonies but that full as many 
vessels with their Provisions and Stores have arrived 
from thence as usual, and the Storehouses well stocked'. 
3 
Even the Restraining Acts had no great effect in reducing 
supplies to the West Indies, and many planters were 
optimistic that if the Americans carried out their 
planned embargo, there were some merchants who would 
defy it in order to maintain their commercial relations 
with the islands. 4 
After the passage of the Prohibitory Act in 
December 1775, however, the British West Indies were 
faced with the imminent threat of privation unless an 
alternative market was substituted - one with which the 
islands would be allowed to exchange rum and other 
products for provisions and lumber. This was suggested 
by Governor Burt, who, before leaving London in 1776, 
discussed with Lord Germain, and John Robinson, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, the possibility of allowing 
the islands to import lumber, fish, pitch, tar, and other 
articles from Russia, in exchange for rum, either in 
foreign or British vessels. Such a proposal was an 
infringement of the Navigation Acts and was turned down. 
5 
3 Edward Hay to the Earl of Dartmouth, 6 April 1775. C. O. 28/56, 
fo. ld. 
4 John Pinney to John Ilayne, 10 April 1775. Pinney Papers: L. B. 
3, p. 305. 
Burt to Germain, 17 September 1777. C. O. 152/56, fos. 193-194. 
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When Burt arrived in the West Indies, he became 
even more convinced of the necessity of his earlier 
proposal, and made another appeal for its adoption, but 
his suggestion was not practical as much through the 
cost of shipping and insurance, as from its infringement 
of British mercantilist policies. It was therefore not 
accepted, though some lumber from the Baltic countries 
reached the West Indies through BrItain. 6 Increased 
quantities of some articles of food were also sent from 
the United Kingdom, but these were expensive, and 
insufficient for the West Indian demand. The planters 
also had to rely on the foreign West Indian islands for 
some American supplies, and this dependence was mainly 
responsible for the growth of the illicit trade discussed 
in Chapter III. 
As the West Indian colonies were developed mainly 
for sugar and rum production, with guaranteed markets 
for exports balancing import of provisions, the planters 
could not reorganise their agricultural system. It is 
also doubtful whether the slave system could have 
continued without external markets for provisions and 
lumber. There was not enough land; and the absence of 
a farmer class, not necessarily slave-owning, which would 
produce food for domestic consumption, added to the 
planters' problems. Even in America where land was 
plentiful, no plantation was totally self-sufficient, 
and there is no evidence that there were plans to make 
6 'State of Trade' (no date). C. O. 325/6, fo. 4. 
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the sugar estates so either. When, therefore, it became 
apparent to the planters that their American markets 
would be closed, no significant agricultural changes 
could be made. Legislative measures introduced in 
several of the islands to encourage the production of 
food, although a significant departure from pre-war 
economic planning, were only partly successful. In the 
older islands, alternative sources of land could not be 
found without reducing sugar-cane cultivation, and even 
where land was available, the cost of slave labour made 
the production of provisions a temporary measure. In 
some islands, however, some planters were 'determined to 
plant Provisions', even though they made negligible sugar 
crops, 'for the prospects of a famine is horrid', wrote 
John Pinney. 7 
In Jamaica there were approximately six hundred pro- 
vision gardens in 1774, and room for expansion; neverthe- 
less, after the receipt of two letters from Connecticut 
informing the House that supplies would be cut off, the 
Assembly early in November 1775 appointed a committee 
of nine members to consider ways and means of preventing 
the expected scarcity of foodstuffs and lumber, to 
encourage the cultivation of all types of grains, and to 
procure and manufacture lumber. The committee's first 
recommendation was an embargo on the exportation of 
provisions, and consequently, each outgoing vessel was 
7 Pinney to Pretor, 1 June 1775. Pinney Papers: L. B. 3, p. 13; 
Pinney to Mills and Swanston, 9 December 1775. Ibid., L. B. 4, p. 21. 
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allowed only enough supplies for the voyage. 
8 To 
compensate the merchants for their lost trade, the 
Assembly ordered the Receiver-General to purchase all. 
provisions for export at their selling prices. These 
were then sold at cost price to the planters in quantities 
not exceeding five barrels to any person-9 A month later 
the Assembly passed a bill which was renewed annually, 
enabling the Governor to prohibit the exportation of 
provisions by proclamation when the House was in recess. 10 
On the recommendation of its committee, the 
Assembly further agreed to award 9150 Jamaican currency, 
to any person in the parish of St- Andrew who grew and 
sold not less than one thousand bushels of Indian or 
Guinea corn, rice, peas, or beans, between 1 December 
1775 and 31 March 1777. A second award of 9100 was given 
to the person producing not less than seven hundred and 
fifty bushels. on the following day, a third award 
valuing Z50 was established for the producer of not less 
than five hundred bushels of grain. 
11 In December Sir 
Basil Keith assented to a bill extending the awards to 
planters throughout the island 'to encourage the planting 
and Growth of Provisions in the several Parishes . **. j12 
8 J. A. J., 1 November 1775. C. O. 140/46, p. 575. 
9 J. A. J., 2 November 1775. Ibid., p. 576. 
'cSir Basil Keith to the Earl of Dartmouth, 18 January 1776. 
C. O. 137/71, fo. 43. 
"J. A. J., 2 and 3 November 1775. C. O. 140/46, pp. 576,579-580. 
12 J. A. J., 22 December 1775. Ibid., P. 631. 
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Efforts were also made to develop the cattle industry. 
The legislature passed an Act in 1778 prohibiting the 
stealing or destroying of sheep, goats and cattle, 
and in the following year it approved Governor Dalling's 
appointment of William Harvey to purchase and quarter 
cattle for the troops for which he was paid 7ýd. per 
lb. 14 The effect of the American War in stimulating 
the cattle industry can be seen in the increase in the 
number of cattle from 135,750 in 1768 to 224,500 in 
1780.15 
Besides these important legislative measures, the 
Jamaican Assembly in 1774 appointed a botanist, Dr. 
Thomas Clarke, to collect plants from the South Seas, 
China, the East Indies, or from different gardens in 
London. An advance of E100 sterling was given to Stephen 
Fuller to assist Clarke in leaving England. 
16 In 
November 1775 a further 9140 was sent to the botanist 
to purchase plants. 17 In the same month, the commis- 
sioners for the botanical gardens in Kingston appointed 
a gardener at a salary of E100 Jamaican currency per 
annum. But many of the valuable plants carried to the 
West Indies during this period were of little value as 
food. Clarke who arrived in Jamaica in 1777 brought with 
13 J. A. J., 22 November 1778. C. O. 140/59, P. 101- 
14 J. A. J., 18 August 1779. Ibid., p. 146. 
is Noel Deerr, The History of Sugar (London, 1949), Vol. I, p. 176. 
16 J. A. J., 23 December 1774. C. O. 140/46, p. 570. 
17 J. A. J., 23 November 1774. Ibid., p. 597. 
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him the jujube tree, the litchi, the purple dracoena, 
the sago palm, the camphor tree, the tea tree, and the 
'saru' hemp plant. However, it was not until 1778 that 
he obtained the akee, later a well-known Jamaican food, 
from a West African slave-ship. The mango, now widely 
cultivated throughout the West Indies, and the cinnamon 
were carried there in 1782 by Captain Marshall of Admiral 
Rodney's squadron. Likewise, the nutmeg was introduced 
into Jamaica by Rodney in the same year. is 
The only other British island with a botan. idal, ', 
garden was St. Vincent. The garden, supervised by 
Alexander Anderson, contained several rare plants from 
the East Indies and South America. 
' 9 In 1772 Valentine 
Morris, an Antigua planter, Member of the Council, who 
became the first Governor of St. Vincent, 1776-17791 
wrote to Joseph Banks, recently returned from Cook's 
first circumnavigation, who was aware of the breadfruit's 
value as a food, suggesting that the plant should be 
introduced into the British West Indies to provide food 
for the slaves .20 The West India conunittee adopted a 
resolution in March 1775 to award 9100 sterling to the 
captain of any East India ship, or to any person bringing 
a thriving and healthy breadfruit plant into England. 
2i 
In the middle of the following year, John Ellis# Agent 
18 F. Cundall, Historic Jcanaica (London, 1915), pp. 25-26. 
is Edwards, History of the West Indies, Vol. I, p. 403. 
20 Ragatz, The PZanter CZass, p. 26. 
21 Minutes of the West India Merchants, 7 March 1775, vol. I, 
fo. 73. 
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for Dominica, presented several papers relative to the 
premium for importing the plant to the Committee 
22 which 
then appointed a subcommittee to consider the best way 
23 
of introducing the trees into the British West Indies. 
The question of the importation of the breadfruit 
plant was again raised at a general meeting of the West 
India Committee in February 1777 when a fund to reward 
24 
all claimants who imported the tree was established . 
A decade later, the project received the British govern- 
ment's assistance, but it was not until 178 925 when 
Captain William Bligh sailed in the Bounty to the South 
Sea islands for breadfruit plants, that an attempt was 
made to supply the sugar colonies with this valuable 
plant for food. Nevertheless, this failed because of 
the famous mutiny on the Bounty. The tree was finally 
imported into the West Indies in 1794, but the bread- 
fruit was of no value as food for the slaves until the 
nineteenth century. 
In spite of the efforts of the Jamaica Assembly 
to encourage the planters to produce most of their own 
food, they still had to rely on external sources. Con- 
sequently, it adopted various measures to facilitate the 
importation of provisions. In November 1775 the Assembly 
offered a bounty of Z5 per ton, and 10s. per barrel of 
22 Minutes of the West India Merchants, 4 June 1776. Ibid., fo. 86. 
23 Minutes of the West India Merchants, 2 July 177G. Ibid., fo. 87. 
24 Minutes of the West India Merchants, 18 rebruary 1777. Ibid., 
fo. 104. 
25 Hall, WO-Ot India Conflnittee, p. 2. 
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not less than 32 gallons, on all dried fish imported into 
Jamaica for sale before 10 December 1776; 3d. per bushel 
was awarded for imported salt; while 6d. per bushel was 
given to persons manufacturing over 10,000 bushels of 
salt before 1 December 1776. As an incentive to ship- 
owners, and probably to encourage shipbuilding, all goods 
imported into Jamaica were to be brought in vessels half- 
owned by residents . 
26 Finally, on 22 December the legis- 
lature passed 'An Act to encourage the taking and curing 
of Fish and Turtle, and making oil ... procuring Salt 
and importing the same into the island'. 27 
The other West Indian legislatures did not adopt 
policies as readily as that of Jamaica. Some attempts 
to initiate parallel legislation were unsuccessful, 
chiefly because their Councils and Assemblies failed to 
agree on the most suitable measures for achieving their 
goals. A bill compelling the planters of Antigua, for 
example, to grow more food for their slaves originated 
in, and passed the Council, but was rejected by the 
Assembly after its second reading. 28 Because of the 
necessity of increasing food imports into that island, 
however, Richard Burton introduced into the House a bill 
to give a bounty on all goods and lumber imported for 
26 J. A. J., 9 November 1775. C. O. 140/46, p. 583. 
27 J. A. J., 22 December 1775. Ibid., p. 631. 
28 Journal of the Assembly of Antigua, 14 June 1776. C. O. 9/35, 
(hereafter cited as J. A. A. ). 
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29 30 sale. The bill passed the 11ousc, and was sent to the 
Council whore it was rejected after the second reading. 
The members of the Council believed that if the merchants 
were not induced by high prices'to import food and lumber, 
no bounty would encourage them. 31 But, as food shortages 
became more severe in the latter part of the War, the 
Antigua legislature passed an Act in 1780 imposing a 
heavy duty on live stock exported from the island. 32 
In St. Kitts, John Tyson, a friend of Curson and 
Gouverneur, 33 was Chairman of a committee of the House 
appointed to frame a bill awarding bounties to persons 
importing provisions, lumber and live stock. The bill 
passed the House in May 1776,34 but was amended by the 
Council to make all persons receiving bounties certify 
under oath that the articles imported were for domestic 
use only. As both Houses could not reach a compromise, 
the Assembly rejected the amendment, and the Council 
then rejected the bill .35 However, as the American War 
continued and the shortage of provisions and lumber grew 
more acute in St. Kitts, the Tonnage Bill of 1779 
29 J. A. A., 3 February 1776. C. O. 9/33. 
30 J. A. A., 6 February 1776. Ibid.; see also C. O. 9/35. 
31 J. A. A., 11 April 1776. Ibid. 
32 J. A. A., 7 December 1780. C. O. 9/41. 
33 Wilkes to Curson and Gouverneur, 23 January 1781. C. O. 
239/1, fo. 211. 
34 J. A. S. K., 1 May 1776. C. O. 241/11. 
35 J. A. S. K., 20 June 1776. Ibid. 
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provided for the importation of provisions, live stock 
36 and lumber into St. Kitts . 
In Nevis, a bill, brought in by John Pinney and 
John Taylor, Members of the Council, prohibiting the 
exportation of all kinds of provisions and live stock 
was passed by that House at the beginning of January 
1776, but was thrown out by the Assembly after its first 
reading. 37 As in Jamaica, a committee of both Houses 
awarded bounties on all articles of provisions and lumber 
imported into St. Kitts for domestic consumption. Three 
shillings were given for every barrel of flour, bread, 
beef, pork, herrings or pickled fish: 'for every Tierce 
of Rice, four shillings and six pence; for every firkin 
of Butter, six pence; for every thousand feet of staves, 
ten shillings'. In addition, the Treasurer was ordered 
to pay port and other charges of all transient vessels 
entering the island with provisions and lumber. 38 
Similarly, the Assembly and Council of Montserrat 
established a bounty system to encourage the merchants 
to import supplies. As in Nevis, the merchants were 
required to make sworn statements that all articles 
imported into the island were for sale. No bounty was 
paid on goods brought in for re-exportation. The 
Treasurer was ordered to pay for 'every Barrel of Flour, 
36J. A. S. K., 2 June 1779. Ibid. 
37 Journal of the Assembly of Nevis, 4 January 1776. C. O. 186/6 
(hereafter cited as J. A. N. ). 
38J. A. N., 2 May 1776. Ibid. 
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Broad, Beef, Pork, Herring or Pickled Fish, the Sum of 
three Shillings; for every. Tierce of Rice, five shillings; 
for every Bushel of Corn, Pease or Beans, six pence; for 
every Firkin of Butter, one shilling: and for, every 
Hogshead of Fish, six shillings'. The bounties were to 
be paid within twenty days of the sale of the articles, 39 
40 and in August 1777 they were substantially increased . 
Apart from these legislative measures to relieve 
the islands, most Governors imposed embargoes on the 
exportation of provisions and lumber. For instance, at 
the end of June 1775 Governor Shirley placed an embargo 
on the exportation of American products from Dominica, 
41 
and to enforce his order, he requested Captain William 
Garnier of the Argo to post a nightly guard to restrict 
42 the illegal traders . Likewise, on the advice of 
the 
Council of St. Kitts, Greatheed issued a proclamation, 
shortly before Christmas of the same year, prohibiting 
the export of all American products for fourteen days; 
but allowing British and Irish goods to be exported. 
43 
In May of the following year, however, on a joint 
. 
application from both Houses of Antigua, Greatheed 
39 Minutes of the Assembly of Montserrat, 20 March 1776. C. O. 
177/2 (hereafter cited as M. A. M. ). 
40 M. A. M., 28 August 1777. Ibid. 
41 $A Proclamation', by Thomas Shirley, 27 June 1775. Adm. 1/309, 
fo. 328. 
42 Thomas Shirley to Captain Garnier, 27 June 1775. Ibid., 
fo. 327. 
43 Craister Greatheed to Lord Germain, 29 December 1775. C. O. 
152/55, fo. 44; 'A Proclamation', 23 December 1775. Ibid., fo. 46. 
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forbade the exportation of all provisions. 41% 
Tho Assembly of Mirbadon did not initiate any 
legislative measures after an earlier attempt had failed 
to got the necessary support In the Assembly. On that 
Occasion, In October 1774 Ilenry Duke brought in a bill 
'to encourage the importation of provisions 
Opponents of the measure, led by James Maycock, argued 
that since llarb3dos was an agricultural society, it was 
necessary to retain the restrictions on its commerce. 
In contrast, tho bi. 11's supporters, led by the Speaker, 
contended that the unsettled conditions of Anglo- 
American relations had made it imperative for the House 
to remove all laws which would prevent the planters from 
recaiving plentiful and cheap supplies of provisions if 
the Americans carried out their threats. But the motion 
for the bill's adoption was defeated by two votes. 
" It 
was even loft to Governor Hay to take action against the 
exportation of supplies. In August 1775 Hay prevented 
Dome merchants from exporting two thousand barrels of 
flour to England, because he was unsure about future 
GuPP1108 of American products to Barbados. 
" 
Yet# in spite of Hay's action, it is difficult 
to determine the true condition of Barbados because his 
'4 161A Proclaim4tion', fi Niy 1776. ibid.. fo. 00. 
"Journ4l of tile Assembly of narbadon, 4 October 1774. C. O. 
31/39 (horeafter cited as J. A. P. ). Tho Bill# If passed, would 
havo repe4led noveral Acts of tho Inland namely: Nos. 50,65, 
171* 176 duo) 204. 
46 114Y to Mirtmouthe 29 August 1775. C. O. 20/56, fo. 10d. 
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despatches are full of contradictions on the question of 
the quantity of supplies reaching Barbados. When Hay 
prohibited the exportation of the flour, he wrote in 
August 1775 that although several shipments of provisions 
had arrived in that island, he was taking no chances 'as 
it is said that the Ports in North America were to be 
shut up by order of the General Congress some time in 
July. We do not expect much more, unless from those 
Colonies who have not sent Deputies to the Congress'. 47 
Another paragraph of the same letter shows more optimism: 
'We are not apprehensive of any bad effect from the 
C onduct of North America. Indeed I am inclined to 
believe whatever may be the public declaration of their 
General Congress, Individuals after a certain Time will 
be apt to do what is most for their own interest'. 48 
Hay's impression of the effect of the American 
War on supplies for Barbados was a false one, and was 
formed because he lacked adequate knowledge of West 
Indian conditions and the organisation of the sugar 
49 economy . Furthermore, it was made early 
in 1775 when 
the restrictions on American-West Indian commerce by the 
Prohibitory Act were not even considered, and when large 
quantities of supplies were still being carried to the 
sugar colonies. On 6 April 1775, he wrote: 'I think 
47 Hay to Dartmouth, 29 August 1775. C. O. 29/21. 
4 eIbid.; see jiay to Dartmouth, 29 August 1775. C. O. 28/56, fo. 
10d. 
49 See Ragatz's description of Ilay in his Vic Planter Class, 
p. 151. More will be said of flay's character in Chapter VI. 
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there is little to fear from any ill Consequence to this 
Island henceforward'. so Despite warnings to the contrary, 
flay remained firmly committed to his earlier report. Ile 
wrote four months later: 
Some People have been apprehensive of the 
North Americans shutting up their Ports, and 
withholding their Provision and lumber. 
Hitherto as many ships as usual have come 
here from North America. For my own part, 
I am more apprehensive of the effects of a 
dry Year, than of any Distress from the 
North Americans. 51 
Once the Prohibitory Act was enforced at the 
beginning of 1776, however, supplies began to decrease. 
Attempts by the planters to provide a sufficient quantity 
of corn failed, and many of them were uncertain over the 
question of supplies if alternative sources were not 
found. 52 But instead of changing his interpretation of 
the situation, Hay remained 'of the opinion that with 
proper diligence, they may be supplied from places not 
mentioned in the Act', and he suggested that lumber be 
brought from northern Europe via England. 53 Hay was 
probably thinking also of Canada, Nova Scotia, and the 
Floridas, but these colonies could not supply the West 
Indian demand. However, some of the lumber used in the 
islands during the American War did come from Europe. 
In previous wars, the British colonies were always 
so Hay to Dartmouth, 6 April 1775. C. O. 28/56, fo. 1. 
SlHay to Dartmouth, 31 August 1775. C. O. 29/21, No. B. 
52 Makinson, Barbados, p. 93. 
53 Hay to Germain, 13 February 1776. C. O. 29/21; Ilay to Germain, 
13 February 1776. C. O. 28/56, fo. 27. 
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well supplied, and prices were generally 10W. 
54 From 
early 1776, however, the reduction of supplies reaching 
the West Indies caused grave hardships. In January when 
the Barbados Assembly made a check of the quantity of 
provisions in the store-houses at Bridgetown, it found 
only six weeks supplies. 55 A similar report compiled by 
the merchants of Antigua showed that supplies in that 
island were greatly depleted. 
56 It was at this critical 
time that Captain Benjamin Payne of the Royal Irish 
Regiment arrived in Barbados and the Leeward Islands to 
purchase provisions. In order to supply Captain Payne, 
Young purchased 'every Cask of Provision' in Antigua and 
the neighbouring British and foreign islands, and with 
some from his squadron he gave him 550 barrels of beef 
and pork, 500 casks of butter, and 40 casks of rice. 
57 
From Barbados he also received a quantity of rum, beef 
and pork, oatmeal, barley and rice. 
Se Because provision 
supplies were so low, the Antigua Assembly warned Vice- 
Admiral Young against depleting them. 
59 He did just 
54 Pares, War and Trade, pp. 491-494. 
55 J. A. B., 13 February 1776. C. O. 31/39; Makinson, Barbados, p. 91. 
56 J. A. A., 3 February 1776. C. O. 9/33. The supplies in hand were 
102 tierces of rice, 13,840 barrels of corn, 1740 barrels of flour, 
340 barrels & tierces of bread (300 tierces), 295 barrels of beef 
and pork, 1250 bushels of beans, 200 bushels of peas, 513 firkins 
of butter and 200 bushels of oatmeal. By the time the report was 
prepared and presented to the Assembly, a quantity of most articles 
was sold. 
57 Captain Payne to Major General Howe, 15 February 1776. C. O. 
5/93, Part 1, fo. 127d. 
"eibid., fos. 126-126d; Ragatz, The Planter Class, p. 
"Assembly of Antigua to the Council, February 1776. C. O. 9/33. 
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that. Many Barbadians criticised Hay for allowing Payne 
to purchase all he needed.. In a debate in the House, 
Henry Duke attacked the Governor's action as one fraught 
with disastrous effects, which had deprived the inhabi- 
tants of their scant supplies, thus increasing prices. 60 
Hay's failure to prevent the purchase of 
provisions by Payne 61 gave rise to a petition from the 
Assembly to the King on 15 February 1776, outlining the 
distresses which had befallen the island since the 
restrictions on its trade with America. 62 But in 
contrast to the Assembly's picture of gloom and disaster, 
a month later Hay sent his own report to Lord Germain. 
While acknowledging the shortage of corn for the slaves, 
he reported a plentiful supply of live stock, British 
and Irish provisions. At the same time, however, he 
blamed the traders for maintaining high prices, but 
discounted the Assembly's claims of imminent famine: 
It is wicked to talk of Famine in the most 
plentiful Island of all the West Indies, 
and where I, who have no plantations, and 
must buy all the provisions for my Table, 
can assure your Lordship that scarcely any 
One Article of provisions and live Stock 
of the Island has raised in price for near 
these three years. " 
60 J. A. B., 13 February 1776. C. O. 131/39. 
61 Minutes of the Council of Barbados, 31 January 1776. C. O. 
31/38 (hereafter cited as M. C. B. ); flay to Germain, 13 February 
1776. C. O. 28/56, fos. 22-27d; Anonymous, The West India 
Merchant... (London, 1778)t No. 16; Ragatz, The Planter Class, 
P. 151. 
6 2Address 
of the Assembly of Barbados to the King, 15 February 
1776. C. O. 28/56, fos. 33-33d and 35-35d. The Address was signed 
by 13 of 22 members in the House. The other nine were absent. 
63 flay to Germain, 13 April 1776. C. O. 28/56t fo. 40. 
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In London, the petition received support from the 
West Indian Committee which made representations to North 
64 
and Germain for its adoýtion . Yctp it was turned down. 
George Walker, the Barbados Agent, accused Germain of not 
listening to any other reports than Hay's. He further 
accused the British ministers of disregarding the plight 
of the sugar colonies: 'there is a settled plan of 
operations, to which they seemed determined to adhere, 
let Barbados, let all the West Indies suffer as they 
may'. 65 Similar charges were made by the Jamaica Assembly 
in 1779.66 Lord Germain should not be blamed entirely 
for his miscalculations, for he had relied on Hay's 
reports. Later, in June 1778, he observed that from 
the Address of the Assembly of Barbados to the King, and 
from letters he had received from Barbadians resident in 
England, it was clear that distress in the island was far 
greater than he had been led to believe. Nevertheless, 
Germain showed his ignorance of West Indian problems when 
he told Hay that the islands should not rely on govern- 
ment help, but should be supplied through 'the ordinary 
and accustomed Methods'. 
67 
David Makinson in his work on Barbados concludes, 
because of his lack of alternative sources to supplement 
64 'Extracts of the Minutes of the Assembly of Barbados, 9 July 
1776. Ibid., fos. 64-64d. 
6 5-Tbid. 
, fos. 64d-65. 
66 Address of the Assembly to the King, 7 December 1779. c. o. 
137/76, fo. 200. 
67 Germain to Ilay, 3 June 1778. C. O. 28/57, fos. 21-22. 
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the Governor's correspondence, that Hay had assessed the 
'condition of his colony far more accurately than his 
antagonists in the Assembly, as there is no documentary 
proof, beyond a rise in prices, to substantiate the 
claims of either the Assembly or the Barbados Agent, 
George Walker'. 68 This is incorrect. Payne's letter of 
February 1776 to Major-General Sir William Howe, 
Commander-in-Chief of the British troops in America, 
provides the answer which Makinson's work has not given. 
I Also, Payne's report on the condition Of Barbados and the 
West Indies in general, is a more objective assessment 
than Hay's and contradicts the Governor's report that 
there were no food shortages in the island. 
On Payne's arrival in Barbados, Hay called an 
emergency meeting of the 'Council, which resolved 
unanimously that Government should be supplied with all 
the Provisions they could spare. Indeed they went 
further; they have not left a single cask of Salt 
Provisions on the island - On this occasion the Gentlemen 
seemed to have vied with each other, who should be most 
active in supporting the King's service'. 69 Commenting 
on the quantity of supplies remaining on the island, 
and on the general conditions of the West Indies, Pýayne 
concluded: I ... all accounts agree and indeed I have 
had some proof of it, that the islands in general in the 
West Indies ... are in the greatest want of salt 
k 
68 Makinson, Barbados, p. 99. 
69Payne to Ilowee 15 February 1776. C. O. 5/93, Part I, fo. 126. 
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170 provisions . 
Not only did Payne's. despatch show that all the 
West Indian islands were distressed by the American War, 
but an extract of a letter written by a Barbados planter 
to a gentleman in Jamaica in May 1777 gives us a fairly 
good picture of the condition of Barbados and the neigh- 
bouring islands. Severe dry weather had increased the 
burdens of the inhabitants. The planter wrote: 
We are here in the most deplorable situation: 
our cane-pieces are almost entirely burnt up, 
many estates will not produce sufficient to 
answer the taxes and other contingent charges. 
The last year I made four thousand pots of 
sugar, which was a little more than a third 
of the usual quantity; but this year I shall 
scarce be able to send four hundred to market. 
Several even of the stationed ships will be 
obliged to return not more than half loaded, 
and others almost in ballast; the neigh- 
bouring islands are in a condition little 
better than ourselves. 71 
Other evidence shows that the economy of the sugar 
colonies was precariously situated. In April 1778 Lord 
Macartney, in acknowledging the declining production of 
Grenada, stated that the crops in Antigua and Barbados 
had failed, and they were badly in need of supplies. 
72 
In July of the same year, Rear-Admiral Barrington found 
no provisions of any kind except rum in Barbados. 
73 
7 Onid., fo. 127d. 
71 'Extract of a letter from a Planter of Barbados to a Gentleman 
in Kingston', in Supplement to the CornwaZZ ChronicZe and Jamaica 
General Advertiser, 10 May 1777, No. 128: 4. 
72 Macartney to Germain, 21 April 1778. C. O. 101/21, fo. 189; 
see figures in Appendix A, Tables 11 and 12. 
73 Rear-Admiral, 
' 
Barrington to Philip Stephens, 13 July 1778. Adm. 
1/310, fo. 299. 
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If we were therefore to accept Hay's reports of plenty in 
Barbados as being correct, then we would have to discount 
those of Captain Payne, Lord Macartney, and Rear-Admiral 
Barrington, or we would have to assume that the planters 
had abandoned sugar-cane cultivation- There is no 
evidence to indicate that the latter occurred, and thus 
it is more likely that Hay, without intending any malice, 
exaggerated the Iflourishing'condition of Barbados. 
On the whole, the remaining islands depended on 
external markets for provisions and lumber, and at times 
a, they experienced periods of severe shortages. At the 
beginning of 1776, for instance, there was very little 
food in Dominica. Governor Shirley could only expect 
relief from captured American trading vessels with 
cargoes of corn and flour for the foreign islands, and 
from the operation of the Prohibitory Ac t74 which allowed 
the colonists in the West Indies to trade with those 
towns and colonies in America which were under British 
control. Many planters were therefore forced to reduce 
their already meagre allowances of provisions given to 
the slaves, and there were fears of slave rebellions on 
account of the scarcity of food for the Negroes. 7S 
The Leeward Islands do not seem to have been 
affected as soon as Barbados or Dominica because their 
proximity to the foreign islands made it much easier for 
74 Thomas Shirley to the Earl of Dartmouth, 4 February 1776. C. O. 
71/6, fos. 31-31d. See Chapter II for a discussion of this Act. 
75 Connocticut Ga--ettc, 6 February 1776. In Clarke, ed., Naval 
Domnents, p. 1319. 
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the merchants to trade illegally with the Americans, 
and because most of the pri. zes captured by British 
warship S76 and non-commIssioned vessels fitted out by 
77 the merchants were carried there . But as the War 
progressed into 1777, the number of captured American 
merchantmen decreased as the rebels had built remarkably 
fast sailing ships superior to those of the British 
squadrons in the Caribbean. Furthermore, by the end of 
1776, the number of British warships in the West Indies 
was insufficient, with many of them being unseaworthy, 
for all the required naval services. Lastly, American 
trading vessels were carrying French, Dutch and even 
British registers, thus reducing the number which was 
captured. 
By September 1777 conditions in the Leeward Islands 
had worsened considerably, and the scarcity then 
78 
experienced was the worst for over forty years . Con- 
sequently, every Council and Assembly made separate 
representations to Governor Burt for relief. The Assembly 
of Antigua, for example, promised to pass any measure 
which he might propose to forestall a famine .79A 
similar claim of impending famine in St. Kitts was made 
76 Young to Stephens, 7 April 1776. Adm. 1/309, fo. 458d. 
77Burt to'Germain, 7 June 1777. C. O. 152/56, fo. 108d. 
78 'Extract of a letter from Antigua May 17', in The Antigua 
Mercury, 20 September 1777. C. O. 152/56, fo. 22. 
79 The Assembly of Antigua to Governor Burt in Council, 14 August 
1777. Ibid., fos. 203-203d. The Council later passed a resolution 
supporting the Assembly. 
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in a letter to Burt from the Council and Assembly. " 
Both Houses of the legislature of Montserrat sent a joint 
appeal to the Governor urging him to take immediate 
action to prevent famine in that island. Coupled with 
the loss of lives which would normcilly result from such 
a disaster, the white inhabitants were frightened of 
slave rebellions which might have occurred 'to the 
Community at large from the Impracticability of procuring 
Sustenance for our Slaves, cannot fail to operate very 
forcibly upon the Guardians of that Community, and to 
raise them to an Exertion of their best Efforts for 
preventing those Consequences'. Both Houses recommended 
the importation of provisions from the foreign islands 
81 in British ships as a possible solution . 
At the end of 1777 the conditions of those 
colonies worsened. There was no bread in Montserrat for 
a few days, and many Negroes in that island and Nevis 
received no food. In Antigua and St. Kitts, conditions 
were only slightly better, 82 and in 1778 even less 
supplies reached the islands. Consequently, the various 
Councils and Assemblies petitioned Burt for further 
relief. The Council and Assembly of Nevis blamed the 
American War for their distresses. 83 The situation had 
80 The Council and Assembly of St. *Kitts to Governor Burt, 25 
August 1777. Ibid., fo. 201. 
81 The Council and Assembly of Montserrat to Governor Burt, 
4 September 1777. Ibid., fo. 205. 
82Burt to Germain, 1 December 1777. C. O. 152/57, fo. 151. 
83 Petition of the Council and Assembly of Nevis to the King (no 
date). C. O. 152/59, fo. 75. 
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grown so alarming that the inhabitants had combined and 
used every known strategy ýo withhold payments of debts 
to John Pinney, Attorney to Mills & Swanston. Pinney 
who wanted to remain on amicable terms with his fellow 
colonists resigned his legal position with the company. 
He wrote: 
You have no idea of the distressed and 
unhappy state of this country -a man 
capable & willing to pay his debts is become 
almost a prodigy - the unwarrantable & 
iniquitous proceedings made up to defeat 
the just right of Creditors are far beyond 
your conception: in short, a man's life is 
scarce safe'. 84 
To relieve the British islands, Governors Hay and 
Burt, in conjunction with Vice-Admiral Young, adopted 
measures allowing the importation of American products. 
Early in February 1776, the Council and Assembly of ' 
Antigua asked Young to provide vessels going to America 
with 'Letters of Protection'. 85 Exactly where these 
vessels were going was left vague. About a month later, 
Hay who was writing to Lord Germain that there was no 
shortage of supplies in Barbados also asked Young to 
allow British vessels with American products from the 
foreign islands to carry passports exempting them from 
seizure by British warships. 86 In April the Council and 
Assembly of Nevis appealed to' the Vice-Admiral to permit 
the prizes captured by ships in his squadron to be sent 
84 Pinney to William Croker, June 1778. Pinney Papers: L. B. 4, 
220. 
es J. A. A., 6 February 1776. C. O. 9/33. 
86 Edward Ilay to James Young, 24 March 1776, in M. C. B., 16 April 
1776. C. O. 31/38. 
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to that island. 07 Influenced by several applications" 
asking for the importation of provisions from the neigh- 
bouring foreign islands in British vessels, in September 
1777 Burt applied to Young and týe officers of the 
Customs in Antigua to allow the importation of provisions 
from any place in British vessels. e 9 Young agreed not to 
seize those trading to the neutral islands. 90 
Likewise, because of the shortage of lumber, 91 
Burt allowed its importation in British vessels with 
certificates signed by at least two prominent merchants 
proving that the lumber was not the property of the 
American rebels, nor 'that any person in Rebellion hath 
any Share, Interest or claim Thereto'. 92 Most of the 
lumber and provisions carried to the neutral islands, 
however, went from America, and by extending his policy 
Burt was forced to sanction the illegal trade with the 
Americans through the foreign islands. It was difficult 
for him to do otherwise, especially since the merchants 
were assured by the Inspector-General that they were 
legally entitled to import all American products from 
87 The Council and Assembly of Nevis to Young, 15 April 1776, in 
Minutes of the Council of Nevis, 2 May 1776. C. O. 186/7; see 
M. C. B. 2 April 1776. C. O. 31/38. 
Be The Assembly of Antigua to the Governor in Council, 14 August 
1777. C. O. 152/56, fos. 203-203d; The Council and Assembly of 
St. Kitts to Burt, 25 August 1777. Ibid., fo. 201. 
as The Council and Assembly of Montserrat to Burt, 4 September 
1777. Ibid., fo. 205. 
so Burt to Germain, 17 September 1777. Ibid., fos. 193-193d. 
91 Burt to Germain, 14 December 1777. C. O. 152/57, fo. 165. 
92 Burt to Germain, March 1778. Ibid., fos. 247-247d. 
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any place in British vessels-9 3 Burt was also aware of 
his own policy and in order to justify it, and to 
exonerate himself from any charge of contravening 
British commercial laws, he wrote: 
This mode my Lord is attended with an 
Injury, it takes from the Dutch and French 
American produce; but my Lord the Injury 
on the other side would be far greater; 
In this Dilemma of two Evils, I shall be 
under a Necessity of chusing the least and 
by giving every Aid so far as possible to 
the distressed loyal Planter and Merchant 
keep their Minds easy, and make them as 
happy as possible. 94 
The policy of relaxing the Navigation Acts and of 
importing foreign supplies in British ships which became 
an important feature of British commercial policy in the 
West Indies after the War was introduced as a temporary 
measure by Governors Hay and Burt, 95 because of the small 
quantity of American supplies reaching the British West 
Indies, and was sanctioned by Lord Germain who believed 
that the necessity of the situation would 'extenuate' 
any charges brought against Burt: 
Extraordinary Cases at all times call for 
extraordinary Exertions, and the Servants 
of the Public must use every proper means 
to prevent unforseen, & unprovided for 
Distress and trust to the exigency of the 
Case, and the integrity of their Intentions, 
for Justification and Indemnity, if they 
step beyond the exact Bounds of their legal 
Duty. 96 
93 See Chapter III. 
94 Burt to Germain, 14 Deccmber 1777. C. O. 152/57, fo. 165. 
95flay to Young, 24 March 1776, in M. C. B., 2 May 1776. C. O. 
31/38. 
96 Germain to Burt, 3 June 1778. C. O. 152/57, fos. 331-331d. 
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At the close of 1778 when the Leeward Islands were 
again threatened with famine, the various Councils and 
Assemblies recommended the suspension of the Navigation 
Acts to allow the importation of all kinds of provisions 
and lumber from any place, and in any vessel. 97 In 
April 1779, therefore, Burt ordered the Customs officers 
in Antigua to allow foodstuffs to be imported from any 
place and in any vessel, except those belonging to 
America and France. Though the order had excluded these 
ships, many of those which probably took advantage of 
this measure belonged to the Americans, but carried Dutch 
and even British registers. Burt's policy was based on 
his own belief that no 'Revenue Law or Act is too Sacred 
to be set aside', in such trying conditions. 
" of course, 
Burt had foundation for his decision. The previous 
August Germain had assured him that he was free to take 
any step to prevent famine as 'no human Law can be 
supposed too sacred a nature to be dispensed with when 
a Famine must be the inevitable Consequence of inforcing 
99 the observance Of it'. 
The measures initiated by Hay and Burt brought 
only temporary relief to the inhabitants. The trade with 
the foreign islands could not replace the former American 
97 The Council and Assembly of Nevis to Governor Burt, 8 December 
1778. C. O. 152/59, fo. 64; The Assembly of Antigua to Governor 
Burt. Ibid., fo. 113. 
98 Governor Burt to the Officers of the Customs in Antigua, 
11 October 1778. Ibid., fo. 15. 
99 Germain to Burt* 5 August 1778. C. O. 152/58, fO- Illd. 
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commerce. Moreover, the supplies were insufficient 
because of the high costs of provisions in the foreign. 
islands, coupled with the shortage of money in the 
British West Indies. Consequently, periods of critical 
scarcity of food were experienced continuously through- 
out the War. Between 1776 and 1782, several petitions 
from the Assemblies of the Leeward Islands and Barbados 
were sent to the King requesting supplies from Britain. 
Within the first seven months of 1776, the Barbados 
Assembly sent two unsuccessful ones. 100 But in October 
1777, another address supported by a memorial from some 
Barbadian planters resident in England was successful. 101 
Lord Germain's evidence, in support of the address, 
showed that there was likely to be a famine without 
direct help from the British government#102 and on his 
recommendations the Lords of the Treasury directed 
Charles Atkinson, a partner in Mure, Son & Atkinson, 
London merchants, to consign a supply of provisions to 
Governor Hay to be sold at cost price, and in small 
quantities to the planters. 103 
The relief sent out to Barbados, and the scarcity 
100 Address of the Assembly of Barbados to the King, 15 February 
1776. C. O. 28/56, fos. 33-33d; Address of the Assembly to the 
King, 9 July 1776. Ibid., fos. 73-74. The second was in support 
of the first. 
10'The memorial was signed by John Brathwaite, Samuel Estwick, 
the Agent, and William Prescod; 'Memorial of the Planters of 
Barbados' to the Lords of the Treasury, in M. C. B., 30 December 
1777. C. O. 31/38. 
1021 Extract of Minutes of the Treasury', 21 October 1777. Ibid. 
103 John Robinson to Edward Ilay, 25 October 1777. Ibid. 
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of supplies in the Leeward Islands, influenced Governor 
Burt to renew an earlier appeal to the British government 
for assistance. From the tone of Burt's despatches, even 
though he tried to play down the seriousness of the 
declining fortunes of the Leeward Islands, the situation 
there was grave: 
In Public Letters I have begg'd for vessels 
being sent to this Government with provisions: 
in those official Letters I would not say my 
Dread of Want from September to January, 
provided there is not a Peace with America: 
unless these Ships are sent, the Ground and 
Colonial Provisions will not half supply us; 
add to this, should there be a Hurricane God 
only knows what may be the Event. 104 
Burt requested that four ships with supplies - two 
for St. Kitts and Nevis, and two for Antigua and Mont- 
serrat - should be sent out immediately. A month later, 
he was again writing that because of an embargo in America 
restricting supplies to the foreign islands, the British 
West Indies would be even more distressed. 105 The fact 
that Burt admitted this shows that the islands continued 
to rely on the American colonies for food during the War. 
A year later the Treasury ordered out a quantiýty of 
provisions for the Leeward Islands, but only after the 
Antigua Assembly had borrowed Z20,000 to pay for it. "' 
In welcoming the Treasury's decision, Burt wrote; 
No relief was ever more seasonable than 
the Provisions ordered; those purchased 
with the Money raised will be Expended in 
a few Weeks; where then to get a supply - 
104 Burt to Germain, 17 June 1778. C. O. 152/58, fos. 192-192d. 
105 Burt to Germain, 30 June 1778. Ibid., fo. 226. 
106 Burt to Germain, 14 June 1779. C. O. 152/59, fo. 208; Ragatz, 
The Planter Class, pp. 157-158. 
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Heaven only knows; it has supplied us 
through the Bounty of our Sovereign, and 
the feelings of his Ministers; had not 
these Bills been also Accepted the Colony 
must have Sunk:. Private Credit is almost 
Expired, Public then would have been 
threatened with its last Gasp: Notwith- 
standing these Reliefs 'tis a Melancholy 
truth that many have Perished throl wantý 07 
In Jamaica, the prohibition of American trade was 
critical at first, but grew less so as the War continued. 
The Assembly fearing an economic recession asked Sir 
Basil Keith at the end of 1775 to adopt measures to 
relieve the inevitable shortage of provisions and 
lumber. "' one step which the House had probably contem- 
plated was the relaxation of the Navigation Laws, as 
Governor Burt had initiated. This was not done, and 
from the middle of 1776 the essential articles of fish, 
salted pork, corn, and rice, the chief diet of the slaves 
became scarce, 109 and prices rose by over 100 per centPI 
By the end of the year, the scarcity of provisions and 
lumber grew worse daily, and because of the limited 
quantity of food produced in the colony, there were 
serious fears that any delay of the convoys from England 
and Ireland would have disastrous effects. "' The condi- 
tions in Jamaica might have improved later in the War as 
107 Burt to Germain, 19 December 1779. C. O. 152/60, fos. '59d-60. 
108 The Assembly of Jamaica to Sir Basil Keith, in J. A. J., 
22 December 1775. C. O. 140/46, p. 630. 
109 Dalhouse and Stephens to Sir John Hugh Smyth, 23 July 1776. 
Woolnough Papers: Ashton Court Collection: AC/WO. 16(27), pp. 89- 
101. 
"'Ibid. 
III Sir Basil Keith to Lord Germain, 24 December 177G. C. O. 137/72, 
fo. 34d. 
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a result of the measures adopted by the Assembly to 
encourage the ýlanters to grow more food. 112 
Grenada seems also to have experienced a milder 
economic setback than the older islands. In 1776 when 
the London newspapers reported a shortage of provisions 
and the possibility of famine in the British West Indies, 
Lord Macartney denied that his government was affected. 
He reported a large quantity of beef and flour, in so 
much so that vessels which had gone there had to sail 
away in search of better markets. 113 The increased 
cultivation of local provisions had averted any severe 
shortages, and thus the planters' production of sugar 
and rum declined only slightly. Tn July 1777 Macartney's 
estimates of the number of ships which sailed from the 
southern Caribbean islands to Britain were: 107 from 
Grenada, 23 from Tobago and 11 from St. Vincent. 
' 14 
In 1778 the number had decreased: there were only 27 
from Grenada, 4 from Tobago and 6 from St. Vincent: 
4 were for Halifax and Quebec and the remainder for 
Britain. "s Though thi. s was disappointing, before its 
capture in 1779 Grenada had produced one of its largest 
crops valued at over z700,000 sterling, and the merchant 
fleet was estimated at 150 large top sail vessels for 
112 Ragatz, The Planter Class, pp. 152-153. 
113 Macartney to Germain, 3 September 1776. C. O. 101/20, fo. 203. 
114 'List of Topsail Vessels from Grenada, laden with the produce 
of the Southern Caribbee Islands, since last March 17771, in 
Macartney to Germain, 28 July 1777. Ibid., fo.. 243. 
"sMacartney to Germain, 21 April 1778. C. O. 101/21, fo. 189. 
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Great Britain & Ireland & 10 or 12 for Quebec, 11alifax, 
Now York and Savannah 
116 
Yet, as in the case of the other islands, the 
American liar had retarded the economic progress of 
Grenada, and had-therefore prevented 'it from attaining 
that degree of prosperity & improvement which was 
expected and of which it is undoubtedly Capable', wrote 
Lord Macartney. 117 Likewise, by the end of 1778 all 
articles of provisions had grown scarce and expensive. "a 
The shortage of supplies in that year was even more 
serious as no ships were expected from Britain and 
Ireland before January 1780.119 
The reduction in supplies, of provisions and lumber 
reaching the British West Indies led to a rapid escala- 
tion of prices, and the cost of maintaining the estates 
was a severe burden to the planters. While the price of 
imported goods increased to exorbitant heights, those for 
local produce fell 'so low as not to bear any proportion 
thereto'. 120 The rise in prices began early in 1776, and 
became worse as the War continued. In Dominica, the 
overall increase was less than in the other small islands. 
For example, 'in 1776,1777, & 1778 the average price of 
lumber was double that of the former years. Horses, 
116 Macartney to Germain, 23 May 1779. c. O. 101/23, fo. 159. 
117 Macartney to Germain, 30 June 1776. C. O. 101/20, fo. 30. 
lleMacartney to Germain, 10 October 1778. C. O. 101/22, fo. 139. 
"SMacartney to Germain, 3 April 1779. C-0- 101/23, fo. 116d. 
120 Petition of the Assembly of Dominica to the King, 24 April 
1776. C. O. 71/6, fo. 53. 
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Horned Cattle and live stock rose about 75 per cent. 
Rice, Flour and Fish, about 50 per cent. Beef and Pork 
about 25 per cent'. But after the French captured the 
island in 1778, in 1779,1780 and 1781 the prices of 
most articles increased 100 per cent., while those for 
lumber, flour, beef and pork trebled. 121 
In 1776 George Walker, the Barbados Agent in 
London, estimated that the cost of food for the white 
people in Barbados had risen more than 150 per cent. 
Salt-fish and herring had increased in like proportion, 
and corn, one of the chief foods for the slaves, had 
risen by 400 per cent. 122 From the Governors' reports 
on prices sent in 1785 to Lord Sydney# Secretary for the 
Home Department, the increased cost of lumber and 
provisions in all the islands during the American War 
ranged from 150, to 500 per cent over pre-War prices. 123 
William Smalling, a planter, gives us a good idea of the 
situation in Jamaica in 1777: 
... everything is at present extravagantly dear. Beef sells at Z10 per barrell and 
other articles in proportion. Lumber we 
cannot afford to purchase any. If the 
unfortunate war in America is not soon 
ended we shall suffer greatly. This 
Country Corn is now from 5/ to 12/6 - and 
should our own provision fail we must starve 
of which we had a specimen last year ý24 
121 'Answers to lleads of Inquiry', 22 January 1785. C. O. 71/9, 
fo. 61. 
12 2George Walker to Lord Germain, 8 September 1776. C. O. 
28/56, fos. 75-76; Ragatz, The Planter Class, p. 153; see 
Appendix D, Table 1. 
123 See Appendix D, Tables 2,3,4 and 5. 
124 William Smalling to Sir Joseph roster Barham, 10 July 1777. 
Barham Papers: Bodl. MSS. Clarendon, Dep. C 357, Bund. 1. 
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In contrastj although rum prices in Barbados and 
the Leeward Islands increased during the War, this was 
insufficient to compensate for the high costs of 
provisions and lumber. The average price for Barbados 
shows that rum sold in that island doubled in value 
between 1777 and 1783, and was much higher than in any 
of the remaining islands for which statistics are 
available. In the Leeward Islands the price of rum rose 
from 2s. 6d. in 1777 to 4s. per gallon in 1783.125 
St. Vincent rum increased by an average of only 9d. per 
gallon, from 2s. 3d. per gallon before the War to 3s. 
during it; 126 while in Jamaica, the increase was only 
5 to 10 per cent. 127 The low prices for rum in the 
colonies were caused by the loss of the American market. 
In Britain, after the initial increase in the 
prices of West Indian products at the beginning of 1776, 
there was a slump. The sale of rum fell off, and the 
price declined to as low as 2s. per gallon by the end 
of the first half of the year. 12 8 The lack of demand 
for this article continued throughout the American War, 
and though prices rose slightly around the end of August 
1777, they did not get above 2s. 3d. to 2s. 4d. per gallon. 
129 
125 See Appendix D, Table 6. 
126 'Answers', in Edmund Lincoln to Lord Sydneyj 8 January 1785. 
C. O. 260/7, No. 14. 
227MiChael Craton and James Walvin, A Jariaican Plantation. The 
History of Worthy Park 1670-1970 (London, 1970), p. 119. 
128 Houston & Co. to Houston and Peterson, 19 June 1776. Houston 
Papers: N. L. S. MSS. 8,793, p. 45. 
129 Houston & Co. to Charles Irvine (Jamaica), 28 August 1777. 
Ibid., p. 259; Houston & Co. to Jonas Akers (St. Kitts), 31 December 
1777. Ibid., p. 327; Houston & Co. to Thomas Frith (St. Vincent). 
31 December 1777. Ibid., p. 328. 
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The shortage of money in Britain after 1778 also 
hindered the sale of West Indian products. 130 Cargoes 
of rum, cotton, and even sugar remained in the store- 
houses of British companies for months. 131 For example, 
Houston wrote to his agents in St. Vincent in November 
1778: 'Rum is at present, & has been for several months 
past, a perfect drug.... ' 132 Information sent to 
England from the colonies in 1779 told the same sad 
tale: 'no sale for Rum here, is become a drug.... 1233 
Coupled with the lack of rum sales, the production 
costs of sugar increased during the war. 
134 For example, 
the salaries for white bookkeepers, overseers, distillers 
and carpenters rose by 50 per cent in Jamaica, according 
135 to Long's figures. other figures show, however, that 
the wages of bookkeepers increased by 40 to 100 per cent. 
Those for skilled labourers advanced by as much as 100 
per cent. Carpenters' wages, which were usually Z50, 
increased to E70 and L80 for ordinary ones, and as high 
130 Houston & Co. to Messieurs Gill and Nisbet, 30 July 1778. 
Houston Papers: N. L. S. MSS. 8,794, p. 40; see Chapter II. 
131 Houston & Co. to Josias Jackson (St. Vincent), 31 December 
1777. Houston Papers: N. L. S. MSS 8,793, p. 230. 
132 Houston & Co. to Turner and Paul, 23 November 1778. Houston 
Papers: N. L. S. MSS. 8,794, p. 78. 
133 'Jamaica Advices', 27 July 1778. Add. MSS. 12,412, fo. 19d. 
134 Hall, 'Incalculability as a Feature of Sugar Production', 
Social and Economic Studies (1961), Vol. X, No. 3, p. 343. 
135 'Comparative Prices and Charges attending the Jamaican Planter 
at and since the Commencement of the War extracted from actual 
accounts' (no date). Add. MSS. 12,413, fo. 45 (hereafter cited as 
'Comparative Prices and Charges'). 
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as E100 for a very good tradesman; while distillers' 
salaries rose from t20 to 930 annually. 
136 Similarly, 
the cost of employing Negro labourers advanced quite 
significantly in some islands; 
137 from ls. 10d. and 
less per day to 2s. 3d. on the average, and as high as 
2s. 6d. per day. 
138 
Other charges also increased during the War. For 
example, the cost of producing sugar in Jamaica was 
estimated at E12 sterling per hogshead or roughly 20s. 
per cwt at the outbreak of the War. This was slightly 
less when the planters were able to reduce boiling and 
curing charges from approximately Z7 to 94. With 
increased freight and insurance charges, interests on 
debts and duties, amounting to approximately E1.13s., 
the minimum cost of producing 1 cwt of sugar was approx- 
imately 47s. Many planters therefore made little or no 
profit when their sugars were sold in Britain. 139 In 
addition to the increased cost of sugar production, the 
planters also paid higher prices for slaves because of 
the small number imported into the islands. 140 
At the best times, the estates business in the 
136 Van Keelen to Barham, 9 September 1782. Barham Papers: Bodl. 
MSS. Clarendon, Dep. C. 357, Bund. 1. 
137 Lieutenant-Governor Joseph Graham to Lord Germain, 27 July 
1779. C. O. 101/23, fo. 203. 
138 Van Keelen to Barham, 9 September 1782. Barham Papers: Bodl. 
MSS. Clarendon, Dep. C 357, Bund. 1. 
13 9'Charges to produce 1 cwt sugar in Jamaica', 1781. Add. MSS. 
12,412, fos. 23d-24. 
140 'Jamaican Advices', November 1778. Ibid., fo. 3; see Chapter 
III. 
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West Indies was an uncertain one, and it became even 
more so during the American War. Apart from the high 
costs of production and. the lack of adequate supplies, 
the islands' crises were compounded by a series of 
natural disasters. Antigua was so severely hit by 
excessively long periods of dry weather that Gov ernor 
Burt likened the island to the 'deserts of Arabia'. 
Antigua which produced on the average about twenty 
thousand hogsheads of sugar annually, produced only 
four thousand hogsheads in 1779. If this had belonged 
to one planter, it could not pay his taxes, servants' 
wages, repairs 'and Contingent expenses, much less Aid 
the Great Expence of feeding the slaves, which in 
tolerable years are generally supported for one third 
of the year by Country Produce', 141 wrote Burt. Many 
small planters had to sell their entire year's crop to 
the local merchants in order to pay their debts, 142 
while those in Britain accumulated. Consequently, the 
effects of the American War coupled with the natural 
disasters, and domestic political crises 143 led to a loss 
of confidence in the sugar economy. One planter wrote: 
The present gloomy prospect of American 
affairs, united with our internal deplorable 
situation, causes an apparent dejection 
in countenance of every man, and unless some 
speedy alteration takes place, God only 
knows what will be the event of this 
141 Burt to Germain, 3 May 1779. C. O. 152/59, fo. 111d. 
142 Pinney to Mills and Swanston. 31 July 1777. Pinney Papers: 
L. B. 4, p. 151. 
143 See Chapters VI to VIII. 
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fatal War: I tremble for the Consequence. 144 
In Jamaica, a hurricane and earthquake in October 
1780 destroyed Savannah la Mar, Lucca and the parishes 
of Westmoreland, Hanover and St. James. Hardly a building 
was left standing and over one thousand people were 
killed. 145 A committee appointed by Governor Dalling to 
evaluate the cost of the damages estimated that the 
losses in Westmoreland alone exceeded L950,000 Jamaican 
currency. In Hanover, over a quarter of all property 
was completely destroyed. The Kingston merchants 
contributed around Z10,000 worth of provisions, clothing 
and medicine for the relief of the sufferers. 146 
A week later, the second hurricane to hit the 
West Indies devastated Barbados. Plantations were 
destroyed, and the loss of local provisions and live 
stock added to the planters' distress. Admiral Rodney's 
appraisal of the island's condition summarises the 
extent of its destruction: 
... nothing but ocular demonstration could have convinced me that it was possible 
for wind to cause so total a destruction 
of an Island remarkable for its numerous 
and well-built habitations - the whole 
face of the country appears one entire 
ruin and the most beautiful island in the 
world has the appearance of a country 
laid waste by fire and sword, and appeals 
to the imagination more dreadful than it 147 is possible... to find words to express . 
144 John'Pinney to Peter Easton, 18 April 1777. Ibid., p. go. 
145 Charles Ruddach to Charles Steuart, 30 October 1780. Charles 
Steuart Papers: N. L. S. MSS. 5,032, fos. 57d-58; 'Extract from the 
Supplement to the Kingston Gazette: 14 October 1780. C. O. 137/79, 
fos. 41-42d. 
246 John Dalling to Lord Germain, 20 October 1780. Ibid., fo. 13d. 
147 Admiral Rodney to Philip Stephens, 12 November 1780. Adm. 
1/311, fos. 423-423d. 
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Approximately 2,033 Negroes, 211 horses, and 6,606 
cattle were killed. The total cost of damages was put 
at over Z1,000,000.148 These natural disasters were 
more acutely felt, and bore heavier on the planters, as 
they w6re unable to receive relief from America. 
The small margin of profit, if any, at this time 
made the planters even more dependent on good yearly 
crops, large exports to England and high prices, if they 
were to meet'most of their estate expenses. But the 
quantity of West Indian staples imported into Britain 
declined, and except for sugar there was little demand 
in Britain for West Indian products. Though the 
reduction in the imports of sugar led to substantial 
price increases, there were times when prices would 
fall significantly because of the arrival of the West 
Indianmen, reduced exportation of refined sugar to 
Europe, or the scarcity of money. 14 9In other words, the 
market fluctuated much in the same way as during peace 
time. 
After the initial jump in sugar prices at the 
beginning of 1776, they declined and remained low for 
the rest of the yearlso because speculators who had 
forced the prices up by purchasing all the sugar 
14 8'An Account of the Damage done by the Hurricane in Barbados', 
10 October 1780. Parliamentary Papers, Vol. 84, Part III, A. No. 15. 
149 William Cuninghame to Robert Dunmore, 9 July 1778. Cuningham 
of Lainshaw MSS: N. R. A. (Scotland), GD 247, Box 5, Bun. Q. 
ISO Houston & Co. to Houston and Paterson, 19 June 1776. Houston 
Papers: N. L. S. MSS. 8,793, p. 45. 
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arriving at British ports had left the market in a state 
of stagnation. 151 At times much of the sugar remained 
unsold, 152 and there was no certainty whether prices 
would rise or fall. ' 53 flowever, sugar prices rose again 
between September and December 1777.154 At the beginning 
of 1778 they declined slightly but soon regained their 
former level and remained so until July 1778, with 
Jamaica and Tobago sugars being sold for the lowest price 
of 46s. to 52s., and 47s. to 52s. per cwt: those from 
Antigua and St. Kitts fetched as much as 51s., and 57s. 
respectively. 155 However, in August when France entered 
the War, there was little demand for British refined 
sugar in Europe, and in London the sale of sugar was 
'exceeding slack & the prices of what little was sold 
was less than' those of the previous month. ' 56 Prices 
increased later in the War, IS7 but the benefits to the 
planters were minimal because of 
the heavy losses they had sustained from 
the failure of the crop, and the 
consequences of the American War, in the 
15"The Causes of the Rise of the Price of Sugar', 6 July 1778. 
Add. MSS. 12,404, fo. 445. 
152 Houston & Co. to Charles Irvine, 28 August 1777. Houston 
Papers: N. L. S. MSS. 8,793, p. 259. 
153 'The Causes of the Rise of the Price of Sugar', 6 July 1778. 
Add. MSS. 12,404, fo. 445. 
154 See Appendix D, Table 7. 
155 Cuninghame to Dunmore, 27 July 1778. Cuningham of Lainshaw 
MSS: N. R. A. (Scotland), GD 247, Box 5, Bun. Q. 
156 Cuninghwne to Dunmore, 13 August 1778. Ibid. 
157 Ragatz, The Planter Class, p. 167. 
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high rates of freight and insurance, the 
extraordinary charges of carrying on their 
plantations from the dearness of lumber 
and provisions, the scarcity of which had 
in some islands occasioned a mortality 
among their Negroes. 158 
From 1776 to 1783, throughout the West Indian 
Islands, foreign as well as British, only about two- 
thirds of the average crop of sugar was produced. 
Furthermore, the troubles between Spain and Portugal 
stopped all exportation of sugar from Brazil to Lisbon, 
thus raising prices in Europe and causing a large 
quantity of refined sugar to be sent there from 
Britain. 159 Refined sugar was about 231d. per pound 
cheaper in England than in France, in spite of the high 
costs of freight and insurance paid by the West Indian 
planters. ' 60 
Consequently, when the sugar refiners petitioned 
the Commissioners of the Customs in March 1780 for a 
reduction of the duty on prize sugars entering Britain, 
and for a bill to lower the duty for a limited time, 161 
the West Indian Committee used the orthodox mercantilist 
arguments to oppose any restrictions on their privilege 
Of supplying the British market. 162 Later that year, 
, 158 'The Causes of the Rise of the Price of Sugar', 6 July 1778. 
Add. MSS. 12,404, fo. 445; Allen, 'British commercial Policy in 
the West Indies 1783-17931, p. 38. 
Is 9 'The'Causes of the Rise of the Price of Sugar', 6 July 1778. 
Add. MSS. 12,404, fo. 445. 
160'Jamaican Advices', 21 April 1778. Add. MSS. 12,412, fo. 3d. 
261 Minutes of the West India Merchants, 1 March 1780, Vol. II, 
fos. 24d-25d. 
1621bid., fo. 26. 
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when a second petition from the refiners seemed imminent, 
the West Indian merchants again prepared to oppose the 
application, informing North and Germain that the 
refiners were being supplied with cheaper raw sugar than 
when their first petition was made, and that they sold 
refined sugar at higher prices. 163 In spite of opposition 
from the West Indian interests, the London refiners, with 
the support of the Treasury Board, petitioned Parliament 
early in 1781 for the importation of prize sugar at the 
same duty as British produced sugar. Similar pleas 
were made by the Bristol refiners and the London 
grocers. 16 4 
These repeated attempts to. reduce the duty on 
prize sugar led to a vigorous opposition from the 
West Indian lobby in Parliament. In May 1781 the 
West Indian Committee, as well as Stephen Fuller, sent 
petitions to the House of Commons. In his petition, 
presented by John Fuller, Member for Southampton, the 
Jamaican Agent argued that the advanced prices on 
freight, insurance, lumber, provisions and plantation 
utensils, the higher duties on West Indian products 
imported into Britain, and the increased local taxes 
on the planters had almost ruined them. It was there- 
fore unwise, he maintained, to alter British commercial 
laws because of the refiners' petitions which were 
163 Minutes of the West India Merchants# 13 December 1780, Vol. II, 
fos. 50d-51. 
164 Ragatz, The Planter Class, p. 169; Minutes of the West India 
Merchants, 3 February 1781, Vol. II, fo. 55. 
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calculated solely to lower the price of sugar. 165 
The refiners lost in their efforts to secure 
legislation to reduce the duty on prize sugar, but the 
planters were affected by the petitions nevertheless. 
In 1781, for example, the West Indian Committee did 
not oppose legislation allowing the importation of sugar 
from the captured Dutch colonies of Essequibo and 
Demerara at British plantation duties. 166 Under an Act, 
sugar from these colonies was entitled to the same 
drawback on exportation as British West Indian sugar. IG7 
By another, Parliament suspended the Navigation Acts to 
allow the importation of sugar from the captured 
British islands of St. Kitts, Nevis and Montserrat into 
Britain and Ireland at British plantation duty, and in 
British or neutral vessels. 168 West Indian Governors 
were ordered to give passports to ships trading with 
the captured colonies-169 By an Order-in-Council of 
June 1782, the suspension of the Acts was enforced, and 
captains of all British warships and privateers were 
prohibited from capturing any vessel enroute to Britain 
170 
or Ireland with foreign products on board. 
265 Minutes of the West India Merchants, 21 June 1781, Vol. II, 
fo. 63. 
166 Minutes of the West India Merchants, 29 May 1781, Vol. II, 
fos. 62-62d. 
167 21 6Geo. III C. 62. 
168 22 Geo. III C. 30; 'Extract from the Minutes of a General 
Meeting of the Planters and Merchants Interested in the Islands 
of St. Christopher, and Nevis', 7 April 1782. C. O. 152/62, fo. 34. 
169 Thomas Shirley to Lord Shelburne, 26 June 1782. Ibid., fo. 122. 
170 'Instructions from the Earl of Shelburne', 7 June 1782, in 
J. A. J., 12 February 1783. C. O. 140/59, p. 549. 
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The suspension of the Navigation Acts, apart from 
showing the readiness of the British government to 
forsake the islands when the interests of the planters 
conflicted with those of the home industries and 
consumers, had a two-fold effect on the planters. First, 
the capture of St. Kitts, Nevis and Montserrat made it 
much easier for French and Dutch merchants to export 
their sugar to Britain and Ireland. Second, by allowing 
neutral, as well as British, vessels to carry West 
Indian staples to the United Kingdom, a considerable 
part of the shipping was diverted from the British to 
the foreign islands. A committee of the Jamaica 
Assembly, after investigating the effects of the new 
regulations, reported to the House t hat 'while French 
sugars were triumphantly sailing into the ports of 
Great Britain, under Imperial colours, uncharged either 
by enormous freight or enormous insurance', Jamaican 
products remained on the wharves because of the loss of 
the customary means of shipping. 171 
The Jamaica Assembly and Council now attacked 
British policy as one which brought no benefits to the 
planters, but discriminated against their products. 
Both Houses adopted the position that traditional 
British commercial policy should be maintained. Any 
change should provide benefits to the planters since 
they were expected to contribute to the British economy. 
In voicing their protest, both Houses demonstrated their 
171 J. A. J., 12 February 1783. Ibid., p. 545. 
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fears of the repercussions which would ensue from 
suspension of the Acts, and argued that British policy, 
while it limits the trade of the colonies, 
gives them in return a kind of exclusive 
preference at the home market by the 
great duties which were there in imposed 
upon foreign West-India produce; but the 
temporary laws in question, while they 
take away this preference, have 
carefully preserved all the limitations: 
By the sanction which gives a latitude 
even to English vessels to load at 
St. Domingo, French sugars, unclogged 
either by enormous freight or enormous 
insurances, are poured into the ports 
of Great Britain; and thus, under every 
disadvantage, we meet with competition 
v172 at our own markets.... 
Between 1779 and 1783, British policy not only 
rejected the concept of preferential treatment for 
the West Indian planters, but the duties on British 
plantation products were increased to help pay the 
I 
rising costs of the American War. In 1779 Parliament 
imposed a tax of 5 per cent on the Customs and Excise 
duties on colonial products imported into Britain. 
The new charges raised the tax on 1 cwt of sugar from 
approximately 6s. 4d. in 1775 to 6s. 8d. in 1779. Again, 
in March 1781 the duty on sugar was almost doubled from 
6s. 8d. to lls. 8d. per CWt. 173 A year later, Lord John 
Cavendish abandoned the unpopular turnpike and carriage 
tax, and replaced it with another 5 per cent tax upon 
172 J. A. J., 27 February 1783. Ibid., p. 567. 
173 19 Geo. III C. 25; 'History of the Policy Hitherto pursued 
by... (Britain) with respect to the Trade of Sugar' (no date). 
Add. MSS. 38,759, fo. 32 (hereafter cited as 'Trade of Sugar'). 
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the Customs and Excise. 174 Effective from 25 July 1782, 
the duty on 1 cwt of sugar rose from lls. 8d. to 12s. 3d. 175 
There was some division of opinion as to whether 
the new duties would be borne by the planters or the 
consumers. The official view was that the consumers 
would ultimately pay the tax, but the general consensus 
in the West Indies, and among some merchants trading 
with the islands, was that the taxes would severely 
affect West Indian properties, "" 'as to render the 
culture of sugar-cane scarce worthy of attention'. 177 
The Assembly and Council of Jamaica assumed the lead 
in opposing the latest duty, and sent a petition to 
the King. 178 In July 1781, the Assembly further 
resolved that if the duty were not withdrawn, it would 
assist the sugar planters to refine their sugar for 
exportation to the United Kingdom, 179 and threatened to 
vote no more money for the island's defence after March 
1782.180 Adopting a similar argument to that formerly 
held by the Americans in their disputes with Britain, 
174 Stephen Fuller to the Assembly of Jamaica, 29 June 1782F in 
J. A. J. F 16 November 1778. C. O. 140/59, p. 507. 
17522 Geo. III C. 16; 'Trade of Sugar' (no date). Add. MSS. 
38,759, fo. 32. 
176 Houston & Co. to Walter Nesbit, 17 April 1781. Houston Papers: 
N. L. S. MSS. 8,794, p. 521. 
177 Pinney to Manning, 25 July 1781. Pinney Papers: L. B. 5, P. 131. 
178 Petition of the Assembly and Council to the King, 3 July 1779. 
C. O. 137/75, fo. 85. 
179 J. A. J., 14 February 1783. C. O. 140/59, p. 553. 
ISO J-A. J., 13 July 1781. C. O. 137/80, fos. 279-280; Dalling to 
Germain, 24 November 1781. C. O. 137/82, fo. 32. 
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the Assembly sent a petition to the King claiming that 
British policy was 'repugnant to the soundest principles 
of Colonization', and that though the island was a 
colony in whose trade Britain had an exclusive privilege, 
it was'incompatible with those principles 'to convert 
what ought to be an Object of Trade into a Source of 
Revenue I. "I 
The increased duties on West Indian products, 
the prohibition of the islands' trade with America, the 
series of natural disasters, the high prices of 
provisions and lumber in the colonies, and the reduction 
of, exports to Britain fell hard on the majority of 
sugar growers, increased their debts, and affected their 
capital investments in slaves who were now used to plant 
corn instead of cane. 182 This practice led to increased 
costs to the planters who had to hire extra slaves to 
regain lost time. ' 83 Yet, although the slaves' time 
was invaluable to the production of sugar 184 and could 
not be misused, it was necessary during the American War 
to grow food to. prevent mass deaths among the Negroes. 
On some estates, such as that of Sir Joseph 
Barham, for example, of the 167 Negroes between the ages 
of thirty and forty, only a few were able-bodied ones 
"'Petition of the Assembly of Jamaica to the King, 17 November 
1781. Ibid., fo. 25. 
182 
Dalhouse and Stephens to Smyth, 14 January 1778. Woolnough 
Papers: Ashton Court Collection, AC/WO 16(27), pp. 89-101. 
183 Dalhouse and Stephens to Smyth, 26 May 1779. Ibid., 102-112. 
184 Craton and Walvin, A Jcunnican Plantation, p. 105. 
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who were fit to work. The remainder were suffering from 
malnutrition because of 'a very great scarcity of 
provisions... I which was generally the case on the other 
estates. 185 By March 1778, over-a thousand slaves had 
died in Antigua. Montserrat had lost twelve hundred, 
and in St. Kitts many died from hunger. 186 In Jamaica187 
and Barbados there were also numerous deaths among the 
slaves, because of repeated hurricanes and lack of food. 
In 1780 and 1781 in Barbados, an estimated 5,000 slaves 
died because of the hurricane of 1780 and the scarcity 
of provisions. John Brathwaite, the Agent for the 
Assembly, estimated that the slave population declined 
from 74,874 in 1774, to 63,248 in 1781-188 In 1784 
there only were 61,808 slaves in that island. 189 
So disheartening were the economic conditions 
of the British colonies that some planters emigrated 
to the foreign islands with their slaves, "O while 
others sold their estates and Negroes at public auction 
for much less than their real value to pay their debtsPI 
, 185 Van Keelen to Barham, 7 April 1781. Barham Papers: Bodl. 
MSS. Clarendon, Dep. C. 357, Bun. 1. 
186 Southey, History of the West Indies, Vol. II, p. 479. 
287 'Statement of Circumstances relating to the Slave Trade, 17891. 
ParZiamentary Papers, Vol. 82, No. 626, p. 4. 
188 Propositions relative to the Slave Trade, 1784'. Ibid., No. 627, 
p. 3. 
189'An Account of the Number of Slaves returned into the 
Treasurer's Office of Barbados from 1780 to 1787 inclusive', 1788. 
C. O. 28/61, fo. 204. 
190 Macartney to Germain, 25 October 1778. C. O. 101/22, fo. 157. 
191 Hay to Gemain, 4 June 1778. C. O. 28/57, fos 41-42. 
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Other planters abandoned their estates, and left the 
islands to escape litigation in the courts. 192 A year 
before his death, Ilay was disillusioned by the damaging 
effects of drought and the American War on the island's 
economy: '... the short Crops for several Years past 
have not been sometimes sufficient to pay the certain 
annual Expence of the plantation much less to enable 
193 them to pay off any of their debts" he wrote. 
Moreover, not only were the planters heavily in 
debt# but throughout the British West Indies the 
governments could not procure credit. The local 
treasuries were empty, and most Assemblies were unable 
to collect the taxes. Despite his attempt, Hay could 
not ascertain the true amount of his government's 
debt' 94 which was put at E30,000 in 1782 by his successor 
James Cuninghame. 195 As no plan could be devised to pay 
it, half of the Parliamentary gift of Z80,000 for the 
sufferers of the hurricane of 1780 was used to liquidate 
the debt. In St. Kitts, a joint committee of both 
Houses was set up in December 1779 to raise E5,000 by 
public subscription to cover the expenses of the troops 
sent there. The Assembly pledged the previous year's 
192 J. A. B., 25 July 1780. C. O. 31/41; flay to Germain, 28 November 
1781. C. O. 28/35, fo. 93d; see 'The Answer of Major-General James 
Cuninghame to the Petition of the House of Assembly of the Island 
of Barbados to the King' (no date). C. O. 28/35. 
193 flay to Germain, 4 June 1778. C. O. 28/57, fo. 42d. 
19 'Ibid. 
195 Governor Cuninghame to Welbore Ellis, 23 April 1782. C. O. 
28/59, fo. 320d. 
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poll tax as security-196 In Jamaica, where the 
government had no money, Dalling ordered the Receiver- 
General on 19 August 17-79 to establish a subscription 
'for raising ... money by voluntary loans'. 
197 Over Z14,000 
was collected. On Dalling's further recommendation the 
legislature passed an Act on the following day 
empowering the Receiver-General to borrow E30,000 at 
6 per cent in terest to pay the troops. 198 In Montserrat 
in September 1777 both Houses agreed to permit John 
Ravel Frye, a Member of the Assembly, to borrow X500 at 
8 per cent per annum to purchase food for the poor. 199 
Faced with a similar problem two years later, the 
Antigua Assembly petitioned Governor Burt to assent to 
a bill to issue X30,000 worth of paper money at 6 per 
cent interest per annum for two years, without a 
suspending clause. 200 Although the bill conflicted with 
Burt's twenty-sixth instruction, he was prepared to 
assent to it as the conditions of Antigua demanded 
immediate action. 201 On Burt's recommendation, and the 
merchants' objections to the plan, however, it was 
discontinued. Instead, the legislature passed an Act 
in June 1779 for drawing bills of exchange amounting to 
196 J. A. S. K., 1 December 1779. C. O. 241/11. 
197 J. A. J., 19 August 1779. C. O. 140/59, p. 147. 
198 J. A. J., 20 August 1779. Ibid., pp. 148-149. 
199M. A. M., 25 September 1777. C. O. 177/12. 
200 Petition of the Council and Assembly of Antigua to Governor 
Burt, May 1779. C. O. 152/59, fo. 181. 
201 Burt to Germain, 24 May 1779. Ibid., fo. 178. 
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920,000 sterling for two years at lawful interest, on 
the Lords of the Treasury, 'to be subscribed by his 
Excellency the General, the President of the Council 
and the Speaker of the Assembly'*. 202 The money which 
was used to purchase provisions for the slaves was 
repaid by capitation taxes on all Negroes. 203 In spite 
of the novelty of the Act, the British government 
accepted it. 204 
The monetary crisis in the British West Indies 
was further complicated by a shortage of specie 
resulting from the exportation of money to the foreign 
islands to purchase provisions, the loss of the American 
market for rum, the decay of the exchange trade, the 
decline in the amount of Portugal gold usually carried 
to the southern Caribbean colonies to purchase bills of 
exchange, and the large sums of money sent to Britain 
to pay debts. 205 In Jamaica, the unparalleled scarcity 
of money 206 was caused by the decline of the Spanish 
trade which ended the flow of bullion to that island, 
as well as Jamaica's imbalance of trade with Britain, 
202 'Extract of the Minutes of the Council of Antigua,, 9 June 1779. 
Ibid., fos. 211-211d; Burt to Germain, 24 June 1779. Ibid., fo. 208. 
203 J. A. A., 20 September 1780. C. O. 9/41. 
204 Germain to Burt, 4 October 1780. C. O. 152/60, fo. 102; 
Ragatz, The Planter Class, p. 158. 
205 Macartney to Germain, 25 October 1778. C. O. 101/22, fos. 156- 
157. 
206 Charles Stirling to Sir William Stirling, 23 April 177B. 
Aberghany MSS: N. R. A. (Scotland), GD 24,1/461. 
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thus forcing the merchants to send large sums of money 
to their correspondents at home . 
207 But, 'the Total 
Revolution in the usual circuitous Trade of the West 
Indies, occasioned by the Disturýbanccs in America', 
wrote Lord Macartney, was the major reason for the 
decline of the supply of money in the islands. 208 To 
ease the shortage of money, specie was sent out from 
209 England to pay the troops in the Leeward Islands . At 
the end of 1780 the Treasury also ordered that the 
troops in Jamaica were to be subsisted in the same 
manner as those in America, 210 and in the following year 
the Parliamentary gift of E40,000 to relieve the needy 
sufferers of the hurricane of 1780 was sent in specie 
to the island. 212 
The American War had greatly distressed the 
British Caribbean Islands, and had brought immense 
hardships and near economic ruin to the planters. 
Throughout the War, there was a general scarcity of all 
articles in the islands, nearly approaching famine in 
some. There was also a general shortage of plantation 
utensils and machinery so necessary to the production 
of sugar and rum, in so much so that the value of most 
of the plantations declined significantly. The incessant 
207 'Jama , ican Advices', 21 June 1778. Add. MSS. 12,412, fo. 6. 
208 Macartney to Germain, 25 October 1778. C. O. 101/22, fo. 157. 
209 Germain to Dalling, 5 May 1779. C. O. 137/74, fo 158. 
210 Germain to Dalling, 7 December 1780. C. O. 137/78, fo. 344d. 
211 'Extract from the Minutes of a meeting of the Jamaican 
Planters, and Merchants', 8 February 1781. C. O. 137/79, fo. 121. 
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pleas from the Assemblies of the several islands for 
relief should not be dismissed as insincere attempts to 
extort financial or any other assistance from the 
British government, nor as attempts to conceal the 
inability of the planters to make their estates self- 
sufficient. 
The development of the West Indian agricultural 
slave system had many weaknesses which had to be overcome 
in the years after 1776 if the planters were to produce 
their own food. Despite the measures adopted by the 
several legislatures to plan the islands' economies 
and to encourage the planters to grow food, they failed 
because it was extremely difficult to change a sugar 
estate suddenly to another form of agriculture. In 
addition, the very nature of the British West Indian 
slave system had restricted the planters from producing 
food on their estates, for the labour of a slave was as 
important as any other factor in the production of sugar. 
The planters were thus enclosed in the familiar 'vicious 
circle'. By using their slaves to grow their own food 
instead of directing their labour force to the 
production of those valuable staples, so necessary to 
their survival, the planters had changed their system 
of agriculture, reduced the cultivation of sugar-cane, 
lessened the productivity of their estates, and misused 
their investments in slaves, thus reducing their incomes. 
Consequently, many planters could neither pay their 
debts nor procure credit, and to a planter in debt, his 
inability to purchase provisions was fatal to his slaves. 
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The planters survived, but at an inordinate cost to 
themselves and the islands. Many were made insolvent 
because of the loss of production and the general 
stagnation of trade unknown in the British West Indies 
before'the American War. 
During the period of the American Revolution, 
the British Caribbean islands had to rely on the illegal 
trade between the merchants and the Americans, as well 
as on captured American vessels for a large part of 
their supplies. As early as April 1776, Vice-Admiral 
Young wrote that the prizes he had taken were of 
inestimable value to the Leeward Islands. 212 Similarly, 
at the beginning of 1780, Commodore Hyde Parker, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Leeward Islands squadron, had 
. performed an 
invaluable service to the inhabitants of 
Antigua and Barbados by supplying them with provisions. "' 
But, the quantity of supplies from captured American 
vessels was inadequate and the source was unreliable. 21 4 
Such were the economic conditions of the British 
West Indian colonies from 1776 to 1782. The planters 
who were accustomed to a system in which they functioned 
profitably saw that very system vanish before their eyes. 
It was therefore difficult to expect a great deal of 
public spirit and liberality from those who lost so much. 
212 James Young to Philip Stephens, 7 April 1776. Adm. 1/309, 
fo. 458d. 
213 Commodore Hyde Parker to PhiliP Stephens, 20 February 1780. 
Adm. 1/312, fo. 180d. 
214 Edwards, History of the West Indies, p. 411. 
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Consequently, during the American War, each colony 
guarded very carefully its political 'rights' and some 
Assemblies even chose the opportunity provided by the 
rift in the British Empire to enl'arge upon them. 
CHAPTER VI 
POLITICS IN JAMAICA AND BARBADOS 1774-1782 
The study of the constitutional and political 
debate between Britain and her colonies during the 
latter part of the eighteenth century naturally centres 
on the American colonies in the Revolutionary period. 
Only one work attempts to look at the political aspect 
of West Indian history, and it views the period mainly 
as one of personal conflict between the Jamaica 
Governors and their Assemblies-' While such an inter- 
pretation is not entirely incorrect, there is more to 
the disputes than one of interpersonal relationship. 
The period marks a growing struggle for a shift of 
authority to the Assemblies, as well as the demand for 
the redress of some of the grievances which the 
Americans were attacking - the question of taxation, 
interference with the rights of the Assemblies, an 
adverse balance of trade, and the inconvenience of some 
sections of the Navigation Laws. The attempt by the 
British government to suppress all opposition in America 
helped to crystallise the opinions of the colonists in 
the British West Indies, and though there were no formal 
declarations in support of the American colonies, except 
'See George Metcalf, Royal Government and PoliticaZ Conflict in 
Jcanaica 17"09-1783 (London, 1965). 
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in Bermuda, all the colonies experienced significant 
internal political changes. 
Because of the geographical situation of the 
islands, there was no united action in response to 
either the disputes between Britain and the continental 
colonies or to the outbreak of the fighting. This 
failure was duly noted by the Council of St. Vincent 
in an address to Lieutenant-Governor William Young. 
His repeated appeals to that House for a loyal address 
to the King in support of the British goverranent's 
Ainerican policywq- m complied with belatedly; but the 
Council considered it 
unnecessary for a colony so remote & of 
so little weight in the great scale of 
public Affairs: alone to utter Our 
Sentiment on such an important subject, 
and thought it more becoming our 
Situation not to lead, but wait the 
Example of the Old Settled Islands with 
which united our Address might be more 
worthy the Attention of his Majesty. 2 
The Council's address leaves little doubt that 
it was in favour of united action in pressing the King 
to end the disputes between Britain and the American 
colonies. Surely, it would not need the support of 
the colonies to send a loyal petition which would be 
'worthy' of the King's attention. The waters of the 
Caribbean were, and have remained, the chief obstacle 
to West Indian political unity. Furthermore, it was 
left to the West India Committee, and to the islands' 
agents in London, to press for an end to the dispute, 
2 Address of the Council of St. Vincent to William Young, 2 April 
1776. C. O. 101/19, fos. 152-152d. 
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but they did nothing until it was too late. The West 
Indian colonists might have also considered the dispute 
a temporary one to be resolved amicably when the 
British government abolished its claims to the right 
to tax the colonists, preferring to preserve their 
trade rather than become embroiled in the dispute. The 
fact is that the commercial intercourse between America 
and the West Indies played a significant role in 
political developments, and was an important factor 'in 
determining the attitude of' the West Indians to the 
Americans after 1774 when it seemed likely that their 
commerce would be interrupted by the disputes. There 
was now a greater degree of sympathy among the Caribbean 
and American colonists than at any other time in their 
long relationship, 3and it became a feature of West 
Indian politics during the American War. 
On constitutional issues several of the 'West 
Indians' in England 'upheld the American thesis'. 4 
Of those who sat in Parliament during the 'sixties and 
early 'seventies, William Beckford who normally 
supported the government's economic policy opposed its 
attempts to force the Americans to pay for the upkeep of 
the British troops stationed in the colonies-5 Likewise, 
3 Agnes M. Whitson, 'The Outlook of the Continental American 
Colonies on the British West Indies 1760-17751. Political Science 
Quarterly (1930), Vol. XT. V, p. 86 (hereafter cited as P. S. Q. ). 
4 Namier, England in the Age of the American Revolution, pp. 277- 
278; Whitson, 'The Outlook of the Continental American Colonies,,, 
P. S. Q., Vol. XU!, P. 86. 
5 Sir Lewis Namier and John Brooke, The llistorýij of Parliament: 
The Iloure of Conimons 1754-1790 (London, 1964), Vol. II, p. 77. 
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Rose Fuller who supported the bu*_9 of Newcastle opposed 
the Ministry in 1774 because of its American policy 
which he predicted would lead to hostilities. Mean- 
while, in the colonies many Westý Indians watched with 
keen interest and apprehension the attempt of the 
British government to subdue the Americans. 6 
Though the fundamental factor in the relationship 
between America and the Caribbean colonies was economic, 
there were also social and family ties. For example, 
Samuel Vaughan, an Assemblyman of Jamaica, was the son 
of Samuel Vaughan, a friend of George Washington. 
Vaughan's wife was from Boston. Philip Livingston, a 
merchant and Assemblyman for Portland in Jamaica, was 
the eldest son of Philip Livingston, a signatory of the 
American Declaration of Independence. The elder 
Livingston was married to a Jamaican. Some West Indians 
held lands in America, and some Americans in the West 
Indies. For instance, Thomas Benson of Jamaica owned 
properties in Philadelphia; conversely, the Middletons, 
the Bulls and the Colletons of South Carolina owned 
estates in Jamaica and Barbados. 7 The Antigua merchant 
John Spear was the son of William Spear of Baltimore. 
John and other merchants supported and supplied the 
rebels during the War. 8 There was considerable inter- 
marrying between the children of West Indian and American 
61bid., pp. 479-480. 
7 Edward Brathwaite. The Development of Creole Society in 
Jamaica 1770-1820 (oxford, 1971), pp. 64-G5. 
Seo Chapter III. 
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families, and those parents who had American leanings 
and background, or who could not afford to educate their 
children in England, sent them to colleges in Philadelphia, 
New Jersey and Now York. 9 Thus, given the socio-economic, 
cultural and family ties, it was only natural that the 
West Indians should have taken an interest in the 
political debates in America. 10 
The constitutional issucs raised on the continent 
were therefore discussed in the West Indies. American 
supporters in Jamaica were estimated to be approximately 
one-third of the white population at the beginning of 
1776,11 and some were known to have toasted the rebels 
whose blood they 'extoll'd as precious drops of Record'. 
They, like the Americans, viewed 'Obedience to Law and 
Authority' of the British government as a form of 
'slavery', and even drank to the 'Immortal Honours of 
Incountering Death in every form rather than submit to 
slavery. Let its Chains be ever so Gilded'. Conse- 
quently, 'the strange dislike which then grew upon them 
[the English and Irish who also supported John Wilkes] 
against [the) Ministry' wrote R. Lindsay, Rector of 
St. Elizabeth, 'works... like a charm to this day - for 
as the N. American struggles (as they say) are only 
against [the] Ministry, they must be on the side of 
Rebellion - for to be with [the] Ministry now, would 
9 Whitson, 'The Outlook of the Continental American Colonies'. 
P. S. Q. 
, Vol. XLV, pp. 62-65. 
loBrathwaite, Creole Society in Jamaica, p. 67. 
"'Extract 
of a Letter from Jamaica', 10 February 1776. Clarke, 
ed., Naval Doctimonts, of the American Revolution, Vol. III, p. 1209. 
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look like a changing of sides'. Lindsay cited a slave 
rebellion in Jamaica in 1776, which was planned and 
executed by the house slaves, as an off-shoot of the 
support which the American rebels enjoyed among the 
white people who spoke openly on the issue in the 
presence of their slaves: 'Dear Liberty has rang in the 
Ears of every House-bred slave, in one form or other, for 
these Ten Years past', 12 he emphasised. 
This was(o: 
D)nly 
-the first time that the house 
slaves had either planned or engaged in a rebellion. In 
1760, for example, they played a prominent part in 
crushing the uprising of that year. Sir Basil Keith, 
searching for reasons for this unique rebellion, believed 
that it occurred because of 'the particular Circumstances 
of the times'. No doubt he was referring to the 
example of the Americans. Yet, he could not understand 
the basis of the slaves' ideology and their desire 'to 
throw off the Yoke of Slavery-to make themselves 
Master of' Jamaica. 13 Lindsay, of course, explains that 
while the white Jamaicans only spoke about rebellion, in 
those very terms, the blacks 'went no farther than their 
private reflections upon us & it, but as soon as we came 
to blows, we find them fast at our heels. Such has been 
the seeds sown in the Minds of our Domestics by our 
12 R. Lindsay to Dr. william Robertson, Principal of the University 
of Edinburgh, 6 August 1776. Robertson-Macdonald Papers: N. L. S. 
MSS. 3,942, fos. 260d-261. 
13 Sir Basil Keith to Lord Germain, 6 August 1776. C. O. 137/71, 
fos. 228d-229: 'Extract of a Lotter from Sir Simon Clark to 
Benjamin Lyon', 23 July 1776. Ibid., fo. 257. 
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Wise-Acre Patriots - And see it as it ripens'. 
14 Although 
the slaves' abortive attempt to seize the island seems 
to have changed the thinking of many Jamaicans about 
actively participating in rebellion, it will be argued 
in this chapter that the political crisis which occurred 
in Jamaica during the years 1776-1782 resulted from the 
pro-American ideology of a large faction of the 
inhabitants whose members controlled the Assembly. 
The English colonies in both America and the 
Caribbean had a representative form of government similar 
to that of England. They had authority over internal 
taxation and other domestic affairs, with very little 
interference from the British government. Their commerce 
with foreign countries, however, was restricted by the 
Navigation Acts, and even though this led to a certain 
measure of dissatisfaction at times, both West Indians 
and Americans accepted Parliament's control of legis- 
lation in this area. Eighteenth century West Indian 
political thinking can be viewed in the writings of 
Edward Long and Bryan Edwards. Long, a confirmed 'Whig' 
disliked 'imperial dominance' of the colonies. 'He 
distrusted the executive power in government, and since 
this was under imperial control, he distrusted the 
imperial power itself'. is He viewed the British 
government's control of the colonies from England 'as 
14 Lindsay to Robertson, 6 AUquSt 1776. Robertson-Macdonald 
Papers: N. L. S. MSS. 3,942, fo. 261. 
is Elsa V. Goveia, A Study on the Historiography of the British 
West Indies to tho end of the Nineteenth Century (Mexico, 1956), p. 56. 
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virtually impossible', and therefore he readily 
defended the Jamaica Assembly 'against the charge of 
chronic faction in its. proceedings' on the grounds that 
it had rights, and the duty to defend them vigilantly 
at all times'. 16 
Adopting Locke's political philosophy, Long 
further maintained that it was the duty of the Assembly 
to safeguard the peoples' rights 'which it held in 
trust'. 17 On the status of the colonies, Long contended 
that the sovereign did not have sole authority over them, 
since this would have relegated the colonists to the 
status of Aliens', forcing them to forfeit 'all. the 
Rights of Englishmen', which would have seriously 
retarded the colonisation of foreign lands. That this 
did not happen, Long sees as a significant feature of 
British colonial policy, and thus assured every English- 
man at home or in the colonies 
A Dominum UtiZe in it for the benefit of 
themselves, and of that nation to which 
they belong: their Rights are unalienable 
whilst they continue in obedience to the 
nationaZ Laws; they cannot be subjected to 
Laws repugnant to those of England and 
consequently are no more liable to be 
governed by the WiZZ of the King than if 
they had remained in England. They may not 
enact Laws or Ordinances injurious to the 
national welfare. But the national Senate 
is reciprocally bound to Impose nothing on 
the colonists injurious to those rights, 
properties & Immunities which they inherit 
, with their 
Fellow Subjects in the mother state. 18 
"'Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
17 Ibid. , p. 57. 
18 Edward Long, 'On the Constitution and Government of Jamaica' 
(1774). Add. MSS. 12,402, fos. 1-2. 
Long's criticisms were not only directed against 
the crown, but he also insisted that Parliament did not 
have unlimited authority over the colonies, and 
therefore it could enact no legislation which adversely 
affected the colonists' rights which they shared 
equally with their 'Fellow Subjects' in Britain. Long 
was undoubtedly proud of the English constitution 
which had given Englishmen at home and abroad 'an 
honest pride of birthright'. Any attempt, therefore, 
to restrict this right was to degrade the national 
character and thus destroy every Englishman's belief in 
his 'superiority over the subjects of foreign states'. 
Consequently, those who emigrated to the colonies 'like 
Bees from their hive to labour' for the general good of 
the British Empire were thus 'entitled to the full 
enjoyment of English franchises, and more particularly 
by this sequestred industry, they become in time the 
most solid props of the liberty, property and happiness 
enjoyed by their Countrymen at home'. " 
Bryan Edwards' History of the West Indies 
published about twenty years after Long's work conveys 
much of pre-Revolutionary West Indian political thinking 
and much of his argument on the relationship between 
Crown and Parliament, and the local legislatures also 
comes from pre-Revolutionary Jamaican documents. 20 
19 Long, 'Of Government and Constitution' (no date). Add. MSS. 
12,404, fo. 7. 
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20 Edwards, History of the West Indies, Vol. II, pp. 348-349; 
see Goveia, Historiography of the British West Indies, p. 83. 
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Edwards' opinions on the constitutional authority of 
Parliament over the colonies were also in keeping with 
American writers such as'John Dickinson in his Essay on 
the Constitutional Powers of Britain over the Colonies 
in America published in 1774, and were no doubt common 
among many Jamaican planters. Like Long, Edwards 
contended that the colonists had retained the same 
liberties, privileges and immunities as those enjoyed 
by their fellow subjects in Britain, and therefore were 
only bound by those laws which applied to everyone in 
the Kingdom. Morever, the establishment of Assemblies in 
the colonies gave the people control of their internal 
affairs, 21 and Parliament by reserving 'the Superin- 
tending and controlling power in all commercial matters' 
had implied that it would not 'interfere in matters to 
which the colonial assemblies' were sufficiently 
competent. 22 The colonial Assemblies were therefore 
subject only to the King. They owed 'no allegiance to 
the Lords and commons; to whom they are not subjects, 
but "fellow" subjects with them to the same sovereign'. 
Parliame-nt therefore could not exercise any 
authority over the colonists without their permission, 
and instead of being 'subordinate', the colonial 
legislatures were 'co-ordinate with' that of Britain. 
Their forms of civil government were identical 'almost 
as nearly as the condition of a dependent colony can be 
21 Edwards, History of West Indies , Vol. II, pp. 341-345. 
22 Ibid., p. 349. 
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brought to resemble that of its mother country which is 
a great independent empire I. Most of the colonies had 
their own courts of chancery, courts of ordinary, 
courts of vice-admiralty, courts of quarter session, 
vestries, and during martial law, military courts. 23 
Edwards and Long had stopped short of claiming in- 
dependent status for the colonial legislatures, but 
implied that they had an early form of responsible 
government. In essence, both writers contended that the 
privileges enjoyed by the Assemblies were not delegated 
by the Crown, but were derived from the people, and 
must therefore be maintained inviolably to protect them 
from an arbitrary power, whether Crown or Parliament. 24 
These constitutional claims did not originate 
with the disputes in America, but were well-known 
throughout the islands. The Assembly of Jamaica which 
virtually sided with the Americans in a 'Petition and 
Memorial' to the King in December 1774 was only restating 
its earlier position in the "Oliphant Case', 1764 to 
1766. In December 1764 Richard Wilson, a provost 
officer, served a writ of venditore exponas on the 
coach-horses of John Oliphant, an Assemblyman, on account 
of Pierce Cook who had obtained a favourable judgement 
against Oliphant. Cook was encouraged in his action by 
Lachan McNeil, a deputy Marshal. Wilson, Cook and 
McNeil were arrested for seizing Oliphant's property, 
23 Aid. , pp. 360-361. 
24 Sir George Cornewall Lewis An Essay on the Government of 
Dependencion, ed., Sir Charles Lucas (Oxford, 1891), pp. 301-303; see 
Goveia, Historiography of the Nitish Mot Indies, p. 83. 
k 
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but instead of applying to the House for their release 
in the customary manner, thq three men petitioned 
Governor Lyttleton, as Chancellor, for writs of habeas 
corpus. of the choices facing Lyttleton, he decided to 
prorogue the House for a day, during which time he 
issued the writs for freeing the men. 25 
When the Assembly met on the following day, 
Wilson, Cook and McNeil were again arrested. Edward 
Bolt, the Messenger, was served with a writ of habeas 
corpus signed by Lyttleton. On 21 December Cook and 
McNeil were taken before the Governor in the Court of 
Chancery where he freed them. The House immediately 
arrested the men again, and refusing to do any business 
until reparations were made, they accused Lyttleton of 
a breach of privilege. The Governor immediately 
dissolved the Assembly; but when a new one met, it drew 
up an address to the King which was published in the 
local newspapers. The struggle was therefore carried 
from inside the House to the Crown and the people, with 
the Assembly claiming the right of freedom from arrest 
for its members and their properties, as well as the 
right to commit its own members and others. The case 
was bitterly contested for another year and a half, 
resulting in Lyttleton's recall and thus the recognition 
26 
of the Assembly's position . 
25 Metcalf, Royal GoVernment, pp. 160-162; Mary Patterson Clarke, 
ParZiamentary Privilege in the America Colonies (New Haven, 1943), 
pp. 252-254. 
26 Edwards, Ilistory of the West Indies, pp. 348-355; see petition 
to Mleston in the note; Lawrence 11. Gipson, The Corning of the 
Revolution 1763-1775 (London, 1964), pp, 158-159; Clarke, 
Parliamentary Privilege, pp. 255-258. 
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After Lieutenant-Governor Roger Hope Elleston 
took office in June 1766, the Assembly re-opened the 
debate over the release of Cook and McNeil. In a 
petition to Elleston, the House asked him to expunge 
Lyttleton's decision from the Court of Chancery records. 
The Council agreed with the Assembly's demand, and the 
Lieutenant-Governor 'pronounced Lyttleton's decision 
unconstitutional, declared it annulled and made void, 
and erased it from the records'. 27 Of particular 
interest here is the petition sent by the Assembly to 
Elleston. It predated its own 'Petition and Memorial' 
of 1774, as well as the American 'Declaration of Rights' 
of the same year, but contains many of the claims of 
28 the latter documents. 
In 1774, as in 1766, the Jamaican Assembly declared 
that it was unconstitutional for Parliament to legislate 
for the colonies except in areas of mutual benefit; 
that their rights were constantly guaranteed by the 
Crown and 'therefore the people of England had no right, 
power, or privilege to give to the emigrants', which 
they had not possessed before leaving England. It stated 
that while it had previously received the Navigation Acts 
for regulating the colony's trade, it had never given 
Parliament the right to enact such laws, but only accepted 
them as they were beneficial to both areas. It observed 
27 Metcalf, Royal Government, pp. 167-168; 
28 Edwards, History of the West Indies, pp. 348-355 (note); 'The 
Petition and Memorial of the Assembly of Jamaica to the King, 
23 December 1774. C. O. 140/4G, pp. 569-570; Ford, ed., Journals 
of Congress, Vol. I, pp. 67-70. 
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however that rarliament was now attempting to exercise 
an unrestrained power over the colonies, aimed at 
reducing them to 'an abject state of slavery'. Con-' 
sequently, 'the most essential rights of the colonists 
have been invaded, and their property given and granted 
to his Majesty, by men not entitled to such a power'. 
Having reiterated its claim that the people were not 
bound by any other laws than those to which their 
Assembly had assented, and passed by his Majesty, the 
petitioners demanded a guarantee 'that no laws shall be 
made, and attempted to be forced upon them, injurious 
to their rights as colonists, Englishmen, or Britons'. 
29 
Jamaica was not the only island to pass pro- 
American addresses. The Grenada, Tobago and Barbados 
Assemblies passed them, and Bermuda and the Bahamas 
overtly supported the American Rebellion. The group in 
the Assembly which pushed through the petition might 
have formed the nucleus of the same one which was in 
opposition to Britain, and was also responsible for 
distributing copies of Thomas Paine's Common Sense 
throughout Jamaica, 30 and voted down a motion that the 
Assembly 'will not receive any letters from any of the 
assemblies or congresses in North America during the 
present disturbances'. 31 It was also likely that this 
group formed the core of a 'party' whose goal was 
29 'Petition and Memorial of the Assembly of Jamaica to the King' 
23 December 1774. C. O. 140/46, pp. 569-570, adopted by a vote of 
16 to 9. 
30 Keith to Germain, 27 March 1776. C. O. 137/71, fos. 98-98d. 
31 J. A. J., 2 November 1775. C. O. 140/46, p. 576. 
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independence from Britain, and continued to exist until 
1811, and probably after that year. 32 But if the 
constitutional and political ideology of the Jamaicans 
paralleled that of the American'colonists, there was a 
marked'difference in the degree to which they were 
prepared to go to achieve their goal. 
The West Indian colonists, like the Americans, 
were divided into two distinct political groups. Those 
who supported the Americans formed a majority in the 
Assemblies, were labelled 'rebels', 'Gallo-Americans', 
and even denounced as 'traitors'. Moreover, every West 
Indian Assembly was actively engaged in openly opposing 
and criticising their Governors who, likewise, were 
quick to return the criticism. This mutual emnity 
continued in most islands from 1775 to 1782. The auto- 
cratic attitude of a few officials gave rise to some 
opposition, but the American War was chiefly responsible 
for increasing West Indian opposition to Imperial 
authority. Though there were unrestrained professions 
of loyalty to the Crown, the Governors bore the brunt 
of the colonists' anger, and the Governors were repeatedly 
accused of violating those rights which the Assemblies 
tenaciously fought to maintain, and enlarge upon when- 
ever possible. 
Before we can understand the importance of these 
political crises and the constitutional gains emanating 
from them, it is necessary to outline the executive 
32 Edward Morrison to the Earl to Liverpool, 19 September 1811. 
C. O. 187/131. 
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jurisdiction of a 13ritish West Indian Governor - one 
which encompassed the entire area of the island's 
political, economic and judicial life. lie could summon, 
prorogue, and dissolve the Assembly by proclamation 
He could refuse to assent to bills with which he did 
not agree. He had a certain amount of patronage, and 
as he was allowed to suspend patentees until the 
Crown's pleasure was known; at times he could remove 
troublesome officers, and replace them with his own 
supporters. The Governor also had absolute control of 
the militia, and could dismiss its officers without any 
interference from the Crown or the Council and Assembly. 
He could issue public money by warrant without the 
consent of the Assembly, proclaim martial law on the 
advice of a Council of War, call out the militia, and 
command the lives and properties of the inhabitants. 
Some Governors misused these powers; others obstructed 
legislation for trivial reasons, adhering to too strict 
an interpretation of their instructions, and thereby 
intensified the discord. 
The first area of the prerogative to be attacked 
was defence, including the Governor's control over the 
forts, other public works, martial law and the militia. 
In 1769 the Assembly of Jamaica in agreement with the 
Governor and Council formed one centralised body called 
the Commissioners for Forts, Fortifications, and Public 
Buildings. The Commissioners of Fortifications Act of 
1778 then named the entire House and Council to join the 
Governor as members of that Board. But as the Assembly 
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had a majority of members, it controlled every important 
decision regarding the maintenance and extension of all 
public works in Jamaica, and the Governor's authority was 
reduced to that of making recommendations. 33 It does 
not appear, however, that the administration of the 
works had improved, and like most government bureau- 
cracies of the period, this one was hopelessly inef- 
ficient. In June 1778, for example, Dalling complained 
that the island's defences were neglected, and that the 
Assembly had refused to vote money to continue work which 
it had begun in the previous year. 34 It was not until 
he had warned the House that a French attack was 
imminent, and it was necessary to complete several 
defence projects 35 that the House voted E2,000, but this 
was grossly inadequate, and to meet the cost of the 
work Dalling drew his bills on the Treasury. 36 
The Assembly's failure to raise a sufficient 
amount of money brought no immediate rebuke from Dalling 
who was experiencing some of the distresses of the War, 
and he was even-ready to defend the Assembly's stand. 
In 1778 alone the House had voted over V1,000 for the 
island's defence, excluding its pay for the troops. To 
33 F. 
-G. Spurdle, 
Early West Indian Goverment: Showing the Progress 
of Goverment in Barbados, J=aica and the Leeward Islands 1660-1783 
(Palmerston North, New Zealand), pp. 140,153. 
34 Address of the Assembly of Jamaica to Governor Dalling in J. A. J. 
13 June 1778. C. O. 140/59, p. 68; J. A. J., 15 June 1778. Ibid., 
p. 70; Dalling to Germain, 19 June 1778. Ibid., fo. 159d. 
35 Copy of Dalling's Message to the Assembly of Jamaica (no date). 
C. O. 137/74, fos. 99-100. 
36 Dalling to Germain, 20 December 1778. Ibid., fos. 97-97d. 
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do this, the House was forced to reduce its spending on 
roads and other public works, to double the deficiency 
tax, and to increase the poll tax five and half times - 
5s. 6d. on slaves and 4ýd. on cattle. Because of the 
adverse economic effect of the War on Jamaica's economy 
Dalling warned Germain early in 1779 that unless the 
British government assumed more of the cost of the 
island's defence, unrest among the inhabitants would 
#crease. He further pointed out that some were 
complaining that the British government had abandoned 
the island; others were protesting that since the 
Jamaican government could not pay its entire defence 
cost, the colonists should join the Americans, thus 
exempting them from capture by the French. Such public 
expressions were particularly worrying to Dalling who 
now recommended that steps should be taken 
to prevent, if possible, the disappointment 
than leave Great Britain to risk the 
Consequences - Coloniest like the 
individuals that compose them and like 
mankind in general will be... governed 
by their Interests. They may be ranked 
among those of the great politicians who 
neither love nor hate; but are influenced 
in their attachments by their hopes and 
fears alone. 37 
In spite of Dalling's favourable opinion of the 
Assembly, the economic condition of Jamaica not only 
enabled the House to wrest from the Crown the control of 
all public works, and the disposal of public money; but 
37Dalling to Germain, 12 January 1779. Ibid., fos. 115d-118. 
Similar calls for the West Indian governments to join the Americans 
were made in almost all the colonies; see West India Planter to 
West Indian Planters and Merchants, 16 September 1778. C. O. 101/22, 
fo. 128. 
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the War also enabled it to wrest from the Governor his 
authority over the militia, and the declaration of 
martial law. The functioning of the colonial system 
allowed an unscrupulous executive to paraly-se legiti- 
mate legislative and commercial business by declaring 
i 
martial law and calling out the militia on the 
flimsiest sign of any danger. Consequently, the Jamaica 
Assembly sought to make the military subject to the 
civil power. one of the charges the Americans brought 
against the King in the 'Declaration of Independence' 
was that he rendered 'the Military Independent of and 
superior to the Civil Power'. 38 
To declare martial law and to call out the 
militia, the Governor was required by his instruction to 
summon a meeting of his Council of War which consisted 
of himself, the members of the Council, and field 
officers of the militia, at which he always received 
permission to raise the King's standard. During this 
time he had the power to command the services of all the 
colonists, except those exempt from duty by law, the 
young, the old and infirm, for their horses and cattle, 
to pull down houses, to fell trees for lumber, 
to command all merchant ships and their crews; and to 
act with full authority in any other field which he and 
the Council considered necessary. 3 9 But the Governor 
38 Howard Preston, Documents Illustrative of American History 
(Now York, 1886), p. 213. 
39 Memorial of Stephen Fuller to Lord Germain, 24 December 1778. 
C. O. 137/73, fo. 252d; J. Knight, 'History of Jamaica' (no date), 
Vol. II. Add. MSS. 12,419, fos. 115d-116. 
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had his own problems. 
militiamcn in most of 
population was small, 
to enforce discipline 
fight. Consequently, 
and drill the militia 
The military calibre of the 
the islands was poor. The white 
and the laws could hardly be used 
among men who were unwilling to 
martial law was used to assemble 
In previous wars, there was little opposition to 
martial law, except that it was generally believed to 
cause hardships among the poor, and to offer a respite 
to debtors by curtailing all legitimate commercial and 
40 legal business . During the American War, however, the 
colonists objected to military service because the loss of 
even one day's work might mean the ruin of their crops. 42 
One historian writes that because the estates were heavily 
capitalised, the planters preferred to remain at home, and 
to surrender to the French in return for assurances that 
42 
they would keep their property . This might have been 
the case in the ceded islands, St. Kitts, Nevis and Mont- 
serrat; but there is no evidence that the planters in 
Barbados, Antigua and Jamaica would have made a deal with 
the French. It is more likely that they would have done 
one with the Americans. Neverthelesst because the West 
Indians watched with concern the British government's 
attempt to restrict civil liberties in America, they re- 
fused to serve in the militia on political grounds, and 
40 Pares, 'War and Trado, pp. 234-237. 
41 Memorial of Stephen Fuller to Germain, 24 December 1778. C. O. 
137/73, fos. 250-250d. 
42 mackesy, The War for America, p. 227. 
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the Assemblies took the first opportunity to prevent any 
curtailment of individual freedom. 
Hence, when Dalling declared martial law early 
in September 1778 after the captiire of two British 
frigate's, the Active and the Minerva, 43 James Pinnock 
recorded in his diary - 'Martial law proclaimed, nobody 
knows any good reason for it'. 44 Dalling certainly had 
enough evidence to fear an attack on Jamaica after the 
loss of the vessels. During this time he continued the 
public works left unfinished by the Assembly's refusal 
to raise any money, and he called out the militia to 
assess its strength, and to train the men as was 
customary. This immediately led to a dispute with the 
lower House. Dalling was astonished to find that he had 
lost the cooperation of the Assemblymen who were in- 
fluenced by 'a variety of views according to the[irl 
different political Principles ..... The Kingston 
group for example, denied that the Governor could 
declare martial law by proclamation rather than an Act 
of the legislature, and vowed to wrest that power from 
him. By a vote of fifteen to thirteen late in October 
the Assembly passed a message asking Dalling to remove 
martial law before it ruined the island's economy; but 
he refused, hoping that a larger House would reverse this 
decision. On the following day, however, the Assembly 
43 Ruddach to Steuart, 21 October 1778. Charles Steuart Papers: 
N. L. S. MSS. 5,031, fo. 87; Dalling to Germain, 21 November 1778. 
C. O. 137/74, fos. 90-90d. 
44 James Pinnock, 'Diary, 1758-1794', 4 September 1778. Add. 
MSS. 33,31G, fo. 8d. 
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persisted with its demand by a vote of twenty-nine to 
two, and threatened not to raise any money for his 
salary. The Council thus advised him to concur with the 
wishes of the House, and avoid any further dispute. 
Pinnock again recorded in his diary: 'Martial Law taken 
off.... The Governor damnably disgruntled.... v46 
Just under a year later, without meeting with the 
Council of War, Dalling raised the King's standard on 
7. August when reports he had received indicated that a 
French squadron under Comte D'Estaing had arrived at 
Saint Dominque, and was preparing for an attack on 
Jamaica. 47 While Dalling had broken with precedent, it 
is only fair to understand some of the problems with 
which a British West Indian Governor had to contend. 
The squadrons on the Leeward Islands and Jamaican station 
were stretched to their limits. The Assemblies refused 
to make any effective preparations for the troops, 48 
or to provide new defences even though the French had a 
superior naval force in the Caribbean for the greater 
part of the War after 1778, and American privateers 
had the capacity to raid the coasts, bringing distress to 
many planters. Dalling immediately summoned the militia 
to Kingston, and ordered the planters to furnish slaves 
45 Dalling to Germain, 21 November 1778. C. O. 137/74, fos. 90d- 
92d; Metcalf, Royal Government, p. 207. 
46 Pinnock, 'Didry', 1 November 1778. Add. MSS. 33,316, fo. 8d; 
Metcalf, Royal Government, pp. 207-208. 
47, Intelligence by the Advice Boat', July 1779. C. O. 137/75, 
fos. 145-147. 
48 Ragatz, The Planter Clasa, pp. 144-145. 
for completing the defences. Two days later, he lowered 
the King's standard, and legally declared martial law 
after holding a meeting of the Council of War. The 
Governor now purchased and stored a quantity of salt 
provisions, to pay for which he drew his bills on the 
British Treasury. Later that month he began the 
completion of all works not finished during the last 
martial law .4 
9' The reaction to Dalling's conduct was 
mixed. The Council concurred with him-50 On the other 
hand, while praising his decision to return to the legal 
and constitutional method of proclaiming martial law, 
the Assembly voiced its fears of his power to declare 
arbitrarily a measure so 'dangerous to the liberties of 
51 the people'. 
The congregation of the militia numbering about 
five thousand men brought several problems for Dalling. 
In accordance with a resolution of the Assembly, he 
allowed Negro servants to the troopers and infantrymen, 
and one ration of food to every servant. The House 
immediately passed a new resolution depriving the Negroes 
of their rations. 52 Furthermore, apart from their daily 
supplies, the Assembly refused to make any other 
allowances for the militiamen, most of whom had to use 
ýq Dalling to Germain, 6,9,10 August 1779. C. O. 137/75, fos. 
148-150. 
50 Address of the Council of Jamaica to Governor Dalling, 
18 August 1779. Ibid., fos. 190-190d. 
51 Address of the Assembly to Governor Dallinge 18 August 1779. 
C. O. 140/59,1). 147; Address of the Assembly to Dalling, 19 August 
1779. C. O. 137/75, fo. 190d. 
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52 J. A. J., 10 September 1779. C. O. 140/59, pp. 158-159. 
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their own money and even pawn their belongings to pay 
their expenses. 53 This led to 'discontents and 
violences, not short of mutiny' among certain divisions 
of the militia. 54 The House, while acknowledging that 
its policy had led to the 'discontents', emphasised 
that it was unable to feed 'an Asiatic train of 
unnecessary attendants.... "' 
5 But this dispute brought 
.1 
the Assembly one step nearer to its goal of control 
over the declaration and duration of martial law. 'It 
now passed a bill 'for subsisting the militia in time 
of martial law, and for accommodating them, and also 
his Majesty's regular forces.... while on march'. 56 
Dalling's hands were thus tied, and as it was essential 
to get supplies for the troops, he assented to the bill. 
Dalling's first Year as Governor had gone 
exceedingly well, so it was surprising to him when the 
Assembly adopted a hard-line policy on the issue of the 
declaration of martial law, and the calling out of the 
militia. From that time onwards, his honeymoon with the 
Assembly was over, and he was virtually bombarded on all 
fronts by the opposition. 
57 His remaining years from 
late 1778 to November 1781 were unhappy ones as he 
fought to uphold the prerogative of the Crown, as he 
understood it. In the middle of December 1778 the 
53 Dalling to Germain, 3 September 1779. C. O. 137/75, fos. 164d-165. 
54 J. A. J., 10 September 1779. C. O. 140/59, p. 159. 
55 J. A. J., 12 September 1779. Ibid., p. 162. 
56 J. A. J., 18 September 1779. Ibid., p. 169. 
57 Metcalf, Royal Goverrunent, pp. 201-202. 
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Assembly passed two militia bills which Dalling rejected 
as they were based on 'republican principles'. By their 
provisions, the Assembly would have virtually gained 
control of the militia. The Governor was allowed to 
declare martial law in emergencies; but had to convene 
the House within fourteen days in order to continue it. 
Furthermore, the important Articles of War were 
deliberately left vague, and the penalties for non- 
attendance for military service were the same as during 
peace. 58 
Instead of tacking the rejected ones to money 
bills as was customary, the Assembly passed a new bill 
constituting itself the Council of War. 59 By its 
provisions, the Governor had no control over the militia 
during martial law. As the sine qua non of his assent, 
Dalling insisted on the inclusion of penal articles. To 
placate him, the Assembly included a rider which was to 
be in force for one year only, though the bill itself 
was perpetual. On the Council's advice, Dalling assented 
to the measure, but recommended its disallowance by the 
Board of Trade, 60 which was done. 61 The infuriated 
Jamaica Assembly immediately despatched an address to the 
King: 
We cannot but deplore the Rejection of this 
58 Dalling to Germain, 12 January 1779. C. O. 137/74, fos. 110d- 
111,115; Metcalf, Royal Government, p. 208. 
59Spurdle, EarZy West Indian Government, p. 60. 
60 Dalling to Germain, 12 January 1779. C. O. 137/74, fos. 112d-113. 
61 Germain to Dalling, 5 May 1779. Ibid., fo. 157. 
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Act, as your majesty's faithful people... 
had recently felt the effects of the 
unconstitutional power exercised by that 
board; and could not but with horror look 
forward, to what extent it might be carried 
under its present constitution, which... 
has, from various circumstances, in a 
length of time, been greatly altered from 
its original institution: With the 
confidence of a people greatly aggrieved, 
we look up to your Majesty as the father 
of your country, for relief. 6' 
Determined to gain total control of internal 
security, the House passed a new bill in December 1779 
for 'ascertaining who shall compose future Councils 
of War, and for subsisting the militia, in time of 
martial law, and for other purposes respecting the said 
militia.... 1 63 The bill incorporated parts of the 
previous ones, and deprived most of the old members of 
the Council of War of their seats. The new Council 
comprised of the Commander-in-Chief, the members of the 
Council, and the whole Assembly. The Council favoured 
the bill's rejection; but Dalling, fearing that this 
would lead to increased political unrest, passed it, 
thus giving the Assembly control of the militia and the 
declaration of martial law. 64 
The gains of the Jamaica Assembly were not 
restricted only to the areas of taxation, or to the 
control of the militia. Its most notable political 
62 Address of the Assembly of Jamaica for the King, in J. A. J., 
11 November 1779. C. O. 140/59, p. 189. 
63 J. A. J., 23 December 1779. 
64Dalling to Germain, 10 December 1779. C. O. 137/76, fo. 196d; 
Brathwaite, Creole, Society, p. 12; Spurdle, Early West Indian 
GoVornment, p. 60; Metcalf, Royal Goverment, p. 208. 
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battle and constitutional achievement of the period was 
in the judicial field. One of the complaints of the 
American and West Indian colonists was that the King had 
$made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure 
of their offices.... '65 The judges in the colonies held 
their offices durante bene pZacito, and not quamdiu se 
bene gesserint as in England. As early as 1751 the 
Jamaica legislature passed an Act creating an independent 
judiciary, but as it was a novel idea at the time, it 
was disallowed. A similar bill which Dalling sent to 
England, as he could not assent to it without special 
permission, was passed by both Houses in 1778.66 When 
therefore the Assembly passed another bill the following 
November, the Governor refused his assent. 67 
No decision on the bill's future was received in 
Jamaica when the capture of San Fernando de Omoa in 
October 1779 by a joint naval and military force, 
commanded by Commodore John Luttrell and Captain William 
Dalrymple, with the help of some Indians and Baymen, led 
to the seizure of two 'Register Ships', and a quantity 
of valuable merchandise from the fort. 68 This rich 
capture brought problems for Dalling. Dalrymple and 
65 Preston, Documents, p. 213; Ford, ed., Journats of Congress; 
Vol. I, p. 64. 
66 Long, 'History of Jamaica', Add. MSS. 12,404, fo. 75; J. A. J., 
12 November 1778. C. O. 140/59, p. 91. 
67 Dalling to the Council and Assembly , in Dalling to Germain, 
21 January 1780. C. O. 137/76, fo. 206; Metcalf discusses this 
question in his work. See pp. 210-215. 
"William Dalrymple to John Dalling, 28 October 1779. C. O. 
137/76, fos. 58-65. 
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Luttrell reached a private understanding for the 
distribution of the booty, depriving the Indians and 
Baymen of most of their share. 69 Part of the prize was 
then libelled in the Vice-Admiralty Court in Jamaica 
by Thomas Harrison, as prize to the commanders of the 
Charon, Lowestaffe, and Pomona, in accordance with the 
King's proclamation of 25 June 1779, ordering reprisals 
against the subjects of the Spanish King, and awarding 
the booty to the captors. 
However, Harrison was placed in a difficult 
position in regard to the prosecution of the prize. He 
supported the claim of Admiral Sir Peter Parker, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Jamaica squadron, to a share 
of the proceeds, but only if the ships were captured by 
Captain Luttrell's orders; Dalling's claim to a share, 
as Commander-in-Chief of the military forces employed 
in the Nicaragua expedition, was less clear, 
70 since 
the booty belonged to the Crown if captured by an order 
of Captain Dalrymple. Harrison also had no objection 
to the removal of the 'Register Ships' to England to be 
libelled in the Court of Admiralty, as no preference 
could be shown to any one. Some lawyers in England, 
including Lord Mansfield, the Attorney and Solicitor- 
Generals, concurred with Harrison's opinion that Dalling 
had no claim, but believed that the booty was not subject 
to the King's proclamation of 1779, and should therefore 
"Mackesy, The War for America, p. 335. 
70 J. A. J., 15 December 1780. C. O. 140/59, pp. 292,306. 
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be condemned as 'Droits of the Crown'. 71 
The enmity and distrust which had developed 
between Dalling and uarrison over a period of time were 
now brought to the open. Theirmutual dislike stemmed 
from their differing ideological positions on the 
American War. Harrison, in two opinions, had prevented 
Dalling from taking any action against American 
supporters. Metcalf cites Harrison's cooperation with 
the Governor's 'enemies in the House' as the reason for 
the mutual hatred. 72 Harrison was also considered by 
Vice-Admiral Gayton whom he refused to represent in 
court to be an American supporter. On the other hand, 
Harrison felt that some of the reasons for his disagree- 
ment with Dalling arose from his opposition to the 
Governor's claims to shares of the prizes captured by 
non-commissioned vessels, and his advice to Dalling not 
to quarrel with th. e Assembly over the declaration of 
martial law. 73 
The problems raised by the Omoa capture were 
further complicated when James Bartlet, who had gone to 
Jamaica to represent the Baymen, sent an affidavit to 
Harrison requesting him to prevent the 'Register Ships' 
and their cargoes from being sent to England and to 
libel them in the Court of Exchequer. 74 Harrison was 
'Aid., pp. 307-308. 
72 Metcalf Royal Goverment, p. 211. 
73 Thomas Harrison to Lord Germain, 10 February 1780. C. O. 137/76, 
fos. 252-252d. 
74 James Bartlet to Thomas Harrison, 22 January 1780. Ibid., fo. 
154. 
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surprised by the request. The case was outside the 
jurisdiction of that Court, since only the Court of 
Admiralty in England or a Vice-Admiralty Court in the 
colonies was entitled to hear cases involving the 
transfer of property from the subjects of one Crown to 
those of another .75 But Harrison who believed rumours 
that Dalling was sympathetic to Bartlet's request and 
that the Governor had sought the advice of two other 
lawyers on the condemnation of the 'Register Ships' 
refused to give him an opinion on the removal of the 
vessels, pointing out instead that if he were suspended 
Dalling would be free to follow the advice of others. 
Harrison then resigned as Attorney-General because 
Dalling's accusations of 'Drunkyard, lyer, impertinent' 
-1 
had destroyed the confidential relationship that was 
needed between a Governor and his Attorney-General. 76 
Not wishing to prolong the dispute, after 
realising that he was creating an unfavourable public 
opinion, Dalling persuaded a mutual friend George 
Ricketts to write to Harrison suggesting that he could 
resume his duties as Attorney-General, if he would let 
the dispute 'sink in oblivion'. However, if he did not 
withdraw his resignation, Dalling threatened to relieve 
him of both commissions. Harrison agreed; but before 
the issue could be settled amicably, Dalling reneged on 
his promise and asked Harrison to resign one of his 
75 Harrison to Germain, 28 January 1780. Ibid., fo. 148. 
76 Thomas Harrison to Govornor Dalling, 22 January 1780. Ibid., 
fo 160; Metcalf, Royal Government, p. 212. 
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commissions. Harrison refused, and was suspended as 
Advocate-General. 77 Harrison immediately forwarded his 
case to Lord Germain and to the Lords of the Admiralty. 
But as he had voluntarily resigned as Attorney-General, 
and since the appointment of Robert Sewell, son of the 
Master of the Rolls, was already confirmed, he could not 
be reinstated. The Lords of the Treasury disapproved 
of Harrison's dismissal as Advocate-General, without 
proper reasons, and ordered Dalling to return his 
commission to him immediately. 78 
Dalling ignored his instruction, 79 and Harrison 
appealed to Philip Stephens, Secretary of the AdmiraltY,, 80 
and to Lord Germain. 81 Then he applied to John Brownrigg, 
Judge-Surrogate of the Court of Vice-Admiralty, for 
redress. His application for a judicial ruling was made 
because he believed that Dalling, by refusing to obey his 
orders, was interfering in the internal affairs of the 
Vice-Admiralty Court. 82 But Brownrigg refused the appeal 
77 Harrison to Dalling, 28 January 1780, fos. 149d-150. 
78Lord Germain to Thomas Harrison, 5 April 1780. C. O. 137/77, 
fos. 47-47d; Philip Stephens to Thomas Harrison, in J. A. J., 
15 December 1780. C. O. 140/59, p. 310; Metcalf, Royat Government, 
p. 212. 
79 Edward Barry to Thomas liarrison, 25 May 1780. C. O. 137/77, 
fo. 213d. 
80 Thomas Harrison to Philip Stephens, 1 June 1780. Md., fos. 
211-211d. 
81 Harrison to Germain, 2 June 1780. Ibid., fos. 209-210. 
8"In cuy, vice admitis', in J. A. J., 15 December 1780. C. O. 140/59, 
pp. 310-311.1 
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as he had no instructions from London. 83 However, it is 
more likely that the Judge-Surrogate did not want to 
establish a dangerous precedent. Harrison now lost no 
time in appealing to the Supreme Court for a writ of 
mandamus to Brownrigg to reinstate him, and for an 
injunction against the 'use and privileges' of the 
Office of Advocate-General by any one but himself. 84 
Harrison's appeal to the Supreme Court was politically 
motivated, and thus raised certain constitutional 
questions. Was the Court asked to deal with a matter 
which was outside of its jurisdiction? Should not the 
writ of mandamus have been directed to Governor Dalling? 
He was head of the executive branch with the power to 
suspend and appoint officers, until the King's pleasure 
was known. Brownrigg had no such authority. However, 
Dalling made serious mistakes. Before the writ could 
be served, the Governor, believing that Judges James 
Trower, Lewis Burwell Martin, John Grant, and William 
Elphinstone, Members of the Assembly, had made up their 
minds in Harrison's favour in advance, in so much so 
that they were called 'the Mandamus Judges', excluded 
their names from a new commission he had issued for 
appointing a chief justice and his assistants. 8 5 
83 
'At the Court of Vice Admiralty', 12 June 1780. C. O. 137/77, 
fo. 216. 
84 
'Harrison's Protest - In cur vice a&iiitisa' ,2 June 1780, in 
J. A. J., 15 December 1780. C. O. 140/59, p. 311; Dalling to Germain, 
25 June 1780. C. O. 137/78, fo. 73d. 
as 'In Supreme'Court', 16 June 1780. Ibid., fo. 88d; Dalling to 
Germain, 25 June 1780. Ibid., fos. 73d-74; Metcalf, Royal 
Govorivnent, pp. 213-214. 
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The displaced judges now petitioned the King for 
the protection of the colony from a despotic Governor; 
for the courts to be made independent of the Governor, 
thereby preventing any further interference 'from 
disquieting the minds, and angering the rights of your 
dutiful people of Jamaica'. 86 The petition was full of 
political connotations, but nevertheless, the four 
judges were reinstated. 87 Dalling's position in this 
controversy goes beyond the 'arbitrary' use of power. 
He, like other West Indian Governors, was obsessed with 
his pledge to uphold the prerogatives of the Crown at 
all cost. 'If the removal of the Judges is necessary 
to preserve the Royal Prerogative from Injury', he 
emphasised. 
I would be ashamed to hesitate to remove 
them. If it is the King's prerogative to 
chuse by what hands his Executive Powers 
should be exerted, all opposition to that 
choice is injury. If, as they are, all 
civil officers in this Island, holding 
office during the pleasure of the Crown, 
are suspendible by the Governor- 'till the 
King's pleasure be known, & the sufficiency 
of insufficiency of his inducements is 
ascertained by his Majesty's sense of it and 
by no other, any attempt to interrupt the 
exercise of that power is an attempt to 
abridge the prerogative. " 
The dismissal of the judges or any other patentee 
including liarrison as Advocate-General, was within the 
bounds of the Governor's instructions, but had to be 
86 The Petition of Messrs. Trower, Martin, Grant and Elphinstone 
to the King, 12 June 1780. ibid., fo. 123. 
87 Germain to Dalling, 4 April 1781. C. O. 137/80, fo. 13; 
Germain to Messrs. Trower et at., 4 April 1781, ibid., fos. 15-15d. 
88 Governor Dalling to the Board of Trade, 17 February 1781. C. O. 
137/39, fo. 160. 
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confirmed by the Crown. In fact, Dalling had done 
no worse than any of his contemporaries. His chief 
obstacle was the Assembly which saw its opportunity to 
make political gains from the incident, and it fully 
exploited the situation. The Governor was not flawless 
either. In refusing to reinstate Harrison, he had 
challenged the authority of the Crown, for which there 
was no excuse. Dallina lost this constitutional 
struggle precisely because the Imperial government wished 
to make concessions to the West Indians in this time of 
crisis. No wonder Dalling believed that he was 
victimised by the British Ministers, thus withering 
away any form of the authority previous Governors had 
possessed. 89 
On 24 November 1780, the Jamaican Assembly 
appointed a committee to inquire into the workings of the 
courts and the dismissal of the four judges. 90 The 
committee's report stated that the Governor's power to 
remove judges had been improperly used, and if allowed 
to continue in its present form would degrade the 
office of judge and would make the courts subservient 
to the will and pleasure of a Governor. It therefore 
recommended that a committee of five Assemblymen should 
be appointed to prepare a bill to make the judges hold I 
as Dalling to Germain, 5 December 1780. C. O. 137/38, fo. 190. 
so J. A. J., 15 December 1780. C. O. 140/59, pp. 284-285. 
2G7 
their offices qurmdiu on bene gesserint. 91 Early the 
following January, the House passed the Judges Bill, 92 
but the Council amended it to include a clause limiting 
the number of judges on the Supreme Court to twelve, 
with nine justices on each Court of Assizes. Moreover 
it requested a voice in the appointment as well as the 
removal of all judges, but the Assembly threw out the 
amendment, 93 and the Council then rejected the bill. 
A week later, at a new session of the Assembly which 
began on 13 January, another Judges Bill was passed. 94 
This one received Dalling's assent, "' after a compromise 
was reached between both Houses. According to the Act, 
the nomination of judges was left to the Assembly, but 
the Council was given the right to concur in their 
dismissal, by five instead of seven assenting votes. 96 
In England, the Board of Trade, after making a thorough 
investigation of the Act, recommended its acceptance to 
the King. Not only were the judges given secure tenure 
of office, but the Act was incorporated into the 
Governors' instructions after 1783.97 
I 
91J. A. J., 23 December 1780. Ibid., p. 331. The five members 
were Messrs. H. Lewis, Philip Livingston, the American, Henry 
Browne, George Crawford Ricketts, and John Grant, one of the 
displaced judges. 
92 J. A. J., 3 January 1781. 
93 J. A. J., 9 January 1781. 
94 J. A. J., 13 January 1781. 
9 sIbid. 
, p. 356. 
96 Dalling to Germain, 31 January 1781. C. O. 137/80, fos. 58-60. 
97 Metcalf, Royal Govcrnmcnt, p. 215; Richard Jackson to the 
Board of Trade, 28 November 1781. C. O. 137/39, fo. 164. 
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In Jamaica, like Antigua, the life of an Assembly 
could be extended indefinitcly. 98 Because of the 
continuing disputes and political unrest in the island, 
the Jamaica Assembly wanted to get a mandate from the 
people for its policies. Therefore, in 1778 it passed 
a bill restricting the duration of future Assemblies to 
seven years. 99 A clause was included dissolving the 
present House after 1 February 1780-100 However, Dalling 
refused his assent because the bill had no suspending 
clause, but still sent it to England. 101 The Governor 
who was ideologically averse to the dissolution of a 
recalcitrant House since this created strong public 
support for the factious leaders who were invariably 
re-elected, saw his opportunity to get rid of many of 
his enemies if such a measure was accepted in London. 102 
When, therefore, the Assembly passed a similar bill a 
year later limiting its life to 1 February 1781,1 03 on 
the advice of the Council, as well as to maintain peace 
in the island, Dalling passed the bill. Nevertheless, 
he became worried about the ever increasing tendency of 
the members of the Assembly to make more demands once he 
98 Spurdle, Early West Indian Goverment, p. 72. 
99 J. A. J., 11 November 1778. C. O. 140/59, p. go. 
100'An Act for limiting the duration of the Assembly of Jamaica', 
11 November 1778. C. O. 137/74. 
101 Governor Dalling's Speech to the Assembly, 23 December 1778. 
Ibid., fo. 19. 
102 Dalling to Germain, 14 September 1779. C. O. 137/76, fos. 
166d-167. 
103 J. A. J., 23 November 1779. C. O. 140/59, p. 181. 
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had made concessions. '... the more I sacrifice to the 
people who lead the present Assembly, the more rude, the 
more offensive, the more ungovernable they become', he 
now wrote. 104 
In England, Richard Jackson, law-officer to the 
Board of Trade, supported the Act's confirmation, and 
also recommended that no action should be taken against 
Dalling for disobeying his instructions not to assent 
to such laws. 105 But the Board viewed the Act as too 
important an innovation to be dealt with in the usual 
manner, and sent it to the King for his personal 
examination. It also directed Lord Germain to instruct 
the Governor to dissolve the Assembly before 1 February 
1781, if the 'political situations' worsened in Jamaica. 
In this way, the British government hoped to forestall 
any crisis, while fulfilling the wishes of the people 
'without admitting and establishing the operation of 
the Act'. But once the political climate had cooled, 
the Act would then be disallowed. 'OG By the beginning 
of December 1780, Dalling had not yet received any 
information on the fate of the measure and as the 
political existence of the House was to end on 1 February 
following, 107 he dissolved it in January. 108 The fate 
104 Dalling to Germain, 10 December 1779. C. O. 137/76, fos. 196d- 
197. 
105Jackson to the Board of Trade, 27 April 1780. C. O. 137/80, fo. 
108. 
106 The Board of Trade to Lord Germain, 25 May 1781. C. O. 137/77, 
fo. 119. The date appears to be wrong. Germain to Dalling, 6 June 
1780. Ibid., fos. 128-128d. 
107 Dalling to Germain, 5 December 1780. C. O. 137/79, fo. 125d. 
108 Dalling to Germain, 31 January 1781. C. O. 137/80, fo. 56. 
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of the Act has not been included in the records, but 
thereafter the Jamaica Assembly was always dissolved 
before the end of the seventh ycar. 109 
After Dalling's first year as Governor of 
Jamaica, which was a quiet one, and for which the 
Assembly gave him a plate valued at E500 'as a testimony 
of the esteem the House entertained of his conduct', 110 
he was faced with almost insurmountable problems, 
already discussed. As his relations with the House grew 
increasingly worse, he repeatedly requested a transfer 
because he felt that he was unequal to his'civil and 
political duties, and wanted to return to the rigorous 
discipline of military life, "' and because he was 
disappointed with the turn of events in Jamaica. 
Surrounded by a dissident Assembly made up of angry 
planters who were witnessing the destruction of their 
once prosperous estates, ' Dalling became disillusioned, 
and wrote: '... I experience in this Government certain 
things so derogatory to the honour and feelings of a 
man, that, were it not for your Lordships approbation 
of some parts of my conduct, I believe I should desert'. 112 
Dalling also felt that the policy of giving in to the 
109 Lord Sydney to Lieutenant-Governor Allured Clarke, April 1787. 
C. O. 137/86, fos. 212d-213. 
110 W. A. 'Feurtado, Official and Other Personages of Jamaica from 
1655 to 1790 (Kingston, 1896), p. 25. 
ill Mackesy, The War for America, p. 334; Metcalf, Royal GoVernment, 
p. 202; Dalling to Germain, 20 May 1780. C. O. 137/77, fos. 142-142d. 
112 Dalling to Germain, 20 May 1780. C. O. 137/77, fos. 142-142d. 
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Assembly had destroyed the Governor's executive power, 
and as the 'King's Representative' the Governor had 
become but a 'shadow of what he was formerly'. 1 13 
As the dispute between Dalling and the Assembly 
got out of control, Germain became convinced that the 
safety of Jamaica depended on the Governor's removal 
from office. Sir Archibald Campbell who had 
distinguished himself as an officer in the American War, and 
had been given 'a dormant' commission as Lieutenant- 
Governor of Jamaica was now appointed Commander-in- 
Chief. 114 Dalling left Jamaica in November 1781. His 
recall was not for any misconduct, but because the 
British government felt that a change was. essential to 
ensure the loyalty and safety of the island. 115 
Campbell's appointment was strictly for military 
reasons and his administration, though quieter than 
Dalling's, was not without its problems. For instance, 
at the beginning of his administration the Council and 
Assembly became embroiled in dispute over the disposal 
of the surplusage. Campbell only succeeded in quieting 
the House by forcing the Council to surrender its 
claims. 116 
113 Dalling to Germain, 5 December 1780. C. O. 137/38, fo. 190. 
114 Germain to Dalling, 13 November 1779. C. O. 137/75, fos. 140- 
140d; Germain to Dalling, 30 June 1781. C. O. 137/80, fos. 195d- 
196; Metcalf, Royal Government, pp. 219-222. 
'"Lord Germain to Sir Archibald Campbell, 2 August 1781. Ibid. 
fos. 204d-205. 
116 Archibald Campbell to Lord North, 21 June 1783. C. O. 137/83, 
fo. 103. 
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Like other West Indian Governors who had the 
misfortune to administer any of the islands' government 
during the American War, Dalling had experienced much 
hostility from the colonists and their representatives. 
While his character might have contributed to some of 
his problems, it is more likely that it was the general 
desire for political change with a shift of authority 
to the Assembly which gave rise to most of the disputes. 
During the years 1775 to 1782, the Jamaica House of 
Assembly made significant gains, and by the time 
Campbell took office at the end of 1782, he needed the 
Assembly's concurrence to implement any measure he 
considered necessary. of this encroachment, Dalling so 
aptly wrote: 
There is not a function of Government that 
these men have not thought of assuming: - 
the Sword as well as the Ballance they would 
wrest from the hands of the King; and leave 
his representative what Government have 117 contributed to make him, an empty name. 
The political problems so evident in Jamaica are 
also common to Barbados, governed by Edward Ray, the 
former British Consul at Lisbon, from 1773 to 1779, and 
by Major-General James Cuninghame from 1780 to 1782. 
Here, as in Jamaica, a sizeable sector of the colonists 
was: ý, sympathetic to the American cause. The Barbadians 
were among the first to establish a fund for the 
sufferers of Boston. Moreover, although the American 
supporters had failed to got the Assembly to pass an 
117 Dalling to Germain, 31- January 1781 . C. O. 137/80, fo. 57. 
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address to the King in support of the Americans, 118 
one to Governor Hay in July 1774 clearly outlined the 
Assembly's position on the developing crisis in 
America, which was expected to cause serious economic 
and political repurcussions in the British West Indian 
colonies. The Barbadians were surely justified in their 
claims that because of 'that natural Connection and 
dependence of the distant Settlements on each other', 
the Caribbean colonists were 'deeply interested and- 
affected' by the dispute. 119 
It is therefore not surprising to find that the 
constitutional debate between Parliament and the American 
colonists gave rise to increased opposition to the 
Imperial government throughout the British West Indies. 
In Barbados, this was centred around four main issues: 
namely, the control of internal taxation, the issuing 
of public money, the control of the militia and all 
defence projects, and in general, the entire question 
of Parliamentary privilege. The British Governors who 
were schooled to uphold the prerogatives and to interpret 
their instructions very strictly were unable to handle 
the chain reaction in the islands to the political 
struggle in America. In the West Indies prior to the 
period of the American Revolution, the various Assemblies 
were emerging as the most powerful body in the legis- 
lie Whitson, 'The Outlook of the Continental American Colonies', 
P. S. Q. , Vol. XLV, p. 86. 
119 Address of the Assembly of Barbados to Governor flay, 19 July 
1774. C. O. 152/55, fo. 103d. 
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lature, and consequently the members were demanding 
control over the executive branch of government. This 
was an organic change occurring within the existing 
political system as the sugar planters were too 
economically tied to Britain to risk exclusion from her 
markets. 
This did not mean, however, that they were 
prepared to sacrifice their political freedom for 
economic security. The strange paradox was that without 
one they could not get the other, andthey wanted both. 
In the early 'seventies, there was a significant amount 
of political disturbances in several West Indian 
islands, which were the results of some aspect of British 
policy. In Barbados, for example, attempts by officers 
of the Customs to curb smuggling, with the Americans, by 
seizing bonds without certificates, incensed the white 
inhabitants and led to several days of rioting. 
Describing these events early in April 1775, Hay wrote: 
The Town was illuminated Tuesday 28 March 
and Thursday 30th and produced Mirth, 
Drunkenness and Riot; on Tuesday an Effegy 
was Burnt, said to be of Mr. Mills or 
Mr. Felton, and every Bodys windows broke 
who would not illuminate. On Thursday 
Edward Worrell, A Searcher of the Customs 
House, his dwelling was attacked by the 
Mob, and severely handled. 120 
The disturbances continued until the following 
Saturday 1 April when all the buildings in Bridgetown 
were lit up to celebrate the reinstatement of Gedney 
Clarke, Collector of the Customs, who was suspended for 
120 Edward Ilay to the Earl of Dartmouth, 6 April 1775. C. O. 29/21, 
No. 8. 
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embezzling public funds. Hay was unable to end the 
destruction of propcrty, which accompanied the 
celebrations, and he had to appeal to some of the most 
prominent inhabitants, including Clarke, to use their 
influence to end the rioting. Such was the mood of 
the people when Captain Payne arrived in Barbados in 
February 1776 for supplies for the British troops in 
America. Hay's permission to Payne to purchase all the 
provisions he could get angered many of the white 
inhabitants who complained to their representatives. 121 
Consequently, Henry Duke, the Solicitor-General and 
Representative for St. Michael, lost no time in raising 
the question in the House. 
Duke was once described by Hay as a 'haughty 
and impetuous' man who loved, and would do anything for 
$money... and popularity'. 122 On the contrary, however, 
Duke was an able lawyer. Educated in England under the 
eminent jurist Sir William Blackstone, he possessed a 
shrewd and subtle mind, and was a popular leader who 
placed the interest of Barbados above Britain's. John 
Poyer, a contemporary historian, described Duke as an 
'intelligent patriot'. 123 It was in this latter light, 
and not the Governor's, that many contemporaries viewed 
Duke's character. He was therefore able to pose such a 
121 Sir Robert Schomburgk, The History of Barbados (London, 
1848), p. 334. 
122 Ilay to Dartmouth, 2 June 1774. C. O. 28/55, fo. 40d. 
123 John Poyer, The History of Barbados 1655-1801 (London, 1808) 
p. 446. 
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formidable threat to Hay's authority from 1773 to 1779 
that the Governor recommended that lawyers should be 
prohibited from sitting in the Assembly; 'for if they 
are not well disposed, their studies give them a 
superioiity over the Planters, who are the other 
Members'. 124 
Soon after Hay's arrival in Barbados, he was in 
conflict with Duke who, as Attorney to Mr. Lascelles, 
a Barbados proprietor and partner of Lascelles and 
Maxwell of London, a firm trading to Barbados, 12S was 
directed by his client to sue Gedney Clarke for debt. 
In order to prevent Clarke's creditors from seizing his 
property, George Mills, the Inspector-General, on the 
advice of the Attorney-General William Moore, seized 
Clarke's property for money he had embezzled from the 
Crown. Hay then issued a 'Writ of Protection in Clarke's 
favour'. 126 Duke was so infuriated by Hay's action that 
he refused to appear for the Crown in Clarke's case. 127 
Duke's refusal to prevent his private interest 
from clashing with his public duties further complicated 
the already tense situation. At a session of the Court 
of Chancery to hear several suits against Clarke, Duke 
refused to recognise Hay as having a superior position on 
124 Hay to Germain, 15 February 1776. C. O. 29/21. 
125 Ragatz, The Planter Class, p. 93. The letter-books of Lascelles 
and Maxwell (Wilkinson and Gaviller) were destroyed in the last war. 
126 Hay to Dartmouth, 13 August 1774. C. O. 28/55, fos. 60-60d. 
127 George Mills to Henry Dike, 15 June 1774. Ibid., fo. 64; 
Henry Duke to George Mills, 15 June 1774. Ibid., fos. 66,72. 
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the Court, and addressed himself to your 'llonours' 
flay therefore threatened to leave if he were not 
addressed in the customary manner; whereupon, Duke 
replied, "'If your Excellency leaves the Court, I will 
speak to the Members ... who have equal voice with your- 
self"'. The Solicitor-General's failure to observe 
protocol, and his doctrine of co-equality of the judges 
on the Court of Chancery did not prevent a majority of 
the members of the Council from voting for Duke to be 
reprimanded but not suspended. 12 a Duke's behaviour was 
found to be 'highly improper and inconsistent with his 
duty as the King's Solicitor-General'; 12 9 but probably 
because of his influential friends and employers in 
London, no further action was taken against him. Hay had 
therefore lost in his first encounter with Duke. 
But the Governor was not one to forget old issues, 
He was an obstinate and self-centred official who had 
virtually no knowledge of colonial affairs, and even less 
of West Indian viewpoint. By the outbreak of the 
American War, he had lost touch with the mood of the 
white inhabitants of Barbados. 130 One contemporary 
wrote of Hay's character: 'This Governor did not want 
understanding, and... good intentions - but the 
impetuosity of his passions, to which he was extremely 
128 'At a Meeting of His Excellency and Council', 18 May 1774. 
ibid., fos. 48,51-52. 
129 The Earl of Dartmouth to Governor Hay, 3 August 1774. Ibid., 
fo. 64; Dartmouth to flay, October 1774. Ibid., fo. 74. 
130 Makinson, Barbados, p. 92; Ragatz, The Planter Class, p. 151. 
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subject, led him into frequent quarrels with the first 
people in the island.... ''31 Evidently, it was because 
of Hay's opinionated personality that he deliberately 
maintained his very favourable view of the impact of 
the American War on the Barbadian economy, contrary to 
his own experiences and the Assembly's reports of 
severe scarcity. 
The revolt of the American colonies had caused 
severe shortages not only for the West Indian planters 
but also for the British army fighting in America, and 
the squadrons in the Caribbean. Consequently, contrary 
to the desire of the West Indians to adopt a policy of 
neutrality, as much as possible, the Governors were 
willing to support the British government whenever 
possible. Such an opportunity came to Governor Hay in 
the middle of February 1776 when Captain Payne arrived 
in Barbados. As has already been stated, he was allowed 
to buy most of the provisions on'the island, despite the 
opposition of many of the inhabitants. Conscious of the 
mood of his constituents, on 14 February Duke submitted 
to the Speaker, Sir John Gay Alleyne, an address to the 
King outlining the distressed economic conditions of 
Barbados, and requested that supplies be sent out 
inunediately. 
Sir John Alleyne was a popular leader, and as 
Speaker of the House of Assembly during the period of 
131 William Senhouse, 'Diary, 1750-1800', copied and compiled by 
Sir II. F. Senhouse. Rhodes House Library: MSS. W. Ind. r. 5, pp. 
304-305. 
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the American War, he made a significant contribution 
to the political maturity of the Barbados Assembly. 
His influence was so great that Governor Cuninghame 
described him as the chief opponent of 'the King's 
measuresi, who endeavoured 'to rob the Crown of the 
executive power'. 132 But Poyer saw him as 'uniformly 
the noble, erect and zealous assertor of the rights 
of the people'. 133 
After a heated debate on the declining state of 
the Barbados economy, and the probable outcome of Hay-s 
permission to Payne, Sir John Alleyne skilfully influenced 
the House to defer the consideration of its petition until 
the following day, in order to ascertain the true state of 
the island's supplies. Hay's attempts to pressure the 
Speaker with threats of the dissolution of the House 
if the address were not withdrawn failed. On the 
following day, after rejecting two draft addresses, one 
from Sir John and the other from James Maycock, the 
Assembly unanimously adopted Duke's as being satis- 
factory to both factions. 134 During the years 1776 to 
1782, there were two parties in the Assembly of Barbados. 
The majority party which was led by Sir John Alleyne and 
Henry Duke was ideologically more sympathetic to the 
American cause than was the minority party led by Robert 
132 James Cuninghame to Lord Germain, 20 September 1780. C. o. 
28/57, fos. 205d-206. 
133 Poyer, Barbados, p. 440. 
134 J. A. B., 14,15 February 1776. C. O. 31/39; Schomburgk, 
Barbados, p. 334. 
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Burnet Jones, a lawyer, and sought to maintain harmony 
between the Governors and the Assembly. Only on a few 
occasions did the Assemblymen vote unanimously on any 
issue, and on major political debates in the House, the 
party members took opposite views, almost similar to 
twentieth century political parties. 
Because the House had adopted Duke's address 
independent of the Governor and Council, Hay became 
infuriated and demanded an assurance from the Assemblymen 
that in future they would send all their petitions to 
be countersigned by the Governor and Council, and then to the 
King through the regular channels. 135 The revolt of the 
American colonies had probably led Hay to believe that 
the first signs of discontent should be crushed, and 
the ringleaders punished. But such a step was sure to 
breed more discontent. Like the American colonists, the 
West Indians had free governments with control over their 
internal affairs and thus the Assemblymen contended that 
petitioning the King was part of their Parliamentary 
privilege. Hoping to gain political advantages from 
reducing Duke's popularity, Hay suspended him, and then 
insisted on his dismissal as Solicitor-General; but 
regretted his action when Duke emerged as one of his 
most powerful enemies in the Assembly. 136 This dispute 
which began as a difference of opinions on the effect of 
135 Edward flay to Sir John Gay Alleyne, 15 February 1776. C. O. 
28/56, fo. 31; Hay to Germain, 15 February 1776. Ibid., fo. 29d. 
136 flay to Germain, 25 July 1776. Ibid., fo. 62. 
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the American War on the Barbados economy was now shaping 
up into a political struggle between the Assembly and 
the Governor over the question of Parliamentary 
privilege. 
The situation was allowed to develop by Lord 
Germain's policy towards the West Indian colonies. 
During the American War, Germain was more concerned with 
the defeat of the rebellious colonies. 137 Consequently, 
he virtually allowed the West Indian Governors a free 
hand in making important and sensitive decisions. 138 
This therefore left them to confront Assemblies led by 
lawyers who used their knowledge of constitutional law 
and British Parliamentary history to make the Assembly 
the most important branch of the legislature. 
Viewing his dismissal as a political move, and 
having received no reasons from Hay to whom he had sent 
a memorial challenging his right to dismiss patentees, 139 
Duke carried his dispute with the Governor to the House, 
claiming his right to do so, not only as a Member of that, 
body but because Hay's action had violated the Assembly's 
rights and privileges to petition the King. Using the 
same sort of language as the framers of the American 
'Declaration of Rights', 14 0 Duke argued that in order to 
preserve free governments in the colonies, it was 
137 Alan Valentine, Lord George Germain (Oxford, 1962), pp. 89-90. 
138 Germain to Ilay, 17 May 1776. C. O. 28/56, fos. 37d-38. 
139 Memorial of Henry Duke to Governor Ilay, 22 February 1776. 
Ibid., fos. 45-47. 
140 Ford, ed., Journal of Congress, Vol. I, p. 70. 
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necessary that the separate branches of the legislature 
remained independent. warning the House that it would be 
the architect of its own destruction if members were 
allowed to sacrifice their 'Principles of Honor, Justice 
and Patriotism', Duke reminded the Assembly of its duty 
to uphold its resolution of 1760 'that an affront to 
the person of any member of the legislature for any 
matter, cause or act arising from any part of his whole 
circle of his duty in the public service, is an affront 
to the whole legislative body, an invasion of their 
rights and privileges'. 141 
But though Duke considered his address to be in 
the best interest of the public and had nothing to do 
with his duties as Solicitor-General, the Assembly did 
not agree that Duke's dismissal was a violation of its 
rights and privileges. The Speaker, normally one of 
his most ardent supporters, considered Hay's readiness 
to dismiss corrupt officers as an advantageous step 
towards maintaining the civil liberties of the colonists. 
He thus maintained that any attempt to censure the 
I 
Governor would encroach on his authority for which he was 
not accountable to the Assembly. However, the House 
narrowly passed a resolution, moved by Valentine Jones, 
the other Member for St. Michael, and seconded by 
Samuel Hinds, supporting Duke's behaviour in the House. 142 
The early faith which some members had shown in 
141 J. A. B., 19 March 1776. C. O. 31/39. 
142 Ibid. 
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the Governor was quickly shattered when at the beginning 
of July 1776 the Speaker received a letter from George 
Walker, the island's Agent in London, stating that its 
petition had failed because Hay had misrepresented the 
island's economic condition to Lord Germain. Yet, the 
Governor's own measures to relieve the scarcity of food 
in Barbados by facilitating the importation of provisions 
into the colony show. -,, that the picture drawn by Duke's 
address was not exaggerated. At a meeting of the House 
to consider the implication of the Governor's claims, 
Duke made a long speech haranguing Governor Hay. He 
charged that Hay had deliberately attempted to subvert 
the right of the House to petition the Crown. This was 
yet another charge made in the 'Declaration of Rights', 143 
and the issue had probably not been raised in the West 
Indies before. 
Duke's protest to the House was the more vigorous 
on account of the constitutional struggle in America. 
He warned his fellowmen that if the Governor's doctrine 
went unchallenged, 'the Yoke of Tyranny and the abject 
marks and badges of Servitude are fixed on this Country... ' 
Beseeching the House not to surrender its political 
freedom, he informed the Assemblymen that if its address 
were disallowed because it represented the people's 
views 'then indeed are things come to a strange and 
deplorable pass - and if to this Governor we owe it - to 
our Country we owe every nerve & sinew in the course of 
143 Ford, ed., Journal of Congress, Vol. I,, pp. 69-70. 
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a vigorous & steady opposition'. 144 He further stated 
that he was prepared to fight to prevent 'the Chain 
from being fastened upon' their necks and to stop Hay's 
chaLges from destroying rhe Assembly's political 
existence. 
The House was moved by Duke's exhortations on this 
occasion, and upholding its rights to petition the King 
independent of the Council and the Governor, it 
unanimously passed a resolution asserting this privilege 
'either concurrently with the other Branches of the 
legislature... or independently of them, to address the 
throne; and whoever... says or goes about to impeach... 
their undoubted right and privilege, is the Enemy of the 
Countryi. 145 Following this, the Assembly voted a 
petition to the King denying that the Governor was 
qualified to speak for the people in its place. 'But 
God forbid', the petitioners wrote 
that your Majesty should be influenced by 
any Representation of the Condition of Your 
People, contrary to that which has been 
offered by the chosen Guardians of the most 
valuable Interests, who must feel immediately 
with them no less than for them in every 
crucial Conjecture, and who are on every 
account the best qualified to transmit the 
real State of their Grievances to the 
Royal Ear. 146 
The Assembly's struggle with Governor Hay was 
studiously followed throughout the island, especially in 
144 'Extract of Minutes of the Assembly', 9 July 1776. C. O. 28/56, 
fos. 65-67d. 
145 J. A. B., 9 July 1776. C. O. 31/39. 
146 Petition of the Assembly of Barbados to the King, 9 July 1776. 
C. O. 28/56, fos. 70-70d. 
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St. Michael. In March 1776 the freeholders of that 
parish sent an address to their representatives 
supporting the Assembly's first petition to the King, 
and deploring Hay's suspension of the Solicitor-General. 
One of the signatories was James Shepherd, Chief Baron 
of the Court of Exchequer, who Hay removed from office 
for 'putting himself at the head of a Cabal to create 
mischief'. 147 Hay appointed Thomas Miller Shepherd's 
successor, but he too was forced to resign for opposing 
his policies. 148 
Like Governor Dalling, Hay had demonstrated his 
inability to handle potentially explosive political 
situations judiciously. The removal of the judges was 
within the bounds of the Governors' instructions, but 
was unpopular with the colonists. Even Lord Germain was 
quick to point out to Hay that such action was detri- 
mental to the public service, as it tended to weaken the 
judiciary. 14 9 These incidents demonstrated the need 
for judicial reform in Barbados; but nothing was done, 
and the judges continued to hold their places durante 
bene pZacito. During such politically sensitive times, 
-it would have been better for Germain to take the 
initiative and send out an additional instruction to 
prevent the arbitrary removal of public officers. There 
are several other examples of the arbitrary removal of 
14711ay to Germaine 13 April 1776. Ibid., fo. 40d; Poyer, 
Barbados, p. 372. 
148 Ilay to Germain, 7 December 1776. C. O. 28/56, fo. 97d. 
149 Germain to Ilay, 6 March 1777. Ibid., fos. 103-104. 
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patentees during this period; 150 but the Assembly stuck 
to its earlier decision not to interfere with this 
part of the Governor's prerogatives, although it took 
note of this situation in one of its addresses to the King. 
The House was more concerned with maintaihing its 
authority to appoint and remove its own officers 
without any interference from the Governors. 
At the end of 1776, Hay found an opportunity to 
reduce the Assembly's opposition by refusing to assent 
to a bill unanimously passed by both Houses appointing 
George Walker the island's Agent. Walker had incurred 
the dislike of Hay and Germain by his aspersions on 
their conduct towards the West Indies, especially of 
disregarding the plight of the islands. 's' Hoping to 
avoid a clash with the Assembly, however, the Governor 
promised to assent to a new bill appointing another 
Agent. But the House's decision not to appoint another 
representative in England 152 was welcomed by Hay because 
he believed that 'the political notions of the West 
Indians resident in England are so very contrary to 
the measures of government'. 113 However, in spite of 
the Assembly's pledge not- to surrender its constitutional 
ISO flay to Germain, 27 May 1779. C. O. 28/57, fo. 91; Poyer, 
Barbados, p. 484; Cuninghame to Germain, 20 l4ay 1781. C. O. 28/58, 
fos. 164-165; Cuninghame to Germain, 28 May 1781. Ibid., fos. 
166-170d; Schomburgk, Barbados, p. 342. 
151 Hay to Germain, 12 October 1776. C. O. 29/21; Minutes of the 
Council of Barbados, 26 November 1776. C. O. 31/38 (hereafter 
cited as M. C. B. ); Hay to Germain, 7 December 1776. C. O. 28/57, 
fo. 97; Germain to Hay, 2 October 1776. C. O. 28/56, fo. 77d. 
152 M. C. B., 18 February 1777. C. O. 31/38. 
153 Hay to Germain, 26 February 1776. C. O. 28/56, fo. 
287 
right to choose its Agent, the worsening economic 
conditions of Barbados and other circumstances which 
increased its need for-representation in England forced 
the House to rescind its former stand. In 1777 the Assembly 
appointed Samuel Estwick its Agent in London. 
But Estwick soon found himself locked in dispute 
with the British authorities, and in 1780 Governor 
Cuninghame rejected the bill for paying Estwick's 
salary. Like Hay's, Cuninghame's action threatened the 
rights of both Houses to appoint a representative, and 
raised serious doubts in the minds of the Assemblymen 
of the value of that office, if it remained within the 
Governors' power to disallow a bill which did not 
contravene his instructions. Estwick's conflict with 
the authorities was not of his own making, but stemmed 
from his orders from the Assembly to secure the 
abolition of the four and a half per cent duty. 
In 1776 Felton issued new orders for the collection 
of the tax. Among these was one that all sugars were to 
be brought to the chief ports of the islands to be 
weighed and certified before exportation to Britain. 
This threatened toincrease the hardships of the planters, 
by exposing their products to capture, theft and 
destruction. The conditions of shipping, and the threat 
of American privateers made the order unworkable. 154 
The Barbados planters had complied with the new orders; 
but because of the worsening economic condition,, the 
154 Burt to Germain, 17 September 1777. C. O. 152/56, fos. 185- 
186d. 
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Council and Assembly petitioned the King for the 
suspension of the order: 
Such among other hardships is the rigid 
exaction laid upon this voluntary tribute, 
that the unfortunate planters are made to 
pay a duty of sugar for the dead weight of 
their Casks. Such are the unprecedented 
severities laid on our declining Trade, 
that the little Commerce remaining amongst 
us, must we fear be totally relinquished. 155 
In support of the petition, Estwick sent Lord 
Germain a memorial, along with a statement of 'Facts 
... relative to the 4ý per cent duty', and objections 
to its collection under Felton's regulations. Estwick 
also suggested the abolition of the impost and its 
replacement by a general tariff of three pence per 
hundred pounds on all sugar imported from the West 
Indies. 156 The Commissioners of the Customs denied 
giving Felton any new orders; but at the same time, 
they reserved the right to regulate the collection of 
the duty. ' 57 As Estwick had also received reliable 
information that Governor Cuninghame was instructed 
to settle this affair on his arrival in Barbados, the 
Agent dropped his own proposal to raise the question of 
the collection of the duty in the House of Commons. 158 
However, because Cuninghame felt that Estwick had misled 
15SPetition of the Assembly and Council of Barbados to the King, 
14 April'1778. C. O. 31/38; see also T. 1/551, fos. 209-211d. 
156 Memorial of Samuel Estwick to Lord Germain, 8 August 1778. 
T. 1/551, fos. 200-208; J. A. B., 3 May 1780, C. O. 31/41. 
157 'Report of the Commissioner of the Customs', 16 July 1779. 
T 1/551, fos. 213-214. 
158J. A. B., 25 July 1780. C. O. 31/41. 
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the Assembly# he refused to assent to the bill for 
paying his salary. '" Even the minority party viewed 
the Governor's action as an attack on the rights and 
privileges of the Assembly, and the House unanimously 
resolved that it would appoint no other person and 
that the usual salary of t200 per annum would be paid 
to Estwick retroactive to the date on which the Agent's 
bill was passed. 160 
Tho Assembly's struggle to assert its rights 
against the Governor's interference with its proceedings 
was inevitably linked to the field of taxation and the 
financing of public works, as in Jamaica. Worsening 
economic conditions in Barbados provided the Assemblymen 
with the opportunity to gain control of all public 
works. The repairs of the fortifications were now 
entrusted to commissioners comprising members of the 
Assembly, the Councillors and Field Officers of the 
Militia resident in each precinct. 161 At a time when 
the planters were finding it difficult to pay their 
taxes# it was politically expedient for the House to 
reduce its levies on the inhabitants, by cutting back 
on government expenditure. This brought the brief inter- 
ludo of harmony between Ilay and the Assembly to an 
abrupt and. Verbal cannonading between both parties was 
renewed over money for repairing and building new 
'"Cuningh. -uno to Germain, 20 September 1780. C. O. 20/57, fo. 
207d. 
160 J. A. D. o 18 April 1701. C. O. 31/41. 
161 Spurdlo# Failly Prot Indian Goverment, p. 91. 
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fortifications. So intent was the Assembly on upholding 
its rights and privileges against the Governor that it 
paid little, if any, attention to the island's defences. 
Reports reaching Hay in 1778 convinced him that 
France'would declare war against Britain. lie therefore 
convened the Assembly, and requested it to raise money 
for the fortifications, to pass the Militia, Alarms and 
Molehead Acts to preserve the territories and commerce 
of Britain. 1G2 The loyalty expected from the Assembly 
was not forthcoming. It refused to do anything because 
of the rising costs of government. Departing from the 
customary method of financing its internal defence, the 
Assembly now expected Britain to bear the burden; the 
island's share of the work had to wait until war was 
actually declared. 163 But there was little likelihood 
that Lord Germain would have allowed the Governor to 
draw his bills on the Treasury. Germain's policy was 
that the West Indian Assemblies were to pay the costs of 
defending the islands, and maintaining the soldiers sent 
164 there. However, when France declared war against 
Britain in August 1778, Hay made another appeal to the 
Assembly for money to repair the fortifications. On 
this occasion, the House voted X6,000 to defray the cost 
of removing the serviceable guns to places on the coast 
162 Governor Hay to the Assembly of Barbados, 28 May 1778. C. O. 
28/57, fos. 43-43d; M. C. B., 28 May 1778. C. O. 31/38; Ray to 
Germain, 4 June 1778. C. O. 28/57, fo. 41. 
263 Address of the Assembly to flay, 28 May 1778. Ibid., fos. 
45-45d. 
164 Valentine, Germain, p. 128. 
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most susceptible to attack, and for other related works. 
But no money could be spent without the Assembly's 
authority, and then only for the purpose for which it 
was raised. The Council rejected the bill; 165 but 
choosing not to press the issue, the House passed a new 
one without the objectionable clause, a few days later. 166 
However, the capture of Grenada and St. Vincent 
in July 1779 shook the confidence of the recalcitrant 
Assemblymen. Hay summoned a joint meeting of both 
Houses and outlined to them the weakness of the island's 
defences. He urged the building of entrenchments, small 
redoubts, and a large one which could be used as a 
refuge in the event of an attack. . 167 The Council and 
Assembly now unanimously passed a tax bill to raise 
E10,000 for building a large redoubt. By the Redoubt 
Act, the Assembly appointed a committee composed of five 
Councillors and seven Assemblymen, with any five forming 
a quorum, to carry out the project. In spite of this 
apparent cooperation, however, the Assembly empowered 
the commissioners named in the Act to draw their expenses 
directly upon the island's Treasurer, to borrow money, 
and to contract for material as required, 168 thus giving 
the House control of the public works and the money to 
165 J. A. B., 1 September 1778. C. O. 31/39. 
166 J. A. B., 16 September 1778. Ibid. 
167Governor Hay to the Council and Assembly, 22 July 1779, in 
J. A. B., Ibid. 
168 Cuninghame to Germain, 23 November 1780. C. O. 28/57, fos. 
36-36d; Spurdle, Early Went Indian Goverrynent, p. loo. 
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be spent on them. A parcel of land was purchased in 
the parish of St. George to build the redoubt, later 
named Fort George, but Hay died before the completion 
of his one major success. For four years, he had 
fought with the Assemblymen to defend the island. In 
this struggle, Hay had conceded the executive power 
over the expenditure of public money, and although in 
theory his right to issue all monies still remained 
intact, in practice it was only a mere formality. 
The Assembly's claim to examine the public 
accounts before any payments were made led to a political 
battle which lasted throughout James Cuninghame's 
administration. In August 1780 he refused his assent to 
a levy bill containing the objectionable clause, even 
though the Council, the Attorney-General, and the 
Solicitor-General Charles Brandford advised him to do so 
to maintain political peace in the island. 
169 Instead, 
he sent the bill to Lord Germain who, likewise, advised 
him to pass any legislation based on precedent, and to 
cultivate the friendship of the House rather than 
attempt to regain any part of the prerogative which had 
been lost. 170 
Cuninghame turned a deaf ear to these recom- 
mendations, and for the remainder of his administration 
169 See 'Extract from the Levy Bill', 5 September 1780. C. O. 
28/57, fo. 212; Opinion of William Moore and Charles Brandford, 
5 September 1780. Ibid., fo. 212d; Cuninghame to Germain, 20 
September 1780. Ibid., fo. 205; Spurdle, East West Indian 
Government, pp. 92-93. 
170 Lord Germain to Governor Cuninghame, 28 November 1780. C. O. 
28/58, fos. 74-74d. 
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the Assembly tenaciously refused to pass any tax bills, 
to the near ruin of the island's credit. Many public 
officers whu had not received their salaries for several 
months resigned their positions; but the Assembly 
remained immovable, opposing any attempts at reconcil- 
iation with the Governor. On one occasion, when 
Cuninghame pointedbut that the British government could 
not possibly pay for the internal defences of Barbados, 
the House rebuked him, and called for the application 
of the four and one-half per cent duty to its intended 
use. Then, if this could not be done, the Assembly 
demanded its immediate abolition. In previous wars, 
the West Indian Assemblies had raised large sums of 
money to fortify the islands, but to undertake, the works 
only when an attack seemed imminent. 171 In the American 
War, however, they did nothing because they could not 
tax impoverished planters, and also because of the 
several constitutional crises 'in the islands. 172 
As in Jamaica, one of the burning issues of the 
period, apart from those of maintaining the rights and 
privileges of the Assembly, the control of public works, 
especially defence, the dismissal of patentees, and the 
issuing of public monies, was that of protecting the 
civil liberties of the colonists. The Barbados Assembly 
had not gone as far as that of Jamaica in constituting 
"'Pares, War and Trade, pp. 240-241. 
172Address of the Assembly to Cuninghame, 28 November 1780. C. O. 
28/58, fos. 74-74d; J. A. B., 20 March 1781. C. O. 31/41; 'Resolves 
of the Assembly of Barbados', 14 May 1781. C. O. 28/58, fos. 223- 
223d. 
294 
itself a Council of War. It refused instead to renew 
the Militia Act, thus preventing the Governors from 
calling out, discipling or training the militia. The 
verbal political volleying between Hay and the Assembly 
prevented the latter from giving him any power which 
was likely to endanger the liberties of the individual. 
In rejecting Hay's recommendations for a militia bill, 
the Assemblymen wrote: 
... the difficulties and distrusts that rise 
up in our minds against the undertaking, and 
which seem rather to increase than lessen by 
every impulse to remove them....; and we are 
therefore most unwilling now, in times too 
more propitious to the Claims of civil liberty, 
in the Colonies than ever, to renounce a 
principle of attachment so Honourable to 
Society, and enforce Obedience by a power 
congenial only with the Habits of despotic 
sway. 173 
It was, of course, the American War which they 
had in mind. Hay was disappointed, even shocked, by the 
attitude of the Assemblymen in which he detected the 
'Speculative Notions of Liberty, such as have brought 
the Northern Colonies into those troubles'. 174 The 
experiences of the Assemblymen during Hay's admini- 
stration, and the constitutional struggles in America 
before the fighting broke out, had also made them 
reluctant to comply with a request from the new Governor 
for a new militia law. The House reiterated its stand 
that because it was entrusted with the civil liberties 
of the people, it wished '... to guard on such an 
173 J. A. B., 1 October 1776. C. O. 31/39. 
174 'flay's Intended Address' to the Assembly, October 1778. C. O. 
28/56, fo. 101. 
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occasion with more than common strictness ... against all 
contingencies, and to provide for the time, which, from 
some painful Experiences of the past, we may fear to find 
no less favourable in the future'. 175 After communi- 
cating this in an address to Cuninghame, the Assembly 
voted to reduce his salary. This move renewed the 
power struggle which characterised Hay's administration, 
and sparked off yet another heated constitutional 
crisis in Barbados. Therefore, when Cuninghame appealed 
for a militia bill in 1781, the Assemblymen replied: 
... your Excellency must pardon us, 
if 
whilst we observe a Disposition to exercise 
extraordinary Powers not warranted by 
Law, we are fearful of granting by Law, 
such new Powers, as from an arbitrary 
Stretch or Interpretation might inflict 
not only a temporary but a lasting and 
irretrievable Mischief upon our free 
Community. 176 
Because of the tense political situation in 
Barbados, there was need for a tactful leader in 1780, 
but Cuninghame was not the man. He challenged the 
power of the Assembly outright, and thus clashed head 
on with its members. By the time Cuninghame began his 
administration in July 1780 the West Indian Assemblies 
had grown in stature and power. With every passing 
session, they became more like, and worked on the same 
principles as, the House of Commons. They had acquired 
the right to grant the Governor a salary, to impose 
internal taxes, to pass money bills which could not be 
175T. A. B., 22 Auclust 1780. C. O. 31/41. L 
176 J. A. B., 20 March 1781. Ibid. 
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amended, to appoint their own officers, and to control 
all matters relating to the daily functioning of the 
Assembly, except its adjournment, although some 
Governors allowed the Speaker to adjourn their Assemblies. 
The following incident illustrates the deter- 
mination of the Barbados Assembly to maintain and 
preserve those rights for which it had struggled. At 
the end of 1779 Henry Duke was searching for ways of 
reducing government spending. His first proposal was 
the reduction of the salary of John Dotin, President of 
the Council and Commander-in-Chief from 1779 to 1780, 
but the House voted it down. At the opening session of 
a new House on 18 January 1780, even before it was known 
that James Cuninghame was appointed to that office, 
Duke proposed a lessening of the Governor's salary; but 
because of the constitutional limitations of awarding 
the Governor his salary only on the first meeting with 
the House, the motion was thrown out. 
It came as no surprise, therefore, when Duke moved 
two resolutions in the House on 25 July 1780, after the 
Assembly's initial meeting with Cuninghame. The first 
was to cut his salary to Z2,000 per annum, and the 
second stated that if the four and one-half per cent 
duty was abolished, the House would add Z1,000 to his 
salary. The members of the majority party supported the 
resolutions. Sir John Alleyne made a thorough examin- 
ation of the island's decline which he said was multi- 
plied 'by the American Civil War, and the loss of those 
suppliestrom that Continent'. Robert Jones, on the 
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other hand, speaking on behalf of the minority party, 
viewed the proposed saving of tl, 000 as an inept move 
which would make the Governor indifferent to the island's 
interests. While he agreed that something had to be 
done to curb the rising expenses of the government, he 
called for a reduction in defence allocations as a more 
judicious decision. Duke's supporters now rallied behind 
him, and in a full House, they pushed through the 
Settlement Bill with the four and one-half per cent duty 
resolution tacked to it. 177 
The Council also passed the measure, but attached 
a stern message attacking the Assembly's action. 178 
However, Cuninghame refused to assent to the Bill because 
he was unable to prejudge the British government's 
policy in regard to the tax, and because he feared that 
if he were to accept his salary under that condition, he 
would be setting a dangerous precedent. Germain's first 
reaction was that the Barbados Assembly had disrespected 
the King's representative, and wanted to force Parliament 
to abolish the duty. 179 It is doubtful whether the 
177 J. A. B., 25 July 1780. C. O. 31/41: 
Six for 3,000 - Robert Burnet Jones, Colonel Richard Haynes, 
Major Thomas Burton, John Burke, Judge Samuel Walcott, and Judge 
Joshua Gittens. 
Sixteen for 2,000 - Samuel Husbands, Edward Haynes, Benjamin 
Bostock, Benjamin Babb, Harrison Walke, James Cogan Cox, Robert 
Ayshford, Valentine Jones, Samuel Hinds, Abraham Cumberbatch, John 
Stewart, Joseph Woods, Henry Duke, Thomas Alleyne, William Gibbes 
Alleyne, and Sir John Gay Alleyne. 
Most members voted along these lines on all major issues. This 
is particularly noticeable in the voting pattern of the minority 
group. 
178 The Council of Barbados to the Assembly, 25 July 1780. C. O. 
28/57, fo. 170. 
179 Germain to Cuninghame, 7 February 1781. Ibid., fos. 176-177d. 
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Assembly was trying to extort any concessions from 
London. The movement for the abolition of the duty 
originated from the worsening economic conditions of 
Barbados, and from the dangers inherent in the implemen- 
tation of Felton's regulations. Furthermore, the 
resolution was a way of circumventing the constitutional 
restriction of increasing Cuninghame's salary which could 
not be changed after he had accepted it. 
When the House met on 5 September, the controversy 
was renewed. Cuninghame's praise for the Assembly in 
his first meeting with that body was soured by his 
disappointing financial settlement. Consequently, he 
published an attack on the House charging that it was 
corrupt and profuse, that it had illegally appointed the 
island's Treasurer and Storekeeper, that its proceedings 
were done in a contentious spirit, and he called on the 
Assembly to frame laws which were based on strong 
constitutional principles. 180 Even Germain was shocked 
by Cuninghame's assault, and wrote to him: 'It was of 
great concern to me to find your answer contained so 
much Matter for Contention & ill Humour, and some 
Expressions which might be expected to excite Resentment, 
in Minds already heated and disposed for Inflamation'. 181 
In reply to Cuninghame's published address, the 
House adopted a highly inflammatory memorial, moved by 
Samuel Husbands and seconded by Henry Duke, vindicating 
180 Cuninghame's Address to the Assembly, in J. A. B., 5 September 
1780. C. O. 31/41. 
18'Germain to Cuninghame, 7 February 1781. C. O. 28/58, fo. 56d. 
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it from the charges. 'To be silent on the occasion of 
receiving such a Paper, full of accusations against the 
Ass7embly the memorialists wrote, 'might be construed 
... as an acknowledgement of our Guilt, and yet to reply 
to such a charge in a manner equal to our sense of 
injurious treatment lays us under the greatest 
difficulty'. They further asserted their right to 
appoint the Treasurer and Storekeeper to protect the 
island's interest against the abuse of power, and they 
admitted that the Assembly's usurpation of the executive 
power was to protect the people. 182 No attempt was made 
to heal the breach with the Governor, although the 
minority party, from its loyalty to King and country, 
wanted to prevent the impending crisis. 
Robert Burnet Jones, seconded by Judge Joshua 
Gittens, moved a postponement of the consideration of the 
memorial because the repercussion from such a highly 
emotional document was unpredictable; but this was 
defeated by a vote of fourteen to two. In the debate 
which followed, Duke was foremost in supporting the 
memorial. In another of his politically motivated 
speeches, haranguing the Governor, he told the Assembly: 
'If the Commander-in-Chief is disposed to be violent 
the way to prevent this is not by a lame submissive 
conduct but... to act in all instances with a becoming 
spirit'. However, when the memorial was presented to 
Cuninghame, he refused to receive it. Sir John Alleyne 
182 J. A. B., 19 September 1780. C. O. 31/41. 
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therefore ordered its publication, along with the 
minutes of the last two meetings of the House, and copies 
of all material relevant to the Assembly's relationship 
with Cuninghame were sent to the Agent to begin 
proceedings for the Governor's recall. 183 
Disappointed with his loss of income, Cuninghame 
now established a 'Table of Fees' covering all aspects 
of his command. But while this freed him from depending 
on a hostile House, it did not free him from popular 
resentment. Here in Barbados, as in America and 
Jamaica, the colonists argued that by their charters 
they possessed 'all the liberties, franchise, and 
privileges of British subjects'. Therefore, no decree, 
no laws 'should be made to the hurt or discommodity of 
any person or persons, either to the binding, constraining, 
burthening, or taking away of their liberty, goods and 
chattels otherwise than by laws made with their own 
consent'. 
284 Cuninghame's action was also contrary to 
local statutes and the custom of his predecessors who had 
never taken fees for their private use. 185 Every attempt 
was therefore made to evade paying the new fees. Even 
the women 'suffered their patriotism to prevail over 
their natural delicacy, and submitted to the banns of 
marriage, rather than their lovers should yield to the 
183 Ibid. 
184 Poyer, Barbados, pp. 443-444. 
1851lay to Germain, 4 June 1778. C. O. 28/57, fos. 47d-48. 
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governor's exactions for a license' - 
"' 
The growing dissatisfaction with the fees, which 
had spread throughout the island, was brought to the 
Governor's attention in an address of the Grand Jury, 
but this went unnoticed. 187 However, a number of legal 
suits brought against Thomas Workman forced him to stop 
collecting the fees-188 But this did not deter 
Cuninghame from establishing a more comprehensive 
'Table', and appointing Nicholas Walrond his Agent for 
collecting the new charges. 189 In November 1780 the 
Assembly sent an address to the King asking him to 
redress Cuninghame's usurpation of its legislative 
authority over taxation, and the appropriation of public 
money. "30 Six months later, after hearing a memorial 
from the associated inhabitants of St. Michael stating 
that Cuninghame's policies were destroying the commerce 
of Barbados, "91 the House further petitioned the King 
for the 'Protection of the Rights, Liberties and 
186 Poyer, Barbados, p. 445. 
1871COPY of the Grand Jury's Address to his Excellency', 18 
December 1780. C. O. 28/58, fos. 61-61d. 
Ise M. C. B., 29 September 1780. C. O. 31/42; M. C. B., 25 April 
1781. Ibid. 
189 Samuel Estwick to the Board of Trade, 18 August 1781. c. o. 
28/58, fo. 326d. 
190 Petition of the Assembly of Barbados to the King, 17 November 
1780. C. O. 31/41. 
19'Memorial and Remonstrance of the Merchants, Traders and 
Inhabitants of St. Michael to Sir John Alleyne, 14 May 1781. C. O. 
28/58, fo. 215-220. 
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properties of the Injured Inhabitants'. 
192 
As the dispute between Cuninghame and the Assembly 
continued, public services were disrupted. Led by the 
residents of St. Michael, the seat of opposition to 
Cuninghame, the inhabitants of other parishes formed 
volunteer associations to repair the fortifications and 
to defend their properties. Believing that these were 
signs of the people's willingness to pay taxes, 
Cuninghame dissolved the Assembly in the middle of 
1781, and published a proclamation listing his reasons 
- one of which was that the Assembly's refusal to vote 
money for the island's defence had 'drawn injurious 
imputations on their loyalty and attachment to his 
Majesty's Government'. 193 In contrast to the Governor's 
aims, meetings were held to show and declare public 
confidence in the Assembly's stand. 'In many parishes 
patriotic dinners were given by the freeholders in 
honour of their representatives, accompanied by popular 
approbation and. esteem'. 194 At the elections, the 
voters rejected Cuninghame's charges. All the members 
of the last Assembly were elected, many of them unopposed 
and petitions in support of the behaviour of some members 
were sent to the new House. 19s 
In England, in the meantime, Samuel Estwick was 
192 Petition of the Assembly of Barbados to the King, 14 May 1781. 
ibid., fo. 324. 
193 J. A. B., 15 May 1781. C. O. 31/41; J. A. B., 28 August 1781. 
Ibid. 
194 Poyer, Barbados, pp. 501-504. 
195J. A. B., 10 July 1781. C. O. 31/41. 
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busily pursuing several charges against Cuninghame; 
but with the change of the North Ministry in March 1782, 
there was a change of attitudeg towards the colonies and 
Estwick therefore dropped the charges when Cuninghame 
was recalled, and replaced by David Parry. Cuninghame 
left Barbados a defeated and disappointed man whose 
failure, though partly due to his policies, lay in his 
struggle 'to maintain the just Prerogative of the Crown, 
and the Measurest of Administration in an Island tinged 
by American and levelling Principles, 196 which were 
noticeable in every West Indian island, from Jamaica 
to Tobago. It seems unlikely that the British government 
had deliberately chosen autocratic men to head the West 
Indian governments at this critical time. Dalling and 
Cuninghame failed not because they had adopted 
Machiavellian principles in running their administrations; 
but because they were unfortunately asked to govern two 
islands where the economic plight of the planters 
determined the amount of political activism, and where 
the American constitutional struggle had demonstrated to 
the Anglo-West Indians that as Englishmen they had to 
assert their 'rights' in order to protect their civil 
liberties. 
Parry's arrival in Barbados was timely, in the 
same way that Campbell's had helped to quiet the 
colonists in Jamaica. It must also be remembered that 
by the time these men had assumed their commands, the 
196 James Cuninghame to Welbore Ellis, 23 April 1782. C. O. 
28/59, fo. 332. 
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Americans had all but won their independence. Therefore, 
the West Indians had now set their sights on the 
economic revitalisation of the islands. Parry found 
Barbados on the brink of economic and political disaster 
The Council and Assembly were at loggerheads over the 
fees controversy. The militiamen refused to obey 
Cuninghame; but concentrated on their own associations 
for the defence of their 'liberties and properties'. 
Summing up the situation, Parry wrote that he 'found it 
[Barbados] torn to pieces, and destructed by Party, 
and men's minds sour'd to a degree approximating to 
dissaffection to the Mother Country'. 197 
As in Jamaica, the British government did not 
want to take chances, and therefore it gave in to the 
Assembly's demands by changing parts of the Royal 
Instructions. The fifteenth instruction was amended 
and Parry was authorised to consent to all money bills 
which, although not conforming to the instruction with 
respect to the issuing of public money, was in accordance 
with the custom and practice of the island. His 
thirty-sixth was also changed, and the Governor was 
directed to assent to a bill placing the permanent 
establishment of fees in the whole legislature. The 
Assembly lost this opportunity by clogging the bill for 
paying Parry's salary with one declaring the right of 
establishing fees to be in the Barbados legislature; 
but no Governor would have dared to impose his own fees 
197David Parry to Lord North, 21 September 1783. C. O. 28/60, 
fo. 60d-61. 
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again. Finally, the thirty-ninth instruction was 
amended and Parry was prohibited from filling any 
vacancies which, by law and custom, were appointed by 
the Assembly or by the whole legislature. 198 
It is not accidental that Dalling, Hay and 
Cuninghame, as well as the Governors in the other 
Caribbean colonies, made almost identical statements 
about the growth of a republican ideology among the 
colonists, by which the executive power was to be 
controlled by the elected representatives, with the 
Governor a mere figurehead. On political and consti- 
tutional issues, there was one major difference between 
the Americans and the West Indian colonists - the degree 
to which they would go to achieve their aims. Until 
1775, the majority of Americans did not want awar. The 
West Indians remained decidedly anti-war throughout 
the period. There were some in the smaller islands who 
spoke of armed struggle; but these were few. The 
majority of the colonists in the Caribbean preferred to 
gain their goals by constitutional means. 
199Draft of Instructions to the President and Council', 27 
August 1780. C. O. 28/59, fos. 354-357. 
CHAPTER VII 
POLITICS IN THE CEDED ISLANDS 1774-1779 
Many of the political questions raised in Jamaica 
and Barbados were also common to the ceded islands, 
namely: Dominica, Grenada, St. Vincent and Tobago. 
There were murmurings against the payment of the four 
and one-half per cent duty, the suppression of civil 
liberty, and the participation of French Catholics in 
government. By proclamation of October 1763 and the 
Royal Instructions to Governor Brigadier-General Robert 
Melville, the usual form of colonial legislature was 
established in each of the new colonies; but as the law 
required each member of the legislature to make a 
declaration against transubstantiation, the French 
Catholics were excluded. Another proclamation of 1768 
partially corrected this discriminatory practice, and a 
limited number of French Catholics were admitted to the 
Council and Assembly, without having to take the oath. 
This policy change was bitterly opposed in Grenada, and 
was seen as a denial of the civil liberties of the 
English speaking inhabitants. ' One planter complained: 
I am apprehensive that Gov't want to make 
our Liberty's a meer shadow, the attempt to 
I Ragatz, The Planter Class, p. 113; Burns, Actory of the West 
InAes, pp. 506-507. 
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bring in Foreign Catholicks .... The Taxing us, without our Consent, while we 
have a Legislature, the depriving us of 
tryal by Jury & obliging us to pay those 
illegal Taxes by a Court of Exchequer, 
without a remembrance, the proceeding to 
Elections without summoning the Electors 
are certainly steps not altogether right. ' 
Following the establishment of legislatures in the 
ceded islands, the King by letters patent issued in July 
1764 imposed on, the planters the same four and one-half 
per cent duty as that paid by the inhabitants of Barbados 
and the Leeward Islands. One planter, Alexander Campbell, 
who owned lands in Grenada and had paid the duty, filed 
an action in the English courts in 1774 againstý William 
Hall, the Customs Officer who had collected the tax, 
claiming that the Crown had surrendered its right to tax 
the colonists when he created legislatures in the islands. 
The case was heard by Lord Mansfield who ruled in favour 
of the plaintiff. In this celebrated test case, Campbell 
argued that Royal orders could not replace the laws, and 
were therefore not enforceable in the colonies without 
the authority of their legislative bodies. This decision, 
a milestone in the debate on Britain's right to tax the 
colonies, led to the abolishment of the four and one- 
half per cent duty in the ceded islands. 3 
Campbell's victory motivated the colonists to 
unite in opposition to attempts by the Governors to 
persuade the Assemblies to pass bills granting the duty 
2 John De Ponthieu to John Wilkes, 10 October 1769. Add. MSS. 
30,870, fo. 204d. 
3 Augier et al., The West Indies, pp. 105-105; Ragatz, The 
Planter Glass, p. 128. 
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to the Crown. The problem of implementing such an un- 
popular measure worried the Governors of the ceded 
islands. Lord Mansfield's ruling in November 1774 had 
come at a critical moment in the relations between 
Britain and America, and around the same time that 
Valentine Morris, a wealthy Creole and slave-owner, had 
arrived in St. Vincent. Morris was 'ostentatious' and 
'extravagant', a generous and convivial host and gambler 
who was accustomed to an affluent life. An absentee 
Member of the Council of Antigua since 1759, Morris was 
4 
appointed Lieutenant-Governor of St. Vincent in 1773 . 
On his arrival in St. Vincent, Morris found 
"'a turbulent colony little disposed to conduct itself 
with order and regularity, or pay due respect to 
authority"'. 5 There were sporadic disorders on the 
island; the Assemblymen refused to enact any laws; and 
the functions of government were-severely retarded. His 
reports were therefore unfavourable to the colonists. 
Thus, as one way of curbing the power of the Assembly, 
Morris recommended his appointment as Escheator of the 
Crown. Like many of his contemporaries, he too was 
fundamentally opposed to the dissolution of the Assembly 
as an effective way of forcing it to implement unpopular 
4 Ivor Waters, The Unfortunate Valentine Morris (Chepstow, 1964), 
pp. 6-28. When Morris was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of St. 
Vincent, the ceded islands were grouped together to form the 
Southern Caribbee Islands governed by William Leybourne. After 
Leybourne's death, the British government created St. Vincent a 
separate government independent of Grenada and Tobago, and Morris 
became its first governor. 
sibid., pp. 31-32. 
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policies; for when political disputes led to premature 
dissolutions of the House, the general public became 
involved in them, and the same members or others of 
similar or much stronger beliefs were elected, thus 
'bringing with them an increased degree of acrimony, & 
distrust of every future measure whatever'. 6 But Morris 
was not against influencing the election of represen- 
tatives by bribery; for he believed that if they were 
dependent on him for their seats, their opposition would 
be broken as their 'obstinacy would be daily sapped and 
lulled asleep, by very many of their own connections, 
and dependents who harkened after favours from the 
Escheatorl. 7 While the planters loved social position, 
it was doubtful whether they were prepared to surrender 
any part of their political freedom for public office. 
After failing to get a four and one-half per cent 
bill through the House, Morris advocated in April 1775 
the enlargement of the Assembly from thirteen to fifteen 
members. This, he believed, would enable him to break 
the strength of the opposition group led by John Collins, 
a firm supporter of the rebellious American colonies; 
Michael Keane, who called his House Fenneuil (Faneuil) 
Hall after the meeting place of the rebels in Boston, and 
toasted their commanders when they won any advantages; 
6 valentine Morris to the Earl of Dartmouth, 25 December 1774. 
C. O. 101/18, Part 1, fo. 14. 
7 Ibid., fos. 14d-15; Waters, Morris, p. 33. 
emorris to Germain, 29 may 1779. C-0.260/6, fos. 112-113; 
Valentine Morris, A Narrative of the Official Conduct of Valentine 
Morris,, esq., ... (London, 1787), p. 42. 
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Duncan Campbell, a relative of the Alexander Campbell 
who had successfully opposed the four and one-half per 
cent duty, was able to influence a majority in the 
Assembly since several members depended on him for their 
seats; and William Crooke, a wealthy planter, who was 
suspended from the Council for opposing the Governor's 
policies. He was immediately elected to the Assembly, 
and became its Speaker. 9 
This group opposed the four and one-half per cent 
tax bill, and refused to renew the militia bill or to 
pass a new one until shortly before Leybourne's death, 
and then clogged it with so many restrictions limiting 
the prerogatives of the Crown that he refused his assent. 
What they wanted is not quite clear, and in most cases 
their political ideology has to be taken from the 
Governor's despatches, but even so it is still possible 
to create a fairly comprehensive picture of politics in 
St. Vincent during the period of the American Revolution. 
Men like Collins and Keane supported the Americans, and 
called for 'liberty and independence' for the island. 
But these demands were not backed by any real threat of 
violent rebellion; for the West Indians fully understood 
that their economic interests dictated that they remained 
neutral in the conflict. However, Morris might have 
underestimated the strength and ability of his opponents 
when he accused them of not understanding the words 'but 
catch the sounds from their ideas of these from North 
9 See Ibid., pp. 47-48 (note). 
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American gazettes & North American Capts., both of which 
swarm in all these islands'. 10 
There were two ways by which Morris could have 
increased the St. Vincent Assembly. He could have done 
so by an Act of the legislature, but he preferred to 
issue a proclamation which would enable him to influence 
the choice of representatives. Issuing writs of election, 
especially for new parishes, was a significant political 
weapon, if the writs were worded to impress upon the new 
members that they owed their position to the Governor. 
Some Governors'failure to publish notices of elections in 
certain areas had already been a source of complaint in 
the West Indies. 11 Thus, this latter method seemed the 
more explosive bearing in mind that Alexander Campbell's 
successful law suit was fresh in the minds of the planters. 
Any proclamation to change the composition of the Assembly 
therefore posed innumerable problems, but to Morris's plan 
everything was secondary. His obsession was to bridle 
the opposition, and reduce the importance of the 
'turbulent members'. 
When, at the end of 1775, St. Vincent became a 
separate government, with Morris as its first Governor, he 
was instructed to secure the passage of the four and one- 
half per cent tax bill with provisions similar to those 
in the Leeward Islands Act. To encourage him to carry 
out his instruction, Morris was told that no other fund 
10 Morris to Dartmouth, 28 April 1775. C. O. 101/18, Part 1, 
fos. 121-121d. 
II DePonthieu to Wilkes, 10 October 1769. Add. MSS. 30,870, fo. 204. 
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was provided in England f or paying his salary. In view 
of the political mood of the colonists and their total 
opposition to this measure, the Governor was asked to 
perform a Herculean task. 
12 Had he followed the stand 
taken by Shirley in Dominica, who simply refused to ask 
the Assembly to pass such a bill, 13 his administration 
might have escaped the political crises with which it 
was faced. But Morris's social and political background 
was such that he could not condone disloyalty, and it was 
in this light that he viewed the Assembly's refusal to 
enact the duty bill. He assumed that because most of the 
Assemblymen opposed to the tax came from the towns where 
they were in contact with North American merchants and 
ideas, and were 'led away with the delusive sounds of 
liberty and independence', 
14 it was possible to secure 
the duty if a new House were elected. 
Therefore, on the advice of Charles Sharpe, lawyer 
and Speaker of the Assembly, who was later accused of 
supporting the Americans and because of Morris's desire 
to implement his instruction, Morris dissolved the 
Assembly in August 1776 and issued writs for new 
elections. Immediately the public papers teemed with 
letters and advertisements advising the freeholders to 
choose only men who were opposed to the bill. The 
opposition grew so powerful, and the proposed tax became 
12 Lord Germain to Valentine Morris, 3 April 1776. C. O. 71/6, 
fos. 1-2. 
13 Shirley to Germain, 16 May 1776. C. O. 71/6, fo. 68. 
14 Morris to Dartmouth, 28 April 1775. C. O. 101/18, Part 1, 
fo. 121. 
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such a popular issue, that many voters extorted from the 
candidates an explicit agreement not to support the four 
and one-half per cent tax bill. Only those who made f irm 
commitments were elected. Heading the opposition was 
Duncan Campbell whose name, wealth and social position 
made him a popular leader, and a powerful opponent of the 
administration's policieS. 15 
With an overwhelming mandate from the voters, the 
House assembled prepared for battle. When Morris met the 
new Assembly in September, on the advice of Charles 
Sharpe, he did not mention the duty in his speech to 
both Houses. A majority of the members were not only 
prepared to vote against the bill, but to accompany their 
refusal 'with votes & resolves, so indecent & Disrespect- 
ful to his Majesty'. 26 Consequently, as a solution to 
this impasse, Morris renewed his appeal for a larger 
Assembly, and recommended a closer examination of those 
appointed to public offices to determine their loyalty 
to Britain. Here the West Indian Governors, Morris 
informed Germain, could play a significant role enabling 
government 
to crush the too daring, to strengthen the 
friendly, & to punish the rebellious ... & 
all this would be found scarce sufficient 
to keep men to their duty, when the latent 
desire of independency, the pride of 
acquiring importance, & the removal from 
the immediate source of rewards & Punish- 
"Morris to Germain, 6 September 1776. C. O. 260/4, fo. 37; 
see Waters, MOrriS, p. 37. 
IGMorris to Germain, 6 September 1776. C. O. 260/4, fo. 37d. 
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ments concur to prompt them to spurn & 
resist all restraint & orders. 17 
In order for Morris, without any help from London, 
to 'overthrow the... tow'ring fabrick of popular 
opposition so effectually that it could never once again 
raise its head' in St. Vincent, he extended his former 
plan. Instead of adding two members to the Assembly, he 
now recommended four, and the creation of a new parish 
by dividing St. George which was now to be bounded by 
the lambou River. The remaining section along with the 
lands granted to General Robert Monckton and those ceded 
by the Caribs were to constitute the new parish which 
was to have three of the new seats in the House. The 
other representative was to be elected from Calliagua, a 
town in the parish of St. George, only a few miles from 
Kingstown. Morris assumed full responsibility for 
influencing the election of the new members if he were 
allowed to increase the Assembly by proclamation rather 
than by an Act of the legislature-'a The Board of Trade 
favoured the plan in full, and at first proposed that it 
should be adopted, but postponed the consideration of a 
draft instruction on the advice of Lord Germain. 19 
As has already been indicated, one of the 
deficiencies of Lord Germain's administration was his over- 
riding concern with the American War, and his consequent 
17 Morris to Germain, 19 September 1776. Ibid., fo. 40d. 
18 Morris to Germain, 6 September 1776. Ibid., fos. 38-38d. 
"'Jour-nal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations 1768- 
1775 (London, 1937), p. 167 (hereafter cited as Journal of the 
Board of Trade). 
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failure to make firm decisions on pressing questions in 
the West Indies. Despite Morris's repeated appeals for 
instructions on how 'to Bridle the licentiousness of 
certain hotheaded individuals that have hitherto dis- 
tructed the colony', 20 nothing was done. He therefore 
took matters into his own hands. At the beginning of 
July 1777 he prorogued the House for six weeks hoping 
that during the interval he would be instructed to 
21 institute his plan. But as he received no directives 
from Lord Germain, he created two new parishes - Chepstow 
and Monmouth, named after his native areas in Wales, and 
the hamlet of Tintern which adjoined Monmouth parish. 22 
Chepstow adjoined St. George, while Monmouth began 
at Galaway River, extending to the Colonarie River.. The 
hamlet of Tintern included all the lands between the 
latter river and the Carib lands on the Bayera River. 
In seeking confirmation of his plan, Morris warned 
Germain that, 'without some new instructions', he was 
not to 'expect anything but a series of opposition to 
measures each in a bolder strain than the preceding one 
from the success of the opposition to the last'. 23 
Governor Dalling of Jamaica made the same observation 
about the Assembly of that island. In the middle of 
November Morris completed plans for the representation 
20 Morris to Germain, 2 January 1778. C. O. 260/5, fo. 65d. 
21 Morris to Germain, 8 July 1777. C. O. 260/4, fos. 157d-158d. 
22 Morris to Germain, 16 September 1777. Ibid., fos. 191-191d. 
23 Ibid., fo. 192. 
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of the now electoral areas, but decided to issue no writs 
of election for them until he had received instructions 
from London. 24 But the deteriorating condition of St. 
Vincent's economyt the growing political unrest, and the 
threat of an Anglo-French war forced the Governor to 
change his decision. After meeting Attorney-General 
John Sharpe, Morris dissolved the Assembly in May 1778 
and issued writs of election for three members from each 
of the new parishes .25 No writ was issued for the hamlet 
of Tintern. 
Morris's action was certainly unconstitutional, 
but here was a prime example of the difficulties with 
which Governors were faced when they were not directed 
on what steps to take on sensitive political matters, 
especially when they requested them as Morris had 
repeatedly done. In the West Indies where the gulf 
between the rights of the Crown and the demands of the 
colonists was widening, and where the total opposition 
to 'Government' was the 'prevailing madness' of the 
colonists, 26 it was difficult for any Governor to carry 
out unpopular policies. When the new House met at the 
end of June, it elected William Crooke Speaker, and 
before meeting Morris the Assembly sent him a message 
questioning the election of the six additional members, 
pointing out that according to his twelfth instruction 
24 Morris to Germain, 13 November 1777. C. O. 260/5, fos. 40-40d. 
25Morris to Germain, 28 May 1778. Ibid., fo. 195d. 
26 Morris to Germain, 4 February 1778. Ibid., fo. 134. 
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there were to be only thirteen members in the Assembly; 
but the returns showed that nineteen representatives were 
elected. Furthermore, the old members requested permis- 
sion to view his additional instruction, or any other 
authorisation, empowering him to create parishes and to 
file writs of election for them. 27 These were probably 
the moments that a Governor regretted most. Morris had 
made a constitutional change without any instruction. 
Nevertheless, he maintained, against all opposition, 
that he was entitled to do so, as it was by his authority 
that the House was elected, prorogued and dissolved. 28 
This arbitrary and unpopular decision came at a time 
when the House was least willing-to let the matter rest. 
In contrast to Morris's claims, the Assemblymen 
maintained that the power to change the composition of 
the House lay with its members. The Governor therefore 
had no authority for any of his actions. However, the 
Assembly conceded that the proper constitutional procedure 
was by an act of the legislature; but denied that it met 
by virtue of the Governor's proclamation: 
as by his Majesty's Proclamation of the 
6 ... January 1767, a Constitution bearing 
some resemblance of that of Great Britain 
was granted to ... St. Vincent , since 
which if any new Parishes were necessary to 
be formed, or any addition made to the number 
of Members in the Assembly, the only proper, 
and constitutional method would have been by 
-an Act of the whole legislature. 29 
27 The Assembly of St. Vincent to Governor Morris, 29 June 1778. C. O. 
260/5, fo. 266. 
28Governor Morris to the Assembly, 30 June 1778. Ibid., fo. 267. 
2 9The Assembly to Morris, 30 June 1778. Ibid., fos. 268-268d. 
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The Assembly's protest over the constitutionality 
of Morris's action was a more complex argument than 
whether he merely had the power to enlarge the membership 
of the House or not. To the Assemblymen, Morris had 
encroached on matters within their jurisdiction. Three 
other important questions were raised: first, if the 
Governor could increase the Assembly at will, then it 
would be directly responsible to him, and not to the 
electorate. It was therefore incumbent on the members 
to oppose Morris's attempts to pack the House, thereby 
maintaining free elections. Second, if a Governor were 
permitted to interfere with the composition of the 
Assembly every time it refused to adopt unpopular 
measures, then it would lose its freedom of debate; and 
third, if, as Morris argued, the Assembly's life depended 
solely on the Governor's proclamation, then any un- 
scrupulous Governor could discontinue the meeting of the 
Assembly at will, either by dissolving or proroguing it 
for long periods. While the Governors had the authority 
to do any of these things for short periods of time, 
there is no evidence to indicate that he could alter the 
membership of the House. 
The Assembly itself was unsure of its constitu- 
tional position in this area, and thus it wanted to 
establish a favourable precedent by increasing its 
membership by an Act of the legislature rather than by 
proclamation. The position taken by both sides created 
much tension on the island. In the House, the six now 
members were excluded from participating in its pro- 
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ceedings, and they therefore withdrew, thus posing severe 
worries for Morris. As they were not expelled, which 
would have probably been to recognise the legality of 
Morris's action, the Governor could not issue writs to 
elect six additional members only. His reaction to this 
impasse was not to find some common ground, but to send 
a message to the House reiterating his earlier declara- 
tion that the Assembly was summoned, prorogued and 
dissolved by virtue of the King's proclamation only. 30 
In the crisis that was developing, the Assemblymen 
moved swiftly to establish their own authority in the 
disputed field. They immediately framed a bill to enable 
'the different parishes in ... [St. Vincent] to send 
representatives to the Assembly, and for regulation of 
31 Electors .... It was unlikely that the Board of Trade 
would have recommended the bill's acceptance since it was 
an attempt to limit 'the rights of the Crown' to create 
new parishes. The House itself was divided on the 
provisions of the bill, and after sitting for three days, 
the members failed to reach an agreement. 32 
Before abandoning the proposed piece of legisla- 
tion, however, the House prepared a detailed document 
charging Morris with acting unconstitutionally. It 
pointed out that it had the same control over its 
internal matters as the House of Commons whose membership 
30 Morris in Council to the Assembly, 7 July 1778. Aid., fos. 270- 
271d. 
31 Assembly to Morris, 14 July 1778. Did., fos. 272d-273. 
32 Morris to Germain, I August 1778. kid., fo. 219d. 
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could not be altered except by an Act of Parliament; that 
though the Jamaica House of. Assembly was increased by 
proclamation in 1681 'ere the liberty of the subject had 
been ascertained' no such power had been used in that 
island since then, and the Jamaican Assembly had estab- 
lished the right to model its House to the exclusion of 
the prerogative. Furthermore, and probably the most 
significant argument raised by the Assembly was based on 
Lord Mansfield's decision in Campbell vs. Hall. They 
contended that if the King had surrendered his right to 
tax the people after he had granted a constitution and 
established Assemblies in the islands, the Crown had also 
forfeited its authority to interfere with the representa- 
tion of the House. 33 The Assembly's new twist to the dis- 
pute had far reaching repercussions, and to quiet matters 
Morris prorogued. the House indefinitely. Whether or not 
the old members were legally entitled to exclude the new 
ones is subject to debate; but it seems likely, however, 
that the Assembly's conclusion that the King had no power 
to increase its membership was basically correct. 
The prospect of an Anglo-French war in the 
Caribbean at the beginning of August 1778 forced Morris 
to summon the House to a special meeting at which Captain 
Morse, the Engineer, gave a gloomy picture of the condi- 
tions of the island's defences. Although it was aware 
of the dangers facing the colonists, the House did nothing, 
because 'the means of the inhabitants to supply these 
33 Assembly to Morris, 14 July 1778. Ibid., fos. 272-272d. 
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deficiencies, were totally inadequate to the exigencies 
of a season so full of peril both within and without'. 34 
But two months later, the House, seeing its opportunity 
to take control of the expenditu re of all public monies 
as was the case in the other islands, rescinded its 
former decision, and voted the nominal sum of E2,000 
currency for repairs to the fortifications; but no steps 
were taken to raise the money. Furthermore, as in the 
case of Jamaica and Barbados, the Assembly placed the 
expenditure of the money under the control of a large 
committee of both Houses, and since a majority of the 
whole formed a quorum, absenteeism prevented the 
committee from doing any work. 35 
As in Barbados and Jamaica, the militia laws of 
St. Vincent were ineffective. Attempts by the late 
Governor William Leybourne to persuade the House to frame 
an acceptable bill were unsuccessful. In July 1776, 
however, it passed one which prevented Governor Morris 
from keeping out the militia for more than three days 
without the consent of both Houses, and limited its 
duties to only those areas inhabited by white people; 
but he rejected the bill, and none was introduced in the 
House again. With no militia law and the threat of a 
French war, Morris ran into more trouble. On 23 August 
1778 he summoned a meeting of the Council to get its 
advice on the declaration of martial law; but it refused 
34 Assembly to Morris, 26 August 1778. C. O. 260/5, fo. 262. 
35 Morris to Germain, 17 October 1778. Ibid., fos. 296-296d. 
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to do so, or to take any steps to defend the island, 
until the Assembly was reconvened. Morris reluctantly 
complied with the Council's request. 36 
As there was no militia law, the forts in a 
dilapidated condition, and the regular troops depleted, 
Morris declared martial law at the end of August 1778. 
As in Jamaica, the raising of the King's standard was 
attended with problems. At the beginning of martial law 
Morris sent his clerk John Show, a gunner at the fort in 
Kingstown, to survey the guns in the forts throughout the 
island. His report was prepared and submitted to Colonel 
Thomas Ottley, of the southern region militia. Morris 
also received Ottley's permission to retain Show's 
services during the period of martial law. But after 
Thomas Ottley left Kingstown, Lieutenant-Colonel George 
Lowman, a Member of the Governor's enemies in the 
Assembly, ordered Lieutenant Drewery Ottley, and another 
lieutenant of the militia, to go to the Governor's 
residence and arrest Show for desertion, but Morris 
stopped them. Later that evening, however, Drewery 
Ottley sent a sergeant of the militia, clerk to Duncan 
Campbell, and about fourteen men to arrest Show. With 
bayonets drawn, they rushed past the sentries demanding 
that Show be handed over to them. This detachment of the 
militia left the Governor's residence only after Morris 
ordered his night guards of the regular troops 'to turn 
out'. 37 
36Morris to Germain, 24 August 1778. Ibid., fo. 244d. 
37 Morris to Germain, 5 September 1778. C. O. 260/5, fos. 264d-265. 
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The incident bore little direct relation to the 
question of service in the militia, but was more of a 
test of strength between. the Governor and the colonists. 
Around the middle of November, Morris, having received 
reports of a possible French attack on St. Vincent, had 
no choice but to call out the militia under a 'Commission 
of Array'. Most of the principal inhabitants refused to 
bear arms or to allow their employees to attend alarms, 
on the pain of removal from their services. 38 six 
planters were indicted on charges of refusing to defend 
the island; but Lieutenant-Colonel Ganley and Major Peter 
Haffey, former Speaker of the House refused to hold a 
court-martial for the trial of deserters. 39 This Act of 
treason went unpunished. No judges would hear the 
charges, and Morris was forced to drop them for fear that 
if the cases against the deserters were heard by a grand 
jury also composed of defaulters, the defendants would 
certainly be acquitted, thus giving the King's prerogative 
a severe blow. 40 
The Governor's power of declaring martial law, on 
the advice of the Council of War, was viewed with mis- 
givings, and was one of the prerogatives that most 
Assemblies wanted to control by statute. Such emergency 
powers restricted trade, prevented the cultivation of 
estates, subjected the islands to slave uprisings, were a 
38 Southey, History of the West Indies, vol. II, p. 441. 
39 Morris, A Narrative p. 52; JournaZ of the Board of Trade, p. 236. 
40 Morris to Germain, 15 February 1770. C. O. 260/6, fo. 67. 
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financial burden to the planters, and created a host of 
other economic and social p?: oblems. The policies adopted 
by the West Indian Assemblies in dealing with this 
question varied from island to island; but in St. Vincent 
the colonists adopted a unique method. On a motion in 
the House by John Collins and seconded by James Blair on 
23 December 1778, the Assembly went into a committee of 
the whole to investigate Morris's authority to compel 
the colonists to bear arms, under the penalties of 
martial law, without the sanction of a Militia Act. 
In its report to the House, the committee called 
for the adoption of its strongly worded resolutions which 
held that 'no power whatever has aright to Compel the 
Inhabitants to take arms to perform military service'; 
that the Governor's declaration of martial law was uncon- 
stitutional, 'void of legal foundation', and was a 
'manifest usurpation of the libertys of the subject'. But 
contrary to its own reportl however, the Assembly advised 
the people 'that in the Hours of real Danger', they were 
'to arm themselves And to exert their utmost Efforts for 
the Preservation of it'. The Public Works Committee was 
instructed to gain all information on the strength and 
41 
movement of the French fleet . The Assembly's resolu- 
tion summoning the colonists to bear arms was ambiguous 
and vaguely worded, but seemed to be as much a summons 
to the people to bear arms against the Governor as 
against the French to protect their civil liberty. 
41 Minutes of the Assembly of St. Vincent, 22 December 1776. Ibid., 
fos. 43-43d. 
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Two days later, when it became clear that the 
Assembly would be embroiled in further disputes with 
Morris, it resolved that if it were dissolved, all its 
records must be immediately sealed up, and given to the 
Speaker who was to safeguard them until another Assembly 
42 met . This probably accounts for the lack of Journals 
of the Assembly of St. Vincent for this period. The 
House also refused to withdraw its resolutions, and Morris 
dissolved it on Christmas Day because of its 'Seditious, 
if not rebellious conduct'. He immediately issued writs 
for new elections; but by this time, the relationship 
between Morris and the Assembly had irrevocably broken 
down, and the functions of the civil government had all 
but disappeared. The Assemblymen showed no regard for 
the Governor's authority or even his instructions: 
'These men, my Lord, do not couch their denial of his 
Majesty's rights and Prerogatives, in doubtful terms or 
even decent language; they say his Majesty's proclama- 
tions are "no law no authority whatever" and have 
43 
especially called them waste paper' . 
The dissolution of the House had once more given 
Morris an opportunity to increase its membership, and he 
therefore issued writs for the election of six additional 
representatives from Chepstow and Monmouth. When the new 
Assembly met early in 1779 it not only passed a resolu- 
tion denying the Governor the right to establish new 
42 ibid., fos. 44-44d. 
43 Morris to Germain, 5 February 1779. C. O. 260/6, fos. 55-56. 
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parishes and to issue writs of election for them; but it 
expelled the six new representatives, and refused to seat 
two other legally elected members, Robert Malloun, a 
magistrate, and Robert Glasgow, because the French voters 
had not taken the oath against transubstantation. It 
seems more likely, however, that the other representatives 
suspected that Malloun and Glasgow were planted by Morris. 
44 
They therefore seated two other members . Morris now 
dissolved the Assembly, and no new elections were held 
before St. Vincent was captured by the French in July 
1779. 
The contest between Morris and the Assembly was 
not resolved. After the island was returned to the 
British in 1783, Governor Edmund Lincoln was instructed 
to make a report on the creation of parishes in St. 
Vincent, and to make recommendations for the distribution 
of seats, in view of the addition of the Grenadines to 
that Government. Lincoln made a study of this subject; 
but did not submit a report as the Assembly was then 
framing a bill 'to regulate the Qualifications of 
Electors & Candidates', encompassing the entire question 
in a way which embodied his ideas. By the provisions of 
the bill, St. Vincent was divided into five parishes 
instead of four. Each was to send three representatives 
to the General Assembly, while Kingstown and the 
Grenadines were to have two each. The qualifications 
44 Affidavit of Robert Malloun, January 1779. Ibid. 
Morris to Germain, 5 February 1779. Ibid., fo. 55d. 
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for representatives and voters were also acceptable to 
Lincoln; but nevertheless he refused to assent to the 
bill because it limited the life of future Assemblies to 
three years -a similar measure was passed by the Jamaica 
legislature a few years earlier. The bill, like the 
Jamaica Act, was allowed to 'lie on the table' in 
England, 45 and Lincoln was instructed to assure the 
representatives 'that no Assembly will be kept in 
Existence longer than the convenience of the members 
together with the good of His Majesty's service will 
allow'. 46 It was therefore accepted in principle that 
the Assembly could not be increased but by an Act of the 
Legislature. 
Having successfully opposed the Governor's 
attempts to secure a four and one-half per cent duty 
bill, the colonists in 1776 refused to pay the quit-rents 
at Z3.18.3 per ounce of gold, as agreed to at the time 
of purchasing their lands. The issue in contention was 
not the Crown's right to the rent, or even its legality. 
On the contrary, the colonists opposed an order sent to 
Archibald Ingram, the Receiver-General, that the rents 
should be collected at 82ý per cent exchange. Charles 
Sharpe who represented the planters and other pro- 
prietors argued that market factors, resulting from the 
American War, had forced the rate down to around 65 per 
cent, and therefore Ingram could not legitimately claim 
45 Edward Lincoln to Lord Sydney, 26 July 1785. C. O. 260/7, No. 22. 
46 Lord Sydney to Edmund Lincoln, 6 October 1785. Ibid. 
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the rate he was demanding. Furthermore, Sharpe insisted 
that though the Crown could give a currency to any coin 
or could fix its value in the colonies, it could not 
change 'the Course of a Country contrary to an express 
Law, by no other Authority or Solemnity than the Instruc- 
tions given to the Receiver'. 47 This interpretation was 
adopted by the courts in later decisions. For example, 
in 1777 when suits of debt for the quit-rents were filed 
against four planters, the judges ruling in their favour 
stated that the rents were to be paid at the highest 
current rate of exchange, and not the one requested by 
Ingram. 48 
An association for opposing the rents was headed 
by Duncan Campbell, John Collins, William Crooke, John 
Fraser and others of the Governor's enemies in the 
Assembly. Of the leaders, Chancery suits were instituted 
against Collins and Fraser; but they refused to answer 
the subpoenas, hoping that Morris would instruct the 
Attorney-General to issue writs of contempt against them. 
The Governor was sensible to the possible outcome of any 
attempt to arrest either Fraser or Collins, and therefore 
no further action was taken. Opposition to the collection 
of the rents reached remarkable heights. One planter, 
voicing, according to Morris, the opinion of a majority 
of his contemporaries, publicly declared his intentions 
47 Charles Sharpe to Archibald Ingram, 30 August 1776. C. O. 260/4, 
fos. 52-53; See 11ýxtract of Act' (no date). Ibid., fos. 143-143d; 
Waters, Morris, p. 61. 
48 Morris to Germain, 9 November 1777. C. O. 260/5, fo. 32. 
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to 'joyn Washington's Army' rather than pay the 82ý per 
cent exchange. 49 Other threats to join the Americans 
were commonly made in the West Indies. A planter in 
Grenada, afraid of losing his civil liberties, wrote: 
'If I must be a slave, I'll go live somewhere between 
latitude 30 & 441.50 The association now organised a 
public meeting as a show of strength. The hand-bill 
circulated throughout the island read as follows: 
The present critical Situation of the 
Island demanding the Attention of every 
Gentleman who is not an enemy to his 
Country; It is hoped and requested that 
all who do not desire to be included in 
that desci: iption (particularly such as 
have lately been served with subpoenas in 
Chancery) will give attendance at the 
Court House on Friday next 30th instant, 
in order to consider what measures are 
most proper to be adopted. 51 
For fear of adding fuel to the flames of discon- 
tent, Morris did not interfere with the meeting. One 
result was that Collins harangued the crowd to resist 
by force any attempt to collect the rents at Z3.18.3 
per ounce of gold. The association further agreed 'to 
disobey all process of any, and every Court, which might 
be issued for compelling the paying ... the Quit Rents'. 
But the meeting turned out to be less violent than 
Morris had anticipated. The more moderate land-holders 
who were in the majority defeated a motion calling for 
49 Governor Morris to the Lords of the Treasury, 23 February 1778. 
Ibid., fos. 151-152. 
50 De Ponthieu to wilkes, 10 October 1769. Add. MSS. 30,870, 
fo. 205. 
S"Copy of Hand Bills', 24 January 1778. Ibid., fo. 138. 
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resistance by violence. 52 Nevertheless, a mob attempted 
'to tar and feather' Ingram, 53 unless he collected the 
quit-rents at the current rate of exchange. Fearing 
further attacks on his life, Ingram left St. Vincent, 54 
and Mortis appointed Jonathan Atkinson who succumbed 
to the wishes of the planters and other proprietors. 55 
Morris's administration was further rocked by 
the Resolve Smith incident. In June 1777 the Governor 
received from Lord Germain three letters intercepted 
from Smith, in Salem, Massachusetts, to his wife, a 
supporter of the Americans; Dear Mills, a ship-owner 
and merchant, who traded with the West Indies during 
the War; and Henry Keene, a Justice of the Peace of 
Southwark, London. Smith, an American by birth, who 
was appointed private Secretary to Morris, claimed that 
he was captured enroute to St. Vincent and taken to 
America where, because of his connections he was 
appointed 'Commissary for the Management of Cartels and 
Exchange of Prisoners' for the entire Leeward West 
Indian islands. He was therefore given a ship with a 
cargo of provisions to go to St. Vincent where he was 
to use his influence with Morris to gain information 
52 Morris to Germain, 2 February 1778. Ibid., fo. 136. 
53 'Summary of the Conduct of the Colonists', 10 March 1778. 
Ibid. ,fo. 
167. 
54 Morris to Germain, 13 June 1777. C. O. 260/4, fos. 140-141; 
Morris to the Treasury, 14 March 1777. 
55 Charles Ashwell to Edmund Lincoln, 28 October 1784. C. O. 
260/7. 
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for the Americans. 56 
Smith also had intentions of using his special 
position for commercial'gains. In this business venture, 
Mills was to send him about Z5,000 worth of medicine, 
civilian and military clothing and East India goods, 
except tea, on which he hoped to make over 500 per 
profit, and another 175 per cent on sterling cash 
dealings. His plans were no different from those of 
West Indians merchants who traded illegally with the 
rebels. After receiving the articles from England, 
Smith would then send them to Charlestown, Massa- 
chusetts; but with the pretence of clearing them out 
for New York under the provisions of the Prohibitory 
Act. S7 There is very little doubt that Smith was 
supporting the rebels, and had successfully tricked 
Morris into believing that he was forced to write the 
letters. Although Smith refused to comment on political 
issues in the event his letters were seized, he was 
qonf ident of England 's def eat, and said so in no un- 
certain terms: 
It would be much easier to extirpate the 
lice from Ireland, Itch and Mange from 
Scotland and the Bed-bug from England And 
much more becoming the powers and Military 
Genius of your Ministry to undertake it 
than vainly to delude you into fatal 
expectation of conquering this vast Con- 
tinent now in Arms from the Age of 16 yrs 
-to 60, besides the corps of Reserve of 
56 Resolve Smith to Wife, 19 March 1777. C. O. 260/4, fos, 69-71; 
Resolve Smith to Dear Mills, 25 March 1777. Ibid., fos. 60d-61; 
Resolve Smith to Henry Keene, 25 March 1777. Ibid., fos. 66d-67; 
Waters, Morris, p. 51. 
57 Smith to Mills, 25 March 1777. C. O. 260/4, fos. 6ld-62. 
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Amazonian Heroines, who alone is enough to 
keep the field against all the Powers of 
Mars; but this is not the first time that 
England has been engaged in a War with 
Women & Children'.... " 
On receiving the letters from Germain,. Morris had 
Smith arrested. His correspondence was laid before the 
Council which ordered him to be tried for 'misdemeanour 
and high crimes', 59 which covered a host of offences, 
except treason, and were mainly political charges in the 
eighteenth century. At first the colonists believed that 
Morris had supported Smith; but when his letters were 
made public, Smith gained many friends. None of the 
qualified judges in St. Vincent wanted to hear the case. 
At his trial, however, Smith denied writing the letters 
despite the testimonies of Robert Malloun, and Robert 
Montagu Brown, Judge of the Court of Vice-Admiralty, who 
identified Smith's handwriting. Furthermore, Michael 
Keane, defence lawyer, convinced the court that even if 
Smith had written the letters, he did so under duress 
C-knd they were therefore not admissable as evidence. 
Keane'thus secured Smith's acquittal much to the chagrin 
of Morris. 60 
At the end of 1777, the Council and Assembly of 
St. Vincent petitioned the King against Morris's conduct. 
Two major but trumped-up charges were laid against him. 
581bid., fos. 62d-63. 
"'Extract of the Minutes of the Council of St. Vincent', 27 June 
1777. Ibid., fo. 155d. 
60 Morris to GerTnain, 15 January 1778. C. O. 160/5, fo. 67; Waters, 
Morris, p. 59; Morris, A Narrative, P. 42 (note 2) 
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One was that he had made land grants to his relatives 
and friends without the advice of the Council. The 
second was that he had aided Resolve Smith. 61 There was 
absolutely no foundation to the latter, and the list of 
land grants on which the former was based was illegally 
procured. This list, signed W. Taylor, Clerk of the 
Patents, was actually prepared by the Governor's 
enemies. According to subsequent investigation, it was 
revealed that Taylor did not sign it. Thomas MacPhum, 
Taylor's clerk, who had access to his office, and was 
authorised to sign all documents in Taylor's absence, 
was summoned to Duncan Campbell's house where, in the 
presence of William Crooke, he was made to sign W. 
Taylor to a list of land grants which he found to be 
62 incomplete and incorrect . Yet, although Crooke knew 
that the list was forged, he used it to persuade some 
members of the Council to sign a petition to Lord Germain !3 
The Board of Trade immediately began an investi- 
gation into the charge that Morris had made illegal land 
grants, 64 and in its report to the King in December 1777 
the Board stated that Morris had prejudiced the rights 
61 Petition of the Assembly of St. Vincent to the King, November 
1777. C. O. 260/5, fos. 5ld-52; Memorial of the Council of St. 
Vincent to Lord Germain (no date). Ibid., fos. lld-13d. 
62 'Enclosure in Morris's', 3 October 1777. Ibid., fo. 12; 
Minutes of the Council of St. Vincent (no date). Ibid., fos. 25- 
26; Waters, Morris, pp. 57-59. 
63 Morris to Germain, 13 October 1777. C. O. 260/5, fo. 23; 
'Morris's Remarks on the Several Articles-within the Memorial, 
(no date). Ibid., fos. 14d-16. 
64 Germain to Morris, 3 December 1777. C. O. 260/4, fo. 201d. 
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of the Crown and the interests of St. 'Vincent by giving 
away over 3,854 acres of land in 64 lots contrary to the 
power vested in him and the Council. Without waiting for 
Morris's answer to the charges, his conduct was severely 
censured and he was instructed to grant no more lands with- 
out the Council's consent. 65 But in the meantime, Michael 
Keane was sent to England to press for the Governor's re- 
call. Through Keane's connection, he solicited the help 
of Lord Shelburne and Colonel Barr. 6 to raise the question 
of the Governor's conduct in their respective Houses. 66 
While Morris was being investigated in England, he 
was facing more problems in St. Vincent. His next major 
disagreement with the colonists occurred because of the 
economic conditions of St. Vincent which inspired the 
Assembly to refuse making any appropriations for defence, 
as was the case in Barbados and Jamaica. Furthermore, the 
Lords of the Treasury had adopted a similar policy, and 
Morris was instructed to draw no bills on the Treasury for 
work which was not first approved by London. The Governor 
was therefore placed in an awkward situation. He had 
spent large sums of his own money to gain valuable and 
accurate information about the movement of the French 
squadrons and their military and naval preparations in 
the West Indies, to carry out much of the public works 
done in St. Vincent, and to pay for transporting food for 
the British soldiers in the outposts, when the House 
65 Report of the Board of Trade to the King, 9 December 1777. Ibid., 
fos. 203-204; Journal of the Board of Trade, p. 166. 
66 Michael Keane to John Fraser, 17 December 1778. C. O. 260/5, 
fo. 290. 
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refused. With no help from either England or the 
Assembly, Morris dejectedly asked: 'flow can I do it? how 
can I my Lord without funds, put the Island in that State 
of Security your Lordship's Letter directs? ' 67 
Moreover, some of his bills drawn on the Treasury 
were not honoured. Morris immediately stopped all 
public works, 69 ordered the dismissal of the workmen, 
and directed all public officials and contractors to 
apply directly to the Treasury for their money. His 
action had left St. Vincent undefended and vulnerable 
to an attack. Perhaps one way out of the dilemma was 
for him to issue writs for new elections; but then he 
would have either to surrender his declared right to 
increase the Assembly by proclamation, or risk asking 
a recalcitrant House to vote large sums for repairing 
the forts. He did neither. Instead, he wrote Lord 
Germain a long letter illustrating the conditions of his 
government. In summing up the situation, he wrote: 
'For God's sake my Lord do not believe this drawing of 
distress ... is carricaturaed it is a plain & rather a 
slight sketch of outlines, which to fill up justly, 
would render the picture truly shocking'. 69 
Because of the debts he had incurred for public 
works, law suits Were brought against him in the courts 
of St. Vincent, and some of his property was seized. 
67 Morris to Germain, 27 May 1778. Ibid., fo. 194; see his 
earlier letter, 15 May 1778. Ibid., fo. 192. 
Go Morris to Germain, 24 August 1778. Ibid., fo. 244. 
69 Morris to Germain, 2 May 1779. C. O. 260/G, fos. 94d-95. 
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Morris's unpopularity in the island had made him parti- 
cularly vulnerable to such pttacks, and he rightly felt 
that he was unfairly treated by the British government 
and left to the mercy of his enemies. 'Is this my Lord 
treating me with Common Justice? ', he asked Germain. 70 
But his pleadings went unnoticed. Michael Keane with 
the assistance of Messieurs Fraser, Baillie, and William 
Wynne, the King's Advocate and father of Robert Wynne, 
Member of the Council of St. Vincent, successfully 
secured the Governor's recall in August 1778 on charges 
of mal-administration ;71 but Morris remained in his 
government and was captured by the French in July 1779. 
Lord Germain did not raise a finger to secure his 
release; but instead he ordered him to return to England 
immediately upon his release. Morris ignored this, and 
after he was freed he went to Antigua to see about his 
property. This brought a severe reprimand from Germain: 
'I think it proper to acquaint you that if you do not 
without further delay return to England, I shall receive 
his Majesty's pleasure for removing you from His 
Services'. 72 
Morris's return to England did not end his 
problems. Because of debts he had incurred in defending 
St. Vincent, he was imprisoned for nearly five years, 
and was forced to sell his valuable properties in Antigua 
70 Morris to Germain, 27 March 1779. Ibid., fo. 72. 
71 Germain to Morris, 5 August 1778. C. O. 260/5F fos. 199-199d. 
72 Germain to Morris, 3 May 1781. C. O. 260/6, fos. 157d-158. 
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and England. Some of his bills were'only paid in 1789, 
after his death. Ragatz concludes that the treatment of 
Morris 'was one of the most disgraceful episodes in West 
Indian History'. 73 But of greater significance, Morris's 
failure illustrates the immense power which the colonists 
in St. Vincent had obtained over a Governor who received 
no help from London. For three and a half years Morris 
pleaded for instructions which he never received. His 
downfall resulted from his determination to implement the 
Royal Instructions, and to maintain the Imperial interests 
in a colony where the differences between these and local 
ones could not be'easily overcome by the personality and 
character of a Governor. Morris might have lacked the 
political astuteness and administrative skills of his 
contemporary Lord Macartney, but he did his duty and 
fought to uphold the prerogatives of the Crown as he 
understood them. 
The widespread opposition to the Imperial govern- 
ment was also evident in Grenada. Here, as in the other 
islands, the economic decline of the island had developed 
some support for the Americans in the Assembly, and here 
too the colonists were afraid of losing their civil 
liberties. ' 4 Of this support for the rebels, Lord 
Macartney wrote: 
With regards to our own islands, I need not 
mention the strange mixtures of people & 
Complexion which the Inhabitants are 
73Ragatz, Phe Planter Class, Note 3, p. 15G; see Waters, 
Morria, p. 74. 
74De Ponthieu to Wilkes, 10 October 1769. Add. MSS. 30,870, 
fos. 204-205. 
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composed of - Your Lordship knows that 
above half of Grenada and the Grenadines 
are French. There is also a considerable 
Number of French in Dominique and St. 
Vincent. These together with the Americans 
of whom there are a great many scattered 
thro' our West Indies, are certainly not 
. well affected to us. I have often had 
reason to suspect that the TS convey intel- 
ligence to the Rebels .... 
The first signs of opposition in the Assemblies 
were treated differently by the Governors. Those admini- 
strators, such as Lord Macartney who seemed to have 
understood the political viewpoint of the colonists and 
the reasons for their attitude towards the British 
government, interfered as little as possible with the 
internal affairs of the Assembly. On one occasion, 
however, Macartney dissolved that of Tobago for passing 
resolutions sympathetic to the Americans .76 This 
decisive action was successful, and the Assembly remained 
practically free of political strife for the remainder of 
the War. Nevertheless, Macartney was a competent 
Governor whose social position served him well during 
those trying years. By adopting a more moderate policy, 
Macartney's administration was not faced with as many 
- crises as those of the other Governors. 
Just before his arrival in Grenada, the Assembly 
had passed a petition to the King at the end of May 1775, 
expressing the fears of the planters if the American 
commerce with the West Indies were prohibited. Like all 
the petitions sent to the King from the West Indian 
75 Macartney to Germain, 22 October 1777. C. O. 101/21, fo. 66d. 
76Macartney to Germain, 12 February 1777. C. O. 101/20, fo. 99d. 
339 
I 
Assemblies during this period, this one protested the 
colonists' allegiance to the Crown, and called for unity 
among the different parts of the British Empire. The 
petition dealt in some detail with the economic reasons 
for satisfying the American claims, in the interest of 
the planters who depended on the American colonies. The 
House also pointed out that any termination of American- 
West Indian trade would cause severe scarcity and 
increased costs of running the plantations, which would 
ultimately ruin the planters. But apart from the economic 
reasons, the Assemblymen were also moved by their 
political and social ties with the Americans to ask the 
King to use his constitutional power to terminate the 
conflict between Parliament and the American colonies. 77 
When Lieutenant-Governor Sir William Young heard 
of the address on his return from a visit to St. Vincent, 
he opposed its pro-American sentiments, and called on 
the Assemblymen to rescind their address and minutes in 
support of the Americans, before any other business was 
undertaken in the House .7a As in the case of the 
Barbados Assembly, that of Grenada viewed Young's request 
as an attack on its 'Parliamentary' privilege. At its 
meeting on 26 June 1775 the door of the House was locked 
and the key placed on the table. Then the Assembly 
77 Address of the Assembly of Grenada and the Grenadines to the 
King, 13,26 June 1775. C. O. 101/18, Part I, fos. 179d-180. 
70 William Young to the Assembly in Journal of the Assembly of 
Grenada, 26 June 1775. C. O. 104/2, fo. 89d (hereafter cited as 
J. A. G. ); see William Young to the Earl of Dartmouth, 26 June 1775. 
C. O. 101/18, Part I, fos. 176-176d. 
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unanimously resolved that it was 'no less astonished than 
alarmed to find that the Exercise of one of the most 
acknowledged and Indisputable rights of the Subject, that 
of Petitioning the Sovereign for the Redress of Evils' 
should be opposed. It further resolved that Young's 
request to the House to rescind its minutes was 'a very 
Extraordinary and Unheard of Exertion of Power' which, if 
obeyed, would destroy 'every Idea of Freedom of Conduct & 
Debate which are not only the inconvertible right of the 
House of Representatives but Essential to the Welfare and 
79 
good Government' of Grenada . To destroy the pro- 
American party which he viewed as a threat to peace, and 
as a warning to other Assemblies in the ceded islands, 
Young dissolved the Grenada House. 8 0 Five members of the 
Council who supported the address were also suspended. 
In their place, before returning to England, Young 
appointed five others who accepted that Britain had 
supreme constitutional authority over the colonies. 
This was a sensitive question in the West Indies. 
The new governor of Grenada, Lord Macartney, stated 
as had Valentine Morris, that since the Governor's 
successor in the event of sudden death was not 'the 
most loyal or most capable', but the senior member 
of the Council, the names of all candidates for 
public office in the colonies should be forwarded 
to the Governors for their approval. This was even 
79 J. A. G., 26 June 1775. C. O. 104/2, fos. 9ld-92. 
so Young to Dartmouth, 26 June 1775. C. O. 101/18, Part I, 
fo. 176d. 
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more necessary as it was 'possible in timcs like these 
when a latitude of opinion relative to the authority 
of Great Britain over its dependencies is entertained 
by many, that the Administration of a remote Colony 
might fall into improper hands'. 81 
Macartney was faced with other problems. One of 
his first recommendations to the Grenada legislature was 
the passage of an acceptable militia bill. He therefore 
got the Council to frame and pass one. 82 However, a 
majority of the inhabitants, both French and English 
speaking, opposed the measure, as well as the creation 
of a militia force. Four petitions from different 
parishes were sent to the House objecting to the passage 
of the proposed bill. One from the residents of St. 
George presented by the former Speaker, Alexander Winniett, 
claimed that such a law would bring no benefits to the 
colony, that a militia force was unable to defend the 
island, and therefore its defence must rest on the 
British Navy. They further contended, as the Jamaicans 
had done, that the inhabitants were being asked to 
sacrifice more than they would gain. The absence of the 
tradesmen, managers, and other white employees from the 
estates subjected the women and children to slave 
attacks. Furthermore, the cost of service to the. 
ordinary planter was equal to a heavy tax imposed on 
'a Colony already involved in multiplied distresses' 
81 Macartney to Germain, 18 June 1776. C. O. 101/20, fos. 2ld-22. 
82 Macartney to Germain, 20 June 1776. Ibid., fo. 
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from the War. Other objections were that the proposed 
bill had no safeguards to uphold the 'Natural Liberty of 
the Subject', and a militia composed of French and 
English speaking peoples would inevitably produce 
'infinite confusion, Jealousy and Discontent'. 83 
Two similar petitions, from the residents of St. 
John, presented by Etienne Molinier, and from the free- 
holders of St. Andrew, delivered by William Johnston, 
were read at the Bar of the House. 84 Another from St. 
David made a detailed study of the shortcomings of the 
bill. In addition to the objections raised by the other 
petitions, this called for its publication in French 
and English. One of the arguments against the measure 
was that it would serve none of the purposes for which 
it was intended. For example, the time for training the 
men was too short to equip them with any degree of 
military skills. The residents of St. David also 
opposed the militia bill on moral and political grounds. 
To them,, any form of military service was inconsistent 
with human rights and should be adopted only in extreme 
circumstances. Likewise, as the need for a militia bill 
arose as a result of the American War, it was unaccept- 
able to a majority of the white people, or so they 
maintained. 
After the third reading of the militia bill, a 
motion calling for its committal was defeated by a vote 
83 J. A. G., 17 September 1776. C. O. 104/2, fos. 109-110. 
84 ibid., fo. 110d. 
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of eleven to two. 85 Another attempt by the Council to 
frame a bill acceptable to the Assembly failed. " These 
early setbacks did not dampen Macartney's unceasing 
quest for such legislation. The Governor was rightly 
described by a contemporary as being of a 'cool and 
composed' nature, with a clear understanding of the art 
of conciliation. 87 After France declared war in August 
1778, he was able to persuade both Houses to pass a 
militia bill, 88 but he later found it difficult to 
establish a well-trained militia force for two main 
reasons. First, both the French and English refused to 
cooperate, as he explained: 
The French of every denomination and color 
are totally disaffected, and according to 
the best of my observation, incapable of 
any attachment to us - Of our own people, 
the leading and most respectable Gentlemen 
possess strong principles of honor, loyalty 
and public spirit, but the meaner sort 
composed of Overseers, Clerks, low planters, 
and Tradesmen [certainly the majority of the 
white population in the West Indies] are a 
mere Banditti, averse to all order, disci- 
pline, and obedience, turbulent, mutinous 
and impertinent of any restraint whatso- 
ever. 89 
Secondly, under the militia law, the Governor was 
unable to curb the growing disobedience and disorderly 
behaviour among the militiamen. The same situation was 
evident in the other islands, and although Macartney had 
esIbid., fos. 110d-112d. 
86 Address of the Council of Grenada to Lord Macartney, 24 June 
1777. C. O. 101/20, fo. 111d. 
87 Senhouse, 'Diary, Vol. V, compiled by Sr. H. F. Senhouse. 
Rhodes House Library, MSS. W. Ind. r. 5, p. 302. 
88 Macartney to Germain, 2 August 1778. C. O. 101/22, fo. 102. 
89Macartney to Germain, 10 January 1779. C. O. 101/23, fos. 
58-58d. 
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punished a few of the culprits, the conduct of the 
majority was overlooked, since excessive severity would 
have exasperated the planters, thus creating an even 
greater unwillingness among the remainder to defend the 
island. The Militia Act had contained no Articles of 
War for dealing with deserters, and he could not have 
enforced any penalties without legislative authority 
which he had no hopes of securing. 
Like the other Assemblies in the British West 
Indies during this period, the attitude of that in 
Grenada was influenced by the progress of the American 
War and the fortunes of both sides. The heated debate 
between the Council and Assembly in April 1778 over the 
mode of taxation in a new levy bill was a reflection of 
the difficulties many Governors faced. Some areas of 
agreement had been reached; but Macartney expected the 
debate to continue as the majority for the bill was 
small, and was likely to change because of the reports 
reaching Grenada from America. The defeat of General 
John Burgoyne at Saratoga in October 1777, for example, 
'had a considerable influence on the minds of many' 
delighted with the rebels' successes; while those who 
supported Britain were disheartened, and therefore both 
groups did nothing. 'Indeed it is to be feared', he 
wrote, 
that what passes in America may be found 
too sure a Barometer, to know the future 
temper of the West Indies by Numbers of 
people in this Island have formerly lived 
in America & imbibed no small portion of 
her levelling spirit, others have from 
long residence in this Climate contracted 
an insolent Croolian Cast, which tho' easily 
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irritated to do mischief is seldom to be 
aroused to do good. 90 
Although the American War had influenced the West 
Indian colonists to oppose their Governors more than 
before, the economic conditions of the islands had made 
it virtually impossible for the Assemblies to raise any 
large sums of money. The difficulties of Hay, Cuninghame, 
Dalling and Morris have already been discussed. Lord 
Macartney found it no easier. In 1778, for example, when 
an attack on Grenada seemed imminent the Assembly voted 
Z600, a negligible sum, to provide 150*Negroes for 21 
days to dig trenches, transport cannons, and to build 
barricades. 91 But as the money was to come from the 
following year's supplies, Macartney had to borrow the 
money on his personal security, and draw his bills upon 
the Lords of the Treasury. In October 1778 when the 
island was again threatened by the French, the House 
empowered him to spend another X15,000 on his own 
security. 92 However, unlike the case of Valentine 
Morris, Macartney's bills were honoured by the Treasury 
on Lord Germain's recommendations. Why one Governor was 
allowed to draw his bills on the Treasury without first 
being authorisedl and the other allowed to die bankrupt 
for doing the same thing, cannot be determined by any 
available evidence. 
90 Macartney to Germain, 10 April 1778. C. O. 101/21, fo. 178d. 
9.1 Lord Macartney to the Assembly, 16 May 1778. Ibid., fos. 223- 
223d; Address of the Assembly to Lord Macartney, 16 May 1778. 
Ibid., fos. 223d-224. 
92 Assembly's Address to Lord Macartney, 10 October 1778. C. O. 
101/22, fos. 168d-169. 
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The apparent readiness of the Grenada Assembly 
to appropriate money for defence purposes was only super- 
ficial. Macartney found 'that the majority of the 
colonists composed of English, Scots, Irish, French 
Creoles and Americans ... heated by various passions and 
prejudices far beyond any European Idea' were sympathetic 
to the rebelg, iýcause. 93 Even though he had struggled to 
understand the viewpoint of the colonists, and to live in 
harmony and peace with them, he had 'experienced many 
ugly scenes'. He recognised that the economic decline 
of Grenada had contributed to the planters' unrest: 
Most of the Members of the Assembly with 
whom the money bills originate, are more 
embarassed in their Circumstances, and are 
rather to be considered at present as 
Stewards and Managers for the Mortgagers 
in London and Holland, than as the real 
owners of the estates they possess. It is 
to be hoped that the greater part of these 
Gentlemen will be able to surmount their 
Difficulties, but many must inevitably sink 
under them in a short time. 94 
The Assemblies of the ceded islands, like those of 
the older ones had successfully contested important issues 
during the American War. The advent of this conflict had 
inspired the West Indian Assemblies to refuse to pass 
militia laws which impinged upon the liberty of the 
colonists, by placing too much power in the hands of 
their Governors. Perhaps, they feared that the militia 
might have been used in America, but though there is no 
evidence for this suggestion, the Assembly of St. Vincent 
93 Macartney to Germain, 25 October 177a. Ibid., fos. 155-155d. 
94 Ibid., fos. 157d-158. 
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did limit the distance to which the militia could be 
sent. There was no likelihood of armed rebellion in any 
of the British islands, *but it is evident that the 
colonists were determined to reduce the Covernors' 
executive powers. Most political issues of the period 
were common to all the British Caribbean colonies, and 
almost all the Assemblies handled them in similar ways. 
However, the Jamaica Assembly was the only one to gain 
full control over the declaration of martial law, and to 
establish an independent judiciary. In the field of 
finance, most Assemblies gained control over issuing the 
public monies, and even when this power was left in the 
hands of the Governors and Councils, the Assemblies 
insisted that they should examine all accounts before 
payments were made. 
CHAPTER VIII 
POLITICS IN THE LEEWARD ISLANDS 1769 - 1782 
Although on the outbreak of the American War of 
Independence the West Indian islands remained loyal to 
Britain in principle, they had nevertheless shared in 
the political experience which characterised the 
ideological and constitutional development of the 
American colonies. For example, the reaction of the 
colonists in St. Kitts and Nevis, two of the Leeward 
Islands, to the Stamp Duty paralleled that of those New 
England colonies where the stamp paper was destroyed by 
mob riot. officers appointed to distribute the stamps 
in those islands were forced to renounce their positions. ' 
Likewise, St. Kitts shared many of the grievances of the 
mainland colonies, and these surfaced in different ways 
during the 'sixties and 'seventies right down to the 
termination of the American War. 
In St. Kitts, as in Barbados and Jamaica, there 
were two political groups in the Assembly -a majority 
and minority party. The former was led by John Stanley, 
a young lawyer, who was a supporter of Wilkes and in 
conjunction with another lawyer John Gardiner began a 
subscription in aid of the London radical. Stanley had 
I Whitson, 'The Outlook of the Continental American Colonies'. 
S. Q. o Vol - XLV, p. 77. 
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also publicly supported an armed uprising in Britain. 2 
His leadership of the majority party and his influence 
with Governor William Woodley made him a powerful 
individual, enabled him to infiltrate his supporters 
into th6 judiciary, and to use the courts to intimidate 
his political opponents. One contemporary wrote that 
Stanley 
in pursuance of his scheme of independency, 
made cobwebs of such British Acts of 
parliament, as have been made to secure 
the commerce of the colonies. And so 
extraordinary have been the decisions he 
has gained, for our judges are positively 
3 only his mouth to pronounce his sentence. 
In the West Indies, as in America, the Assemblies 
served as the clearing-houses for political opinion ih a 
way which tended to unify the thinking of the colonists 
who by using British Parliamentary precedents developed 
the Assemblies along the same lines as the House of Commons. 
At the beginning of 1776, for example, the majority 
party was instrumental in passing a resolution excluding 
the members of the Council from voting in elections. 
However, the Councillors adopted their own resolution 
upholding their right to vote under the Elections Act 
of 1727.4 The Act had already prohibited the chief justice 
2 James Ramsay to Bishop Terrick, 29 June 1771. Lambeth Palace 
Library: Fulham Papers, Vol. XX, fos. 55-55d; John Gardiner to John 
Wilkes, 26 March 1769. Add. MSS. 30,870, fo. 133. 
3 Ramsay to Terrick, 29 June 1771. Lambeth Palace Library: Fulham 
Papers, Vol. XX, fo. 55; see the Memorial of Edwin Thomas to the 
Judges of the Court of King's Bench, 1 July 1769, in Caribbean and 
General Gazette or the St. Christopher Chronicle. Ibid., fo. 17; 
Edwin Thomas to William Carr, 26 July 1769. Ibid., fo. 18; 'In His 
Majesty's Court of King's Bench and Common Pleas, 9 October 1769. 
Ibid. , fo. q. 25-26. 
4 William Woodley to the Earl of 11illsborough, 7 February 17G9. 
C. O. 152/31, No. 10. 
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of the court of common pleas and king's bench, the barons 
of exchequer, the secretary and his deputies, the provost 
marshal and his deputy, and the treasurer from partici- 
pating in elections. 5 Consequently, the exclusion of the 
Councillors from voting was one more step in the 
Assembly's search for full Parliamentary government, 
and it justified its policy on the grounds of maintaining 
the constitution of St. Kitts based on the British model 
of King, Lords and Commons; there is the 
very texture of this Constitution, implied 
and interwoven; such a Political Disability 
of their voting, as without which; our 
Independence of Council would be Annihilated, 
and there, would maintain to us the meer 
Semblance of a Separate and distinct Branch 6 
of the Legislature . 
It is doubtful whether any American or West Indian 
Assembly had previously disfranchised the members of the 
Council, and therefore that of St. Kitts had no colonial 
precedent on which to base its action. But this parti- 
cular measure was a significant one in colonies where 
one vote, that of a Councillor, usually decided the 
elections of many Assemblymen. This certainly gave the 
Council a greater influence in colonial politics than is 
usually recognised. The dispute over the Assembly's 
resolution was not settled, and at the October elections 
in 1769 the Honourable Samuel Crooke's vote elected 
Alexander Douglas, John Julius and James Akers. the 
Members for the parish of St. Mary. They were therefore 
sequestered from the House until the Committee of 
Sclarke, Parlimentary Privilege, p. 160. 
GAddress of the Assembly of St. Kitts to Governor Woodley, 
28 June 1770. C. O. 152/31. 
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Privileges and Elections examined the returns. The 
situation was further complicated by the resignation of 
James Smith, one of the' members of Christ Church Nicola 
Town, who was elected without his knowledge or desire. 
A new writ was issued and William Burke, a supporter of 
the majority party, was elected and seated in his place. 
The decision to investigate the elections in St. 
Mary was challenged by seven members - Aretas Akers Sr., 
William Wharton, Joseph King, Anthony Bryan, William 
Feuilleteau, Christopher Mardenborough, and Henry Seaton - 
who later became identified as the minority party, and 
who left their seats and the House in defiance of the 
r- 
Speaker John Tahie's order. Consequently, James Saint 
John, Sergeant-at-arms, was instructed to arrest the 
seven men on charges of contempt of the House. 7 The 
departure of such a large number of representatives left 
the Assembly short of a quorum. The remaining members 
therefore voted unanimously to seat John Garnett, 
William Garvey, and John Tyson8 who later became Speaker, 
assistant-judge of the court of common pleas, and was a 
close friend of Curson and Gouverneur, the American 
Agents who resided at St. Eustatius during the War, as 
the Representatives for St. Mary. 9 
John Gardiner who now severed his relationship 
with the majority party acted as counsell. for the seven 
7 J. A. S. K., 24 October 1769. C. O. 241/14. 
a J. A. S. K., 4 November 1769. Ibid. 
9Wilkes to Curson and Gouverneur, 23 January 1781. C. O. 239/1, 
fo. 211. 
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Members, and unsuccessfully applied to Chief-Justice 
Craister Greatheed, President of the Council of St. 
Kitts, for writs of habeas corpus for the release of 
the men on the plea that the Speaker's warrant for their 
arrest was illegal. But Greatheed, who was later 
commended by the remaining members, upheld the Assembly's 
argument that it was the sole judge of its rights and 
privileges to take disciplinary action against its 
members. This was one of the many rights claimed by the 
colonial Assemblies prior to the American Revolution, 10 
and it is doubtful whether this was challenged in the 
courts before thIs incident. The seven members were 
called to the bar of the House where they were accused 
of discrediting the Assembly by submitting its proceedings 
to an inferior court of judicature; " but as they refused 
to apologise, they were expelled. The American and West 
Indian Assemblies had always considered themselves as 
courts, and had carried out judicial and appellate 
functions. Around the same time, the Jamaica Assembly, 
for example, rejected the idea that it had no judicial 
power. 12 Furthermore, Attorney-General Thomas Warner 
supported the St. Kitts Assembly's stand on all points, 
except its resolution disfranchising the Councillors. 13 
10 See Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege, Chapter V. 
11 J. A. S. K., 4 November 1769. C. O. 241/14. 
12 Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege, pp. 28-29. 
13 
. 
'The Opinion of Mr. Warner upon the Petition and remonstrance 
of Seven Members of the Island of St. Christopher', 11 December 
1769, in J. A. S. K., 2 March 1770. C. O. 241/14. 
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The dispute between the two groups in the House 
had split the St. Kitts society into two warring factions. 
Though an appeal from Gardiner to Woodlcy for writs of 
habeas corpus was turncd down, the Governor made a 
personal plea for moderation and clemency. His decision 
to stay out of the dispute, probably because he believed 
in the separation of powers doctrine, was an acknowledge- 
ment of the rights of the House to discipline its members, 
as well as to resolve its internal problems. While 
promising to consider the Governor's request, the House 
informed him that it was 'Accountable to none for ... 
[its] parliamentary Conduct. ' Nevertheless, as the 
Assembly was aware of the political implications of its 
resolution, it called for an election on the issue so 
that the people could show their 'Candid and Impartial 
Judgement'. 14 
At new elections for those parishes from which 
the seven members were expelled, some Councillors, 
including Craister Greatheed (Saint Peter Basseterre), 
Samuel Crooke and John Estride (Christ Church), voted to 
test the validity of the resolution prohibiting them. 
According to the Elections Act of 1727, Greatheed should 
not have voted. The Councillor's names were removed from 
the returns; but the seven members who were re-elected, 
and summoned to take their seats, refused to do so while 
Burke, Garvey and Tyson remained Members. 15 
14J. A. S. K., 9 November 1769. Ibid. 
15J. A. S. K., 22 November 1769. Ibid.; 'The Petition of William 
Wharton, Joseph King, William Feuilleteau, Aretas Akers, Christopher 
Mardenborough Sr., Anthony Bryan and Henry Seaton to His Excellency 
William Woodley' (no date - December 1769), in J. A. S. K., 2 March 
1770. Ibid. 
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The dispute in St. Kitts had reached an alarming 
situation. Anyone who was critical of the proceedings 
of the Assembly was arrested and imprisoned, or severely 
reprimanded. Gardiner who had publicly declared that the 
majority party did not constitute a legal House, that its 
proceedings were falsified and the publications of its 
minutes was unconstitutional, was arrested and imprisoned 
for contempt of the privileges and authority of the House, 
'tending to no less than the Subversion of the Constitu- 
tion of St. Kitts'. 16 Following his release, Gardiner 
filed suits against Saint Johnf and Henry Berkeley, the 
Provost Marshal, for trespass, assault, and false 
imprisonment, on behalf of himself and the seven dis- 
sident members. He was again arrested and imprisoned 
for violating the privileges of the House. Greatheed 
complied with an order of the Assembly to discontinue 
all suits against both men who were released with costs, 17 
Greatheed's role in this dispute was certainly equivocal. 
While supporting the Councillors by voting, he continued 
to uphold the Assembly's right to control its internal 
affairs. 
The proceedings of the House reflected 'the flame 
of Discontent' which was infused into the minds-of a 
majority of the inhabitants influencing many to commit 
acts of violence. 18 Essays published in the Caribbean 
16J. A. S. K., 9 and 22 November 1769. Ibid. 
17j. A. SoK,, 30 March 1770. Ibid. 
18'The Humble Address of the Freeholders and Principal Inhabitants 
of the Parishes of Saint John Capisterre, Saint Paul's Capisterre, and 
Saint Ann's Sandy Point' to the Assembly, 21 November 1769. Ibid.; 
Woodley to 11111sborough, 25 April 1770. C. O. 152/50, fo. 31. 
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Gazette by Edwin Thomas, Rector of St. George and St. 
Peter Basseterre, and James Ramsay, Rector of Christ 
Church Nicola Town and St. John Capisterrel, demonstrate:, 
the deep split among the inhabitants. Thomas, writing 
under the pseudonym 'Publicolal, was actively engaged in 
the Elections of 1770, in opposition to the majority 
party. He accused Stanley and his group of suspending 
the laws of St. Kitts; of 'dispensing tumult, discord 
and confusion' throughout the entire island; of attempting 
to enslave the white people who opposed his party, in 
order to maintain their 'inherent and natural, as well as 
civil right', of using the courts to suppress their 
political opponents by imprisoning them, and of claiming 
that the colonial Assemblies were 'invested with all that 
plenitude of Supreme, uncontrollable, and infinite 
power'. 19 
Even Governor Woodley was not immune to attacks 
by the clergy. He was accused of aiding the majority 
party whose goal, according to Ramsay, was 'independency 
upon the Crown of Great Britain .... 120 Complaints were 
also voiced against Woodley's dismissal of competent 
officers of the militia, and their replacement with 
unqualified persons whose only abilities were their 
19Publicola to Brother Freeholders, and Fellow Citizens of St. 
Christopher, in the Caribbean Gazette. Lambeth Palace Library: 
Fulham Papers, Vol XX, fo. 31d; see 'To the Majority Dauber in 
Thibou's Paper of November 21st', in Caribbean Gazette and St. 
CýwiDtopher Chronicle. Ibid., fo. 33d; 'To Thibou's Sham Freeholder' 
(no date), in Caribbean Gazette. Ibid., fo. 32. 
20 Ramsay to Terrick, 29 June 1771. Ibid., fos. 55-55d. 
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known party affiliations. 21 Although Woodley might have 
relied too much on the support of the majority party to 
got his policies through the House, he had no choice but 
to follow Warner's advice on the controversial election 
resolution. However, because of his inability to handle 
the political crisis in St. Kitts, he was given leave of 
absence to return to England in July 1770. Lieutenant- 
Governor Richard Hawkshaw Losack now assumed command of 
the government. 22 He immediately reported the dispute to 
London, and pointed out that in the Leeward Island 
Assemblies, there was a 'growing Disposition ... to extend 
their privileges beyond what ... is consistent with the 
Nature of their Establishment, and the intentions of 
Government'. 23 
These intentions were never spelt out; but 'the 
document creating or authorising an assembly was intended, 
no doubt, to provide for a body similar to a municipal 
council with legislative powers of very limited and 
purely subordinate type. 124 Nevertheless, in spite of 
the desire among some British officials to restrict the 
political development of the colonists, very little was, 
or could have been, achieved because the Assemblies 
modelled their proceedings on the example of the House 
of Commons. Furthermore, the colonists denied that 
21 'Mr. Howe', in Caribbean Gazette, 12 December 1770. Ibid., 
fo. 39d. 
22 J. A. S. K., 8 July 1770. C. O. 241/14. 
23 Richard Ilawkshaw Losack to the Earl of 11illsborough, 27 April 
1771. C. O. 152/50, fo. 31. 
24 Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege, pp. 14-15. 
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Parliament or the Crown had unlimited authority over the 
colonies. Some Assemblymen even called their legislature 
'Parliament' 
.25 The doctrine of co-equality of status 
between the House of Commons and 'the Assembly of St. Kitts 
was frowned upon by the new Governor Sir Ralph Payne. In 
hearing an appeal before the c6urt of errors, Payne 
rejected the idea that the Assembly could 'exercise any 
jurisdiction or Right of Punishment or Distraint of any 
Persons whatsoever, excepting causes of Self-Defence where 
the Peace of the Assembly was invaded or violated' . 
26 How- 
ever, his ruling was broad enough to allow the House the 
very rights which they claimed, and he sought to deny. 
Each succeeding election brought deeper rifts among 
the inhabitants, and were accompanied by 'Acts of 
Violence'. Losack therefore sent a despatch to the Earl 
of Hillsborough, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
requesting a ruling on the Assembly's resolution to 
terminate the constitutional crisis. 27 The Privy Council 
upheld the right of the members of the Council to vote 
under the provisions of the Elections Act, 28 and an 
additional instruction aimed at curbing the power of the 
judges and the Assembly of St. Kitts was sent to Payne. 
He was directed 'to keep the Assembly ... more within the 
legal bounds of a Provincial Council, and to hinder them 
from usurping authorities, inconsistent with the peace and 
25 J. A. S. K., 9 November 1769. C. O. 241/41. 
26 Sir Ralph Payne to the Earl of Dartmouth, 2G January 1773. 
C. O. 152/53, fo. 5d. 
27 Losack to HillSborough, 11 December 1770. C. O. 152/31, No. B. 
2 OThe Privy Council to the King, 6 June 1771. C. O. 152/51, 
fo. 98d. 
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good goverranent of the said island', 29 but this only 
worsened matters. 30 The disputes continued. The names 
of Councillors who voted were removed from the polls, 
and other members were seated in the place of those 
elected. 31 
The instruction prohibiting the disfranchisement 
of the Councillors was immediately tested in Nevis where 
the Assembly expelled two of its members, shortly before 
the close of its session in 1773. Although Payne drew 
the Speaker John Ward's attention to the issue, the 
expiration of the House at that critical moment terminated 
the possibility of a CriSiS. 32 Meanwhile, in St. Kitts, 
Aretas Akers Sr. made his peace with the majority party. 
In April 1773 he took his seat in the House as the 
Representative for Christ Church, 33 and later became 
Speaker of the Assembly and one of Governor Burt's 
chief opponents. 
Shortly before the outbreak of the American War 
of Independence, therefore, 'the two contending Parties 
[in St. Kitts] existed with all imaginable fury of 
opposition to each other'. 34 Similarly, 'the feuds ... 
which had prevailed between the two Houses of the Legis- 
lature ... had extended to the Subversion of all Society, 
2 9JournaZ of the Board of Trade, pp. 302-303. 
30 Payne to Dartmouth, 26 January 1773. C. O. 152/53, fos. 5d-6. 
31 Petition of James George Verschild and William Hunt to the 
Assembly, in J. A. S. K., 20 January 1772. C. O. 241/14. 
32 Payne to Dartmouth, 23 July 1772. C. O. 152/53, fos. 90-90d. 
33 J. A. S. K., 7 April 1773. C. O. 241/14. 
34 Payne to Dartmouth, 1 March 1773. C. O. 152/53. 
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Order, and the public Business'. 35 Payne's efforts to 
settle the dispute were only partly successful. 36 The 
outbreak of the War renewed the spirit of the colonists 
who, although not involved in the fighting, were in- 
fluenced to fight to retain their legislative -rights and 
privileges which gave them a sense of importance and 
political independence. 37 
The political theories held by the Americans during 
the eighteenth century were also common to the West 
Indians. Such terms as the "'Constitution, even'giorious 
constitution, grand inquest of the country, ancient and 
undoubted rights and privileges of the assembly"', 18 and 
the inherent right of the House to impeach any person or 
persons in the colonies were some of the expressions used 
in defining the role and authority of the colonial 
Assemblies .39 The attempts of the Imperial government 
to interfere in the internal affairs of the American 
colonies were closely followed by the West Indians. 
Therefore, once War was declared, the Assemblies of the 
various Caribbean islands used every possible means to 
gain more control of key parts of their domestic affairs. 
As in the other islands, one area of government 
3SPayne to Dartmouth, 6 October 1773. C. O. 152/54, fos. ld-2. 
36 Payne to Dartmouth, 12 January 1775- C. O. 152/55, fo. 2d. 
37 Ramsay to Terrick, 29 June 1771. Lambeth Palace Library: 
Fulham Papers, Vol. XX, fos. 55-56. 
30 Clarke, Parlimnentary n-, iVilege, P. 263. 
39 Extract of Minutes of the Assembly of Montserrat, 17 October 
1770. C. O. 152/51, fo. 76d; for a good example of impeachment 
proceedings in a colony, see fos. 35-68,71,81-81d, 86d, 90,94d, 
107. 
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which the Leeward Islands Assemblies now tried to usurp 
was the issuing of all public monies. Early in 1776 the 
Council and Assembly of St. Kitts adopted a resolution 
to examine all accounts before they were paid by the 
Treasurer. A few days later, the Council resolved that 
no Imattrosses'' accounts would be settled unless signed 
by their superior officers who were required to submit 
to the Governor a certified list of all employees in the 
forts once every six months. Each captain was also 
instructed to send to the Council an affidavit stating 
that he received no emoluments from the salary of any 
employees. Furthermore, the Treasurer was ordered to 
pay only those accounts which conformed to the orders 
40 
embodied in the resolution . 
Likewise, whenever the Assembly of St. Kitts, 
like those of other islands, was requested to raise 
money, it was placed under the control of commissioners 
appointed by the House which insisted that the money 
should be spent only for that purpose for which it was 
raised. Under this policy, all bills were meticulously 
examined before the smallest account was paid. Those 
which were considered too high, or those for work which 
the House did not initiate, were rejected. Even though 
the Governor was still allowed to issue warrants for the 
payment of bills these had to be checked by the commis- 
sioners. Consequently, the executive functions of the 
Governor in this field were gradually chipped away. 
40 Minutes of the Council of St. Kitts, 4 April 1776. C. O. 241/12. 
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A good example of this encroachment occurred in St. Kitts 
during the American War, and led to a further constitu- 
tional crisis in that island. 
In March 1778 when an Anglo-French War seemed 
imminent, William Mathew Burt, Governor since 1777, 
summoned a joint meeting of the Assembly and Council, 
and pleaded with them to undertake the extensive repairs 
needed to make the fortifications serviceable. His 
request was certainly not unreasonable. Like Dalling, 
he was sympathetic to the planters' economic plight: @I 
fear not too much will or Can be obtained: I have 
ordered Estimates to be made of the Expence; but at the 
Price every Material now Sells, it will require Five 
Hundred Pounds to accomplish the Work which 9150 would 
41 have done from 1772 to 17751 . 
But the Assembly only promised to consider his 
recommendations, and to carry out the necessary repairs 
if it were satisfied that they could be done 'without 
oppression to Our Fellow Subjects'. It is very likely 
that the Assemblymen were acting on the wishes of their 
constituents. They also commended Burt for unilaterally 
reducing the fees of Chancery which were severe burdens 
42 to the planters After touring the three main forts - 
Brimstone Hill, Charles Fort, and Fig Tree Fort - in the 
middle of June, Burt presented his estimates to a joint 
meeting of the Council and Assembly. lie also informed 
41 Burt to Germain, March 1778. C. O. 152/57, fo. 247. 
42 Address of the Assembly of St. Kitts to Governor Burt, 6 March 
1778. C. O. 241/12; Assembly to Burt, March 1778. C. O. 152/57, fos. 
254-255. 
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the House that he had purchased, with his own money, a 
quantity of lumber at only E7.10s., instead of Z30. per 
thousand feet from a Norwegian vessel which had stopped 
at Sandy Point, with the hope that the House would 
reimburse him. But this was a ticklish arrangement as 
Burt himself noted: 'Mr. Clifton & Mr. Akers the late 
Casual Receiver the first noted for his attachment to 
the Americans with four or five more do their utmost to 
Prevent any Supplies & to retard this Service'. 43 
Dr. Benjamin Clifton was formerly a friend of 
Stanley, 44 but it seems that he supported Aretas Akers 
in the election 
; ispute . 45 In eighteenth-century 
colonial politics, parties were often not clearly 
defined, and disputes among different factions were 
quickly forgotten when there was a common issue of 
greater political significance to the interests of the 
colonists. More often than not, this seemed to unify 
the Assembly as in the case of St. Kitts where the 
former arch-enemies now joined to oppose Governor Burt. 
Therefore, when the Council asked the House for its 
cooperation in repaying the Governor, the Speaker John 
Tyson replied that the Assembly would only consider 
'what repairs may be necessary ... what sums ought to be 
raised in the present situation of this Island, for 
43 Burt to Germain, 9 June 1778. C. O. 152/58, fo. 115d; Burt in 
council to the Assembly, 6 June 1778. Ibid., fo. 117. 
44 Ramsay to Terrick, 29 June 1771. Lambeth Palace Library; Fulham 
Papers, Vol. XX, fo 56d; see also fos. 61-61d for Clifton's 
deposition in a complaint against Stanley. 
45 J. A. S. K., 21 November 1769. C. O. 241/14. 
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Defraying the Charges and Expences of such repairs'. 46 
This was a very ambiguous statement, and implied that the 
House was not referring to those expenses which Burt had 
undertaken on his own. 
Any concession which Burt might have received from 
the Assembly was probably over-ruled when the members 
returned to the House. Burt blamed the mood of the 
Assembly on the influence of a powerful pro-American 
party which had a majority in the House. Besides Clifton, 
Tyson was a close friend of Curson and Gouverneur, and 
even received money, for them from their debtors in St. 
Kitts . 
47 In 1779 Tyson was suspended as an assistant- 
judge of the court of common pleas and King's bench for 
declaring in the case Vanderpooý vs CaZhoun (Vanderpool 
was the plaintiff in a bond debt), when he was informed 
that Burt had granted Vanderpool's appeal according to 
his 44th instruction, '"What do I care for a Royal 
Instruction, Itis no Law; a Royal Instruction is nothing 
to me"'. Likewise, when a mandamus issued to a clergy- 
man was being contested before the court, Tyson was also 
accused of saying "'Representation and Taxation went 
together 48 
Tyson's dismissal was unpopular, and almost led 
to the breakdown of the judiciary in St. Kitts. No one 
could be persuaded to accept an appointment on the court, 
46 The Assembly of St, Kitts to Governor Burt, 12June 1778. C. O. 
152/58, fo. 123. 
10 Wilkes to Curson and Gouverneur, 23 January 1781. C. O. 239/1* 
fo. 211. 
48 13urt to Germain, 5 July 1779. - C. O. 152/59, fos. 227d-228. 
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and on the death of Governor Burt in 1780, President 
Anthony Johnson re-appointed Tyson to his former 
position. 19 It has been demonstrated in Chapter III that 
many people in St. Kitts communicated and traded with the 
Americans during the War. No wonder Burt wrote: 'Was I, 
my Lord, to say we have not some American Partizans I 
should attempt to Act a Part foreign to my heart & 
deceive: Some we have', but these he dismissed as being 
neither opulent nor of any high social standing. 50 How- 
ever, as in the case of Grenada, this group, consisting 
of the small planters, tradesmen, clerks, managers and 
merchants, might well have formed the majority of the 
white popu lation. 
The Assembly's refusal to raise money for the 
island's defence left Burt no choice but to work indepen- 
dently of the House, in the same way as Cuninghame had 
done in Barbados. With voluntary supplies, the aid of 
some Negroes and carts from a few parishes, and his own 
money, he built storehouses, and completed other repairs 
to the fortifications. 51 He also prepared the island 
for a long siege of three months and more. For this, he 
constructed a roof on Charles Fort; built carriages for 
the serviceable cannons; and bought a quantity of 
provisions which he stored in Brimstone Hill Fort. 52 
49 Anthony Johnson to Lord Germain, 13 May 1781. C. O. 152/60, 
fos. 93-93d. 
"Burt to Germain, 30 July 17713. C. O. 152/58, fo. 226. 
"Burt to Germain, 22 November 1778. C. O. 152/59, fo. 22. 
52 Governor Burt's Address to the Council and Assembly of St. Kitts, 
9 September 1778. C. O. 241/17. 
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In his endeavours to do his duty, Burt had nonetheless 
made himself vulnerable by Pefying the resolution of the 
legislative bodies, and' had shown that he had enough 
support in the island to work without the assistance of 
the House. This was a challenge to the Assembly's image 
of itself. However, everything would have gone well if 
the Governor were not forced to ask the House to re- 
imburse him for his share of the cost of the work. 
Burt's dilemma arose because the Treasury (as the case 
of Valentine Morris had shown) was against honouring any 
S3 bills for work which it did not authorise . 
But instead of supporting the Governor, the St. 
Kitts Assembly, like that of Jamaica, contended that in 
spite of the island's contribution to the revenue of 
Britain, the government had done nothing to help defend 
the island. 54 This was a fair criticism, but the 
colonists were also guilty of neglecting their defences 
until they had achieved constitutional gains. 55 After 
France joined the War in 1778, an appeal from Burt to 
the House for money to complete the works, which he had 
started was successful. In September the Assembly voted 
E600 to pay for the repairs to the forts and to erect 
new batteries. " 
53 See Houston to Turner and Paul, 16 rebruary 1778. Houston 
Papers: N. L. S. MSS. 8,793, p. 387; see p. 413. 
54 The Assembly to Burt, 16 July 1779. C. O. 152/58, fo. 275. 
55 The Address of the Assembly of St. Kitts to the King, 
September 1778. Ibid., fos. 267-268. 
56 The Council of St. Kitts to the Assembly, 25 September 1778. 
C. O. 152/59, fo. 38. 
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Nevertheless, the bill contained two objectionable 
clauses. It placed the control of the forts in a joint 
committee of both Houses to the exclusion of the Governor, 
and it directed that all monies raised were to be spent 
by order of the commissioners who were to decide which 
batteries were to be repaired, and where new ones were 
to be built. 57 Though the Council considered the bill 
unconstitutional, it did not reject it; but requested a 
conference between the managers of both Houses to work 
out a compromise. 58 The Assembly in refusing this 
request contended that it could not surrender its rights 
by allowing the 
Luncil 
to amend money bills, and it 
pointed out that its policy was ! an invariable Rule of 
the Mother Country. On such Occasions the Upper House 
could only approve or reject money bills'. 59 The Council 
then voted unanimously to reject the bill. 60 
The foundation for colonial political thinking as 
well as the precedents on which the political system was 
developed was based on the model of the British House of 
Commons, and moulded to fit the needs of the specific 
island and the different socio-economic classes which 
were the roots of West Indian society. Each colonial 
Assembly wished to control the executive power, and there- 
fore, it is not surprising that all the West Indian 
57 Burt to Germain, 30 September 1778. C. O. 152/58, fo. 262. 
58 The Council to the Assembly, 25 September 1778. C. O. 152/59, 
fo. 38. 
59 The Assembly to the Council, 25 September 1778. Ibid., fo. 40. 
60 The Council to the Assembly, 1 October 1778. Ibid., fo. 48. 
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Assemblies, from Jamaica to Barbados, used the power of 
the purse to gain control of their defences, even though 
most governors retained the power to view the forts and 
to make recommendations to their respective Assemblies. 
In St. Kitts, the House insisted, according to Burt, 
that it had a right to appoint ... Committees to View, Examine, Report, Direct what works 
are to be done, what Carriages to be 
Repaired, what Buildings to be Erected, to 
receive Estimates for Contracts & in short 
that everything Relative to the Forts & 
Fortifications, except appointing the 
Gunners, is a Power vested in the House of 
Assembly Independent of the Governor & 
Council, & nothing is to be there done but 
what they approve of; this, my Lord, you 
are Sensible is a Privilege which the House 
of Commons of Great Britain never claimed 
& is contrary to His Majesty's 81 & 84 Royal 
Instructions: It is also an Usurped 
Privilege in times like these which might 
lead to the loss of his Majesty's Colonies. " 
Burt was worried that St. Kitts could be lost to 
the enemy because of the American supporters in the 
Assembly who disrupted public affairs by their opposition. 
Like Morris who was at the same time facing similar 
problems in St. Vincent, Burt also complained that his 
instructions were disregarded by the Assemblymen who 
'Publicly Declare they have nothing to do with his 
Majesty's instructions; they are not binding on them; 
nor will they pay any attention to them'. 62 A represbn- 
tative group of colonists from Basseterre, the chief 
town, even drew up a document containing terms of capitu- 
lation in case of an invasion, and influenced a large 
number of the inhabitants to 'Stay at home each to defend 
"Burt to Germain, 25 November 1778. Ibid., fo. 22d 
62 Ibid. , fo. 22. 
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his own house & Family, & to make the best Terms they 
can; that the Sovereignty of the Island is nothing to 
them if their Houses are burnt'. 63 No Governor could 
have tolerated such expressions of disloyalty, and 
although he realised that it was 'impossible to sweep 
the Augean Stable of them all', 64 Burt vowed to destroy 
the'Gallo-American Principled Party'. Thus, he wrote: 
'your Lordship may rest satisfied I will Eradicate these 
monsters or fall in the Contest'. 65 
Burt had taken on a formidable task, and some of 
the policies he adopted, although partly successful in 
enabling him to put the island in a relatively good state 
of defense, did not win the hearts of the colonists, and 
did not prevent them from capitulating to the French 
early in 1782 while Governor Thomas Shirley was entrenched 
in Brimstone Hill fighting to repel the enemy's attack. 
These policies also made him unpopular and brouriht him 
into conflict with'the Assembly, as well as with many 
of the merchants who were trading illegally with the 
Americans at St. Eustatius. In addition to the repairs 
which he had already undertaken on three of the forts, 
on the receipt of a letter from Lieutenant-Governor 
Stuart of Dominica reporting the capture of that island, 
Burt hurriedly purchased a quantity of military stores 
and provisions, and stored them in Brimstone Hill and 
Charles Fort. To pay for these? he drew his bills upon 
63 Burt to Germain, 9 October 1778. C. O. 152/58, fo. 289. 
64 Burt to Germain, 1778. Ibid., fo. 277. 
65 Burt to Germain, 25 November 1778. C. O. 152/59, fo. 21. 
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the treasury, and asked Lord Germain to recommend their 
payment. 66 Though Germain complied with the request, and 
commended Burt's actioris in countering the Assembly's 
policies, he sent him a stern warning: 
The expence which will be incurred in 
executing such necessary measures must 
finally fall upon the Assembly & altho' it 
is incumbent upon you to see that your 
Government & the Public Service should not 
suffer for the want of necessary Supplies, 
yet I cannot undertake to say that all 
Bills drawn for unauthorised Services will 
certainly be allowed at Home: The real 
necessity of Such Expenditure being their 
only justification. 67 
Any decision that Burt should make would displease 
the British government or the Assembly of St. Kitts - 
for he was bound by his instructions on one hand, and 
restricted on the other by the refusal of the House to 
vote any money. But while he pondered over a solution 
to this impasse, another dispute erupted and complicated 
the already delicate situation. An extract of a letter 
from Antigua to Aretas Akers Sr. was read in the House 
on 27 October 1778. Akers was reliably informed that 
Burt had taken the advice of the law officers on the 
legal steps he could take to punish him for constantly 
opposing his policies, and for helping to frame the 
capitulation document. Burt also accused Akers and other 
Assemblymen of making treasonable statements, and it was 
rumoured in Antigua that they would be imprisoned, and 
66Burt to Germain, 4 October 1778. C. O. 152/58, fos. 281. 
67 Burt to Germain, 7 June 1777. C. O. 152/56, fo. 108. ' 
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sent to England 'in irons'. 68 
The nouse immediately went into a committee of the 
whole, chaired by William Wharton, a friend of Akers, to 
consider the implications of Burt's censure. After 
debating the issue, it passed three resolutions. The 
first two were unanimously adopted by the Assembly, while 
the third was passed by a large majority. The first 
resolution affirmed that freedom of speech was the in- 
alienable privilege of the members of the Assembly. OAny 
attempt to Subvert this Right' was 'a daring attack upon 
the liberties of the House, and a high infringement of 
the constitution of the Land'. Secondly, 'that any 
attempt of any person whatever to intimidate any Member 
from exercising this High and Ancient Privilege is ex- 
ceedingly improper and totally derogatory to the Honour 
and Dignity of the House'. The third stated that any 
charge of disloyalty against any member was 'utterly 
Groundless and an injurious attack upon the Loyalty of 
the House'. 69 The resolutions were then published. 
The receipt of the letter, and message from the 
Council censuring the House for the publication of its 
resolution reopened old wounds, and started a new round 
of conflict between both Houses. Charges and counter- 
charges were made continuously - each new one drawing 
both Houses further apart,, thus placing Burt in an 
68, Extract of a letter from Antigua' to Aretas Akers, 27 
October 1778. C. O. 241/11; Minutes of the Council and Governor, 
3 November 1778. C. O. 152/59, fo. 26. 
69 J. A. S. K., 27 October 1778. C. O. 241/11. 
371 
embarrassing and vulnerable position. A request from the 
Council for the name of the author of the letter met with 
the accusation that it had encroached on the rights and 
privileges of the Assembly, whic h was only answerable to 
its members, its constituents, and future Assemblies, 
and it informed the Council that the freedom of the 
colonists and the development of a civilised society 
could only be guaranteed if the independence of both 
Houses of the legislature was inviolably preserved. 70 
Burt now failed in an attempt to disqualify Akers 
from sitting in the Assembly, because the Elections Act 
of 1727 had disfranchised the provost marshal and his 
deputy .71 After investigating Akers qualifications, the 
Committee of Privileges and Elections, Chairman John 
Garnet Jr. ruled that he had not taken the oath of office 
of deputy provost marshal, and he was therefore entitled 
to sit in the House. It was ironic that the same man 
who had previously opposed the doctrine that the Assembly 
was the judge of all its internal matters was now 
protected by that very doctrine. 
A request for a vote of credit was now turned 
down; but the Assembly agreed to pay all accounts which, 
in accordance with its resolution, were certified by both 
Houses for work done on the forts, and also to settle all 
expenses which it considered 'to have been actually 
accrued for the Benefit# Safety and advantage of the 
70J. A. S. K., 1 December 1778. Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
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island'. The Council's criticism of the Assembly's 
attitude only aggravated the already tense situation, and 
brought a refusal from the latter to do any more business 
72 
with the former unless it received an apology . This 
was not forthcoming, and to appease the Council Burt 
prorogued the House indefinitely. It was not convened 
until the middle of January 1779, but because of the lack 
of a quorum no meetings were held for some time after- 
wards. Further disputes between both Houses led to the 
dissolution of the Assembly. At the elections in March 
a majority of the old members was re-elected, and Tyson 
was again chosen Speaker. The House thus met the 
Governor later that month prepared for battle. 
Burt's speech at the opening of the new session 
was aimed at appeasing the Assembly. He carefully out- 
lined the work which he had done while the House was not 
sitting - the magazines were well supplied, but more 
powder was needed to prevent any scarcity; the service- 
able guns were mounted on new carriages; the militia was 
properly armed and there was an adequate supply of spare 
muskets and small arms; storehouses were built and 
supplied; and several guard-houses were being erected. 
Burt had a right to be proud of his achievements. After 
all, he had done a lot of work without any financial help 
from the Assembly. However, to pay for these prepara- 
tions, he drew bills on the Treasury despite Germain's 
warning, and spent some of his own money which he asked 
72 J. A. S. K., 17 December 1778. Aid. 
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the Assembly to refund. 73 
Three weeks elapsed before the House finally 
prepared a reply which, though loyal and courteous, was 
vague, promising to implement his recommendations, after 
'the Estimates of the unavoidable expenses already 
incurred were laid before it. ' 74 Believing that an agree- 
ment had been reached, the Council requested the House to 
examine some provisions which were rotting in the store- 
houses, and to order their sale on behalf of the publ ic . 
75 
The Assembly denied any knowledge of the purchase of the 
provisions, and it reiterated that while it was prepared 
to appoint its members to committees of both Houses when 
matters of 'national importancel. were to be considered, 
it could not appoint a committee to inspect the pro- 
76 
visions. It was therefore no surprise that the House 
77 
refused to pay for them . The dispute over paying the 
Governor's bills resulted from the clash of two doctrines. 
On the one hand, the Governor was by his instructions 
responsible for the defence of the colony, and he rightly 
assumed that he could do repairs to the forts and other 
public buildings without the Assembly's approval. on 
the other hand, however, he was bound by financial 
reasons, as well as British policy, to ask the House to 
73 Governor Burt's Speech to the Council and Assembly of St. Kitts, 
25 March 1779. Ibid. 
74 J. A. S. K., 13 April 1779. Ibid. 
75 Burt in Council to the Assembly, 13 April 1779. C. O. 152/59, 
fo. 220. 
76 J. A. S. K., 7 May 1779. C. O. 241/11. 
77 The Assembly to Burt in Council, 2 June 1779. Ibid. 
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vote money to pay for the work. Once the Assembly was 
approached for money, it hold that it had to be given a 
voice in which works were to be done. Consequently, it 
was dif f icult to see how agreement could be reached. 
Following Burt's failure to reach a compromise 
with the House, the Council sent it a conciliatory message 
stating that it too was opposed to 'any undue Usurpation 
of authority or any infringement of a proper and Parlia- 
mentary Line of Conduct'; but it insisted that Burt's 
motives in purchasing the provisions were in the best 
interest of the island, and were made with 'Purity of 
Intentions attested to even by his enemies' .78 The 
appeal was rejected. A committee chaired by John Thomas 
resolved that the Assembly 'never did bind themselves nor 
are they Bound, nor was the public faith, ever pledged 
for the payment of provisions .... Therefore, despite 
the reasons which moved Burt to take such action, the 
Assembly maintained that to guarantee payment of Burt's 
debt would be to surrender its rights and privileges and 
to establish a precedent dangerous to the freedom of the 
79 
people . While the quarrel with Burt might have 
originated partly as a result of the sagging economic 
conditions of St. Kitts, it developed nevertheless into 
one in which the House saw itself as protecting its con- 
stitutional rights. 
Since there was no chance of a compromise, Burt 
78 The Council to the Assembly, 2 August 1779. C. O. 152/59, 
fo. 297. 
79 J. A. S. K., 3 August 1779. C. O. 241/11. 
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sought recompense from the Treasury. One of his bills 
(for more than k683) was paid, on Germair*recommendation. 
However, the Secretary of State notified him that the 
Assembly had to repay the money, and he was again warned 
that the Treasury would honour no more bills for work 
which it did not authorise. 80 obviously worried by the 
turn of events in St. Kitts, and the refusal of the 
Assembly to pay for the island's defence, Germain sent 
another letter on the following day to Burt affirming 
the Treasury's position. " He therefore left the Governor 
in no uncertainty that he would have to find a way of 
persuading the Assembly to pay his bills. But even 
before receiving the letters, Burt wrote to Germain 
telling him that the House was not prepared to make any 
deals. '32 
As in St. Vincent, the dispute in St. Kitts had 
assumed a new perspective when in August 1779 two 
merchants, John Manning and Hewitt Clarkson, filed a 
suit of debt for more than Z2,000 currency. The jury 
returned a verdict against him, but judgement was. with- 
held. Burt now realised the seriousness of his position. 
If he did not pay the remainder of his debts totalling 
in excess of Z6,000, before the following March, more 
suits were to be filed against him. As he felt that the 
60 Germain to Burt, 4 August 1779. C. O. 152/59, fos. 193-193d. 
81 Germain to Burt, 5 August 1779. Ibid., fo. 197. 
82 Burt to Germain, 27 September 1779. Ibid., fo. 318; Burt to 
Germain, 28 September 1779. Ibid., fo. 321d. 
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British Ministers were prepared to leave him to the mcrcy 
of a group of disloyal colonists, Burt threatened to 
appeal directly to the King. 84 He was saved from further 
humiliation in the courts by Germain's decisive action on 
this occasion, probably inspired by Burt's threat. 85 
However, the matter was not settled. In accordance with 
its policy, the Treasury ruled that the money used to pay 
Burt's bills was to be considered as a loan to the St. 
86 Kitts Assembly . When this 
information was conveyed to 
the House, a committee comprising of Robert Thomson, 
Aretas Akers, William Mahon, Nicholas Richards and 
Benjamin Clifton, some of Burt's most persistent critics, 
recommended that the Assembly should reject the Treasury's 
order. In March 1780 the House adopted the recommenda- 
tions of its committee in a number of resolutions stating 
that it would neither pay for the provisions nor repay 
the Treasury. 87 
As the opposition to Burt became more intense, at 
the beginning of May 1779 he called for five hundred 
troops to be sent to St. Kitts to maintain the sov- 
ereignty of the island. 88 There were good reasons for 
the appeal. The civil magistrates would not carry out 
their duties. The colonists were communicating military 
information to the Americans either directly or via 
84 Burt to Germain, 27 September 1779. Ibid., fo. 318d. 
"William Knox to John Robinson, 30 June 1779, in J. A. S. K., 1 
December 1779. C. O. 241/11. 
86 John Robinson to William Knox, 16 July 1779. Ibid. 
87 J. A. S. K., 7 March 1780. Ibid. 
"Burt to Germain, 3 May 1779. C. O. 152/59, fo. 115d. 
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friends in St. Eustatius, 89 and American prisoners taken 
to St. Kitts were able with the help of 'the friends of 
America', to communicate with the rebels in the Dutch 
island. 90 No wonder therefore that Burt complained: 
'Difficult my Lord is the part I have to Act, surrounded 
by Spies & in the Legislature of this Island many dis- 
affected Persons'. 91 
Because of Burt's repeated requests for troops, 92 
General James Grant, Commander of the military forces in 
the Leeward Islands, stationed the Fifteenth Regiment in 
strategic parts of the island. Two companies were left 
AR 
at Basseterre, two at Old Road, and six on Brimstone 
Hill. But notwithstanding the military precautions, 
before leaving St. Kitts for Antigua Burt also left 
strict orders that no capitulation agreement was to be 
signed with the enemy. 93 Later events were to prove that 
Burt was right all along. Early in 1782 the inhabitants, 
without making an effort to defend St. Kitts, capitulated 
to the French while Shirley was entrenched in Brimstone 
Hill fighting to repel the enemy. 
The disaffection of St. Kitts had reached such 
heights by the beginning of 1780 that besides calling for 
"Morgan, ed., NavaZ Docwnents, Vol. V, p. 957. 
9OPhilip Lewis to Jane Lewis, 2 November 1778. H. C. A. 32/419/2, 
fo. 23. 
"Burt to Germain, 4 October 1778. C. O. 152/58, fo. 281. 
92Burt to Germain, 1 June 1779. C. O. 152/59, fos. 189-189d; Burt 
to Germain, 16 June 1779. Ibid., fo. 218d; Burt to Germain, 22 
June 1779. Ibid., fo. 224d. 
93Burt to Germain, 16 March 1-780. C. O. 152/60, fo. 80d. 
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troops, Burt renewed an earlier suggestion that the con- 
stitution of the Leeward Islands should be changed, as 
'the members in direct succession to the President of 
St. Christophers were not equal in abilities to those of 
Antigua'. Burt certainly did not mean administrative 
abilities. lie meant loyalty. In the event of the 
Governor's death or absence, the command of the Leeward 
Islands would devolve on the President of the Council of 
St. Kitts. Burt now recommended that the command should 
rest with the President of the Council of Antigua . 
94 He 
was obviously worried that if Anthony Johnson became 
Commander-in-Chief, the government would be administered 
by an American supporter. Johnson had voted against the 
Council's resolution censuring the Assembly's resolution 
criticising Burt's interference with the proceedings of 
the House. 95 Germain was sympathetic to the recommendation 
but believed that it could not be implemented until a new 
commission was issued. However, he promised Burt that in 
the event of his death a Governor would be appointed 
immediately. 96 
on 27 January 1781 Burt died a broken and defeated 
man who had fallen 'in the Contest' with the Assembly, 
and the command of the government passed into the hands 
of Johnson 97 whom Burt had considered unequal to the 
94 Burt to Germain, 26 September 1780. Ibid., fos. 251-251d. 
95 Burt to Germain, 30 March 1780. Ibid., fos. 103-104. 
96 Germain to Burt, 30 May 1780. Ibid., fos. 110d-111. 
97 Johnson to Germain, 31 January 1781. C. O. 152/61, fo. 11; 
Thomas Jarvis to Lord Germain, 7 February 1781. Ibid., fo. 15. 
379 
office. As soon as the news reached England, Thomas 
Shirley, the former Governor of Dominica, was immediately 
sent to the Leeward Islands. " In the meantime, Johnson 
saw the correspondence on the pr oposed reorganisation of 
the government, and in May he laid this information 
before the Council which objected to any change. 99 All 
former animosities between both Houses were quickly 
forgotten. A joint address from the Council and Assembly 
opposing the recommendations was sent to London. Germain, 
without knowing that Shirley's commission had been amended, 
assured him that none was contemplated; but requested that 
this information should be withheld from the Assembly 
until it had granted the land around Brimstone Hill to 
the Crown. 100 
It seems strange that the Board of Trade had made 
adjustments to the seat of government without informing 
Germain'01 who was the Member of the Board responsible 
for ordering the drafting of commissions and instruc- 
tions. 102 By Shirley's ninety-fi_--- instruction, the 
seat of the Leeward Islands governmeL'- remained in 
Antigua, 103 but his commission stated that on his death, 
9OLord Germain to Anthony Johnson, 4 April 1781. Ibid., fos. 21- 
21d; Lord Germain to Thomas Jarvis, 4 April 1781. Ibid., fo. 19. 
"Johnson to Germain, 13 May 1781. Ibid., fos. 90-90d. 
10OLord Germain to Thomas Shirley, 1 September 1781. Ibid., fos. 
105-106. 
10'Germain to Shirley, 6 February 1782. C. O. 152/52, fo. 23d. 
102 Arthur Ilerbert Basye, The Lord Commissioners of Trade and 
Plantations (Now Haven, 1925), p. 180. 
103 'Ninety-first Royal Instruction' to Governor Shirley (April 
1781). C. O. 152/G2, fo. 17. 
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and in the absence of the lieutenant-governors who 
normally resided in England, the most senior Councillor 
or the President of the'Council of St. Kitts was to go 
to Antigua and administer the government from there. 104 
Germain now instructed Shirley not to implement the 
change until he had taken steps to make it acceptable 
to the inhabitants of St. Kitts. Exactly what Shirley 
was expected to do is unclear, but it was unlikely that 
anything would have appeased the people. Consequently, 
Germain ordered Shirley to suppress his commission to 
prevent further unrest in St. Kitts. 105 But the white 
inhabitants never forgave Shirley even though he had 
nothing to do with the proposal. 106 
While Burt was engaged in disputes with the 
Assembly of St. Kitts, that of Antigua remained rela- 
tively quiet; but it too was chipping away at the 
Governor's executive powers, especially his control of 
the militia. In March 1776 the legislature of Antigua 
passed a triennal militia law which prevented commissioned 
officers from being dismissed t first being found 
guilty by a military court consisting of not less than 
thirteen commissioned officers. The president of the 
court had to hold a rank above that of field officer. 
The court was required to subpoena witnesses to testify 
under oath, and for an officer to be convicted of any 
104 'Extract from Shirley's Commission', 23 April 1781. Ibid., 
fos. 19-19d. 
105Germain to Shirley, 6 February 1782. Ibid., fos. 23d-24. 
106 Shirley to Germain, 28 November 1781. Ibid., fos. is-i5a. 
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offence, a majority of nine judges had to concur in the 
decision. But when the court consisted of more than 
thirteen members, there had to be a two-thirds majority. 107 
This clause of the militia law gave rise to the following 
dispute. At the end of September 1780, Burt dismissed 
Main Swele Walrond, a Member of the Assembly, assistant- 
judge, as governor of Monk Fill Fort (also called Fort 
George), because of a private incident at the Governor's 
house, over a licence which Burt had issued to Captain 
Hallway to marry Walrond's daughter. 108 Believing that 
he was unjustly treated, as in the case of Thomas 
Harrison of Jamaica, Walrond resigned as assistant-judge 
of the court of common pleas and king's bench, and Burt 
appointed James Nibbs. 109 
About three weeks later, Walrond sent petitions to 
the Council and Assembly of Antigua claiming that he was 
dismissed as an officer of the militia without trial by 
a military court, and as an assistant judge without the 
consent of the Council, and he asked the Assembly to 
approve his conduct. 110 It is likely that Walrond was 
using his dismissal as a test case, to determine the 
legality of the militia law and the Governor's authority 
107kAn Act to alter and amend an Act entitled an Act for regu- 
lating the Militia of this Island for the farther regulation of the 
said Militia', 14 March 1776. C. O. 8/18, No. 120. 
'OeBurt to Germain, 26 September 1780. C. O. 152/60, fo 251; 
Governor Burt to Main Swele Walrond, 5 September 1780. Ibid., 
fo. 255. 
109Burt to Germain, 26 September 1780. Ibid., fo. 251. 
11OMoinorial of Main Swele Walrond to the Assembly of Antigua, 
28 September 17BO. C. O. 152/60, fos. 265-265d. 
382 
over the forts. Walrond, like Harrison, wanted to got as 
much political mileage as was possible out of this 
incident. The Council sent a copy of Walrond's memorial 
and other related information to the Governor for his 
comments. "' Meanwhile, a committee of the House which 
was appointed to investigate Walrond's complaints informed 
the Governor that it was holding a public inquiry at the 
court house. 112 Wishing to cooperate with the Assembly, 
Burt sent his correspondence with Walrond to the 
committee. He charged him with insulting behaviour and 
with attempting to disturb the peace of the colony. ' 13 
Burt made similar claims in a letter to the Council 
which he reminded that he was constitutionally entitled 
to dismiss any of its members, or any patentee, without 
its advice, as long as he submitted his reasons to the 
Crown. 214 
Of course, Burt was within his legal bounds, but 
such hard-line policies did not usually go down well with 
the colonists. It was probably impossible, however, for 
Burt to reach an amicable compromise. Both Houses had 
already shown that they wanted to restrict his authority 
to dismiss militia officers. In such instances, when 
both sides stood firm, parts of the executive power were 
surrendered by the Crown to maintain political peace in 
111Thomas Jarvis to Governor Burt, 28 September 1780. Ibid., 
fo. 261. 
112A Committee of the Assembly to Governor Burt, 9 October 1780. 
Ibid., fo. 263. 
113Burt to the Committee of the Assembly, 10 October 1780. Ibid. 
fo. 267. 
114Governor Burt to Thomas Jarvis, 10 October 1780. Ibid., fos. 
269-270. 
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the islands. At a meeting of the Council to discuss the 
Walrond affair, a committee was appointed to hold a public 
meeting on 20 October at which Walrond was ordered to 
appear with a written and signed affidavit of his dispute 
with Burt. 115 The committee resolved that no judge could 
be suspended without the advice of the Council; that 
Walrond's dismissal was 'unconstitutional', since the 
militia law stipulated that no officer could be dismissed 
without first being convicted by a court-martial, against 
which there was no appeal; and that the Governor had no 
separate or superior power over officers or employees 
in the Forts. AlýChough there was no law to prevent the 
arbitrary dismissal of judges, as in Jamaica, the 
Council's resolution was intended to have the same effect. 
The Council then forwarded its report to the 
Governor with a recommendation for Walrond's reinstate- 
ment to both offices. 116 But at first Burt rejected the 
requests of both Houses. 117 In doing so, he pointed out 
that Walrond, like other public officers in Antigua, held 
his positions 'during pleasure only', and as Walrond had 
resigned his office as an assistant-judge, he was not 
obliged to ask the Council for its advise to accept or 
reject his resignation. Burt also refuted the doctrine 
that he had no superior Power over the forts, and the 
people employed there. He was aware of the implications 
115'Extract of Minutes of the Council of Antigua;, 17 October 
1780. Ibid., fo. 275. 
'"Minutes of the Council of Antigua, 23 November 1780. C. O. 
9/40 (hereafter cited as M. C. A. ). 
127Burt to the Assembly, 7 December 1780. C. O. 9/41. 
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of the positions taken by both Houses. If he were to 
acquiesce in this dispute, he feared that he would make 
the Governor 'a Subordinate Power divested of a right to 
judge or Determine, and to delegate & would relinquish to 
the Council the prerogative of the Crown pointedly mani- 
fested to be vested in the Governor by the 39th and 40th 
Royal Instructions'. 118 
Burt's rejection of the recommendations of both 
Houses led to the establishment of a joint committee - 
five Assemblymen and two Councillors to discuss the 
political implications of the dispute. In January 1781 
the Committee un; nimously recommended to Walrond that he 
should write to Burt stressing that he was sorry for his 
behaviour which Burt had misunderstood, and expressing 
his willingness to receive his commissions, 119 before any 
further action was taken. This was scarcely an apology 
since the onus for the dispute was placed on the Governor. 
Germain was alarmed on hearing of yet another controversy. 
In January he informed Burt that such conflicts had two 
effects. First, they disrupted the public service, and 
second, -they forced the British government to concede to 
the legislative bodies unconstitutional demands: 
I could have wished that means had been 
found to have prevented the Assembly of 
Antigua from going into the Consideration 
of ... Walrond's Memorial, or if that could 
not be, that such satisfaction had immediately 
been given them on the points in which they 
considered themselves interested, as would 
1"Governor Burt's Answer to the Council of Antigua, 20 December 
1780, in M. C. A., 3 January 1781. C. O. 9/40. 
119 M. C. A., 17 January 1781. Ibid. 
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have prevented any serious proceedings 
and Mr. Walrond have been left to make his 
complaint to the Throne. 120 
Germain's letter had reached Antigua after Burt's 
death, but pressure from both Houses had forced him to 
give way to their demands, and to reinstate Walrond. 121 
The victory gained by the Council and Assembly of Antigua 
had reduced the Governor's power to dismiss militia 
officersi thus giving them more control of the militia, 
as was the case in the other Caribbean islands. The West 
Indian Assemblies had long realised that a well disci- 
plined militia could only be achieved if the Governor's 
power to dismiss or supersede officers was transferred 
to a military court. Walrond's dispute helped to achieve 
this in Antigua. It had also touched on an unrelated but 
yet significant question. In its report to Burt, the 
Council stated that none of its members could be removed 
without its consent, irrespective of the Governor's 
ninth instruction which contained a proviso allowing him 
to suspend members without the Council's advice, if his 
reasons could not be communicated to the House. 
Shirley who had been hurriedly sent out to the 
Leeward Islands soon found himself in conflict with the 
Council over his suspension of a Member, Robert Jeafferson. 
The pro-American sentiments of the colonists had worried 
all the Governors in the British West Indies, and Shirley 
soon found that it was his turn to cope with this 
120 Germain to Burt, 3 January 1781. C. O. 152/61, fos. 3-4; see 
M. C. A., 17 January 1781. C. O. 9/40. 
121 Johnson to Germain, 22 March 1781. C. O. 152/Gl, fo. 34d. 
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problem. In April 1782 he informed the Council that lie 
had suspended Jeafferson for making a 'treasonable' 
statement -I "that the King could do what he pleased 
with his Privy Council, and that he had a corrupt 
Parliament to give him sanction for it"'. Afflicted with 
their economic distresses, the colonists naturally blamed 
Parliament for creating this situation by involving 
Britain in the American War which they saw as a threat 
to their own civil liberties. Moreover, when called upon 
to withdraw the statement, Jeafferson retorted: "'Why 
you,, 1 122 you Yourself think so too, don't . Convinced that 
the political opinion of some members of the Council was 
decidedly 'republican', Shirley judged it best not to 
seek the advice of the Council before suspending 
Jeafferson, but sent a letter advising President Thomas 
Jarvis of his decision. 123 
At the end of August, Jeafferson sent a petition 
to the King complaining that he had been removed without 
the advise of his peers. He explained that he neither 
intended to censure the King's conduct nor to show dis- 
respect to Governor Shirley, and asked that he be 
exonerated and reinstated to his seat on the Council. 124 
The Earl of Shelburne, Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, was perturbed over Jeafferson's suspension, 
and he sent a strongly worded letter to Shirley, in which 
he pointed out that while he did not condone the 
122 Thomas Shirley to Thomas Jarvis, 17 April 1782. C. O. 152/62, 
fo. 84. 
123 Ibid., fo. 84d; Thomas Shirley to Welbore Ellis, 7 May 1782; 
Ibid., fos. 82-82d. 
124 The Petition of Robert Jeafferson to the King, 27 August 
1782. Ibid., fos. 128-128d. 
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Councillor's 'indecent' behaviour, he was opposed to the 
Governor's adoption of such decisive action, and it was 
Ivory desirable to exercise his Majesty's authority with 
a spirit of Moderation rather than Resentment'. 125 The 
position adopted by Shelburne not only prevented the 
development of any further dispute in Antigua, it clearly 
illustrated the new element which had become paramount in 
the relationship between the West Indian colonies and 
Britain. 
The Leeward Islands Assemblies, like those of the 
other islands, were explicit in their constitutional 
claims during this period. The Assembly of St. Kitts 
had partly succeeded in excluding the members of the 
Council from participating in elections, and in upholding 
the House's rights to discipline members without any 
interference from the Governor or Council. That of 
Montserrat had impeached two justices of the peace for 
'high Crimes and other Misdemeanours', and even though 
it backed down in the face of opposition from Lieutenant- 
Governor Losack, the Assembly had made its point by the 
resignation of both officers. The Assembly of Nevis had 
also expelled two of its members who were elected by the 
votes of members of the Council; while that of Antigua, 
like the Assemblies of the other islands# successfully 
usurped the Governor's power over the forts and the 
dismissal of militia officers. The West Indian colonists 
had registered their opposition to Britain's American 
125 The Earl of Shelburne to Governor Shirley, 8 July 1782. ibid., 
fos. 93-93d. 
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policy by increasing their search for more 'Parlia- 
mentary privileges', and by widening their power over 
the executive branch. 
a 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
Prior to the outbreak of the American War of 
Independence, the economy of the West Indian sugar 
islands was overall in a healthy position. Of course, 
there were times when mainly because of natural causes 
as well as other factors common to agricultural 
societies, there 6. a-s a sizeable decline in the island's 
staple production; but before 1776 this reduction lasted 
only a short time. In contrast, the economic 
experience of the Caribbean colonists during the 
American War was one of shortages and high prices. But 
the islands were saved from total ruin by the several 
policies adopted by the British government and the local 
legislatures. However, by the end of the War few 
planters were able to meet the costs of running their 
estates, and the majority were heavily indebted. Thus, 
the loss of the American markets had clearly demonstrated 
that the West Indian sugar economy based on slave labour 
could not survive without external supplies. 
On the political level, one major question needs 
to be answered: why did the British West Indies, and the 
mainland colonies - with so many economic, political and 
cultural matters in common - fail to unite in opposition 
to British policies in America? If the West Indians were 
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not overtly engaged in the fighting, it was not because 
they did not sympathize with, or even share, many of the 
problems of the American colonies, as has been 
demonstrated in the preceding chapters. several reasons 
could be offered for the failure of the colonists to 
unite; but the most important was the uniqueness of the 
West Indian plantation system. Absenteeism had rid the 
islands of a substantial part of their white-leadership, 
and in the Caribbean there was no middle class which 
was not connected with slavery. Even more so than 
the American colonies during the colonial period, the 
West Indian economy, based as it was on sugar production, 
could not have survived without the slave system which 
was mainly controlled by English merchants. The system 
itself was responsible for the wealth of the islands, 
and thus the planters could not have-separated from 
Britain without destroying their wealth. Furthermore, 
any rebellion by the white population would have auto- 
maticallY sparked numerous slave uprisings in the 
British West Indies, as was-ý-demonstrated in Jamaica 
in 1776. This fear of slave rebellions was also partly 
responsible for keeping the West Indians 'loyal' to 
Britain. 
Yet, the period from 1776 to 1782 witnessed the 
I growing power of all the West Indian Assemblies, an 
upsurge of political activity, and an unusual rise in 
the number of disputes between the Governors and the 
Assemblies over various constitutional issues. The 
West Indians, like the Americans, explicitly stated that 
391 
they possessed the constitutional power to control all 
matters affecting their internal affairs, without any 
interference from London or the Governors. The promise 
made by Parliament in 1778 not to legislate for the 
colonies except in matters relating to trade was a 
significant concession, and might have influenced the 
attitude of some Assemblies. There is little doubt, 
howevert that the American War had received some support 
from a large sector of the colonists. The fighting on 
the continent was only the final and decisive phase of 
the Revolution which had taken roots in the decade prior 
to 1775. Much of the thinking of this period was shared 
by the West Indians as demonstrated in the writings of 
Edward Long and Bryan Edwards, as well as in many of the 
political claims made by the Assemblies. The earliest 
and most significant was the petition of the Assembly of 
Jamaica to Lieutenant-Governor Roger Hope Elletson in 
1766. it was precisely in these times of crisis that 
the Assemblies' claims to co-equality with the British 
House of Commons were most strongly made. 
The deteriorating economic conditions of the 
islands and the uncertainty of their future were 
reflected in the constitutional debates during the 
American War. The refusal of the Assemblies to tax an 
over-burdened people, the restriction of the Governors' 
powers in all facets of West Indian political life, 
the Assemblies' quest for executive powers, and the 
readiness of the colonists to prosecute their Governors 
formed part of a wider movement manifested in the 
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American War of Independence. All the Governors who 
served in the West Indies during this period spoke of 
the emergence of a republican spirit. For example, 
Governor Burt wrote in one of his last despatches: 
'Others in this part of the World caught the infection 
from America and deeply tinged with the principles of 
Republicanism, attempt bringing all to a level, and 
assume Privileges to which I cannot think them 
constitutionally, I am certain they are not from the 
modo of Government hitherto carried on, entitled'. ' 
Governors Morris, Dalling, Hay, Cuninghame and Macartney 
reached similar conclusions. This diffusion of 
republicanism in the colonies was used by Sir Guy 
Carleton, former Governor of Canada and Commander-in- 
Chief of the British forces in America, in opposing free 
trade between the West Indies and the United States of 
America. in his evidence before the Committee of the 
Privy Council for Trade and Foreign Plantations in 1784, 
he emphasised: 'It is not in the Revolted provinces 
alone that a Republican Spirit is to be found, but the 
tint has ... spread to other parts of America, and to 
the West Indies 9-o- o2 
Long before this period, the colonists had enjoyed 
a broader, more general representation in their 
Assemblies than their fellow subjects in Britain. In 
most of the colonies a white man needed only ten acres 
I Durt to Cermain, 25 October 1780. C. O. 152/60, fo. 258. 
2 Minuton of the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade, 
16 March 1704. H. T. 5/le fo. 14d. 
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of land before he could vote, or be elected to the Assembly. 
Most of the colonists had the necessary qualifications 
or were allowed to hold land in trust, thus enabling 
them to participate in elections. Consequently, the 
ratio of the representatives in the colonial Assemblies 
to the white population was more generous than in 
Britain. The people were therefore more familiar with 
the principles of the British Parliamentary system, 
and thus desired to see more of the executive power of 
government controlled by their elected representatives. 
This movement which included the control of the militia, 
the control of the declaration of martial law, the 
control of the issuing of public money, the limitation 
of the life of the Assembly and in Jamaica a law giving 
the judges their places during good behaviour led"to 
most of the constitutional crises in the islands. 
During the American War, the colonial administrative 
system was severely tested, and it became difficult for 
the Governors to administer their islands according to 
their instructions. In every colony the Assembly defied 
the Governor, and in nearly every clash of authority the 
colonists were victorious. They had achieved their goals 
by subverting the prerogatives in some way. The questions 
in dispute differed only slightly. In Barbados and 
Jamaica, these were attempts to wrest more executive 
power from the Governors; while in St. Kitts and the 
ceded islands, the Assemblies were imbued with a more 
revolutionary spirit although not to the same degree as 
in America. The West Indians were proud to be Englislunen, 
394 
and unlike in the mainland colonies there was no overt 
movement for independence, but for more political 
control which the authorities viewed as incompatible 
with their status as colonists. The extent of the 
opposition to Imperial authority in each colony 
apparently depended on the severity of economic decline, 
as well as the degree of sympathy for the Americans. 
Like the Americans, the West Indians believed 
in government by consent, and were opposed to being 
classified subject people. They were thus willing to 
recogniso the prerogative when it did not conflict with 
their interests. However, the position of the West 
Indian planters in the economic system of the British 
Empire* and the vulnerability of the islands to attacks 
by foreign powers, were factors which compelled them to 
remain 'loyal' to the Crown. But during the seven 
years of fighting, the Caribbean colonists waged their 
own war against the British government, and as the 
island governments were left to be administered solely 
by the Governors, with little direction from Lord 
Cormaino each colonial Assembly successfully made 
inroads into the executive power. The question of a 
unified opposition to British policy was unthinkable at 
this time, and the issues in contention, though common 
throughout the islands, were handled parochially. 
APPENDIX A 
Tablc 1 
Account of Negroes Imported, Exported 
and Retained in Jamaica, '1770-1776 
Year Imported Emorted Retained 
1770 6,824 836 5,988 
1771 4,183 671 3,512 
1772 5,278 923 4,355 
1773 10,729 587 10,142 
9*676 800 8,876 
1774 17,607 2,659 15,028 
18#448 2#511 15,937 
1775 17,364 5,494 13,870 
9,292 1,629 7,663 
1776 18,400 3,834 15,016 
Inspector General's 
Stephen Fuller's 
Agent of Jamaica 
Inspector General's 
S. Fuller's Agent 
Inspector General's 
S. Fuller's Agent 
Taken from Long, 'Papers on the Statistics of Jamaica 1739-1770' 
(1789). Add. MSS. 12,435, fo. 27d. The differences in the figures 
might be due to omission of accounts for part of the year or the 
returns of some port3 by Fuller. Long claims that the Inspector- 
General's figures are correct. 
Table 2 
Account of Negroes Imported into Dominica, 1770-1775 
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0 
Year Negroes Imported 
1770 2,818 
1771 3,093 (3,249)* 
1772 3,991 
1773 2,011 (3,370)* 
1774 2,349 
1775 5,607 
Taken from 'An Account of the number of Negroes imported into... 
Dominica under the Free rort Act of 6 Goo. III C. 49' (no date). 
C. O. 310/2, foo. 249,252 (horeafter cited as Accounts of Negroes 
importod Into Dominica). 
*Thoso figurva might be the correct ones, and miqht include the 
Importationn into all porta. 
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Table 3 
Population Figures for the Leeward Islands 
Year Place Whites Negroes Year Whites Negroes 
1756 Antigua 3,412 31,428 1774 2,590 37,808 
1756 Montserrat 1,430 8,853 1774 1,300 10,000 
1756 Nevis 11050 8,380 1774 11000 10,000 
1756 St. Kitts 2,713 21,891 1774 11900 23,462 
Sir Alan Burns, History of the West Indies (Lon don, 1965), pp. 
499, 510. 
Great Dritaint Parliament. Papers Presented to FarZicment, 
Vol. 841 Accounts and Papers, Vol. XXVI (1789); Part IV, No. 15 
(hereafter cited asParZi=entary Papers. 
Table 4 
population Figures for Jamaica 
Year Whites Slaves 
1760 17,949 166,914 
1773 12,737 192,787 
1770 18,420 205,261 
1700 18,347 226,432 
Compiled fron Ragatz, Statiatios for the Study of British Caribbean 
Watory 170-2833 Mondon, 1928), p. 5, 'Statistics on Jamaica' 
(no date). C. O. 310/2, fo. 19. 
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Table 5 
Population of Dominica, Grenada and St. Vincent 
Dominica 
Year Whites Slaves 
1763 1,718 5,872 
1760 2,020 8,497 
1772 3,850 18,753a 
1773 3,850 18,753b 
Grenadac 
Year Whites Slaves 
1763 12,000 
1771 2,076 26,211 
1777 1,534 35,118 
1783 996 24,620 
1785 23,926 
St. Vincentd 
Year Whiter. Slaves 
1764 2vlO4 7,414 
1772 2,000 7,000 
1707 1,450 11,853 
a 'StAte of Dominica' (no dato). C. O. 318/2, co. 18 
b Itagatz, Statiation, p. S. 
C 'St4tO Of Gronao-Ve 1705. C. O. 310/2# fo. 217. 
d Awlimopst(ley Z11prra, Vol. 04. 
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Table 6 
Population of Tobago 
Year Whites Slaves 
1770 238 3,164 
1775 391 8,643 
Taken from Ragatz, The Planter Class, p. 30. 
Table 7 
Exports from Grenada to England to the Nearest Unit 
Year 
Cocoa Coffee Rum Sugar Cotton 
cWto cwts gals cwts lbs 
1769 2,343 12,443 94,030 126,228 969,093 
1770 3,054 15,927 158,066 196,131 966,496 
1771 5,048 13,749 161,189 157,762 629,228 
1772 3,424 24,740 90,143 194,452 1,069,261 
1773 3,074 17,396 63,664 198,159 1,028,802 
1774 2,811 23,299 72,318 179,375 1,175,913 
1775 2,667 24,423 -143,138 189,939 729,949 
1776 2,386 16,403 292,953 147,722 561,946 
1777 2,413 21,027 98.078 115,740 1,225,201 
1770 2,304 20,124 148,351 122,254 1,296,723 
1779 2,219 12,158 67,223 103,292 1,176.026 
Compiled from The Public Record Office. Customs 3/69-79 
(hereafter cited as Customs 3). 
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Table 0 
Exports from St. Vincent to England 
Cocoa Coffee Rum Sugar Cotton 
Year 
cWts cwts gals cwts lbs 
1769 2401 4,818 5,878 21,174 46,602 
1770 936 2,995 34,694 38,395 63,964 
1771 921 7,685 48,047 44,359 67,895 
1772 1,381 10,503 20,350 53,551 84,627 
1773 2#002 7*348 26,071 58,691 199,670 
1774 1,784 8,111 16,342 62,599 342,228 
1775 1,192 10,568 79,603 51,643 271,472 
1776 2#037 6,827 88,089 45,975 374,229 
1777 530 7,120 39,330 50,381 219,329 
1778 724 3,531 58,883 43,080 577,911 
1779 751 5,320 16,763 40,877 26,500 
OompLIed from Customs 3/69-79. 
Table 9 
Exports from Tobago to England 
suclar Rum Cotton 
Year cwts gals lbs 
1770 10686 Iro 0 
1771 4,450 29 
1772 13,625 619 33,000 
1773 14,153 3,171 2,000 
1774 30,985 550 71,624 
1775 50,385 2,845 167,510 
1776 47,14G 66,656 381,355 
1777 17,754 16,782 408,974 
1770 26,922 35,351 1,459,614 
1779 15,591 4,998 728,506 
1700 22,149 5,050 1,452,002 
Compilml from Cuntomn 3/70-110. 
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Table 10 
Exports from Dominica to England 
Coffee Rum Sugar 
Year 
cwts gals cwts 
1769 14,163 6,604 1,560 
1770 10,480 793 13,940 
1771 16,449 25,489 10,258 
1772 20,321 18,706 10,371 
1773 15,709 10,867 26,705 
1774 21,134 11,707 53,464 
1775 15,792 50,800 40,682 
1776 25,165 74,955 49,837 
1777 16,121 26,444 35,462 
1778 14,306 44,729 38,855 
Compiled from Customs 3/69-78. 
Table 11 
Exports from Barbados to England 
Rum Sugar Cotton 
Year 
gals cwts cwts 
1769 279,056 154,262 112,083 
1770 307,642 172,706 114,055 
1771 112,986 100,945 65,877 
1772 14,214 140,850 129,892 
1773 8,629 110,911 161,139 
1774 11,498 139,564 165,988 
1775 17,841 70,131 230,291 
1776 196,419 117,028 201,050 
1777 28,013 80,701 491,849 
1778 5,350 46,081 253,915 
1779 10,044 86,453 434,785 
1780 5,452 68,720 461,933 
Compiled from Customs 3/69-80. 
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Table 12 
Exports from Antiqua to Enqlnnd 
Year RUM Sti(la r 
2.11-S cwts 
1770 417,512 126#470 
1771 200,897 112,167 
1772 31,669 114,221 
1773 3#297 00,095 
1774 20oO59 233t441 
1775 48#951 241,595 
1776 114,325 196,966 
1777 7#553 85#339 
1778 7#797 100,940 
1779 9,371 60,600 
1700 SP093 35,662 
Compiled from Customs 3/70-80. 
Tablo 13 
Exports from St. Kitts to England 
Year Suqnr Rum 
March to March lloqnhondo Cankn 
1769 - 1770 12#504 69 
1770 - 1771 17,103 91 
1771 - 1772 13*004 62 
1772 - 1773 15,601 49 
1773 - 1774 60900 33 
1774 - 1775 ? 15#039 60 
1775 - 1776 13#520 76 
1776 - 1777 14,233 1,274 
1777 - 1770 11,619 404 
1770 - 1779 10,901 560 
1779 - 1700 15,747 175 
1700 - 1701 l4o617 27 
1701 - 1702 14,102 1,025 
1702 - 1703 13,243 572 
Sheridan quoten t1lo j1111111.11 iv(,, r. i(jo (itimit. it, y ar mitor at 9,141 torm whirb 
comparvii ravotirably wit. 11 tho i1bovo f i(juron - . 1thorl(I. Ill, 'All vra of Wont Indian protipprity'. 11,01, Coviiia and Awlior, tuln., V411,10110 hi Oavlbllom 
I/1111010y, 1). 115. M. 11.1 ho(pilload-4ipprox. IS cwtu, I cank-npprox. 110 (jalil. 
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Table 14 
Exports from Jamaica to England 
q 
Coffeea Sugarb Rumb 
Year 
cwts hogsheads gals 
1770 1,711 39,760 8,743 
1771 2,123 39,136 10,737 
1772 5,900 45,889 12,483 
1773 3,770 54,302 12,596 
1774 4,831 51,218 10,493 
1775 4,029 50,340 11,564 
1776 3,396 40,799 14,257 
1777 3,987 33,856 10,034 
1778 651 40,509 12,320 
1779 6,260 42,876 14,250 
1780 7,176 49,158 12,014 
1781 -- 38,509 8,189 
1782 30,282 7,820 
a Custom 3/70-80. e 
b 'Minutes of the West India Merchants', Vol. It fos. 9,18,28,47,61, 
76,115,147,174; Vol. II, fos. 20,58d, 92d, 112d. 
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Sugar and Rum Exports to the American Colonies 
From the British West Indies 
Year 
Suqar Rum 
cwts gals 
1768 39,750 2,060,726 
1769 49,020 2,718,923 
1770 65,447 3,224,060 
1771 47,946 2,180,060 
1772 44,617 3,351,478 
1773 39,365 a 3,049,298a 
1774 76,071 
8,520,000 lbsb 
IN 
4,783,680 b 
75,880 
8,498,671 lbs c 4,783,825C 
a 'An Account of the Quantity of Rum and Sugar imported into North 
America from the West India Islands... 1768-1773'. B. T. 6/84, fos. 
297,299. 
b James Allen, Considerations on the Present State of the Intercourse 
between His Majesty's Sugar CoZonies and the... United States of 
America (London, 1784), p. 38. He puts the rum exports for 1773 at 
3,549,150 gallons. 
c 'General Account of Sugar, Rum ... Exported ... from the West Indies in 
1773 and 1774' (no date). B. T. 6/83: Part 2, fos. 40,54. The 
quantity of rum exported in 1773 according to this account is only 
two gallons more than Allen's figures. 
Table 18 
Table 17 
Exports fr(xn the British West Indies to Canada 
Year 
Sugar 
cwts 
Rum 
gals 
1768 376 
1769 116 
1770 462 
1771 369 
1772 726 
1773 312 
Compare with figures in Table 17. 
50,340 
4,840 
41,290 
42,820 
42,786 
64,610 
Taken from B. T. 6/84, fos. 297,299. 
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Table 2 
Quantity of West Indian Produce Imported into 
England from 1770 to 1787 to the Nearest Unit 
Year Sugar Rum Coffee Cocoa Pimento 
cwts galýL cwts cwts lbs 
1770 1,818,229 
1771 1,492,096 2,728,565 40,026 6,882 1,793,154 
1772 1,786,045 2,284,163 62,206 6,802 1,450,575 
1773 1,762,387 2,282,544 44,745 7,813 2,282,071 
1774 2,015,911 1,703,222b 57,694b 5,227b 2,530,939b 
1775 2,002,224 a 2,305,808 54,937 5,334 2,522,356 
1776 1,656,934 3,341,025 51,833 6,536 1,589,145 
1777 1,328,838 2,068,756 48,636 4,080 1,418,471 
1778 1,406,429 2,456,572 38,801 3,494 2,498,192 
1779 1,433,026 2,143,055 25,295 3,932 613,247 
1780 1,293,060 1,615,841 8,568 11908 676,076 
1781 968,295 1,207,421 6,305 1,235 915,262 
1782 1,198,860 1,562,327 12,118 605 451,880 
1783 1,480,077 c 1,873,029 c 1.9,933 c 2,853 c 901,597 c 
1784 1,815,510 1,981,308 41,147 2,586 1,134,254 
1785 2,173,468 3,558,380 37,036 5,688 3,258,980 
1786 1,813,098 2,229,231 39,032 1,722 1,017,757 
1787 1,926,121d 2,251,341d 30,365d 3,954d 606,954 d 
a Edwards, History of the West Indies, Vol. II, pp. 509,510. b Ragatz, Statistics, p. 22. 
C'Account of the imports and Exports between ... England and the 
British West Indies ... for Christmas 1773 to Christmas 1783... 
(1784). ' T. 38/269, fos. 1-11 (hereafter cited as 'Account of 
Imports and Exports'). d ParZiamentary Papers, Vol. 84; Accounts and Papers, Vol. xxci, 
Appendix 7. 
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Table 3 
Account of Negroes Retained in the Following Islands 
Year Antigua Barbados Dominica Jamaica 
1775 1,127 879 5,687 13,870 
1776 476 407 3,032 15,016d 
1777 286 34 1,996 5,049 
1778 144 7 305 c 4,419 
1779 9 no account island captured 2,859 
1780 73 no account island captured 3,015 
1781 132 1,138 island captured 6,755 
1782 571 a 109 island captured 4,423 
1783 910 
f 
194 
b 
island captured 9,580e 
a ParZiamentary Papers, Vol. 84; Accounts and Papers, Vol. XXVI, 
No. 646 (12), p. 51. b Ibid., Part III, A, No. 15; ParZiwnentary Papers, Vol. 87; Accounts 
and Papers, Vol. XXIX (1790), No. 577, p. 2. 
C 'Account of Negroes retained in Dominica' (no date). C. O. 318/2, 
fos. 249,252. 
d Long, 'Statistics of Jamaica' (1789). Add. MMS. 12,435, fo. 37d. 
e ParZiamentary Papers, Vol. 82; Accounts and Papers, Vol. xxix 
.f 
(1789), No. 622. 
vAccount of Negroes-retained in each island... 1783 to 17881 
(no date). C. O. 318/1, fo. 141. 
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Table 1 
Total Quantity of Tobacco Imported into Britain 
from North America, the British and Foreign, West Indian 
Islands to 
A 
the Nearest Pound 
North British French 
Year America West Indies West Indies 
1775 101,337,361 491,256 
1776 14,698,400 2,000 
1777 ý01,361 167,224 
1778 1,692,518 626,021 -- 
1779 3,321,043 4,146,167 40,944 
1780 985,273 10,247,272 298,130 
1781 1,872,609 4,827,031 91,463 
1782 1,082,067 5,070,633 289,402 
1783 14,643,165 2,295,088 286,047 
From Macpherson, Annals of Conmerce, Vol. IV, p. 37. 
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Table 1 
Account Showing Prices for Provisions, Lumber, Sugar, 
and Rum in Barbados in 1774,1775 and 1776 
1774 to 1775 1776 
Articles Quantity Prices Prices 
Good Flour bushel 15s. to 25s. Bad Flour 30s. to 37s. 6d. 
Maize bushel 2s. 6d. to 3s. 9d. 10s. to 13s. 
Salt Fish quintal l2s. 6d. to 25s. 30s. to 40s. 
Beef barrel 60s. to 70s. 90s. to 120s. 
Pork barrel 70s. to 100s. 100s. to 150s. 
Herring barrel 25s. to 32s. 6d. 45s. to 55s. 
Butter pound 8d. to 10d. ls. 3d. to ls-10ýd. 
Island's Produce 
Muscovado 
Sugar cwt 30s. to 
Coarse 
Clayed cwt 35s. to 
Proof Rum gallon 2s. 
Taken from 'A State of the price 
sugar and rum in the years 1774, 
C. O. 28/56, fo. 76. 
35s. l8s. 9d. to 25s. 
47s. 6d. 27s. 6d. to 35s. 
Is. 3d. 
s of provisions, and the value of 
1775 and 1776', 8 September 1776. 
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Table 2 
Average Prices of Lumber, and Provisions in Barbados 
Articles, 2uantity Before the War 
Lumber mft. Z4 
Horses, British each r5O 
American E20 
Horned Cattle each Z5 to t7.10s. 
Rice cwt 12s. 6d. 
Indian Corn bushel 2s. 6d. 
Beef barrel SOS. 
Pork barrel 65s. 
During the War 
E30 
EBO to noo 
Z40 
E15 to UO 
30s. 
12s. 6d. 
75s. 
Z5 
Governor David Parry to Lord Sydney, 26 December 1784. C. O. 28/56, 
fo. 209. 
Table 3 
Average Prices of Lumber, and Provisions in the Leeward Islands 
Articles Quantity Before the War During the War 
Rice cwt 18s. to 24s. 50s. to 55s. 
Indian Corn bushel 4s. to 8s. 12s. to l6s. 6d. 
Beef barrel 50s. to Z4 100s. to 160s. 
Po rk barrel 66s. to 4.10s. 132s. to 198s. 
Flour cwt 20s. to 30s. 50s. to 66s. 
Boards, Planks mft. Z5 to kis 400s. to 600s. 
Joists & Hoops 
Shingles mft. 18s. to 30s. 66s. to 160s. 
White Oak Staves 
& Headings mft. V to Z10 400s. to 800s. 
Red Oak Staves mft. t5 to E8 330s. to 660s. 
Horses each k16.10s. to 35 E50 to E120 
11orned Cattle each Z16.10s. to 19-10s. E33 to E50 
Livestock dozen 30s. to 50s. 99s. to 330s. 
111eads of Inquiry with Answers to them annexed, No. V, in Thomas 
Shirley to Lord Sydney, 7 September 1785. C. O. 152/64, No. 115. 
Ragatz, Planter Class. p. 154. 
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Table 4 
Average Prices of Lumber, Provisions in Jamaica 
Articles Quantity Before the War During the War 
Rice bushel l3s. 9d. to 20s. 40s. to 80s. 
Indian Corn bushel 2s. 6d. to 6s. 3d. 6s. 8d. to l7s. 6d. 
Common Flour cwt 15s. to 20s. 20s. to 50s. 
Super Fine Flour cwt 20s. to 27s. 6d. 27s. 6d. to Gos 
Common Board mft. 120s. to 200s. 200s. to 600s. 
Pitch Pine Board mft. 160s. to 240s. 300s. to 80os. 
Shingles mft. 22s. 6d. to 45s. 80s. to 140s. 
White Oak Staves mft. 200s. to 360s. 400s. to 1000s. 
Red Oak Staves mft. 120s. to 240s. 
'Answers to the Several Heads of Enquiry, lst Querie', 11 November 
1784. C. O. 137/85, fo. 115; Ragatz, The Planter Class, p. 153. 
Table 5 
Average Prices of Lumber, Provisions in St. Vincent 
Articles Quantity 1770 to 1774 1774 to 1778 1778 to 1784 
Lumber mft. 80s. to 90s. 
Shingles mft. l6s. 6d. to 20s. 
florses each 400s. to 800s. 
Horned Cattle each 260s. to 720s. 
Sheep each 33s. to 36s. 
Geese & Turkeys each 12s. 
Fowl dozen 36s. 
Salt Fish 110 lbs. 15s. 
Corn bushel 4s. 6d. to 6s. 
Pork barrel 66s. to 100s. 
White Oak Staves mft. 132s. 
Red Oak Staves mft. 100s. 
Prices 400s. to 800s. 
were in 84s. 
state 800s. to 1200s. 
of pro- 400s. to 660s. 
gressive 66s. to 100s. 
increase 25s. to 33s 
72s. 
50s. to 70s. 
70s. to 100s. 
24s. 9d. 
660s. 
400s. 
'The Prices of Lumber, Horned Cattle, Livestock, and Indian Corn 
Compared with the Average Prices Before and During the War-', in 
Edward Lincoln to Lord Sydney, 8 January 1785. C. O. 260/7, No. 14. 
N. B. The 1778 to 1784 figures might have been lessened because those 
for 1783 to 1784 were included in the average. 
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Table 6 
Prices of Rum in the British West Indies 
Year Barbadosa Dominica b Leeward Islands c 
1770 to 1773 19d. 
1774 to 1776 
18d. to 22d. 17d. 
1777 19ýd. 2s. 6d. 
1778 18ýd. 2s. 6d. 
1779 14ýd. 3s. 
1780 3s. ld to 3s. 9d. 
14ýd. 3s. 6d. 
1781 
Is 
15ýd 3s. 6d. 
1782 19ýd. 2s. 9d. 
1783 19ýd. 4s. 
1784 17d. 2s. 6d. 
aParry to Sydney, December 1784. C. O. 28/60, fo. 209. 
bJohn Orde to Lord Sydney, 22 January 1785. C. O. 71/9, fo. 61d. 
clileads of Inquiry with Answers... ', 7 September 1785. C. O. 152/64, 
No. 115. 
Table 7 
Sugar Prices in Britain in SePtember 1777 
Tobago 42s. 6d. to 48s. 
Jamaica 40s. to 47s. 6d. 
Grenada 42s. to 49s. 
St. Kitts 40s. to 52s. 
Taken from Houston & Co. to Turner and Paul, 23 September 1777. 
Houston Papers: N. L. S. MSS. 8.793, p. 265; In December prices 
jumped by 16s. across the board; see Houston & Co. to Alexander 
Hamilton, 1 December 1777. Ibid., p. 276. 
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PRIMARY SOURCES 
A. Public Record Office, London. 
Admiralty- Papers 
Series 1: In letters to the Secretary of the 
Admiralty. Contains all the official 
correspondence between the Commanders-in- 
Chief of the West Indian fleets and the 
Secretary of the Admiralty. 
Adm. 1/240: Dispatches of Admiral Gayton, 
1774-1778. 
Adm. 1/241: Dispatches of Admiral Parker, 
1778-1779. 
Adm. 1/309: Dispatches of Admirals'Man, Parry 
and Young, 1769-1777. 
Adm. 1/310: Dispatches of Admirals Young and 
Barrington and Commodore Hotham, 
1776-1781. 
Adm. 1/311: Dispatches of Admiral Rodney, 
1779-1780. 
Adm. 1/312: Dispatches of Admirals Byron, Hughes 
Drake and Hyde Parker, Commodore 
Walsingham and Affleck. 
Adm. 1/314: Dispatches of Admiral Rodney, 
1781-1787. 
Iligh Court of Admiralty Papers 
Series 32: Contains Prize Papers of American 
ships captured during and after the War of 
American independence. Those listed cover 
the years 1776-1786. 
0 
H. C. A. 
11. C. A. 
11. C. A. 
11. C. A. 
H. C. A. 
11. C. A. 
11. C. A. 
11. C. A. 
32/317/4 
32/360/15 
32/390/10 
32/419/2,3,14 
32/436/4,20,21 
32/437/13 
32/447/12 
32/457/1 
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(c) Board of Trade Papers 
Series 5: Vol. 1. Minutes of the Committee for 
Trade and Foreign Plantations. 
Series 6: Vol. 20. Commercial Papers: Series 11 
1784-1791 American Trade. 
Vol. 75. Miscellaneous Papers on the 
West Indies, 1786-1789. 
Vol. 76. Papers concerning Jamaica: 
West Indies 1786-1791. 
Vol. 77. Papers relating to the West 
Indies 1787-1791. 
Vol. 80. Correspondence: American 
commercial intercourse 1783- 
1784. 
Vol. 81. Papers on American intercourse 
1783-1786: Minutes of the 
Committee of the Privy Council 
on American Trade. 
Vol. 83. Parts I and II. America and 
the West Indies - Commercial 
Intercourse: Minutes and 
Statistics on United States - 
West Indian Trade. 
Vol. 84. Correspondence relating to 
American - West Indian trade. 
Vol. 96. Material relative to shipping 
and the proposed new 
Navigation Act. 
Vol. 185. Sir Charles Whitworth 'State 
of the Trade of Great 
Britain'. First published in 
1776, but the manuscript copy 
contains tables from 1697- 
1801. 
Vol. 186. Jamaica shipping returns. 
(d) Privy Council 
Series 1: 19A/24 'Report of the Lords of the 
Committee for Trade, upon Two Acts 
passed by the Congress of the United 
States of America in July 1789. ' 
(c) Colonial Office 
The Colonial Office papers are the largest single 
collection of documents for any study of West 
Indian history. They contain all the offical 
correspondence between the Governors and the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, as well as 
letters from the Governors to the Board of Trade. 
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Those used in this work are: 
BarbadoD 
Series 28: Volumes. 34 and 35: the original 
corr * espondence 
with the Board of 
Trade, 1772-1782. 
Volumes 42,55-61: the official 
correspondence with the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, 1773- 
1788 
Series 29: Contains the Governors' commissions, 
instructions, and 'out' letters 
from the Board of Trade to the 
Governors. The correspondence is 
usually a duplicate of series 28. 
Volume 21 concerns the period 1767 to 
1778. 
Series 31: This is extemely important for any 
study of the period and contains 
invaluable material regarding the 
relationship between the Governors 
and the Barbados Assembly. Many of 
the speeches made in the House on 
important political and constitutional 
issues are reproduced in the volumes. 
Volumes 38 and 42 are Minutes of the 
Council; volumes 39,41 and 43. are 
Journals of the Assembly. 
Bahamas 
Series 23: Volume 24: Correspondence with the 
Secretary of State of the Colonies 
1777-1780. 
Dominica 
Series 71: Volumes 1 and 2 original corres- 
pondence with the Board of Trade 
1730-1801. Volumes 3 to 9,12,13 
correspondence with the Secretary of 
State 1770-1787. 
Series 72: Volumes 3 to 5 are Sessional Papers. 
Grenada 
Series 101: Volumes 1 to 7 are correspondence 
with the Board of Trade. Volume 6 
contains an address from the Assembly 
of Grenada in favour of the American 
Revolution. 
Volumes 18 to 23,26 are corres- 
pondonce with the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, 1774-1786. 
Volume 18 contains correspondence of 
Lieutenant-Governor Morris of 
St. Vincent. 
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Series 104: Contains the Sessional Papers. 
Volume 2. was particularly useful. 
Jamaica 
Series 137: Volumes 38 to 40 - Board of Trade: 
original correspondence. 
Volumes 68 to 86,1772-1787, which 
contain the correspondence with the 
Secretary of State were used in this 
work. Volumes 79 to 81 contain 
papers regarding the recruiting and 
service of American loyalist troops, 
particularly the Loyal American 
Rangers. 
Series 140: Sessional Papers. Volumes 46,53 
and 59 are Journals of the Assembly, 
1766-1783. Volumes 46 and 59 were 
printed. 
Leeward IsZands 
Series 152: Volumes 31 to 
pondence with 
pertain to thi 
Volumes 49 to 
pondence with 
1768-1788. 
34 are the corres- 
the Board of Trade and 
B period. 
65 are the corres. - 
the Secretary of State, 
Each Assembly had its own Sessional 
Papers, and are as follows: 
(i) Antigua 
Series 9: Volumes 33,35,40 and 41 are relevant 
to the study. 
(ii) Montserrat 
Series 177: Volume 12, Minutes of the Assembly 
1767-1781. 
Nevis 
Series 186: Volume 6 is marked 'Council and 
Assembly', but should )-., e more 
appropriately called 'Journal of the 
Assembly', 1765-1781. 
Volume 7 is listed as 'Council and 
Assembly', but should be 'Minutes of 
the Council', 1768-1780. 
(iv) St. Kitts 
Series 239: Volume 1 contains miscellaneous 
correspondence with the Secretary of 
State, 1702-1812. 
Series 241: Volume 11: marked 'Council and 
Assembly' but should be 'Journal of 
the Assembly', 1768-1780. 
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(f) 
Vincent 
Series 260: 
Volume 12: 
1767-1781. 
Volume 14: 
1768-177OF 
Volume 11 * 
Volume 17: 
1778-1782. 
Minutes of the Council, 
Journal of the Assembly, 
contains duplicates of 
Journal of the Assembly, 
Volumes 4 to 7 are 
with the Secretary 
1786. 
Volume 6,1778-1782 
of the Assembly and 
Council. There is 
of Sessional Papers 
America and the West Indies 
the correspondence 
of State, 1776- 
contains Journal 
Minutes of the 
notable absence 
during this period. 
Series 5: Volumes 93 and 94 are the corres- 
pondence with the Secretary of State, 
contain military despatches concerning 
the American War. 
Series 318: Volumes land 2 are the original 
correspondence with the Board of Trade, 
1624-1808. Contain notes, statis- 
tical tables regarding trade between 
the United States, British North 
America, Britain and the West Indies. 
Volume 7 contains miscellaneous 
material on the West Indies in 
general. 
Series 325: Miscellaneous series. Volume 6 
contains a paper on the 'State of 
Trade with America'. Much of it deals 
with the period after 1783. 
Treasury Papers 
Series 1: Contains several papers, accounts, 
reports, petitions and other material 
pertaining to trade, land grants, 
illicit commerce and other issues 
concerning the British West Indies. 
The relevant pieces used in this 
study are 338,515,516,526,528, 
530,531,534,535,539,540,542, 
551,623. 
Series 38: Volume 269 contains an account of 
Imports and Exports between England 
and the British West Indies 1773-1783. 
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Custom lJousc Accounts 
Class 3: Contains ledgers of imports from the 
British West Indies into London and 
the outports in England, Volumes 
69 to 80 were used in the preparation 
of the thesis. 
B. British Muscump London 
Of particular interest for a study of West Indian 
history are the Long Papers: Add. MSS. 12,402- 
12,440. Those used in this work are Add. Mss. 12,402 
-12,404, Long's manuscript copies of his 'History of 
Jamaica' with corrections and additions; Add. MSS. 
12,411-12,414, notes pertaining to Jamaican history 
and trade statistics; Add. MSS. 12,415-12,421, 
James Knight's unpublished 'History of Jamaica to 
1746'; Add. MSS. 12,431, papers relating to Jamaican 
affairs; Add. MSS. 12,430, 'Code de Noir 17881; 
Add. MSS. 12,435 contains papers on statistics of 
Jamaica 1739-1770. Some are earlier; also contains 
reports on the island's development; Add. MSS. 
22,677, letters of James Knight and others relating 
to Jamaica 1725-1789. The important material in 
this volume concerns neutral shipping with special 
reference to the West Indies during the Anglo-. 
French War. 
Add. MSS. 30,001. This volume contains the corres- 
pondence of the Rickets and Jervis family relative 
to Jamaican matters from 1757-1799. Most letters 
concern their property in the island. 
Add. MSS. 33,316. The diary of James Pinnock, a 
Jamaican planter. Deals mainly with family matters, 
and only contains a few entries of any historical 
value. 
Liverpool Papers 
These are the official papers of the first Earl of 
Liverpool, and contain several items of interest to 
the West Indies, concerning statistics on trade, 
shipping returns, and information on British policy. 
Those consulted are Add. MSS. 38,218 containing 
letters from Jamaica, and other papers on several 
issues concerning the West Indies; Add. MSS. 38,219, 
38,224 'Remarks relative to the Laws of Navigation, 
and of the Revenue of the Customs in Jamaica'; Add. 
MSS. 38,309,38342 and 38,343 contain West Indian 
Trade statistics; Add. MSS. 38,345-38,351: some of 
the papers in these volumes deal with the reorgani- 
sation of the Government of Grenada, and they also 
contain material relative to West Indian-United States 
trade, information about the French West Indies, 
comparative state of the trade between the British 
sugar islands, the United States of America and the 
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British mainland colonies, and also a paper on 
Nassau's claims for a free port; Add. MSS. 38,759 
contains paper concerning British, sugar policy; 
Add. MSS. 38,376 contains shipping statistics, 
1784-1793, as well as papers relative to Grenada, 
and smuggling in the West Indies; Add. MSS. 38,387 
has a paper on the importance of the sugar colonies 
to Britain with suggestions for their extension and 
improvement. 
Add. MSS. 38,717. Letters from Lord Germain to Lord 
Macartney 1776-1779. 
Add. MSS. 38,718. Letters from Lord Macartney to 
Lord Germain, 1776-1779. These are duplicates of his 
official correspondence found in C. O. 101/20-23. 
Egerton MSS. 2.135. This volume contains letters 
and papers relating to the American War of Indepen- 
dence, and material relating to the surrender of 
Grenada to the French in 1779. 
Haldimand Papers 
Add. MSS. 21,809. The volume contains letters 
relative to the condition of Jamaica after the 
prohibition of American shipping in, 1783: calls 
for immediate supply from Canada. 
Kings MSS. 214 is Governor Archibald Campbell's 
'Memoir of Jamaica'. 
Add. MSS. 30,870 and 30,871 contain letters of 
West Indian planters to the London radical John 
Wilkes. 
C. Rhodes Ilouse Library, oxford 
William Senhouse, 'Diary, 1750-18001,2 volumes, 
copied and compiled by Sir H. F. Senhouse: MSS. 
W. Ind. r. 5,6. Much of the material deals with 
William Senhouse's work as Surveyor-General of the 
Customs in the West Indies, his family, character 
sketches of Governor Hay, and Barbados social life. 
D. Bodleian Library, Oxford 
Barham Family Papers. Letters and papers pertaining 
to their Jamaica estates 1747-1835. Bodl. MSS. 
Clarendon; Dep. C. 357-360. Only Dep. C. 357 
Bundle 1 was of any significance for this period. 
It contains letters from overseers in Jamaica about 
conditions of estate, slaves, effect of the American 
War on Jamaica, trade, shipping, sugar and rum 
prices. 
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E. Lambeth Palace Library, London 
Fulham Papers: Vol. XX 
articles, and political 
Thomas and James Ramsay 
politics on the eve of 
This material is highly 
standing of West Indian 
contains letters, newspaper 
essays written by Edwin 
relative to St. Kitts 
the American Revolution- 
sigriificant for an under- 
politics. 
F. Public Library, Bristol 
The CornwaZZ ChronicZe and Jamaica GeneraZ 
Advertiser, 5 vols., 1776-1794. 
C. T. Jefferies Collection of Manuscripts, 16 vols. 
The volumes consulted are VIII to XIII. Vol. XIII 
has material relative to the African slave trade of 
Bristol; and also contains letters from the West 
Indies to Isaac Hobhouse and Partners regarding 
their estates, and the slave trade. 
G. Archives Office, Bristol 
Woolnough Papers in the Ashton Court Collection 
AC/WO. 16(27). The Spring Plantation Papers 
contain letters of exceptional interest for the 
period; also show how the administration of a sugar- 
estate was carried on in the eighteenth century by 
a Bristol sugar house. 
H. University Library, Bristol ' 
Pinney Papers: Letter Books 3 to 5 deal mainly with 
trade and other conditions in the Leeward Islands 
during the American War. 
I. National Library, Scotland 
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